Russian Offensive Marketing campaign Evaluation, Might 23, 2025

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Angelica Evans, Nicole Wolkov, Olivia Gibson, Grace Mappes, and Frederick W. Kagan with Nate Trotter

Might 23, 2025, 4:45 pm ET

Click on here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is up to date day by day alongside the static maps current on this report.

Click on here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click on here to see ISW’s 3D management of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a pc (not a cellular gadget) is strongly beneficial for utilizing this data-heavy software.

Click on here to entry ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces day by day by exhibiting a dynamic frontline. ISW will replace this time-lapse map archive month-to-month.

Word: The information cut-off for this product was 11:30 am ET on Might 23. ISW will cowl subsequent experiences within the Might 24 Russian Offensive Marketing campaign Evaluation.

Russian International Minister Sergei Lavrov demanded that any future peace settlement in Ukraine embody circumstances to stop the election and institution of future pro-Western governments in Ukraine. Lavrov insisted on Might 23 that any peace settlement should embody circumstances stopping the "repetition of what introduced putschists to energy by means of a bloody revolution," referring to Ukraine's 2014 Euromaidan protests and the Revolution of Dignity, which drove out Ukraine's former pro-Russian president Viktor Yanukovych.[1] Lavrov additionally reiterated Russian President Vladimir Putin's repeated declare that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky isn't the respectable chief of Ukraine and claimed that Russia may negotiate with the management of Ukraine's Verkhovna Rada (parliament) as a substitute of Zelensky.

Russian officers usually intentionally misinterpret the Ukrainian Structure to say that Zelensky's authorities is illegitimate since Ukraine didn't maintain presidential elections in 2024, though the Ukrainian Structure and regulation prohibit the federal government from holding elections throughout instances of martial regulation and exterior aggression.[2] Russian officers have repeatedly characterised Ukraine's Euromaidan protests and Revolution of Dignity as a "coup," and leverage this narrative to strengthen Russia's claims that the present Ukrainian authorities isn't respectable and thus can not negotiate with Russia.[3] Lavrov's assertion can also be an express demand for regime change in Ukraine as a situation of any future peace settlement – a requirement that Russian officers routinely make beneath the guise of calls for for "denazification" in Ukraine.[4] Russian officers will doubtless falsely body any future pro-Western authorities in Ukraine as inheriting the illegitimacy of all Ukrainian governments since 2014 and set circumstances to say that any settlement that Russia concludes with Ukraine is non-binding.

Lavrov additionally rejected US President Donald Trump's latest suggestion that the Vatican may host negotiations on Russia's warfare towards Ukraine.[5] Lavrov claimed that negotiations within the Vatican could be "unrealistic" and that it will be "uncomfortable" for the representatives of "two Orthodox international locations" to fulfill within the Vatican.[6]

Ukraine and Russia carried out a 390-for-390 prisoner-of-war (POW) and civilian change on Might 23 as half of a bigger 1,000-for-1,000 change agreed upon throughout latest bilateral negotiations in Istanbul. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said that Ukraine and Russia exchanged 390 Ukrainians for 390 Russians within the first stage of the 1,000-for-1,000 change and that Ukraine expects the swaps to proceed on Might 24 and 25.[7] The Russian Ministry of Protection (MoD) claimed that Russia and Ukraine carried out a 270-for-270 POW change and a 120-for-120 civilian change.[8]

Russian forces reportedly lately executed extra Ukrainian prisoners of warfare (POWs) on the battlefield. The Donetsk Oblast Prosecutor's Workplace said on Might 23 that it launched an investigation into experiences of Russian forces executing two POWs within the Pokrovsk path on Might 22.[9] The prosecutor's workplace reported that Russian forces captured, disarmed, and executed two of 4 Ukrainian troopers conducting a fight operation close to Udachne (southwest of Pokrovsk). The prosecutor's workplace reported that the standing of the opposite two Ukrainian troopers is unknown. There was a pointy enhance in credible experiences and pictures of Russian forces executing Ukrainian POWs all through 2024 and 2025.[10] ISW continues to evaluate that Russian army commanders are both complicit in or immediately enabling their subordinates to conduct systemic executions in direct violation of worldwide regulation.[11]

Russian President Vladimir Putin authorised an experimental utility to observe migrants, doubtless in an effort to placate Russian ultranationalist calls for whereas persevering with to leverage migrants to assist drive technology and mitigate labor shortages. Putin signed a regulation on Might 23 permitting Moscow Metropolis and Oblast authorities to introduce an experimental cellular utility to register and monitor migrants.[12] The regulation forces some populations of migrants to register with Russian authorities and supply their location to the Russian Ministry of Inside Affairs (MVD) by means of a cellular utility. Russian state shops reported that Russian authorities could deport migrants who try to hide their location.[13] This experimental utility system will start on September 1 and can final till September 1, 2029. The official Russian authorities newspaper Rossiyskaya Gazeta recommended that Russia would lengthen these registration and monitoring methods all through Russia ought to the take a look at in Moscow Metropolis and Oblast show profitable.[14] Russian Investigative Committee Head Alexander Bastrykin said on Might 20 on the St. Petersburg Worldwide Authorized Discussion board that the Investigative Committee lately created a brand new division for investigating crimes that migrants commit in Russia.[15]

ISW continues to evaluate that Putin is prioritizing leveraging migrants to mitigate ongoing labor shortages and to assist drive technology efforts, regardless of ongoing complaints from Russian ultranationalists advocating for the Kremlin to impose harsher restrictions on migrants.[16] Putin could also be trying to placate Russian ultranationalists by approving choose harsher restrictions that in the end permit Russia to higher monitor migrants to leverage them for labor and drive technology.

Key Takeaways:

Russian International Minister Sergei Lavrov demanded that any future peace settlement in Ukraine embody circumstances to stop the election and institution of future pro-Western governments in Ukraine. Ukraine and Russia carried out a 390-for-390 prisoner-of-war (POW) and civilian change on Might 23 as half of a bigger 1,000-for-1,000 change agreed upon throughout latest bilateral negotiations in Istanbul. Russian forces reportedly lately executed extra Ukrainian prisoners of warfare (POWs) on the battlefield. Russian President Vladimir Putin authorised an experimental utility to observe migrants, doubtless in an effort to placate Russian ultranationalist calls for whereas persevering with to leverage migrants to assist drive technology and mitigate labor shortages. Ukrainian forces superior close to Toretsk, and Russian forces superior close to Novopavlivka and Kurakhove.

We don't report intimately on Russian warfare crimes as a result of these actions are well-covered in Western media and don't immediately have an effect on the army operations we're assessing and forecasting. We are going to proceed to judge and report on the results of those prison actions on the Ukrainian army and the Ukrainian inhabitants and particularly on fight in Ukrainian city areas. We completely condemn Russian violations of the legal guidelines of armed battle and the Geneva Conventions and crimes towards humanity although we don't describe them in these experiences.

Ukrainian Operations within the Russian Federation Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis Russian Most important Effort – Jap Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate primary efforts) Russian Subordinate Most important Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces again from the worldwide border with Belgorod Oblast and method to inside tube artillery vary of Kharkiv Metropolis Russian Subordinate Most important Effort #2 – Seize the rest of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into japanese Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast Russian Subordinate Most important Effort #3 – Seize the whole lot of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and probably advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Marketing campaign Vital Exercise in Belarus Ukrainian Operations within the Russian Federation

Restricted combating continued in Kursk Oblast on Might 23.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces superior southeast of Tetkino (southwest of Glushkovo).[17]

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces continued assaults close to Tetkino and in unspecified areas within the Glushkovo (west of Sudzha) path.[18]

Order of Battle: Components of the Russian 217th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (98th VDV Division) are reportedly working close to Tetkino.[19]

Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported floor exercise in northwesternmost Belgorod Oblast on Might 23.

Ukrainian forces carried out drone strikes towards Russia on Might 22 and 23.

The Ukrainian Basic Employees reported on Might 23 that Ukrainian forces struck the Energiya enterprise in Yelets, Lipetsk Oblast.[20] Ukrainian Middle for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko reported that the Energiya plant produces chemical energy sources, batteries, and different elements for Russian drones, digital warfare (EW) methods, tanks, missiles and missile methods, and different merchandise for the Russian Ministry of Protection (MoD).[21] Lipetsk Oblast Governor Igor Artamonov claimed that drone particles fell on an industrial zone in Yelets.[22] Geolocated footage revealed on Might 22 reveals a hearth on the Energiya plant in Yelets, and Russian opposition outlet Astra reported that the fireplace destroyed a workshop on the plant.[23] Astra assessed on Might 22, citing information from NASA FIRMS exhibiting warmth anomalies, that there was doubtless a hearth on the Ryazan Oil Refinery following experiences of Russian forces downing Ukrainian drones in Ryazan Oblast.[24] Geolocated footage revealed on Might 22 reveals a Ukrainian drone hanging the Patriot Expo middle close to Zelenaya Roshcha, Moscow Oblast.[25] The Russian Ministry of Protection (MoD) claimed that Russian forces intercepted 24 drones over Moscow Oblast, six drones over Ryazan Oblast, and one drone over Lipetsk Oblast on the night time of Might 22 to 23.[26]

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian goal: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine alongside the worldwide border and method to inside tube artillery vary of Sumy Metropolis)

Russian forces continued restricted offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on Might 23 however didn't make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces superior in fields east of Loknya (northeast of Sumy Metropolis).[27]

Russian Most important Effort – Jap Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Most important Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast ( Russian goal: Push Ukrainian forces again from the worldwide border with Belgorod Oblast and method to inside tube artillery vary of Kharkiv Metropolis)

Russian forces continued restricted offensive operations northeast of Kharkiv Metropolis close to Vovchansk on Might 23 however didn't advance.[28]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 72nd Motorized Rifle Division (forty fourth Military Corps [AC], Leningrad Navy District [LMD]) are reportedly working in Kharkiv Oblast.[29]

Russian Subordinate Most important Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian goal: Seize the rest of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into japanese Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Kupyansk path on Might 23 however didn't make any confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: The Russian Ministry of Protection (MoD) claimed that Russian forces seized Radkivka (instantly north of Kupyansk).[30] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces additionally superior into japanese Kindrashivka (instantly northwest of Radkivka) and close to Dvorichna (additional north of Kupyansk) and Kamyanka (close to the worldwide border northeast of Kupyansk).[31]

Russian forces attacked north of Kupyansk close to Kindrashivka, Dovhenke, and Holubivka and towards Mala Shapkivka; east of Kupyansk close to Petropavlivka; and southeast of Kupyansk towards Pishchane on Might 22 and 23.[32]

The spokesperson for a Ukrainian brigade working within the Kupyansk path reported on Might 23 that Russian forces are prioritizing efforts to determine pontoon bridges and advert hoc crossings to the west financial institution of the Oskil River.[33]

Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Borova path on Might 23 however didn't advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova close to Kolisnykivka, Nova Kruhlyakivka, and Zahryzove and southeast of Borova close to Hrekivka on Might 22 and 23.[34]

Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Lyman path on Might 23 however didn't make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that components of the Russian 144th Motorized Rifle Division (twentieth Mixed Arms Military [CAA], Moscow Navy District [MMD]) superior in Ridkodub (north of Lyman).[35]

Russian forces attacked north of Lyman close to Ridkodub, Novyi Mir, Novomykhailivka, Lypove, and Zelena Dolyna; northeast of Lyman close to Nove and Myrne; and east of Lyman close to Torske on Might 22 and 23.[36]

A deputy head of a Ukrainian unit working within the Lyman path reported on Might 23 that Russian forces have intensified floor assaults, benefiting from foliage development and climate circumstances.[37]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian “Rubikon” Middle for Superior Unmanned Applied sciences and 144th Motorized Rifle Division (twentieth CAA) are reportedly hanging Ukrainian positions close to Zarichne (east of Lyman).[38]

Russian Subordinate Most important Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian goal: Seize the whole lot of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and probably advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Siversk path on Might 23 however didn't make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that components of the Russian seventh Motorized Rifle Brigade (third Mixed Arms Military [CAA], previously 2nd Luhansk Folks’s Republic Military Corps [LNR AC], Southern Navy District [SMD]) superior close to Hryhorivka (northeast of Siversk).[39]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Siversk close to Bilohorivka and Hryhorivka and southeast of Siversk close to Vyimka on Might 22 and 23.[40]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian “Avangard” reconnaissance unit of the 123rd Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (third CAA) are reportedly working close to Siversk.[41]

Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Chasiv Yar path on Might 23 however didn't advance.

Russian forces continued floor assaults close to Chasiv Yar itself and south of Chasiv Yar close to Bila Hora on Might 22 and 23.[42]

The Ukrainian Basic Employees reported on Might 23 that Ukrainian forces struck a ahead command-and-control (C2) put up of the Russian third Military Corps (AC) in Bakhmut (east of Chasiv Yar) on Might 21, damaging the command put up.[43]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 331st Airborne (VDV) Regiment (98th VDV Division) are reportedly working within the Kostyantynivka path.[44]

Ukrainian forces lately superior within the Toretsk path.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage revealed on Might 23 signifies that Ukrainian forces lately superior in northern Toretsk and north of Toretsk.[45]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on Might 22 and 23 that Russian forces superior towards the western outskirts of Novospaske (west of Toretsk) and north of Nova Poltavka (southwest of Toretsk) and that Russian forces occupy most of Hnativka (southwest of Toretsk).[46] One other Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces superior in an space as much as 3.4 kilometers large north and east of Romanivka (southwest of Toretsk).[47]

Russian forces attacked close to Toretsk itself; northeast of Toretsk close to Ozarynivka; east of Toretsk close to Druzhba; north of Toretsk close to Dyliivka, Dachne, and Krymske; west of Toretsk close to Novospaske; and southwest of Toretsk close to Romanivka, Oleksandropil, Hnativka, Zorya, Yablunivka, and Nova Poltavka and towards Poltavka, Rusyn Yar, and Popiv Yar on Might 22 and 23.[48] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked close to the Poltavka-Popiv Yar space.[49]

The deputy commander of a Ukrainian mechanized battalion working within the Toretsk path reported that Russian forces try to interdict Ukrainian floor traces of communication (GLOCs) with drone strikes and that Russian forces proceed to conduct infantry assaults with gentle autos, together with bikes and buggies.[50] The commander of a Ukrainian unmanned system battalion working within the Toretsk path reported that Russian forces have concentrated a major variety of drone items within the space that use numerous kinds of drones, together with fiber-optic drones.[51]

Order of Battle: Components of the Russian 102nd and 103rd motorized rifle regiments (one hundred and fiftieth Motorized Rifle Division, eighth CAA, SMD), 238th Artillery Brigade (eighth CAA), and 174th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion (one hundred and fiftieth Motorized Rifle Division) are reportedly working close to Shcherbynivka (west of Toretsk).[52] Drone operators of the 102nd Motorized Rifle Regiment are reportedly additionally hanging Ukrainian targets close to Popiv Yar.[53] Components of the Russian twentieth Motorized Rifle Division (eighth CAA) are reportedly working close to Yablunivka (southwest of Toretsk).[54]

Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Pokrovsk path on Might 23 however didn't advance.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed on Might 22 and 23 that Russian forces superior north of Myrne and southeast of Shevchenko Pershe (each east of Pokrosk).[55]

Russian forces attacked east of Pokrovsk close to Promin, Yelyzavetivka, Malynivka, Novotoretske, and Myrolyubivka and towards Shevchenko Pershe; southeast of Pokrovsk close to Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk close to Dachenske; and southwest of Pokrovsk close to Shevchenko, Zvirove, and Udachne on Might 22 and 23.[56] A Russian milblogger claimed on Might 22 that Ukrainian forces counterattacked close to Myrne.[57]

Russian forces lately superior within the Novopavlivka path.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage revealed on Might 23 signifies that Russian forces lately superior northeast of Troitske (southeast of Novopavlivka).[58]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on Might 22 that Russian forces superior northeast and south of Novoserhiivka (northeast of Novopavlivka).[59]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Novopavlivka close to Novomykolaivka, east of Novopavlivka close to Kotlyarivka, and southeast of Novopavlivka close to Troitske on Might 22 and 23.[60]

A Ukrainian officer in a detachment working within the Novopavlivka path reported that combating is intensifying within the space and that Russian forces should not utilizing armored autos or bikes throughout assaults.[61] The officer famous that Russian forces are utilizing bikes and civilian autos to move infantry.

Russian forces lately superior within the Kurakhove path.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage revealed on Might 23 signifies that Russian forces lately seized Odradne (southwest of Kurakhove).[62] Russian milbloggers credited components of the Russian thirty sixth Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (twenty ninth CAA, Jap Navy District [EMD]) with seizing Odradne.[63]

Russian forces attacked west of Kurakhove close to Kostyantynopil, Andriivka, Oleksiivka, and Bahatyr and southwest of Kurakhove close to Odradne on Might 22 and 23.[64] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked close to Bahatyr and Odradne.[65]

Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Velyka Novosilka path on Might 23 however didn't make any confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Zelene Pole and superior west of Zelene Pole and in southern Novopil (each southwest of Velyka Novosilka).[66]

Russian forces attacked northwest of Velyka Novosilka close to Burlatske and Vesele and towards Komar, west of Velyka Novosilka close to Shevchenko, and southwest of Velyka Novosilka close to Zelene Pole and Novopil on Might 22 and 23.[67] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked south of Komar, east of Vesele, and close to Burlatske and Novopil.[68]

Ukrainian Southern Protection Forces Spokesperson Colonel Vladyslav Voloshyn reported that Russian forces are conducting artillery and drone strikes forward of floor assaults and that Russian forces are most lively west of Velyka Novosilka close to Vilne Pole and southwest of Velyka Novosilka close to Novosilka and Zelene Pole.[69]

Order of Battle: Components of the Russian 394th Motorized Rifle Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division, fifth CAA, EMD) are reportedly working in Zelene Pole, and components of the 114th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, previously 1st Donetsk Folks's Republic [DNR] AC, SMD) are working in Novopil.[70]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian goal: Preserve frontline positions, safe rear areas towards Ukrainian strikes, and advance inside tube artillery vary of Zaporizhzhia Metropolis)

Russian forces continued assaults east of Hulyaipole close to Vysoke on Might 22 and 23 however didn't advance.[71]

Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Zaporizhia path on Might 23 however didn't advance.

Russian forces attacked south of Orikhiv close to Novodanylivka and southwest of Orikhiv close to Stepove on Might 22 and 23.[72]

Russian forces carried out assaults within the Kherson path on Might 23 however didn't advance.[73]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Marketing campaign (Russian Goal: Goal Ukrainian army and civilian infrastructure within the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces carried out a collection of missile and drone strikes towards Ukraine on the night time of Might 22 to 23 and in the course of the day on Might 23. The Ukrainian Air Pressure reported that Russian forces launched an Iskander-M ballistic missile from Rostov Oblast and 175 Shahed and decoy drones from the instructions of Kursk Metropolis; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai.[74] The Ukrainian Air Pressure reported that Ukrainian forces downed 91 drones over japanese, western, northern, southern, and central Ukraine and that 59 drones had been ”misplaced” or suppressed by Ukrainian digital warfare (EW) methods. Ukrainian officers said that the Russian strikes affected Sumy, Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Kharkiv, Kyiv, Zhytomyr, Odesa, Chernivtsi, Chernihiv, Poltava, and Ivano-Frankivsk oblasts.[75] Odesa Oblast Head Oleh Kiper reported on Might 23 that two Russian ballistic missiles struck port infrastructure in Odesa Metropolis and killed one civilian.[76]

Vital exercise in Belarus (Russian efforts to extend its army presence in Belarus and additional combine Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing important to report.

Word: ISW doesn't obtain any categorised materials from any supply, makes use of solely publicly accessible data, and attracts extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media in addition to commercially accessible satellite tv for pc imagery and different geospatial information as the premise for these experiences. References to all sources used are supplied within the endnotes of every replace.

[1] https://mid dot ru/en/foreign_policy/information/2019492/?lang=ru

[2] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-28-2024 ; https://www.president dot gov.ua/ua/paperwork/structure/konstituciya-ukrayini-rozdil-v ; https://unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/hlm/prgm/cph/consultants/ukraine/ukr.structure.e.pdf

[3] https://isw.pub/UkrWar051425 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar043025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042925 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042425 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar060724 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar052824

[4] https://isw.pub/UkrWar041525

[5] https://truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrump/posts/114535693441367601 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-19-2025

[6] https://www.rbc dot ru/politics/23/05/2025/68303c239a7947041c64b039

[7] https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/standing/1925915314719523266

[8] https://t.me/mod_russia/53020

[9] https://t.me/Donetsk_obl_prokuratura/3968

[10] https://isw.pub/UkrWar050725 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar043025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041625 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar031525 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar022025

[11] https://isw.pub/UkrWar022025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar052225

[12] https://www.kommersant dot ru/doc/7752582 ; https://www.vedomosti dot ru/politics/information/2025/05/23/1112278-putin-podpisal-migrantov ; https://rg dot ru/2025/05/23/putin-utverdil-eksperiment-o-kontrole-za-migrantami-cherez-prilozhenie.html

[13] https://www.kommersant dot ru/doc/7752582 ; https://www.vedomosti dot ru/politics/information/2025/05/23/1112278-putin-podpisal-migrantov ; https://rg dot ru/2025/05/23/putin-utverdil-eksperiment-o-kontrole-za-migrantami-cherez-prilozhenie.html

[14] https://rg dot ru/2025/05/23/putin-utverdil-eksperiment-o-kontrole-za-migrantami-cherez-prilozhenie.html

[15] https://www.vedomosti dot ru/society/articles/2025/05/20/1111390-chto-skazal-bastrikin-o-roste-prestupnosti

[16] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-force-generation-and-technological-adaptations-update-may-21-2025

[17] https://t.me/wargonzo/26709

[18] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/165684; https://t.me/dva_majors/71769; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/29009

[19] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/92131

[20] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24611

[21] https://t.me/akovalenko1989/9299

[22] https://t.me/tass_agency/316370 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/316391 ;

[23] https://t.me/exilenova_plus/8202; https://t.co/sctUfhaEbQ; https://x.com/blinzka/standing/1925703659653890161; https://t.me/exilenova_plus/8199; https://x.com/neonhandrail/standing/1925899706258907223; https://t.me/astrapress/81736

[24] https://t.me/astrapress/81677

[25] https://x.com/NOELreports/standing/1925578182918279477; https://x.com/99Dominik_/standing/1925582888927371400; https://x.com/TuiteroMartin/standing/1925583783354302845;

[26] https://t.me/mod_russia/53004

[27] https://t.me/z_arhiv/31638

[28] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24613; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24576; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24571; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/10527

[29] https://t.me/bella_Ciao44/8081

[30] https://t.me/mod_russia/53011

[31] https://t.me/motopatriot78/36244 ; https://t.me/epoddubny/23538 ; https://t.me/sashakots/53848 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64519; https://t.me/z_arhiv/31641

[32] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24571; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24576; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24613; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/10527; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64519

[33] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ehRRA2gGvTo ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/05/23/rozbyta-spalena-znyshhena-na-beregah-oskolu-utvorylys-czvyntari-rosijskyh-shturmovykiv-i-tehniky/

[34] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24613; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24576; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24571; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/10527

[35] https://t.me/motopatriot78/36260

[36] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24613; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24576; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24571; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/10527

[37] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/05/23/zelen-doshhi-lisovi-pozhezhi-chomu-aktyvizuyetsya-vorog-poblyzu-lymanu/

[38] https://t.me/icpbtrubicon/205; https://x.com/AudaxonX/standing/1925838389116325973

[39] https://t.me/motopatriot78/36243

[40] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24576; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24571; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/10527

[41] https://t.me/frontline_pvt/8307 ; https://x.com/franfran2424/standing/1925597222827184326

[42] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24613; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24576; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24571; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/10527

[43] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24612

[44] https://t.me/russian_airborne/10174

[45] https://x.com/AudaxonX/standing/1925911959569928496; https://x.com/AudaxonX/standing/1925918364276285801; https://t.me/KubanArtilery/1264 ; https://x.com/AudaxonX/standing/1925946243668201809; https://x.com/AudaxonX/standing/1925948611000414366; https://t.me/icpbtrubicon/207

[46] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64505 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64530

[47] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/28988

[48] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64505 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64516 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24613 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24576 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24571 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/10527

[49] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64516

[50] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/05/23/byut-pid-chas-rotacziyi-u-toreczku-rosijski-drony-namagayutsya-perebyty-logistyku/

[51] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/05/23/borotba-jde-mizh-pilotamy-nepodalik-toreczka-shturmovyky-prykryvayutsya-zelenkoyu/

[52] https://t.me/nm_dnr/13839 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/92134 ;

[53] https://t.me/nm_dnr/13840

[54] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64505

[55] https://t.me/motopatriot78/36222 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64530

[56] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24613 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24576 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24571 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/10527 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/36222

[57] https://t.me/motopatriot78/36222

[58] https://x.com/moklasen/standing/1925637302719578613; https://x.com/CinC_AFU/standing/1925557289307578610; https://x.com/UAControlMap/standing/1925675773391736864

[59] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/28989

[60] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24613 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24571

[61] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/05/23/nakaty-pid-prykryttyam-molnij-poblyzu-pokrovska-sposterigayut-hvyli-rosijskoyi-pihoty/

[62] https://t.me/voin_dv/15124; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9212; https://x.com/richardzai38580/standing/1925911488495006025; https://x.com/creamy_caprice/standing/1925914945280958536

[63] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/165724 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/15124

[64] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24613 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24576 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24571 ; https://www.fb.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid04ZKUawhf1XNx35h8JJp7WaambUCHqy8UKfGnhYiu55TWu3BCyuTYCf7FD5jSRM7Zl ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/10527 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/28995 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/36225

[65] https://t.me/dva_majors/71769 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/165626 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/26709

[66] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/29017 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/28995 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/36234

[67] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24613 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24576 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24571 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/10527 ; https://www.fb.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid04ZKUawhf1XNx35h8JJp7WaambUCHqy8UKfGnhYiu55TWu3BCyuTYCf7FD5jSRM7Zl ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/165626 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/92143 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/71769 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/26709 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/29017 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64530

[68] https://t.me/dva_majors/71769 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/28995 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/92143

[69] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/05/23/yih-suprovodzhuyut-drony-na-novopavlivskomu-napryamku-vorog-prodovzhuye-atakuvaty-pozycziyi-syl-oborony/

[70] https://t.me/motopatriot78/36234

[71] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24576 ; https://www.fb.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid04ZKUawhf1XNx35h8JJp7WaambUCHqy8UKfGnhYiu55TWu3BCyuTYCf7FD5jSRM7Zl ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24571

[72] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24613 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24576 ; https://www.fb.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid04ZKUawhf1XNx35h8JJp7WaambUCHqy8UKfGnhYiu55TWu3BCyuTYCf7FD5jSRM7Zl ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24571

[73] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24613 ; https://t.me/rybar/70627

[74] https://t.me/kpszsu/34888

[75] https://t.me/kpszsu/34888; https://suspilne dot media/1024465-u-mzs-zaproponuvali-bufernu-zonu-na-teritorii-rf-ukraina-peredala-spisok-na-obmin-1000-na-1000-1185-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1747979535&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps; https://t.me/UkrzalInfo/6901 ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/05/23/vorog-atakuvav-zaliznychnu-infrastrukturu-v-cherniveczkij-oblasti/; https://t.me/synegubov/14409 ; https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1025189-rosia-zavdala-raketnogo-udaru-po-cuguevu-sonajmense-odna-zagibla/; https://t.me/synegubov/14404; https://t.me/poltavskaOVA/23240 ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/05/23/shahedy-atakuvaly-poltavshhynu-znyshheno-budivlyu-pidpryyemstva-bez-svitla-majzhe-2000-spozhyvachiv/; https://suspilne dot media/odesa/1024631-rf-atakuvala-odeskij-rajon-bpla-e-travmovanij/ ; https://t.me/odeskaODA/9711

[76] https://t.me/odeskaODA/9728 ; https://t.me/OleksiiKuleba/6129 ; https://suspilne dot media/odesa/1025179-rosia-udarila-dvoma-balisticnimi-raketami-po-odesi-odna-ludina-zaginula-vosmero-poraneni/ ; https://t.me/astrapress/81749