Iran Replace Particular Report, June 24, 2025, Night Version

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Avery Borens, Ben Schmida, Ben Rezaei, Ria Reddy, Kelly Campa, Johanna Moore, Carolyn Moorman, Andie Parry and Brian Carter

Data Cutoff: 5:00PM ET

The Important Threats Venture (CTP) on the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Research of Warfare (ISW) are publishing a number of updates each day to offer evaluation on the warfare with Iran. The morning replace will deal with the alternate of fireside between Iran and Israel. The night replace can be extra complete, masking occasions over the previous 24-hour interval and refining objects mentioned within the morning replace.

Click on here to see ISW-CTP's interactive map displaying the entire strikes in Iran since June 12, in addition to an interactive timelapse displaying the strikes day-by-day.

CTP-ISW is not going to publish a morning replace given the ceasefire between Israel and Iran. All evaluation of the Israel-Iran warfare can be coated within the each day night replace except occasions warrant a resumption of twice-daily updates.

Israel performed a two-week air marketing campaign with the target of degrading, destroying and eradicating the specter of Iran’s nuclear program.[1] Israel additionally pursued two supporting goals to restrict Iranian retaliation and supply itself with an offramp. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said that “Operation Rising Lion” achieved all of Israel’s warfare goals “and far more.”[2] Israel described Iran’s nuclear program as an existential risk to Israel and said that it will not permit Iran to weaponize its program.[3] Israel achieved its goals vis-a-vis the nuclear program by destroying nuclear services and enrichment capability with US assist and killing key nuclear scientists who had been instrumental within the improvement and weaponization of this system. The Israeli marketing campaign, supported by US strikes, "successfully destroyed” Iran’s enrichment capability, although stockpiles of assorted quantities of enriched uranium stay.[4] Iran’s capacity to complement these to weapons grade uranium is difficult by the destruction of most of Iran’s centrifuges and the lack of many nuclear scientists.[5] There may be extra details about the standing of the nuclear program under.

Israel supported this major line of effort by conducting a marketing campaign designed to stop Iran from conducting efficient retaliatory strikes on Israel by degrading its ballistic missile capabilities.[6] Iran initially deliberate to launch 1,000 ballistic missiles in response to Israeli strikes on Iran, however Israeli strikes pressured it to fireside a lot fewer (extra on the standing of the missile forces under).[7] Iranian ballistic missile strikes would have focused Israeli navy, intelligence, and political establishments that enabled Israeli operations. These strikes may have additionally induced main Israeli casualties, which might have been unacceptable for a lot of Israelis. Israeli airstrikes on Iran’s ballistic missile program destroyed Iranian capabilities and compelled Iran to launch fewer and smaller assaults on Israel, most of which had been intercepted by the IDF.[8]

Israel pursued a second supporting effort to compel Iran to simply accept a ceasefire on Israeli phrases by creating the notion of a reputable existential risk to the Iranian regime. Netanyahu and Israeli Protection Minister Katz directed the IDF on June 20 to “intensify” strikes on Iranian establishments that assist regime stability.[9] The Iranian regime has maintained social management by violently cracking down on protests and different expressions of in style anti-regime sentiment by inside safety organizations. Israeli officers instructed that these airstrikes may create circumstances which the Iranian inhabitants may exploit to overthrow the regime.[10] A sequence of strikes designed to display a reputable risk to the regime’s stability may very well be expanded or contracted relying on how the regime responded and Israel’s want for a ceasefire. Israel may have calculated that the Iranian regime’s overwhelming curiosity in guaranteeing regime survival may compel it to comply with a ceasefire.

The restricted nature of strikes in opposition to inside safety establishments means that the IDF sought to display a reputable risk to regime stability relatively than topple or meaningfully destabilize the regime. A centered, well-designed regime destabilization marketing campaign would have systematically destroyed IRGC provincial and district-level headquarters whereas concurrently destroying the Iranian Regulation Enforcement Command’s infrastructure and belongings throughout the nation. Israel struck these targets, but it surely solely did so in Tehran and didn't achieve this systematically even in Tehran.[11] Israel, given its air superiority over Iran, may have presumably destroyed these targets if wanted, which signifies that the IDF made a deliberate selection not to systematically goal Iranian inside safety belongings. The IDF did systematically goal missile and nuclear services, in distinction.

Israeli strikes in opposition to Iran’s power infrastructure gave the impression to be associated to an effort to affect regime decision-making. Earlier power shortages in Iran have led to protests in opposition to the regime. Demonstrations over the rising fuel costs in 2017 and 2018 escalated into broader challenges for the regime’s stability, for instance.[12] Israel's assaults on fuel manufacturing and oil infrastructure, which might exacerbate the basis causes of earlier demonstrations, instructed that a part of Israel’s marketing campaign aimed to affect Iranian regime decision-making by constructing the notion of a potential credible risk to regime stability. The IDF struck a pure fuel processing facility and fuel refinery in Bushehr Province on June 14.[13] The following fireplace pressured Iranian authorities to partially droop fuel manufacturing at South Pars Fuel Subject, which is among the largest fuel fields on this planet and is central to Iran’s home power provide.[14] The IDF additionally struck Iranian oil infrastructure in Tehran on June 14, together with an oil depot and an oil refinery in Tehran.[15] Each the strikes on inside safety establishments and power infrastructure had been comparatively restricted in comparison with IDF strikes focusing on the nuclear program or retaliatory capabilities.

The Institute for Science and Worldwide Safety assessed that US and Israeli strikes on Iran have “successfully destroyed” Iran’s enrichment program.[16] The Institute stated it is going to take a “very long time” for Iran to revive its enrichment capabilities to pre-strike ranges. This evaluation is predicated on the destruction Iran suffered at Natanz nuclear facility, Fordow nuclear facility, Esfahan Nuclear Know-how Heart and the elimination of many nuclear scientists.[17] The six entry level craters for the US bunker-buster bombs at Fordow had been above two weak factors, and the bombs would have detonated inside the facility.[18] The Institute for Science and Worldwide Safety assesses that the bomb blast would have been channeled by the centrifuge cascade corridor’s aspect partitions, which might have destroyed all the put in centrifuges there.[19] Worldwide Atomic Power Company (IAEA) battle harm assessments point out that Israeli strikes additionally probably broken or destroyed a number of thousand centrifuges at Natanz.[20] Israel and the USA performed airstrikes focusing on the Pilot Gasoline Enrichment Plant above floor and Gasoline Enrichment Plant underground at Natanz, respectively.[21] The IAEA added that it was potential that uranium isotopes could have been dispersed inside the facility (although not exterior), which might make it troublesome to entry.[22] This implies it could be a while earlier than even the Iranians can decide the true extent of the harm.

The Institute for Science and Worldwide Safety said that Iran nonetheless retains stockpiles of three to five %, 20 %, and 60 % enriched uranium, nevertheless.[23] Weapons-grade uranium (WGU) is uranium enriched as much as 90 %. The destruction of so many centrifuges will make enriching from 60 % to 90 % a lot slower. A US weapons skilled said that US and Israeli strikes have additionally made it considerably tougher and time-consuming for Iran to show WGU right into a usable nuclear weapon.[24] He stated the strikes have “considerably” elevated the time required for Iran to “even construct a non-missile deliverable weapon,“ similar to a nuclear bomb. There are vital challenges related to miniaturizing a nuclear weapon to put in it on a ballistic missile warhead.

US President Donald Trump reiterated the US demand for Iran to take care of zero uranium enrichment capabilities.[25] Trump said on June 24 that Iran is “not going to have enrichment and [Iran is] not going to have a nuclear weapon.”[26] He emphasised that “Iran won't ever rebuild their nuclear services.”[27] A senior US official reportedly stated the Israel-Iran ceasefire was based mostly on discussions with Iranian officers that indicated Iran is prepared to renew nuclear negotiations so long as Israel cease its air marketing campaign.[28] Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian said on June 24 that Iran is “prepared for talks.”[29] Iran repeatedly rejected the US demand for zero uranium enrichment in the course of the US-Iran nuclear negotiations from April to early June 2025.[30] It's unclear if Iran is at the moment prepared to simply accept the US demand for zero uranium enrichment.

Israel has killed no less than 14 Iranian nuclear scientists since June 12 as a part of its marketing campaign to delay Iran’s capacity to weaponize its nuclear capabilities. [31] The IDF killed Sayyed Asghar Hashemi Tabar in Tehran Province on June 20.[32] Hashemi Tabar was a weapons skilled on the Shahid Chamran Group, which is a subsidiary of the Iranian Group of Defensive Innovation and Analysis (SPND), and specialised in pulse energy analysis.[33] Pulsed energy is a know-how that shops and releases power in intense bursts to simulate nuclear detonation results for analysis, however pulsed energy doesn't set off precise nuclear explosions.[34] The USA sanctioned the Shahid Chamran Group and Hashemi Tabar in 2019 for analysis associated to Weapon of Mass Destruction (WMD) proliferation.[35] The IDF additionally killed Iranian nuclear scientist Mostafa Sadati Ermaki in Tehran Province.[36]

The IDF introduced it thwarted a potential Iranian ceasefire violation on June 24 at 4:20 PM ET. The IDF intercepted two drones that it stated “apparently" originated from Iran earlier than they entered Israeli airspace.[37] This assault marks the primary time that Iran could have launched drones focusing on Israel because the ceasefire went into impact at 12:00 AM ET.[38] Senior Israeli navy and political officers haven't commented on the drone assault or threatened a response on the time of this writing.

Key Takeaways:

Israel pursued a marketing campaign to destroy Iran’s nuclear program and with US assist was largely profitable in doing so. Israel additionally pursued two supporting strains of effort to restrict Iran’s retaliation and create an off-ramp by creating circumstances that may strain Iran into terminating the battle. Israel pressured Iran by creating a reputable risk of regime destabilization. The restricted nature of strikes in opposition to inside safety establishments means that the IDF sought to display a reputable risk to regime stability relatively than topple or meaningfully destabilize the regime. A centered, well-designed regime destabilization marketing campaign would have systematically destroyed regime establishments, which didn't occur. Iran’s enrichment capabilities have been “successfully destroyed,” in accordance with the Institute for Science and Worldwide Safety. Iran nonetheless retains stockpiles of enriched uranium, however its capacity to complement these stockpiles additional can be difficult by the lack of so many centrifuges and services. Iran’s incapacity to precisely strike navy or power infrastructure highlights the restricted accuracy of its ballistic missiles. The excessive Israeli intercept charge made it much more troublesome for Iran to precisely goal key Israeli infrastructure. Israel nonetheless confronted sustained missile assaults in opposition to key inhabitants facilities that was unprecedented within the October 7 Warfare. The IDF has focused Iran’s inside safety establishments, together with the Iranian Regulation Enforcement Command (LEC), Basij, and IRGC provincial models since June 15.[39] Israeli strikes on regime safety establishments continued on June 23 earlier than the ceasefire. Israeli Protection Minister Israel Katz introduced on June 20 that he ordered “intensified” strikes on regime symbols and home repression facilities in Tehran Province.[40] The IDF struck the IRGC Imam Hassan Mojtaba Corps headquarters in Alborz Province on June 23 and killed no less than 23 IRGC members, together with Provincial Deputy Commander Brigadier Common Mojtaba Karami and Deputy for Social Affairs Brigadier Common Akbar Enayati.[41]

The IDF additionally killed three senior safety and intelligence commanders on June 23, together with Deputy for social affairs of the Basij Group Brigadier Common Meysam Rezvanpour, LEC Intelligence Group Deputy Brigadier Common Alireza Lotfi and Basij Counterintelligence Commander Mohammad Taghi Yousefvand, prone to degrade the regime’s safety and intelligence infrastructure.[42] The Iranian regime has maintained social management by violently cracking down on protests and different expressions of in style anti-regime sentiment by inside safety organizations just like the Basij, LEC, and the IRGC.[43] Basij models have been deployed to assist LEC forces throughout main protest actions just like the Mahsa Amini protests and the Iranian Inexperienced Motion.[44]

IRGC Quds Drive Commander Brigadier Common Esmail Ghaani appeared at a rally in Tehran Province on June 24.[45] A New York Instances reporter claimed on June 13 that Israeli strikes killed Ghaani together with different senior IRGC commanders.[46]

IDF Marketing campaign In opposition to Iran’s Ballistic Missile Forces

The IDF sought to restrict Iran’s capacity to reply to Israel initially of its marketing campaign and continued to destroy Iranian missile launchers and stockpiles all through the air marketing campaign. Iranian leaders initially deliberate to launch as much as one thousand ballistic missiles at Israel within the quick aftermath of an Israeli strike, presumably in a number of barrages.[47] The primary Iranian missile barrage included about 30 missiles, and Iran by no means managed to launch over 40 ballistic missiles in a single barrage all through the 12 days of assaults.[48] Israel reportedly constructed a secret one-way assault drone base in Iran, which it used to strike Iranian ballistic missile launchers close to Tehran on June 12.[49] Israel additionally focused a gathering of senior IRGC Aerospace commanders who would have been liable for giving the order to assault instantly after the strike.[50] The IDF Air Drive proceeded to strike Iranian ballistic missile launchers as they had been readied to launch and in warehouses at a constant and each day tempo all through the marketing campaign.[51] Israel has additionally focused Iranian missile manufacturing websites and gear, together with planetary mixers used to supply strong gasoline for long-range ballistic missiles.[52] Israel’s concerted effort to disrupt missile manufacturing, destroy launch infrastructure, and remove missile stockpile and Aerospace Drive management muted Iran’s capacity to reply to Israel in each the brief and medium time period.

The IDF assessed that Iran launched between 500 and 550 ballistic missiles and greater than 1,000 drones focusing on Israel throughout its “Operation True Promise III.”[53] The IDF’s evaluation is according to CTP-ISW's statement of 543 Iranian ballistic missiles. CTP-ISW has recorded 43 waves of Iranian ballistic missile assaults focusing on Israel because the begin of “Operation True Promise III” on June 13. Iran’s ballistic missile barrages throughout “Operation True Promise III” different in dimension. Iran used round 40 missiles in its largest barrage and one missile in its smallest barrage.[54] Iran’s missile barrages within the current battle are a lot smaller in comparison with its barrages in its October 2024 assault on Israel when Iran launched round 100 ballistic missiles per barrage in two barrages.[55] An Israeli Military Radio correspondent reported on June 24 that Israeli air protection techniques efficiently intercepted 80 to 90 % of Iran’s ballistic missiles.[56] Israel additionally reportedly had a 99.99 % interception charge of Iranian drones, with just one drone making affect.[57]

Israeli air defenses maintained a excessive intercept charge in opposition to Iranian ballistic missile assaults in the course of the warfare. Israeli air protection techniques have efficiently intercepted 89 % of Iranian ballistic missiles launched at Israel since June 12. Israeli air defenses didn't intercept Iranian ballistic missiles on trajectory to strike areas with no threat to Israeli civilians or no strategic worth.[58] Air protection techniques and their operators prioritize incoming projectiles that may hit targets of significance relatively than trying to cease each projectile. Missile strikes in open areas aren't indicative of Israeli air protection failures or a scarcity of interceptor missiles however relatively Israel’s defensive priorities. Israeli air defenses have beforehand prioritized defending extremely populated areas as seen throughout Iran’s October 2024 missile assault.[59] Iranian ballistic missiles did penetrate Israeli air defenses placing populated areas in some situations, nevertheless. Air protection techniques aren't excellent, and a few projectiles will penetrate the system.[60]

Iranian ballistic missiles should not have pinpoint accuracy. Iran’s incapacity to precisely strike navy or power infrastructure highlights the restricted accuracy of its ballistic missiles. All ballistic missiles have a round error possible (CEP). The CEP is “the radius of a circle, centered on the supposed goal, inside which 50% of the missiles could be anticipated to affect.”[61] The said and publicly identified CEPs of Iranian medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) used on this warfare are between 20 and 500 meters.[62] The comparatively poor accuracy of those missiles in comparison with a precision-guided munition signifies that even in situations when Iranian missiles struck navy targets, they had been largely ineffective and induced no casualties and restricted harm. Iran focused an Israeli navy intelligence facility in the course of the warfare with 4 missiles, and three of the 4 fully missed the bottom whereas the fourth struck a warehouse on the outskirts of the compound.[63] This case demonstrates the futility of utilizing these missiles in opposition to pinpoint navy targets, which can clarify the elevated deal with civilian targets throughout this warfare. Iran probably started utilizing cluster warheads--ballistic missile warheads with a whole lot of submunitions--to maximize the potential affect of its ballistic missiles given their comparatively low accuracy when fitted with normal warheads. [64]

Iran used a number of solid- and liquid-fuel MRBMs, together with Ghadr, Emad, Kheybar Shekan, and Haj Qassem missiles.[65] Iran beforehand used the Ghadr, Emad, and Kheybar Shekan missiles throughout its April and October 2024 assaults on Israel.[66] Iran started utilizing extra technologically superior missiles in its assaults on June 18.[67] Iran launched no less than three missiles with cluster munition warheads, together with two Khorramshahr-4 missiles.[68] Iran reportedly launched a Sejjil ballistic missile and a number of other Fattah-1 missiles (which the Houthis have fired at Israel underneath the identify Palestine-2) in direction of Israel on June 18.[69] The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) stated on June 22 that it ”employed new ways utilizing a mixture of long-range liquid- and solid-fuel ballistic missiles with superior warheads able to penetrating air defenses.”[70] Iran additionally launched quite a lot of drones, together with the Shahed-136, Arash-2, and an enlarged model of the Shahed-101.[71]

CTP-ISW has recorded 60 Iranian ballistic missile or Israeli interceptor impacts in Israel from over 40 Iranian barrages because the Israeli air marketing campaign started on June 12. This estimate is according to an Israeli Military Radio correspondent’s evaluation that between 50 and 60 Iranian ballistic missiles struck Israeli territory.[72] Iranian ballistic missile impacts killed 28 individuals in Israel, together with one IDF soldier.[73] Nearly all of Iranian missiles struck civilian areas with solely 5 out of the 60 impacts placing navy or power infrastructure services.[74] Not less than three Iranian missile impacts focused Israeli navy websites or services. One Iranian ballistic missile struck close to HaKirya in Tel Aviv on June 13.[75] One other Iranian ballistic missile struck a warehouse close to the Army Intelligence Faculty in Camp Moshe Dayan on June 17.[76] An Iranian ballistic missile additionally struck the Gav Yem Negev Superior Applied sciences Park which homes lively navy and cyber services.[77] Not less than two Iranian missile impacts focused Israeli power infrastructure. Iranian ballistic missiles struck the Bazan Oil refinery in Haifa on June 15, which induced the ability to briefly shut down.[78] An Iranian ballistic missile struck {an electrical} substation in Ashdod on June 23.[79]

No group has claimed accountability for the drone assaults that focused Ain al Asad Airbase and Baghdad Worldwide Airport in a single day on June 23 and 24 since CTP-ISW's final information cutoff at 08:00 AM on June 24. The USA intercepted each drones.[80] A 3rd drone crashed in al Radwaniyah, Anbar Province, about seven kilometers south of the airport.[81] Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have beforehand attacked each Ain al Asad Airbase and the airport.[82] A number of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias threatened previous to the US strikes on Iranian nuclear websites that the militias would goal the USA and its regional pursuits if the USA entered the warfare.[83]

Drone assaults focusing on Camp Taji, Baghdad Province, and Imam Ali Air Base, Dhi Qar Province, on June 23 “severely broken” Iraqi radars at these websites, in accordance with Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani’s spokesperson. [84] No group has claimed accountability for these assaults on the time of this writing. Sudani ordered the formation of a high-level committee to analyze the assaults. These assaults observe Iranian-backed Iraqi figures repeatedly condemning Israel’s use of Iraqi airspace to strike Iran.[85]

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[65] https://www.twz.com/land/iran-just-used-ballistic-missiles-with-cluster-warheads-to-strike-israel ; https://www.euronews.com/2025/06/22/iranian-weapon-with-ideological-payload-what-is-the-kheibar-shekan-missile ; https://www.kurdistan24 dot web/en/story/845868/iran-uses-new-missile-named-after-qassem-soleimani-in-attack-on-israel

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[67] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-special-report-june-19-2025-evening-edition

[68] https://x.com/ariel_oseran/standing/1935703221961392613 ; https://x.com/ariel_oseran/standing/1936784300067750322 ; https://t.me/moriahdoron/23373

[69] https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/why-hypersonic-missiles-are-stirring-fears-in-the-conflict-between-israel-and-iran ; https://www.tasnimnews dot com/en/information/2025/06/19/3338126/iran-s-operation-true-promise-iii-israel-attacked-with-sejjil-missiles-for-first-time

[70] https://x.com/JoeTruzman/standing/1936658785919172754

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[72] https://x.com/Doron_Kadosh/standing/1937525138087448600

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[74] https://version.cnn.com/2025/06/14/world/video/missile-strike-kirya-israel-military-digvid ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-special-report-june-17-2025-evening-edition ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-special-report-june-20-2025-evening-edition ; https://www.middleeasteye.web/information/iran-strikes-technology-square-israel-microsoft-building-damaged ; https://x.com/andynovy/standing/1937057924381102573

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[76] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-special-report-june-17-2025-evening-edition

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