Russian Offensive Marketing campaign Evaluation, July 14, 2025

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Angelica Evans, Christina Harward, Daria Novikov, Anna Harvey, Jessica Sobieski, George Barros, and Frederick W. Kagan

July 14, 2025, 9:30pm ET

Click on here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is up to date day by day alongside the static maps current on this report.

Click on here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click on here to see ISW’s 3D management of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a pc (not a cellular machine) is strongly really useful for utilizing this data-heavy software.

Click on here to entry ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces day by day by exhibiting a dynamic frontline. ISW will replace this time-lapse map archive month-to-month.

Observe: The info cut-off for this product was 12 pm ET on July 14. ISW will cowl subsequent studies within the July 15 Russian Offensive Marketing campaign Evaluation.

US President Donald Trump introduced large-scale and fast army help provides to Ukraine through the North Atlantic Treaty Group (NATO) and potential future secondary tariffs in opposition to Russia. Trump said on July 14 throughout a gathering with NATO Common Secretary Mark Rutte that the US will impose "extreme" one hundred pc secondary tariffs on Russia's commerce companions if there isn't a peace settlement to finish Russia's warfare in Ukraine inside 50 days. [1] Trump additionally introduced that the US will ship "billions of {dollars}' price" of army gear and weapons to NATO, that NATO can pay for the US weapons, and that NATO will "shortly distribute" these weapons to Ukrainian forces. Rutte said that NATO will provide Ukraine with "huge" quantities of army gear, together with air defenses, missiles, and ammunition. Trump answered a query about whether or not the US was offering Patriot air protection batteries or simply missiles, stating that the US will ship "every thing…a full complement with the batteries." Trump said that some Patriot techniques will arrive in Ukraine "inside days" as unspecified NATO states give Ukraine their very own Patriot techniques, after which the US will change these techniques. Trump said that an unspecified state has "17 Patriots able to be shipped" and {that a} "large portion of the 17 will go to the warfare zone" in Ukraine "in a short time." It's unclear if Trump was referring to 17 Patriot launchers or batteries.

Trump is performing upon the fact that profitable US efforts to deliver Russian President Vladimir Putin to the negotiating desk require that financial devices be coupled with Western army assist to permit Ukraine to extend strain on Russia on the battlefield. Trump said that the Russian financial system is doing "very poorly" and that Russia is utilizing its property for warfare, not commerce. [2] Trump said that Russia is losing cash and folks on its warfare. Rutte said that Russian forces have suffered 100,000 deaths since January 1, 2025. ISW continues to evaluate that Russia's battlefield losses are the important thing driver of Russia's financial woes as Russia suffers from the results of elevated and unsustainable warfare spending, rising inflation, vital labor shortages, and reductions in Russia's sovereign wealth fund. [3] Elevated strain on Russian forces on the battlefield would danger Putin's efforts to stability butter and weapons and will drive Putin to face laborious selections prior to he would really like. Forcing Putin both to make unpopular selections or to face a state of affairs wherein Russia can't proceed the warfare on the present tempo might deliver Putin to the negotiating desk, prepared to supply concessions to finish the warfare on phrases acceptable to Ukraine and the US.

Trump famous that Russia has been delaying negotiations to finish the warfare and that the latest intensification of Russia's in a single day drone and missile strikes demonstrates that Russia just isn't all for peace – in keeping with ISW's longstanding evaluation of Kremlin intentions. Trump said that he's "disillusioned" in Putin and that Trump has thought {that a} peace settlement was shut "about 4 occasions." [4] Trump famous that Russian strikes are hitting residences in Ukrainian cities and that it's going to take Ukraine "years" to rebuild its broken vitality infrastructure. Trump said that Russian strikes in opposition to Ukrainian cities present that Russia's "discuss doesn't imply something" and that the US must see actions and outcomes, not simply "discuss." Rutte added that the latest intensification of Russia's in a single day drone and missile strikes just isn't aimed toward pursuing army targets however making an attempt to create panic in Ukraine. ISW has repeatedly assessed in latest months that the Kremlin was pursuing varied strategies as a part of wider efforts to delay the negotiation course of and lengthen the warfare to be able to safe extra territorial beneficial properties on the battlefield. [5]

Trump stated that European safety advantages US pursuits and famous that Europe is dedicated to serving to Ukraine defend itself. Trump said that "having a robust Europe is an excellent factor" and that Europe thinks supporting Ukraine is essential. [6] Rutte said that Trump's July 14 bulletins are constructing on the June 2025 NATO summit in The Hague, wherein NATO determined to "maintain Ukraine robust" and enhance Europe's protection industrial manufacturing. The joint declaration from the NATO summit highlighted that Ukraine's safety contributes to NATO's safety. [7] Axios on July 13 cited a supply stating that Trump informed French President Emmanuel Macron following the decision that Putin "desires to take all of [Ukraine]." [8] ISW continues to evaluate {that a} Russian victory within the warfare that leads to the conquest of all of Ukraine would deliver fight skilled Russian forces as much as NATO's borders from the Black Sea to the Arctic Ocean such that the US would wish to maneuver massive numbers of US forces and commit a major proportion of its fleet of stealth plane to Europe. [9]

Further US army help to Ukrainian forces will arrive at a dynamic, not static, frontline characterised by ongoing Russian offensive operations aimed toward reaching gradual maneuver and by Ukrainian counterattacks in key frontline areas. Russian forces intensified offensive operations all through the theater in February and March 2025 and have maintained strain alongside all the frontline during the last six months. Russian forces have established or are actively establishing not less than eight salients that Russian forces might leverage in mutually reinforcing tactical- and operational-level envelopments alongside the frontline. Current Russian assaults within the Velykyi Burluk course point out that the Russian army command intends to create a salient from which Russian forces can threaten Ukrainian forces within the rear of the Vovchansk and northern Kupyansk instructions. [10] Russian forces have additionally developed salients aimed toward forcing Ukrainian troops to withdraw from frontline cities and settlements underneath menace of envelopment within the Kupyansk, Borova, Lyman, Siversk, Kostyantynivka, Pokrovsk, and Novopavlivka instructions during the last 12 months. ISW assessed in late January 2025 that Russian forces had been growing and disseminating a doctrinal methodology of advance all through the theater that goals to conduct gradual envelopments of frontline settlements at a scale that's affordable for Russian forces to conclude earlier than culminating, and Russian patterns of advance during the last six months are in step with this evaluation. [11] The Russian army command's obvious resolution to bypass the Ukrainian fortress belt in Donetsk Oblast and makes an attempt at a multi-year operation to envelop the southern half of the fortress belt additional underscores Russia's dedication to this new doctrinal methodology. [12]

Russian forces' potential to advance deep sufficient into Ukraine's defenses to ascertain these salients signifies that the Russian army command has improved its potential to grab on alternatives to advance, however the charge of Russian advances has not elevated past foot tempo. The Russian army command seems to have improved its potential and elevated its willingness to plan and conduct multi-year operational-level efforts. Russian forces have been pursuing the envelopment of Kupyansk since not less than January 2024, though Russian forces didn't make notable advances in direction of this objective till July 2024. [13] Russian forces have thus been pursuing the envelopment of Kupyansk for not less than 18 months and have superior roughly 454 sq. kilometers since July 1, 2024 (roughly 1.2 sq. kilometers per day during the last 12 months). Russian forces have additionally aimed to push Ukrainian forces from the east (left) financial institution of the Oskil River within the Borova and Lyman instructions since late 2023 or early 2024 and solely started making vital advances north of Lyman in early January 2025. [14] Russian forces have superior roughly 15 to 17 kilometers west of the Zherebets River during the last six months as a part of efforts to ascertain the Russian salient north of Lyman. Russian forces renewed offensive operations within the Toretsk space in mid-June 2024 and have centered on increasing their salient south and southwest of Kostyantynivka during the last 9 months. Russian efforts south and southwest of Kostyantynivka additionally reinforce and have coincided with the continued Russian effort to envelop Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad. Russian forces have superior roughly 617 sq. kilometers within the Kostyantynivka course and roughly 1,394 sq. kilometers within the Pokrovsk course since November 1, 2024 - a mean of two.4 sq. kilometers and 5.5 sq. kilometers per day for the final 9 months, respectively. The renewed Russian offensive in Toretsk in June 2024 additionally coincided with intensified Russian mechanized exercise and armor utilization all through western Donetsk Oblast in summer time and fall 2024. Russian forces have since leveraged a number of envelopments to grab Vuhledar, Kurakhove, and Velyka Novosilka and are presently establishing the southern and jap flanks of a future Russian effort to envelop Novopavlivka. Russian forces have superior roughly 1,057 sq. kilometers in western Donetsk Oblast since January 2, 2025, or a mean of 5.5 sq. kilometers per day for the final seven months.

ISW beforehand assessed that Russian forces have superior at a charge of roughly 14 to fifteen sq. kilometers per day over the previous six months, indicating that Russian beneficial properties are unfold throughout the frontline and never concentrated in a single frontline space. [15] Russian forces have largely relied on infantry to advance in Ukraine since Russia's preliminary push in the beginning of its full-scale invasion, and Russian forces have failed to revive their potential to conduct the sort of mechanized maneuver that will allow extra fast Russian beneficial properties. Three and a half years of warfare have solely additional degraded Russia's potential to conduct armored assaults, due partly to vital Russian armored car losses in 2023 and early 2024 and the lack of the extra elite, well-trained servicemembers that comprised Russia's pre-war skilled army cadre. Russian forces have up to now been capable of offset the personnel losses they incur throughout these advances, though excessive Russian casualty charges are perpetuating a cycle of loss that additional incentivizes Russia to depend on poorly skilled and geared up infantry to make advances. This cycle, in flip, is limiting Russia's charge of advance in Ukraine.

Russian forces lately superior in jap Zaporizhia Oblast close to Hulyaipole – the primary tactically vital exercise on this space of the frontline for the reason that Summer season 2023 Ukrainian counteroffensive. Geolocated footage revealed on July 14 signifies that parts of the Russian 1466th Motorized Rifle Regiment and the 114th Motorized Rifle Regiment (each subordinated to the 127th Motorized Rifle Division, fifth Mixed Arms Military [CAA], Japanese Army District [EMD]) lately seized Malynivka (west of Hulyaipole). [16] Russian Protection Minister Andrei Belousov and a Russian milblogger claimed that parts of the Russian thirty eighth Motorized Rifle Brigade (thirty fifth CAA, EMD) additionally participated within the seizure. [17] Russian forces intensified exercise within the Hulyaipole course in early Might 2025 and superior into Malynivka in late June. [18]

The Russian army command seemingly intends to grab on latest advances in western Donetsk Oblast to be able to advance westward into Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhia oblasts. Russian forces made a collection of tactically vital advances alongside the H-15 Kurakhove-Zaporizhzhia Metropolis freeway in mid-June 2025, particularly southeast of Novopavlivka close to Bahatyr and Odradne and south of Novopavlivka close to Komar. [19] Russian forces have steadily superior additional west from Bahatyr and north from Komar during the last month and superior roughly 20 kilometers from Bahatyr to Novokhatske (southwest of Novopavlivka) between June 14 and July 14, or about 670 meters a day on common prior to now month. [20] Geolocated proof signifies that Russian forces have made marginal advances into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast within the course of Novopavlivka, however Russian forces have primarily concentrated their advances westward towards Velykomykhailivka and Havrylivka (each southwest of Novopavlivka). [21] The Russian army command additionally lately redeployed parts of the fortieth Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) and the "Rubikon" Middle for Superior Unmanned Applied sciences from the Kursk course to western Donetsk Oblast, indicating that the Russian army command is taking some steps to strengthen the Russian Japanese Grouping of Forces, presumably forward of a future push into southern Dnipropetrovsk Oblast. [22] The Russian Japanese Grouping of Forces presently oversees the frontline from the Novopavlivka by way of the jap Zaporizhia course and would seemingly command the forces concerned in a Russian offensive into southern Dnipropetrovsk Oblast and jap Zaporizhia Oblast.

Russian forces might leverage advances in western Donetsk Oblast to launch an offensive operation towards Pokrovske, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, in pursuit of Russia's long-standing need to grab Zaporizhzhia Metropolis. Russian forces have established a large and principally stage frontline within the Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk-Zaporizhia oblast border space that spans from Malynivka (east of Hulyaipole) to Zelenyi Hai (southwest of Novopavlivka) from which Russian forces might assault towards Hulyaipole, Velykomykhailivka, and Havrylivka. The Russian army command might intend to assault westward by way of Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhia oblasts if Russian commanders assess that almost all of Ukraine's frontline defensive fortifications are oriented east to west in opposition to assaults from the south, slightly than north to south in opposition to assaults from the east. Russian forces might try to leverage the H-15 Kurakhove-Zaporizhzhia Metropolis freeway to make fast advances and set up handy provide routes from occupied Donetsk Metropolis. Russian forces advancing westward from Zelenyi Hai should ford a number of rivers, together with the Haichur, Solona, Verkhnya Tersa, and Vovcha rivers. [23] Russian forces will even have to cross the T-0408 Preobrazhenka-Novomykolaivka and T-0401 Pokrovske-Hulyaipole highways and seize a number of cities whose pre-war populations are corresponding to that of Chasiv Yar, which Russian forces have nonetheless but to grab regardless of ongoing offensive efforts since Might 2024. [24] Russian forces are extraordinarily unlikely to advance quickly throughout the roughly 150 kilometers from their present positions in Novokhatske to Zaporizhzhia Metropolis given the present charge of Russian advances, and Russian forces would seemingly have to have interaction in a multi-year-long offensive effort to advance to Zaporizhzhia Metropolis from the west. Russian forces will seemingly additionally try to advance inside tube artillery vary of Zaporizhzhia Metropolis from Kamyanske (roughly 35 kilometers south of Zaporizhzhia Metropolis) however will seemingly face vital Ukrainian defenses. Russian forces will even seemingly wrestle to grab Zaporizhzhia Metropolis because of the metropolis’s dimension and close to certainty that Ukrainian forces will critically defend the regional capital. Russian forces haven't taken a metropolis this dimension for the reason that preliminary push in the beginning of Russia's full-scale invasion in early 2022. This evaluation offers one potential avenue the Russian army command might take to realize its reported goal to grab vital areas of southern Dnipropetrovsk Oblast and the rest of Zaporizhia Oblast in 2026. [25]

Ukrainian forces are counterattacking in key areas of the entrance to gradual Russian advances and are inflicting vital prices on the Russian army, nevertheless. Ukrainian forces performed a collection of restricted counterattacks into advancing Russian forces within the Kostyantynivka and Pokrovsk instructions in February and March 2025, which pressured Russian models to regroup and slowed Russian advances in these areas. [26] Ongoing profitable Ukrainian counterattacks and defensive operations within the Kostyantynivka and Pokrovsk instructions seem to have pressured the Russian army command to reevaluate its plan for attacking Kostyantynivka, prompting the latest prioritizing of Russian advances that bypass the Ukrainian fortress belt from the southwest. Ukrainian forces are additionally efficiently counterattacking within the Kupyansk, Lyman, and Siversk instructions and have retaken restricted positions in these instructions in latest days. [27] Ukrainian forces reportedly enveloped some Russian positions in northern Sumy Oblast due to latest counterattacks. [28]

Ukraine's drone-based protection stays a key function of Ukraine's potential to constrain Russian advances. Ukrainian drone operators have created a 15-to-20 kilometer kill zone alongside the frontline that's presently serving to forestall fast Russian advances and inflicting vital manpower and materiel losses on Russia. The Economist lately assessed that Russia has suffered between 900,000 and 1.3 million personnel casualties since February 24, 2022, together with between 190,000 and 350,000 killed-in-action (KIA), and Ukrainian drone operators have inflicted a major variety of these losses. [29] Russian diversifications aimed toward countering Ukrainian drones, together with intensified utilization of bikes, are seemingly additionally contributing to elevated KIA to wounded-in-action (WIA) ratios in Russian models, as Russian forces attacking on bikes are poorly protected against drones. [30] Ukrainian counterattacks and drone operators have up to now succeeded in holding Russian advances to a gradual crawl, though the Kremlin up to now seems keen to just accept these excessive prices for additional beneficial properties.

Forcing Putin to desert his present principle of victory and agree to finish the warfare on affordable phrases requires Ukrainian forces to cease Russian advances and start to retake operationally vital areas. Western help supplied in assist of this effort is important to hastening an finish to the warfare. Ukrainian forces have been profitable in holding Russian advances alongside the frontline to a foot tempo whereas inflicting vital casualties on Russian forces. Putin has demonstrated all through the previous 12 months, nevertheless, that he believes in a principle of victory that posits that indefinite Russian beneficial properties – irrespective of how gradual or how expensive – will enable Russia to realize his targets in Ukraine. [31] Putin's principle assumes that the Russia can outlast and overcome Western army help to Ukraine and that Ukrainian forces shall be unable to liberate any vital territory that Russian forces seize. Putin is working underneath the idea that Ukraine will be unable to accumulate and maintain the manpower and materiel required to forestall creeping however indefinite Russian advances or to contest the initiative and conduct counteroffensive operations at some scale to liberate territory. Western army help to Ukraine's floor forces is required to allow Ukrainian forces to cease Russian advances after which push Russian forces again in vital areas. Such successes will invalidate Putin's assumptions that Russian forces can proceed gradual advances indefinitely and that Russian forces will have the ability to maintain any territory they seize. Solely vital Ukrainian battlefield beneficial properties will immediate adjustments in his calculus and drive Putin to discard his efforts to lengthen the warfare, come to the negotiating desk, and conform to a peace settlement on acceptable phrases to result in Trump's desired simply and lasting finish to the warfare.

Well timed and dependable Western army help to Ukraine coupled with elevated financial strain is important to result in an finish of the warfare on phrases passable for the US, Europe, and Ukraine. Effectively-provisioned Ukrainian forces have beforehand demonstrated their potential to forestall Russian forces from making even marginal beneficial properties and to retake vital territory regardless of Russian manpower and materiel benefits. [32] Western army help to Ukraine will allow Ukrainian forces to take care of, if not enhance, their potential to inflict the numerous materiel and personnel losses on the battlefield which are straining Russia's financial system. Western provisions of air protection techniques to Ukraine will shield Ukraine's folks and allow Ukraine's protection industrial base (DIB) to flourish and more and more meet Ukraine's long-term nationwide safety wants. Ukraine's DIB has confirmed vital for sustaining Ukraine's drone-based defenses which are limiting Russian forces to creeping advances at excessive prices, and the West will proceed to profit from Ukrainian improvements and industrial capability within the long-term. Financial strain, within the type of each Western sanctions and enduring labor shortages and demographic points introduced on by losses in Ukraine, will additional pressure the Russian financial system and cut back the funds obtainable to Moscow for its protracted warfare effort.

Putin stays dedicated to his authentic warfare goals over 1,200 days into his full-scale invasion and is making an attempt to keep away from making concessions at any value, together with those who would danger the long-term safety of the Russian state and the soundness of Putin's regime. [33] Putin is intentionally protracting the warfare in Ukraine, believing that point is on Russia's aspect. Putin has chosen to not enact socially unpopular insurance policies that will increase Russia's warfare effort in a sustainable manner and continues to wager that the West will abandon Ukraine lengthy earlier than he should. The Trump administration has set the stage to grab on this vital second, through each army help to Ukraine and expanded financial strain on Russia, to take advantage of Russia's weaknesses and negotiate a deal that maximizes US, European, and Ukrainian pursuits.

Key Takeaways:

US President Donald Trump introduced largescale and fast army help provides to Ukraine through NATO and potential future secondary tariffs in opposition to Russia. Trump is performing upon the fact that profitable US efforts to deliver Russian President Vladimir Putin to the negotiating desk require that financial devices be coupled with Western army assist to permit Ukraine to extend strain on Russia on the battlefield. Trump famous that Russia has been delaying negotiations to finish the warfare and that the latest intensification of Russia's in a single day drone and missile strikes demonstrates that Russia just isn't all for peace – in keeping with ISW's longstanding evaluation of Kremlin intentions. Trump stated that European safety advantages US pursuits and famous that Europe is dedicated to serving to Ukraine defend itself. Further US army help to Ukrainian forces will arrive at a dynamic, not static, frontline characterised by ongoing Russian offensive operations aimed toward reaching gradual maneuver and by Ukrainian counterattacks in key frontline areas. Russian forces' potential to advance deep sufficient into Ukraine's defenses to ascertain these salients signifies that the Russian army command has improved its potential to grab on alternatives to advance, however the charge of Russian advances has not elevated past foot tempo. Russian forces lately superior in jap Zaporizhia Oblast close to Hulyaipole – the primary tactically vital exercise on this space of the frontline for the reason that Summer season 2023 Ukrainian counteroffensive. The Russian army command seemingly intends to grab on latest advances in western Donetsk Oblast to be able to advance westward into Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhia oblasts. Russian forces might leverage advances in western Donetsk Oblast to launch an offensive operation towards Pokrovske, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, in pursuit of Russia's long-standing need to grab Zaporizhzhia Metropolis. Ukrainian forces are counterattacking in key areas of the entrance to gradual Russian advances and are inflicting vital prices on the Russian army, nevertheless. Forcing Putin to desert his present principle of victory and agree to finish the warfare on affordable phrases requires Ukrainian forces to cease Russian advances and start to retake operationally vital areas. Western help supplied in assist of this effort is important to hastening an finish to the warfare. Well timed and dependable Western army help to Ukraine coupled with elevated financial strain is important to result in an finish of the warfare on phrases passable for the US, Europe, and Ukraine. Ukrainian forces lately superior close to Lyman and Novopavlivka and in western Zaporizhia Oblast. Russian forces lately superior in Sumy and Zaporizhia oblasts and close to Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Hulyaipole.

We don't report intimately on Russian warfare crimes as a result of these actions are well-covered in Western media and don't straight have an effect on the army operations we're assessing and forecasting. We are going to proceed to judge and report on the consequences of those felony actions on the Ukrainian army and the Ukrainian inhabitants and particularly on fight in Ukrainian city areas. We totally condemn Russian violations of the legal guidelines of armed battle and the Geneva Conventions and crimes in opposition to humanity despite the fact that we don't describe them in these studies.

Ukrainian Operations within the Russian Federation Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis Russian Essential Effort – Japanese Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate fundamental efforts) Russian Subordinate Essential Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces again from the worldwide border with Belgorod Oblast and method to inside tube artillery vary of Kharkiv Metropolis Russian Subordinate Essential Effort #2 – Seize the rest of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into jap Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast Russian Subordinate Essential Effort #3 – Seize the whole thing of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and presumably advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Marketing campaign Vital Exercise in Belarus Ukrainian Operations within the Russian Federation

Russian forces continued offensive operations in unspecified areas of Kursk Oblast on July 13 and 14 however didn't advance. [34]

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian goal: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine alongside the worldwide border and method to inside tube artillery vary of Sumy Metropolis)

Russian forces lately superior in northern Sumy Oblast.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage revealed on July 14 signifies that Russian forces lately superior in western Yunakivka (northeast of Sumy Metropolis). [35]

Unconfirmed claims: Ukrainian army observer Kostyantyn Mashovets said that Ukrainian forces bypassed Russian positions close to Oleksiivka (north of Sumy Metropolis) from the east and northeast and broke by way of to Novomykolaivka (northeast of Oleksiivka). [36] A Russian milblogger claimed that parts of the Russian 76th Airborne (VDV) Division seized Yunakivka. [37] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces superior in Kindrativka (north of Sumy Metropolis) and Ryzhivka and close to Beszalivka (each northwest of Sumy Metropolis close to the worldwide border). [38]

Russian forces attacked northwest of Sumy Metropolis close to Beszalivka and Ryzhivka; north of Sumy Metropolis close to Andriivka and Kindrativka; and northeast of Sumy Metropolis close to Yunakivka on July 13 and 14. [39] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked close to Kindrativka and Andriivka. [40]

Mashovets said on July 14 that the Russian army command launched reserves into battle within the Bilovody and Vodolahy instructions (north of Sumy Metropolis) in an try forestall Ukrainian forces from encircling Russian forces in Oleksiivka. [41]

Order of Battle: Mashovets said that parts of the 51st VDV Regiment (106th VDV Division) and 810th Separate Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet) are working close to Loknya (northeast of Sumy Metropolis). [42] Mashovets said that parts of the a hundred and fifty fifth Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) and thirtieth Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, forty fourth Military Corps [AC], Leningrad Army District [LMD]) are working close to Kindrativka. [43] Drone operators of the Russian Smuglyanka Detachment are reportedly working close to Kindrativka. [44] Drone operators of the Anvar Spetsnaz Detachment (presumably referring to the BARS-25 Anvar Volunteer Detachment) are reportedly putting Ukrainian positions close to Esman, Katerynivka, Novovasylivka, and Prohres (all northwest of Sumy Metropolis close to the worldwide border). [45]

Russian Essential Effort – Japanese Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Essential Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast ( Russian goal: Push Ukrainian forces again from the worldwide border with Belgorod Oblast and method to inside tube artillery vary of Kharkiv Metropolis)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on July 14 however didn't make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces superior inside fields west of Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv Metropolis). [46]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv Metropolis close to Vovchansk and Zelene on July 13 and 14. [47]

Ukrainian army observer Kostyantyn Mashovets said on July 14 that Russian forces are extra energetic in Vovchansk. [48] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade working within the Vovchansk course said that Russian forces working within the Vovchansk course conduct as much as 10 assaults and lose on common 100 personnel per day. [49] The spokesperson said that Russian forces are utilizing bikes and buggies extra regularly attributable to favorable summer time climate situations and are leveraging first-person-view (FPV) drones, together with these with fiber optic cables, greater than throughout Winter 2024-2025. The spokesperson said that the biggest "kill zone" within the space is 5 kilometers deep. The spokesperson additionally said that Russian forces are unsuccessfully making an attempt to construct crossings over the Vovcha River and cross the river in watercraft.

Order of Battle: Mashovets said that parts of the Russian 128th Motorized Rifle Brigade (forty fourth Military Corps [AC], Leningrad Army District [LMD]) are working in Vovchansk. [50] Mashovets said that parts of the 18th Motorized Rifle Division (eleventh AC, LMD) are working close to Hlyboke and Zelene (each northeast of Kharkiv Metropolis). [51]

Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Velykyi Burluk course on July 14 however didn't make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces superior west and south of Milove (northeast of Velykyi Burluk). [52]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Velykyi Burluk close to Milove on July 13 and 14. [53]

A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian assaults close to Dehtyarne (northeast of Velykyi Burluk) are aimed toward making a "buffer zone" and stretching Ukrainian reserve [54][55]

Russian Subordinate Essential Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian goal: Seize the rest of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into jap Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Kupyansk course on July 14 however didn't advance.

Russian forces attacked north of Kupyansk close to Kindrashivka, Holubivka, and Radkivka; northwest of Kupyansk close to Myrove; northeast of Kupyansk close to Synkivka, Kamyanka, and Stroivka; east of Kupyansk towards Petropavlivka; and southeast of Kupyansk close to Stepova Novoselivka and towards Pishchane on July 13 and 14. [56]

A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed on July 13 that studies of great Russian advances towards Kupyansk and Russian assaults in opposition to the settlement are untimely and that the complicated Russian logistics measures required to build up Russian forces on the Oskil River’s west (proper) financial institution, terrain, and Ukrainian drone operations will complicate Russian makes an attempt to grab the settlement. [57] One other Russian milblogger claimed that there isn't a proof supporting claims that Russian forces entered Myrove or Sobolivka (west of Kupyansk) and complained concerning the Russian army command’s continued exaggeration of Russian advances. [58] The milblogger claimed that studies that Russian forces have nearly encircled Kupyansk by seizing Myrove and Sobolivka are untimely. [59]

The Kharkiv Oblast Prosecutor’s Workplace said on July 14 that Russian forces launched a Geran-2 sort drone in opposition to Hrushivka (southwest of Kupyansk). [60]

Order of Battle: Ukrainian army observer Kostyantyn Mashovets said that parts of the Russian 1st Tank Regiment and twenty seventh Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (each of the first Guards Tank Military [GTA], Moscow Army District [MMD]) are working within the Kupyansk course. [61]

Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Borova course on July 14 however didn't advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova close to Zahryzove and Kolisnykivka and towards Nova Kruhlyakivka; east of Borova close to Kopanky; and southeast of Borova close to Hrekivka and towards Cherneshchyna and Novoserhiivka on July 13 and 14. [62]

Order of Battle: Mashovets said on July 14 that parts of the Russian third Motorized Rifle Division (twentieth Mixed Arms Military [CAA], MMD) are working within the Hrekivka-Druzhelyubivka course (southeast of Borova). [63]

Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Lyman course on July 14 however didn't advance.

Russian forces attacked northwest of Lyman towards Serednie and Shandryholove; north of Lyman close to Karpivka, Novomykhailivka, Ridkodub, and Zelena Dolyna and towards Novyi Myr; and east of Lyman close to Torske on July 13 and 14. [64] Mashovets said on July 14 that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking close to Ridkodub and Katerynivka (north of Lyman). [65]

The spokesperson for a Ukrainian brigade working within the Lyman course said on July 14 that Russian forces are growing the tempo of their assaults. [66] The spokesperson said that Russian forces assault in teams of 5 to 10 folks, generally on bikes.

Order of Battle: Mashovets said that parts of the Russian 1st and fifteenth motorized rifle regiments (each of the 2nd Motorized Rifle Division, 1st GTA, MMD) and 144th Motorized Rifle Division (twentieth CAA, MMD) are working close to Karpivka and Zelena Dolyna. [67] Mashovets said that parts of the thirty seventh Motorized Rifle Regiment (67th Motorized Rifle Division, twenty fifth CAA, Central Army District [CMD]) are working in Torske.

Russian Subordinate Essential Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian goal: Seize the whole thing of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and presumably advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Ukrainian forces lately superior within the Siversk course.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage posted on July 14 signifies that Ukrainian forces superior within the Serebryanske forest space northeast of Hryhorivka (northeast of Siversk). [68]

Russian forces performed offensive operations northeast of Siversk close to Serebryanka and Hryhorivka; east of Siversk close to Verkhnokamyanske; and southeast of Siversk close to Vyimka and Ivano-Darivka on July 13 and 14. [69]

Order of Battle: Ukrainian army observer Kostyantyn Mashovets said that parts of the Russian 164th Motorized Rifle Brigade (twenty fifth Mixed Arms Military [CAA], Central Army District [CMD]) are working close to Serebryanka. [70] Components of the 14th Separate Tank Battalion (presumably a reconstituted Soviet unit) (third Mixed Arms Military [CAA], previously 2nd Luhansk Individuals’s Republic Military Corps [LNR AC], Southern Army District [SMD]) are reportedly working within the Serebryanske forest space. [71]

Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Chasiv Yar course on July 14 however didn't advance.

Russian forces performed offensive operations south of Chasiv Yar close to Bila Hora, Stupochky, and Predtechyne on July 13 and 14. [72]

Russian forces lately superior within the Toretsk course.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated revealed on July 9 signifies that Russian forces lately superior northwest of Dachne (north of Toretsk). [73] Geolocated footage revealed on July 14 signifies that Russian forces lately superior in western Novospaske (simply west of Toretsk). [74] Geolocated footage revealed on July 14 signifies that Russian forces lately superior alongside Leninska Road in central Yablunivka (northwest of Toretsk). [75]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces superior additional northwest of Dachne, southeast of Katerynivka, east of Rusyn Yar (northwest of Toretsk), and north of Yablunivka. [76]

Russian forces attacked close to Toretsk itself; north of Toretsk close to Dyliivka; and northwest of Toretsk close to Rusyn Yar, Popiv Yar, Yablunivka, Oleksandro-Kalynove, and Poltavka and towards Stepanivka and Pleshchiivka on July 13 and 14. [77] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked in Oleksandro-Kalynove. [78]

Order of Battle: Components of the Russian 4th Motorized Rifle Brigade (third CAA, SMD) are reportedly working west of Dyliivka. [79] Drone operators of the 68th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion (twentieth Motorized Rifle Division, eighth CAA, SMD) are reportedly putting Ukrainian forces close to Stepanivka. [80] Drone operators of the Kaira Detachment of the thirty ninth Motorized Rifle Brigade (68th AC, Japanese Army District [EMD]) are reportedly putting Ukrainian positions close to Sofiivka (northwest of Toretsk). [81]

Russian forces lately superior within the Pokrovsk course.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage revealed on July 14 signifies that Russian forces lately superior in northeastern Fedorivka, southwest of Razine (each northeast of Pokrovsk), and in northeastern Novoekonomichne (east of Pokrovsk). [82]

Unconfirmed claims: The Russian Ministry of Protection (MoD) and Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Fedorivka and Mayak (northeast of Pokrovsk). [83] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces superior northeast of Fedorivka, towards Volodymyrivka, in central Boykivka (each northeast of Pokrovsk), west of Razine, and west of Shevchenko (south of Pokrovsk). [84]

Russian forces attacked towards Pokrovsk itself; north of Pokrovsk towards Rodynske; northeast of Pokrovsk close to Razine, Novotoretske, Novoekonomichne, Myrne, Fedorivka, and Myrolyubivka and towards Volodymyrivka; east of Pokrovsk close to Mykolaivka and Promin and towards Myrnohrad; southeast of Pokrovsk close to Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk close to Vidrodzhennya and Shevchenko; and southwest of Pokrovsk close to Zvirove 13 and 14. [85]

The Russian MoD reported on July 14 that the Russian Chief of the Common Employees Military Common Valery Gerasimov inspected the Central Grouping of Forces within the Pokrovsk course. [86]

Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are attacking west of Razine towards Rodynske to be able to reduce off Ukrainian floor traces of communication (GLOCs) alongside the T-0515 Pokrovsk-Dobropillya street. [87]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian fifth Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, previously 1st Donetsk Individuals's Republic [DNR] AC, SMD) are reportedly putting Ukrainian positions close to Novoekonomichne. [88]

Ukrainian forces lately superior within the Novopavlivka course.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage revealed on July 14 signifies that Ukrainian forces lately superior in jap Tovste and in western Piddubne (each southwest of Novopavlivka). [89]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces superior towards Voskresenka and Oleksandrohrad and west of Shevchenko (all southwest of Novopavlivka). [90]

Russian forces attacked towards Novopavlivka itself; northeast of Novopavlivka close to Novoserhiivka and Muravka; east of Novopavlivka close to Kotlyarivka; southeast of Novopavlivka close to Zelenyi Kut and Oleksiivka; south of Novopavlivka close to Zaporizhzhia, Myrne, Dachne, and Komar and towards Filiya; and southwest of Novopavlivka close to Novokhatske, Zelenyi Hai, Piddubne, and Voskresenka on July 13 and 14. [91]

Order of Battle: Components of the Russian 336th Naval Infantry Brigade (Baltic Fleet), thirty seventh Motorized Rifle Brigade (thirty sixth CAA, EMD), fifth Tank Brigade (thirty sixth CAA), and thirtieth Spetsnaz Firm (reportedly of the thirty sixth CAA) are reportedly working close to Voskresenka. [92] Components of the thirty sixth Motorized Rifle Brigade (twenty ninth CAA, EMD) are reportedly working close to Yalta (south of Novopavlivka). [93]

Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Velyka Novosilka course on July 14 however didn't advance.

Russian forces attacked northwest of Velyka Novosilka close to Vilne Pole and Shevchenko and towards Komyshuvakha, west of Velyka Novosilka close to Zelene Pole and towards Temyrivka, and southwest of Velyka Novosilka close to Rivnopil on July 13 and 14. [94]

Order of Battle: Components of the Russian 143rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division, fifth CAA, EMD) are reportedly working within the Zaporizhia-Donetsk Oblast border space. [95]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian goal: Preserve frontline positions, safe rear areas in opposition to Ukrainian strikes, and advance inside tube artillery vary of Zaporizhzhia Metropolis)

See topline textual content for studies of assessed Russian advances within the Hulyaipole course.

Each Ukrainian and Russian forces lately superior in western Zaporizhia Oblast.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage revealed on July 13 signifies that Ukrainian forces lately superior in northwestern Kamyanske (southwest of Orikhiv). [96]

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage revealed on July 14 signifies that Russian forces lately superior alongside Molodizhna Road in northern Kamyanske. [97]

Russian forces attacked west of Orikhiv close to Plavni, southwest of Orikhiv close to Mali Shcherbaky and Kamyanske, and southeast of Orikhiv towards Novodanylivka on July 13 and 14. [98]

The commander of a Ukrainian drone firm working within the Zaporizhia course said on July 14 that Russian forces are growing the depth of their strikes with fiber optic drones, guided glide bombs, and artillery. [99]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 4th Army Base (58th Mixed Arms Military [CAA], Southern Army District [SMD]) are reportedly putting Ukrainian positions close to Orikhiv. [100] Drone operators of the BARS-Sarmat Unmanned Methods Particular Function Middle (previously BARS-Sarmat Detachment, subordinated to Airborne Forces) are reportedly working within the Zaporizhia course. [101]

Russian forces continued restricted assaults within the Kherson course on July 13 and 14 however didn't advance. [102]

Order of Battle: Components of the Russian 104th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly working within the Kherson course. [103]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Marketing campaign (Russian Goal: Goal Ukrainian army and civilian infrastructure within the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces performed a collection of drone and missile strikes in opposition to Ukraine on the night time of July 13 to 14. The Ukrainian Air Pressure reported that Russian forces launched 136 strike and decoy drones, as much as 90 of which had been Shahed-type drones, and 4 S-300/400 air protection missiles from the instructions of Oryol, Bryansk, and Kursk cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Donetsk Oblast. [104] The Ukrainian Air Pressure reported that Ukrainian forces shot down 61 Shahed-type drones and that 47 decoy drones had been "misplaced" or suppressed by Ukrainian digital warfare (EW) techniques. The Ukrainian Air Pressure reported that 28 Russian drones hit 10 places in Ukraine and that downed drone particles fell in 4 places. Ukrainian officers reported that the Russian strikes broken industrial infrastructure in Kharkiv and Kyiv oblasts. [105]

Vital exercise in Belarus (Russian efforts to extend its army presence in Belarus and additional combine Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko appointed Colonel Pavel Shebeko as Deputy Commander of the Belarussian Northwestern Operational Command on July 14. [106]

Observe: ISW doesn't obtain any categorized materials from any supply, makes use of solely publicly obtainable info, and attracts extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media in addition to commercially obtainable satellite tv for pc imagery and different geospatial information as the premise for these studies. References to all sources used are supplied within the endnotes of every replace.

[1] https://rollcall.com/factbase/trump/transcript/donald-trump-remarks-bilat-mark-rutte-nato-july-14-2025/ ; https://thehill.com/coverage/protection/5399744-watch-live-trump-meets-nato-secretary-general/

[2] https://rollcall.com/factbase/trump/transcript/donald-trump-remarks-bilat-mark-rutte-nato-july-14-2025/ ; https://thehill.com/coverage/protection/5399744-watch-live-trump-meets-nato-secretary-general/

[3] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russias-weakness-offers-leverage

[4] https://rollcall.com/factbase/trump/transcript/donald-trump-remarks-bilat-mark-rutte-nato-july-14-2025/ ; https://thehill.com/coverage/protection/5399744-watch-live-trump-meets-nato-secretary-general/

[5] https://isw.pub/UkrWar070325 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar062625 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar060225 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar060125 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-29-2025 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-29-2025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar040425

[6] https://rollcall.com/factbase/trump/transcript/donald-trump-remarks-bilat-mark-rutte-nato-july-14-2025/ ; https://thehill.com/coverage/protection/5399744-watch-live-trump-meets-nato-secretary-general/

[7] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-25-2025

[8] https://www.axios.com/2025/07/14/trump-ukraine-weapons-missiles-russia

[9] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/high-price-losing-ukraine-part-1-%E2percent80percent94-military-strategic-financial-implications-russian

[10] https://isw.pub/UkrWar071225

[11] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-31-2025

[12] https://isw.pub/UkrWar070525

[13] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-winter-spring-2024-offensive-operation-kharkiv-luhansk-axis

[14] https://isw.pub/UkrWar010525 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar010625

[15] https://isw.pub/UkrWar052525 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar071025

[16] https://x.com/voin_dv/standing/1944676994098110945 ; https://x.com/richardzai38580/standing/1944680190086729906 ; https://x.com/richardzai38580/standing/1944685952913613175 ; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9579; https://t.me/z_arhiv/32006 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/95765

[17] https://t.me/mod_russia/54668 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/15973

[18] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-4-2025 ; https//t.me/z_arhiv/31858; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65040 ; https://t. me/creamy_caprice/9430; https://t.me/banditskiy_nestor/5125

[19] https://isw.pub/UkrWar061425; https://isw.pub/UkrWar060925; https://isw.pub/UkrWar070625 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-16-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-17-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-21-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-22-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-24-2025

[20] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-12-2025

[21] https://isw.pub/UkrWar060925 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-1-2025

[22] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2794 ; https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2804 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-10-2025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar070725

[23] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-9

[24] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russia-has-failed-break-ukraine

[25] https://isw.pub/UkrWar060625

[26] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-9-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-2-2025 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-7-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-15-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-3-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-15-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-8-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-14-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-9-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-29-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-10-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-11-2025

[27]https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-3-2025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041525 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041325 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041825 ; https://isw.pub/InitialRusCampaignAssessment ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar123023 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar031824 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar052424

[28] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-19-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-29-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-24-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-23-2025 ;

[29] https://isw.pub/UkrWar071025

[30] https://isw.pub/UkrWar060525 ; https://isw.pub/RussianForceGen050725

[31] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-7-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-19-2025

[32] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-14-2024 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar021324percentC2percentA0; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-winter-spring-2024-offensive-operation-kharkiv-luhansk-axis ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-29-2024

[33] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-3-2025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041525 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041325 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041825; https://isw.pub/InitialRusCampaignAssessment; https://isw.pub/UkrWar123023; https://isw.pub/UkrWar031824; https://isw.pub/UkrWar052424

[34] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26641 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26614 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26612

[35] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9588; https://t.me/OMBR156/781

[36] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2858

[37] https://t.me/motopatriot78/38823

[38] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65868 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65870 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/31254 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/172392 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/75327 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/27838 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/172425 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/75328

[39] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26641; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26614; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26612; https://t.me/wargonzo/27838 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/75327 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/75328

[40] https://t.me/dva_majors/75327

[41] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2858

[42] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2858

[43] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2858

[44] https://t.me/dva_majors/75318

[45] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/172370

[46] https://t.me/wargonzo/27838

[47] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26641 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26614 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26612; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13750

[48] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2858

[49] https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1066185-na-vovcanskomu-napramku-rosiani-sodna-vtracaut-u-serednomu-do-100-vijskovih-brigada-gart/

[50] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2859

[51] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2859

[52] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/95726 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/27838 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/75328

[53] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26614; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/95726

[54] https://t.me/dva_majors/75327

[55] https://t.me/dva_majors/75327

[56] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26641; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26614; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26612 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13750 ; https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2859

[57] https://t.me/rybar/72129

[58] https://t.me/dva_majors/75323

[59] https://t.me/dva_majors/75327

[60] https://t.me/prokuratura_kharkiv/23993; https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1065865-na-kupansini-vnaslidok-udaru-geran-2-buli-poraneni-dvoe-colovikiv/

[61] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2859

[62] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26641; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26614; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26612; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13750

[63] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2860

[64] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26641 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26614 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26612; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13750

[65] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2860

[66] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/14/mozhut-buty-poodynoki-vershnyky-poblyzu-lymanu-vorozha-tehnika-zhyve-ne-bilshe-20-hvylyn/

[67] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2860

[68] https://t.me/shock3OA/1436; https://x.com/RoadtoMars9/standing/1944680312170025101

[69] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26641 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26614 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26612 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13750

[70] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2860

[71] https://x.com/RoadtoMars9/standing/1944680312170025101; https://x.com/RoadtoMars9/standing/1944680347771261404 ; https://t.me/shock3OA/1436 ; https://tankoved34 dot livejournal.com/74612.html

[72] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26641; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26614; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26612; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13750

[73] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9586 ; https://t.me/ombr_28/2412 ; https://x.com/AudaxonX/standing/1942473791822602429 ; https://x.com/AudaxonX/standing/1944559679486513599

[74] https://t.me/dva_majors/75374 ; https://x.com/richardzai38580/standing/1944796792929067470 ; https://x.com/AudaxonX/standing/1944800884120039778 ; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9591

[75] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9593 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/75376

[76] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65864 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/172416

[77] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26641; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26614; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26612; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13750

[78] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65864

[79] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/172416

[80] https://t.me/nm_dnr/14034

[81] https://t.me/milinfolive/152874

[82] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9590; https://t.me/ssternenko/46337 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/95723 ; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9589; https://t.me/argus38/633; https://x.com/InBigall/standing/1944714541784277244 ; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9578; https://www.instagram.com/reel/DMFEGr1KN7B/?igsh=MTAzYzc0dnlwZWI4

[83] https://t.me/mod_russia/54662; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65873 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/95723

[84] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65864 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65873; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/95723 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/75327

[85] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26641; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26614; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26612; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13750

[86] https://t.me/mod_russia/54661 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/172391

[87] https://t.me/sashakots/54908 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/172365 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65886

[88] https://t.me/nm_dnr/14035

[89] https://x.com/MaxximOSINT/standing/1944637442901889479 ; https://x.com/MaxximOSINT/standing/1944636940810125703 ; https://x.com/TuiteroMartin/standing/1944658513013191046 ; https://x.com/MikiValbuena/standing/1944661080208249090; https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/29631; https://t.me/OVMBr_5/205

[90] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65869; https://t.me/wargonzo/27838

[91] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26641; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26614; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26612; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13750

[92] https://t.me/voin_dv/15983 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/15986

[93] https://www.fb.com/reel/766571112605540; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/13/skynulys-na-drony-otrymaly-minomet-mobilizovanyj-rosiyanyn-rozpoviv-pro-proval-pid-yaltoyu/

[94] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26641; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26614; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26612; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13750

[95] https://t.me/voin_dv/15971

[96] https://x.com/RoadtoMars9/standing/1944614854972547256; https://x.com/RoadtoMars9/standing/1944614929929269341; https://t.me/frontbird/23788

[97] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9587 ; https://t.me/krulaomegu/706

[98] https://t.me/wargonzo/27838

[99] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/07/14/piloty-pereryvaly-kabeli-optovolokna-na-pivdennomu-fronti-maksymalna-aktyvnist-vorozhyh-droniv/

[100] https://t.me/dva_majors/75360

[101] https://t.me/dva_majors/75360

[102] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26641; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26614 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26612 ; https://www.fb.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid023wk9ueFp2C5ZhAxHxyEkPgVwVtu4FFzeiKS3EfqtxAhMFi6NVPPBokbNMyohG8sbl?__cft__[0]=AZXKvdozHP3wBNtYO6wX4-gTgDDgUJ6h-m6FTi2X2MV_KtETdOJyFqZi1iz6_qdlzF1khuUIcTr8M4wEbHLrBc-ie91jbZPT6UYrAgVXiGDxMgYyt39AEcJej5bUntQkGpeLZoN7g9HjkLLuSGNluKJarPR-kDltGVCSCWzqksnyKA&__tn__=%2COpercent2CP-R

[103] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/31240

[104] https://t.me/kpszsu/38403

[105] https://t.me/GalinaMinaeva/4958 ; https://suspilne dot media/1065769-ssa-gotuut-novi-postavki-zbroi-dla-ukraini-zsu-vidpovidatimut-dalekobijnimi-udarami-na-ataki-rf-1237-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1752445364&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps; https://t.me/Mykola_Kalashnyk/6270; https://suspilne dot media/kyiv/1064695-naslidki-rosijskoi-ataki-zafiksuvali-u-dvoh-rajonah-kiivsini-kalasnik/;

[106] https://t.me/pul_1/17527 ; https://t.me/belta_telegramm/323728; https://belta dot by/president/view/pavel-shebeko-naznachen-zamkomandujuschego-vojskami-severo-zapadnogo-operativnogo-komandovanija-726341-2025/