Russian Offensive Marketing campaign Evaluation, July 17, 2025

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Jennie Olmsted, Olivia Gibson, Christina Harward, Daria Novikov, Grace Mappes, and Karolina Hird

July 17, 2025, 7:15 pm ET

Click on here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is up to date each day alongside the static maps current on this report.

Click on here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.

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Click on here to entry ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces each day by displaying a dynamic frontline. ISW will replace this time-lapse map archive month-to-month.

Russia’s Central Financial institution continues efforts to keep up the facade of home financial stability by pursuing financial insurance policies that can possible exacerbate Russia’s financial instability. Bloomberg reported on July 17, citing the Russian Central Financial institution's June 2025 month-to-month report, that Russia’s seasonally adjusted annual fee (SAAR) of inflation decreased to 4 p.c in June 2025, consistent with Russia’s 4 p.c goal inflation fee.[1] Bloomberg assessed the lower within the SAAR of inflation as the primary indicator that the Central Financial institution’s efforts to decrease the inflation fee have been profitable. The Russian Central Financial institution report cautioned that the official annual inflation fee stays at 9 p.c, however assessed that if the present trajectory continues, the inflation fee might hit the goal of 4 p.c someday in 2026. The SAAR is a short-term measurement, nevertheless, and its lower is unlikely to positively influence the Russian financial system in the long run. The Russian Central Financial institution reported that the price of interest-bearing devices — monetary belongings that generate curiosity — considerably decreased in June 2025, and that buyers anticipate a mean key rate of interest beneath 18 p.c between August 2025 and October 2025. The Russian Central Financial institution's report claimed {that a} sturdy Russian ruble considerably contributed to the SAAR lower. A powerful ruble will increase Russia’s buying energy on the worldwide market, which in flip decreases the ruble value of imported items corresponding to equipment and expertise, decreasing enter prices (bills to supply items or providers) and inflationary stress (that will increase the worth of products and providers over time) on companies that depend on imported elements. A strengthened ruble softens the blow of Western sanctions because it makes parallel imports cheaper and retains substitutes reasonably priced. ISW assesses that secondary sanctions will possible additional influence the Russian financial system by undercutting Russian oil revenues and cheaper imports utilizing the strengthened ruble, each of that are important for the Kremlin's financing of its struggle in opposition to Ukraine. The Russian Central Financial institution reported two potential complicating components in decreasing the rate of interest: the eventual waning of results from earlier bouts of ruble strengthening that helped sluggish worth progress in June 2025, and the continuing rise in the price of providers, regardless of a stabilization of the trade fee and value of products delicate to credit score.

Russia's unsustainably excessive funds to troopers and the impacts of the ensuing home labor scarcity will possible additional destabilize the Russian financial system, whatever the Kremlin's claims of financial stability. Russia’s technique of incentivizing volunteer recruitment by providing giant one-time funds to recruits and simultaneous efforts to quickly develop its protection industrial base (DIB) since 2022 has required Russia to considerably enhance funds to each maintain navy recruitment and to enhance the DIB’s labor pressure.[2] Russia has needed to considerably enhance the federal and regional one-time bonuses to incentivize Russians to signal navy contracts slightly than take different jobs, given excessive Russian casualty charges.[3] Competitors between Russia’s DIB and civilian enterprises is elevating the common wage for these positions and is elevating costs in service industries writ giant. These components, coupled with labor shortages within the civilian and protection sectors, are possible contributing to the divergence between the price of items and providers within the Central Financial institution’s report by limiting Russian financial progress, pressure technology efforts, and protection industrial manufacturing. ISW continues to evaluate that Russia can not indefinitely exchange its forces on the present casualty fee with out an involuntary reserve mobilization, which Russian President Vladimir Putin has proven nice reluctance to order, nor can it maintain more and more excessive funds to recruits, which the Russian financial system can not afford.[4] Russia is successfully burning the candle at each ends by concurrently loosening financial coverage to stimulate short-term progress, whereas increasing fiscal expenditure to feed the navy effort. This technique will possible adversely have an effect on the Russian financial system by weakening shopper buying energy, devaluing the ruble within the medium- to long-term, and creating deeper macroeconomic instability.

Russian bankers are reportedly privately expressing issues over a rising variety of non-performing (late and unpaid) loans regardless of the Russian Central Financial institution's claims of financial stability. Bloomberg reported on July 17 that unspecified high executives at "a few of Russia’s largest banks" have privately mentioned searching for a state-funded bailout if the extent of non-performing loans on their books continues to develop by way of 2025.[5] Bloomberg reported that it reviewed paperwork that point out that three of Russia’s systemically vital lenders (monetary establishments whose potential failure might disrupt the broader monetary system and financial system) might have to get better funds misplaced from the non-performing loans. Bloomberg reported that non-performing loans issued by Russian banks have grown by 1.2 p.c in 2025 and will rise to 6 or seven p.c from their present fee of 4 p.c by 2026. ISW is unable to independently confirm Bloomberg's report about these unspecified giant Russian banks and lenders, however has noticed indications that Russian officers are rising involved about financial stability within the wake of Russian Central Financial institution coverage modifications. Russian Central Financial institution Chairperson Elvira Nabiullina beforehand downplayed the danger of systemic financial disaster, claiming that the Russian banking system has capital reserves of eight trillion rubles (about $102.5 billion).[6] Bloomberg reported that the Russian Central Financial institution has suggested lenders to concentrate on restructuring credit score with the debtors and absorbing the dangerous loans, reflective of Russia’s dangerous and contradictory financial insurance policies, slightly than recognizing the complete extent of sourcing loans.[7] The Russian Central Financial institution is due to this fact possible disinterested in bailing out Russian main banks - an motion that would trigger liquidity issues and, within the worst case, trigger financial institution failure. Any failure of a serious Russian financial institution would undercut Russian President Vladimir Putin’s long-standing narrative that neither the struggle in Ukraine nor Western sanctions are hurting the Russian financial system.[8]

Stories that Ukrainian forces focused Moscow Metropolis and St. Petersburg in a single day on July 16 and 17 are possible overreacting to straightforward Russian statements about Ukraine's longstanding deep strike marketing campaign aimed toward degrading Russia's protection industrial base (DIB). The Russian Ministry of Protection (MoD) claimed that Russian forces downed two Ukrainian long-range Neptune missiles and 308 aircraft-type drones in a single day on July 16 to 17 over Bryansk, Orlov, Belgorod, Lipetsk, Oryol, Kursk, Smolensk, Voronezh, Moscow, Kaluga, Leningrad, and Tula oblasts.[9] Moscow Mayor Sergei Sobyanin claimed that Russian forces downed three drones flying towards Moscow Metropolis, and Leningrad Oblast Governor Alexander Drozdenko claimed that Russian digital warfare (EW) programs downed two drones over Kirovsky Raion.[10]

Ukrainian drone strikes in opposition to Russian DIB belongings in areas round Moscow and St. Petersburg, together with Smolensk and Tula oblasts, could also be mischaracterized as concentrating on St. Petersburg and Moscow Oblast, respectively, resulting from their geographical proximity and the path of flight. Tula Oblast Governor Dmitry Milyaev claimed that Russian forces downed seven drones over Tula Oblast.[11] Russian opposition outlet Astra and Ukrainian Middle for Combatting Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko reported that the Shchekinoazot United Chemical Plant in Pervomaysky, Tula Oblast, suspended operations after a minimum of 4 drones struck the power and prompted a fireplace.[12] Kovalenko famous that the chemical plant manufactures industrial chemical merchandise, together with ammonia, methanol, and urea, that assist the manufacturing of explosives, strong rocket gasoline, and artificial supplies.[13] Smolensk Oblast Governor Vasily Anokhin claimed on July 17 that Russian forces downed 14 drones in Smolensk Oblast.[14] Astra reported on July 17 {that a} drone might have struck Russian state-owned protection conglomerate Rostec's 720th Flight Help Tools Restore Plant in Roslavl, Smolensk Oblast.[15] It's unlikely that Ukrainian drones struck targets in both Moscow or Leningrad oblasts, given the shortage of footage and Russian and Ukrainian official reporting that ISW sometimes observes accompanying profitable strikes in opposition to Russian DIB belongings, significantly these in or close to main cities corresponding to Moscow and St Petersburg. Ukrainian drone strikes within the path of or in opposition to Moscow and Leningrad oblasts don't characterize an inflection in Ukraine's long-range strike marketing campaign, as Ukrainian forces usually conduct strikes in opposition to respectable navy and DIB targets in these oblasts and oblasts between the Ukrainian border and Moscow and St. Petersburg cities. Ukraine's strike marketing campaign differs from Russia's in that Ukrainian forces mainly goal respectable navy targets and keep away from incurring disproportionate civilian casualties, whereas Russian strike packages are designed to maximise harm to civilian areas. The Kremlin beforehand employed an informational marketing campaign that leveraged unsubstantiated claims of Ukrainian strikes to discredit Ukraine throughout non permanent ceasefire intervals and will recycle this marketing campaign in an try to affect Western coverage discussions relating to assist for Ukraine.[16]

Ukraine and Russia carried out one other trade of the our bodies of troopers killed in motion (KIA) on July 17, in accordance with agreements reached throughout negotiations in Istanbul on June 2. The Ukrainian Coordination Headquarters for the Therapy of Prisoners of Struggle (POWs) reported that Russia launched the our bodies of 1,000 deceased Ukrainian troopers and that Ukrainian authorities will look at and establish the our bodies.[17] Russian Presidential Aide Vladimir Medinsky said that Ukraine launched the our bodies of 19 deceased Russian troopers.[18] Kremlin newswires TASS and RIA Novosti claimed {that a} supply near the Russian negotiation group reported that Russia is ready to trade the our bodies of three,000 deceased Ukrainian troopers in accordance with Russian President Vladimir Putin's earlier assertion and that the July 17 trade is the primary trade involving these 3,000 our bodies.[19] ISW has beforehand noticed Ukrainian experiences that Russian authorities included the our bodies of Russian troopers KIA in earlier KIA exchanges, prone to artificially inflate the variety of our bodies Russia claims to return to Ukraine and undermine the efficacy of this confidence-building measure.[20]

The Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada permitted the appointment of former Ukrainian Minister of Financial system Yulia Svyrydenko as Ukraine's new prime minister, and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky appointed former Justice Minister Olha Stefanishyna as a particular consultant to the USA. The Rada supported Svyrydenko's new Cupboard of Ministers on July 17, together with former Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal as protection minister; former Digital Transformation Minister Mykhailo Fedorov as first deputy prime minister; former Deputy Minister of Economics Tara Kachka because the deputy prime minister for European integration; former Vitality Minister Herman Halushchenko because the justice minister; former Environmental Safety and Pure Sources Minister Svitlana Hrynchuk because the power minister, and former First Deputy Minister of Financial system Oleksiy Sobolev because the minister of financial system.[21] Ukrainian International Minister Andriy Sybiha and Inner Affairs Minister Ihor Klymenko stay of their positions. Zelensky appointed Stefanishyna because the Ukrainian presidential particular consultant for the event of cooperation with the USA.[22]

Key Takeaways:

Russia’s Central Financial institution continues to posture Russian financial stability and progress to keep up the facade of financial stability by pursuing financial insurance policies that can possible exacerbate Russia’s financial instability. Russia's unsustainably excessive funds to troopers and impacts of the ensuing home labor scarcity will possible additional destabilize the Russian financial system, whatever the Kremlin's efforts to posture stability. Russian bankers are reportedly privately expressing issues over a rising variety of non-performing loans regardless of the Russian Central Financial institution's claims of financial stability. Stories that Ukrainian forces focused Moscow Metropolis and St. Petersburg in a single day on July 16 and 17 are possible overreacting to straightforward Russian statements about Ukraine's longstanding deep strike marketing campaign aimed toward degrading Russia's protection industrial base (DIB). Ukraine and Russia carried out one other trade of the our bodies of troopers killed in motion (KIA) on July 17, in accordance with agreements reached throughout negotiations in Istanbul on June 2. The Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada permitted the appointment of former Ukrainian Minister of Financial system Yulia Svyrydenko as Ukraine's new prime minister, and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky appointed former Justice Minister Olha Stefanishyna as a particular consultant to the USA. Ukrainian forces just lately superior close to Pokrovsk. Russian forces just lately superior close to Borova.

We don't report intimately on Russian struggle crimes as a result of these actions are well-covered in Western media and don't immediately have an effect on the navy operations we're assessing and forecasting. We are going to proceed to judge and report on the consequences of those legal actions on the Ukrainian navy and the Ukrainian inhabitants, and particularly on fight in Ukrainian city areas. We completely condemn Russian violations of the legal guidelines of armed battle and the Geneva Conventions and crimes in opposition to humanity though we don't describe them in these experiences.

Ukrainian Operations within the Russian Federation Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis Russian Essential Effort – Jap Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate major efforts) Russian Subordinate Essential Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces again from the worldwide border with Belgorod Oblast and method to inside tube artillery vary of Kharkiv Metropolis Russian Subordinate Essential Effort #2 – Seize the rest of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into japanese Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast Russian Subordinate Essential Effort #3 – Seize the whole thing of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and probably advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Marketing campaign Vital Exercise in Belarus Ukrainian Operations within the Russian Federation

Combating continued in Kursk Oblast on July 17.

Russian forces continued floor assaults in unspecified areas of Kursk Oblast on July 16 and 17.[23] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces attacked towards Glushkovo and Tetkino (southwest of Glushkovo) and close to Novyi Put (east of Tetkino).[24]

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian goal: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine alongside the worldwide border and method to inside tube artillery vary of Sumy Metropolis)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on July 17 however didn't advance.

Unconfirmed claims: Ukrainian navy observer Kostyantyn Mashovets said that Ukrainian forces possible preserve positions in most of Kindrativka and have partially encircled Russian forces close to Oleksiivka (each north of Sumy Metropolis).[25]

Russian forces continued floor assaults northwest of Sumy Metropolis close to Ryzhivka and Bezsalivka; north of Sumy Metropolis close to Varachyne; and northeast of Sumy Metropolis close to Myropillya.[26] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked north of Sumy Metropolis close to Kindrativka and Andriivka and northeast of Sumy Metropolis close to Sadky and Yablunivka.[27]

Order of Battle: Mashovets reported that an unspecified battalion of the 2 hundredth Motorized Rifle Brigade (14th Military Corps [AC], Leningrad Navy District [LMD]) and components of the Russian one hundred and fifty fifth Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet), the thirtieth Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, forty fourth AC, LMD), and the 1443rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (reportedly of the 18th Motorized Rifle Division, eleventh AC, LMD) are working within the Kindrativka-Oleksiivka space and are now not fight efficient resulting from heavy casualties.[28] Mashovets reported that components of the eleventh and 83rd separate airborne (VDV) brigades, with the reinforcement of 1 battalion from the 1443rd Motorized Rifle Regiment, are working within the Yablunivka-Varachyne space. Mashovets said that components of the 104th, 234th, and 237th VDV regiments (all a part of the 76th VDV Division) are working northeast of Sumy Metropolis, together with close to Yunakivka. Drone operators of the Russian 106th VDV Division reportedly proceed placing Ukrainian forces in northern Sumy Oblast.[29]

Russian Essential Effort – Jap Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Essential Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast ( Russian goal: Push Ukrainian forces again from the worldwide border with Belgorod Oblast and method to inside tube artillery vary of Kharkiv Metropolis)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on July 17 however didn't make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces superior in central Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv Metropolis) and crossed the Vovcha River into southern (left financial institution) Vovchansk.[30]

Russian forces continued floor assaults north of Kharkiv Metropolis towards Kudiivka and northeast of Kharkiv Metropolis close to Vovchansk and Zelene on July 16 and 17.[31] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked close to Vovchansk.[32]

Order of Battle: Ukrainian navy observer Kostyantyn Mashovets said that components of the Russian 128th Motorized Rifle Brigade (forty fourth Military Corps [AC], Leningrad Navy District [LMD]) are working in Vovchansk.[33] Components of the Chechen Zapad-Akhmat Battalion are reportedly working close to Vovchansk.[34]

Russian forces continued floor assaults within the Velykyi Burluk path on July 17 however didn't make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: The Russian Ministry of Protection (MoD) claimed that Russian forces seized Dehtyarne (north of Velykyi Burluk alongside the worldwide border).[35] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces superior west and southwest of Milove (northeast of Velykyi Burluk).[36] Mashovets said that Russian forces superior 200 meters towards Ambarne (northeast of Velykyi Burluk).[37]

Russian forces continued floor assaults northwest of Velykyi Burluk close to Milove and towards Ambarne and Khatne on July 16 and 17.[38] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked close to Milove.[39]

Order of Battle: Mashovets said that components of the Russian forty fifth Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian Basic Employees's Essential Directorate [GRU]) are attacking towards Ambarne.[40]

Russian Subordinate Essential Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian goal: Seize the rest of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into japanese Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Kupyansk path on July 17, however didn't make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces superior in northern Kindrashivka and from Dvorichna towards Kutkivka (all north of Kupyansk).[41]

Russian forces attacked close to Kupyansk itself; north of Kupyansk close to Kindrashivka; northeast of Kupyansk close to Synkivka and Stroivka; east of Kupyansk close to Petropavlivka; and southeast of Kupyansk close to Novoyehorivka and towards Pishchane on July 16 and 17.[42]

A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that Radkivka (northwest of Kupyansk) is a contested "grey zone" and refuted claims that Russian forces reached Myrove (northwest of Kupyansk).[43]

Order of Battle: Components of the Russian 1st Guards Tank Military ([GTA], Moscow Navy District [MMD]) reportedly proceed to function within the Kupyansk path.[44]

Russian forces just lately superior within the Borova path.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage printed on July 17 signifies that Russian forces just lately superior northeast of Borivska Andriivka (northeast of Borova).[45]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces superior north of Kolisnykivka (northeast of Borova).[46]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova close to Zahryzove and Zelenyi Hai; east of Borova close to Nadiya; and southeast of Borova close to Hrekivka and Novoyehorivka on July 16 and 17.[47]

Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Lyman path on July 17 however didn't advance.

Russian forces attacked northwest of Lyman towards Shandryholove; north of Lyman close to Karpivka and Novyi Myr; northeast of Lyman close to Zelena Dolyna, Kolodyazi, and Yampolivka; east of Lyman close to Torske; and southeast of Lyman within the Serebryanske forest space on July 16 and 17.[48]

Russian Subordinate Essential Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian goal: Seize the whole thing of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and probably advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Siversk path on July 17 however didn't make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Ukrainian navy observer Kostyantyn Mashovets said that Ukrainian forces superior south of Hryhorivka (northeast of Siversk).[49]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Siversk close to Serebryanka and Hryhorivka and southeast of Siversk close to Vyimka on July 16 and 17.[50] Mashovets said that Ukrainian forces counterattacked close to Hryhorivka.[51]

Mashovets refuted Russian claims that Russian forces seized Hryhorivka and said that Russian forces have nonetheless not established management over Verkhnokamyanske (east of Siversk).[52] ISW assessed that Russian forces seized Verkhnokamyanske as of October 9, 2024.[53]

Order of Battle: Components of the Russian sixth Motorized Rifle Brigade (third Mixed Arms Military [CAA], previously 2nd Luhansk Folks's Republic Military Corps [LNR AC], Southern Navy District [SMD]) and 127th Motorized Rifle Brigade (reportedly of the third CAA) are reportedly working close to Hryhorivka.[54] Components of the 123rd Motorized Rifle Brigade (third CAA) are reportedly working close to Vyimka.[55]

Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Chasiv Yar path however didn't make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces superior north and south of Chasiv Yar.[56]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Chasiv Yar close to Orikhovo-Vasylivka and south of Chasiv Yar close to Bila Hora, Predtechyne, and Stupochky on July 16 and 17.[57]

The commander of a Ukrainian brigade working within the Chasiv Yar path said that Russian forces often conduct mechanized assaults on this space and have sustained 5,000 casualties within the Chasiv Yar path up to now yr.[58] The commander additionally said that the Russian navy command is continually replenishing components of the Russian 98th Airborne (VDV) Division working in Chasiv Yar with poorly-trained penal colony recruits or personnel who've signed contracts with the Russian Ministry of Protection (MoD) for the monetary incentives, leading to the truth that the division is now not an "elite" formation. That is according to ISW's longstanding evaluation that Russian assault ways in Ukraine have degraded the status and performance of many models that had been thought of "elite" previous to the full-scale invasion.[59]

Kramatorsk Metropolis Navy Administration Head Oleksandr Honcharenko said on July 17 that Russian forces struck Kramatorsk (northwest of Chasiv Yar) with six guided glide bombs, three Geran-2 long-range strike drones, and two KUB-2 reconnaissance and strike drones.[60]

Order of Battle: Components of the Russian 98th VDV Division, together with its 215th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion and 1065th Separate Artillery Regiment, are reportedly working close to Chasiv Yar.[61] Drone operators of the BARS-27 Detachment (Russian Fight Military Reserve) are reportedly placing Ukrainian positions within the Kramatorsk (Chasiv Yar) path.[62]

Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Toretsk path, however didn't make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: The Russian MoD claimed on July 17 that Russian forces seized Popiv Yar (northwest of Toretsk).[63] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces superior north and west of Popiv Yar, east of Poltavka (northwest of Toretsk), and close to Novospaske (west of Toretsk).[64]

Russian forces attacked close to Toretsk itself; northwest of Toretsk close to Rusyn Yar, Oleksandro-Kalynove, Poltavka, and Yablunivka, and towards Nelipivka and Pleshchiivka; and west of Toretsk close to Shcherbynivka and Novospaske on July 16 and 17.[65] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked close to Popiv Yar.[66]

A Russian milblogger claimed that Russia's guided glide bomb strikes within the Toretsk path are supporting Russian floor advances.[67] The milblogger claimed that the Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) are fielding a brand new guided glide bomb modification with elevated noise immunity (a weapon system's means to perform accurately regardless of digital interference) and accuracy.

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Rubikon Middle for Superior Unmanned Applied sciences and the 4th Motorized Rifle Brigade (third CAA) and artillery components of the 238th Artillery Brigade (eighth CAA, SMD) are reportedly placing Ukrainian positions close to Shcherbynivka.[68] Drone components of the 242nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (twentieth Motorized Rifle Division, eighth CAA) and artillery components of the 238th Artillery Brigade are reportedly placing Ukrainian positions close to Rusyn Yar.[69]

Ukrainian forces just lately superior within the Pokrovsk path.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage printed on July 16 signifies that Ukrainian forces just lately superior in southeastern Novoekonomichne (east of Pokrovsk).[70]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces superior inside japanese Udachne, close to Zvirove (each southwest of Pokrovsk), and in Chunyshyne (south of Pokrovsk).[71]

Russian forces attacked towards Pokrovsk itself; north of Pokrovsk towards Rodynske; northeast of Pokrovsk towards Volodymyrivka; east of Pokrovsk close to Novoekonomichne, Mykolaivka, and Myrolyubivka; southeast of Pokrovsk close to Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk close to Novoukrainka; and southwest of Pokrovsk close to Zvirove, Udachne, Kotlyne, and towards Molodetske on July 16 and 17.[72] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked west of Kotlyne.[73]

Ukrainian officers, together with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, said that Russian forces struck a shopping center in Dobropillya (northwest of Pokrovsk) with a guided glide bomb, killing 4 individuals.[74]

Order of Battle: A Russian milblogger credited components of the Russian fifth Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, previously 1st Donetsk Folks's Republic [DNR] AC, SMD) with the latest seizure of Mykolaivka.[75] Components of the Storm Detachment of the 506th Motorized Rifle Regiment (twenty seventh Motorized Rifle Division, 2nd CAA, Central Navy District [CMD]) are reportedly working within the Pokrovsk path.[76] Drone operators of the Rubikon Middle for Superior Unmanned Applied sciences are reportedly placing Ukrainian positions close to Bilozerske (northwest of Pokrovsk).[77]

Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Novopavlivka path on July 17 however didn't make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Mashovets said on July 17 that components of the Russian thirty sixth Motorized Rifle Brigade (twenty ninth CAA, Jap Navy District [EMD]) superior 3.5 kilometers close to Piddubne (southwest of Novopavlivka) up to now day and that components of the thirty seventh Motorized Rifle Brigade (thirty sixth CAA, EMD) superior a minimum of 2.5 kilometers west of Myrne (southwest of Novopavlivka).[78] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces superior southwest of Horikhove (southeast of Novopavlivka), north of Zaporizhzhia (south of Novopavlivka), and northeast and west of Novokhatske (southwest of Novopavlivka).[79]

Russian forces carried out floor assaults towards Novopavlivka itself; northeast of Novopavlivka close to Muravka; southeast of Novopavlivka close to Novoukrainka, Oleksiivka, and Dachne; south of Novopavlivka close to Yalta; and southwest of Novopavlivka close to Piddubne, Voskresenka, Myrne, and Zelenyi Hai on July 16 and 17.[80] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked close to Novoserhiivka (northeast of Novopavlivka), Muravka, Dachne, and Horikhove.[81]

Ukrainian Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov said that Ukrainian forces preserve positions in Novokhatske.[82]

Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Velyka Novosilka path on July 17, however didn't make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Mashovets reported on July 17 that components of the Russian 114th Motorized Rifle Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division, fifth CAA, EMD) superior 1.5 kilometers within the space north of Shevchenko (northwest of Velyka Novosilka) up to now day.[83]

Russian forces carried out floor assaults northwest of Velyka Novosilka close to Vilne Pole and Shevchenko and towards Komyshuvakha, and southwest of Velyka Novosilka close to Zelene Pole and towards Temyrivka on July 16 and 17.[84]

Order of Battle: Mashovets reported that components of the Russian 143rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division, fifth CAA, EMD) are working north of Zelene Pole.[85] Drone operators of the thirtieth Spetsnaz Firm (reportedly of the thirty sixth CAA, EMD) are reportedly placing Ukrainian forces close to Yanvarske (northwest of Velyka Novosilka).[86]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian goal: Keep frontline positions, safe rear areas in opposition to Ukrainian strikes, and advance inside tube artillery vary of Zaporizhzhia Metropolis)

Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported floor exercise within the Hulyaipole path on July 17.

Russian forces continued floor assaults in western Zaporizhia Oblast on July 17 however didn't make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: The Russian Ministry of Protection (MoD) and Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Kamyanske (southwest of Orikhiv) and credited components of the seventh Airborne (VDV) Division, together with its 108th and 247th VDV regiments, with the claimed seizure.[87] A Russian milblogger claimed Russian forces superior south of Plavni (west of Orikhiv).[88]

Russian forces carried out floor assaults close to Kamyanske.[89]

Russian forces continued restricted floor assaults within the Kherson path on July 17, however didn't advance.

A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces continued assaults on unspecified islands within the Dnipro River Delta.[90]

Order of Battle: Artillery components of the Russian 104th VDV Division are reportedly placing Ukrainian forces in west (proper) financial institution Kherson Oblast.[91]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Marketing campaign (Russian Goal: Goal Ukrainian navy and civilian infrastructure within the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces carried out a sequence of drone strikes in opposition to Ukraine on the night time of July 16 to 17. The Ukrainian Air Drive reported that Russian forces launched 64 strike and decoy drones, of which 59 had been Shahed-type drones, from the instructions of Kursk Metropolis; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai.[92] The Ukrainian Air Drive reported that Ukrainian forces shot down 36 drones and that 5 decoy drones had been misplaced or suppressed by Ukrainian digital warfare (EW) programs. Ukrainian officers reported that Russian forces struck civilian infrastructure in Dnipropetrovsk, Sumy, and Kharkiv oblasts.[93]

The Ukrainian Ministry of Inner Affairs reported that Russian forces carried out a "double faucet" strike utilizing first-person view (FPV) drones in opposition to civilians and emergency employees in Nikopol, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, on the night of July 16.[94]

Vital exercise in Belarus (Russian efforts to extend its navy presence in Belarus and additional combine Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing vital to report.

Notice: ISW doesn't obtain any categorised materials from any supply, makes use of solely publicly out there info, and attracts extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media in addition to commercially out there satellite tv for pc imagery and different geospatial information as the idea for these experiences. References to all sources used are supplied within the endnotes of every replace.

[1] ttps://www.bloomberg.com/information/articles/2025-07-17/russia-notches-long-awaited-win-in-fight-against-inflation ; https://www dot cbr.ru/Assortment/Assortment/File/57021/bulletin_25-05.pdf

[2] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russias-weakness-offers-leverage

[3] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-force-generation-and-technological-adaptations-update-april-15-2025 ; https://isw.pub/ForceGen060625 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-26-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-23 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-19-2024

[4] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russias-weakness-offers-leverage

[5] https://www.bloomberg.com/information/articles/2025-07-17/russian-banks-have-discussed-seeking-bailouts-within-next-year

[6] https://ria dot ru/20250703/dolya-2026931910.html?ysclid=md7v0gh1o604045280

[7] https://www.bloomberg.com/information/articles/2025-07-17/russian-banks-have-discussed-seeking-bailouts-within-next-year

[8] https://isw.pub/UkrWar061925

[9] https://t.me/tass_agency/325714 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/54759 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/54742 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/54741 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/54737 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/54736 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/325653 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/325624 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/325622

[10] https://t.me/drozdenko_au_lo/7589 ; https://t.me/drozdenko_au_lo/7590 ; https://t.me/mos_sobyanin/15933 ; https://t.me/mos_sobyanin/15934

[11] https://t.me/dmilyaev/6156 ; https://t.me/dmilyaev/6143

[12] https://t.me/akovalenko1989/9532 ; https://t.me/astrapress/86820

[13] https://t.me/akovalenko1989/9532

[14] https://t.me/anohin67/7259

[15] https://t.me/astrapress/86775

[16] https://isw.pub/UkrWar050725 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar050325 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042825 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041925

[17] https://t.me/Koord_shtab/13806

[18] https://t.me/vr_medinskiy/2667

[19] https://ria dot ru/20250717/peredacha-2029649659.html; https://tass dot ru/politika/24537929

[20] https://isw.pub/UkrWar061925

[21] https://suspilne dot media/1068649-novij-starij-urad-hto-vidteper-ocolue-ministerstva-ukraini/

[22] https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/standing/1945791717363617962

[23] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26763; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26741; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26739

[24] https://t.me/dva_majors/75544; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/31399

[25] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2866

[26] https://t.me/dva_majors/75544; https://t.me/wargonzo/27880; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/31399;

[27] https://t.me/dva_majors/75544; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/172690; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/31399;

[28] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2866

[29] https://t.me/bella_Ciao44/9554; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/172715; https://t.me/mod_russia/54758

[30] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65985; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/95946; https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/13625

[31] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26763; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26741; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26739; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13903

[32] https://t.me/wargonzo/27880

[33] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2867

[34] https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/5842

[35] https://t.me/mod_russia/54753;

[36] https://t.me/wargonzo/27880; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65985

[37] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2867

[38] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65985; https://t.me/dva_majors/75544; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/95971

[39] Warning: graphic content material https://t.me/boris_rozhin/172672

[40] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2867

[41] https://t.me/rybar/72216

[42] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26763 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26741 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13903

[43] https://t.me/rybar/72216

[44] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/172711

[45] https://x.com/ZoamSc2/standing/1945884101497745548 ; https://t.me/rubaka_77/137

[46] https://t.me/rybar/72216

[47] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26763 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26741 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26739 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13903

[48] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26763 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26741 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26739 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13903

[49] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2868

[50] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26763; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26741; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26739; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13903

[51] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2868

[52] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2868

[53] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-9-2024

[54] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2868

[55] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2868

[56] https://t.me/wargonzo/27880

[57] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26763; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26741; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26739; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13903

[58] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZVMUSS0B0yo ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/17/transformuyetsya-i-degraduye-yak-vtraty-v-chasovomu-yari-motyvuyut-rosiyan-zdavatysya/

[59] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-3-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-30-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-3 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-21-2024 https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-14-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-force-generation-and-technological-adaptations-update-may-30-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-28-2023

[60] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1068521-vnoci-vijska-rf-zavdali-sim-udariv-po-kramatorsku/; https://www.fb.com/alexander.vasilyevich.goncharenko

[61] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/31376; https://www.fb.com/twenty fourth.brigade/posts/pfbid02PLq1sETKbvugD6WPT3mhuLQP2SsbsvkwujovZaYGRiEBW1mE1WKkyUZBkpsanWmgl ; https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1068325-u-casovomu-aru-vijskovi-24-brigadi-vzali-v-polon-desantnikiv-98-i-divizii-rf/ ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/16/elitu-rosijskoyi-armiyi-popovnyly-zekamy-u-chasovomu-yaru-vzyaly-v-polon-desantnykiv-z-kryminalnym-mynulym/ ; https://x.com/24th_brigade/standing/1945513659498922041; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZVMUSS0B0yo ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/17/transformuyetsya-i-degraduye-yak-vtraty-v-chasovomu-yari-motyvuyut-rosiyan-zdavatysya/

[62] https://t.me/mod_russia/54758

[63] https://t.me/mod_russia/54753

[64] https://t.me/dva_majors/75544; https://t.me/rybar/72208

[65] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26763; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26741; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26739; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13903; https://t.me/dva_majors/75544; https://t.me/wargonzo/27880

[66] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65993

[67] https://t.me/rybar/72223

[68] https://x.com/AudaxonX/standing/1945601870237471055 ; https://t.co/qfCRrrR782 ; https://t.co/sRnfcv4Yrm; https://t.me/nm_dnr/14055

[69] https://t.me/nm_dnr/14056

[70] https://x.com/Bielitzling/standing/1945644258343453017 https://t.me/icpbtrubicon/319

[71] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65977; https://x.com/clement_molin/standing/1945598718704558323

[72] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26763; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26741; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26739; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13903; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65977; https://t.me/rybar/72208; https://t.me/motopatriot78/38994

[73] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65983

[74] https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/standing/1945550959003811874; https://t.me/VadymFilashkin/9690 ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/16/aviaudar-po-tcz-u-dobropilli-rosiyany-skynuly-kab-500-ye-zagybli-j-poraneni/ ; https://t.me/VadymFilashkin/9700 ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/16/udar-po-dobropillyu-odna-lyudyna-zagynula-kilkist-poranenyh-zrosla-do-21/; https://t.me/VadymFilashkin/9708 ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/16/novi-dani-pislya-udaru-po-tcz-v-dobropilli-dvoye-zagyblyh-i-26-poranenyh/; https://t.me/dsns_telegram/46272 ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/17/dsns-zavershyly-avarijno-ryatuvalni-ta-poshukovi-roboty-na-misczi-udaru-v-dobropilli-shho-vidomo/ ;

[75] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/95944

[76] https://t.me/motopatriot78/38994

[77] https://t.me/milinfolive/153060

[78] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2869

[79] https://t.me/z_arhiv/32053; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/172739

[80] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26763; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26741; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26739; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13903; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/95941; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65983; https://t.me/voin_dv/16033

[81] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65983; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65977

[82] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1068713-rosijski-vijska-kontroluut-novohatske-boi-trivaut-poblizu-bagatira-osuv-hortica/

[83] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2869

[84] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26763; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26741; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26739; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13903

[85] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2869

[86] https://t.me/voin_dv/16028

[87] https://t.me/mod_russia/54753 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/54757 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/96007 ; https://t.me/sashakots/54969 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/325713

[88] https://t.me/wargonzo/27880

[89] https://t.me/wargonzo/27880

[90] https://t.me/dva_majors/75544

[91] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/31376

[92] https://t.me/kpszsu/38621

[93] https://suspilne dot edia/dnipro/1068719-armia-rf-zavdala-dronovih-udariv-po-krivomu-rogu-poraneno-ludinu-vinikla-pozeza/; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/22950; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/22943 ; https://suspilne dot media/dnipro/1068509-vijska-rf-vdarili-po-dnipru-ta-trom-rajonam-oblasti-poraneni-10-ludej-stalisa-pozezi/; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/22970; https://t.me/synegubov/15841; https://t.me/Sumy_news_ODA/37159 ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/17/armiya-rf-zavdala-masovanogo-udaru-po-shostkynshhyni/