Russian Offensive Marketing campaign Evaluation, August 11, 2025

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Olivia Gibson, Christina Harward, Jennie Olmsted, Grace Mappes, Justin Younger, Kateryna Stepanenko, and George Barros with Nate Trotter

August 11, 2025, 10:15 pm ET

Click on here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is up to date day by day alongside the static maps current on this report.

Click on here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click on here to see ISW’s 3D management of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a pc (not a cellular gadget) is strongly really helpful for utilizing this data-heavy software.

Click on here to entry ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces day by day by exhibiting a dynamic frontline. ISW will replace this time-lapse map archive month-to-month.

Word: The info cut-off for this product was 12:30 pm ET on August 11. ISW will cowl subsequent stories within the August 12 Russian Offensive Marketing campaign Evaluation.

US President Donald Trump expressed the US' willingness to facilitate substantive peace negotiations between Russia and Ukraine in an effort to realize an enduring peace in Ukraine. Trump commented on August 11 concerning the upcoming August 15 US-Russia summit in Alaska and said that "it's not as much as [Trump]" to make a take care of Russian President Vladimir Putin concerning the finish of Russia's battle in Ukraine.[1] Trump said that "a deal must be made for each [Russia and Ukraine]," suggesting that the US won't pursue a US-Russian brokered settlement that will exclude Ukraine in the course of the Alaska assembly. Trump added that he would notify Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and European leaders about his upcoming assembly with Putin. Trump said {that a} assembly between Zelensky and Putin or with Zelensky, Putin, and Trump will comply with the Alaska summit – suggesting that the US is fascinated about facilitating substantive peace talks that embrace Ukraine in negotiations with Russia.

Trump signaled that the US would purpose to return a few of Ukraine's economically and strategically vital territories in the course of the peace negotiations course of. Trump famous that Russian forces at the moment occupy "some very prime territory" in Ukraine and that the US goes to "try to get a few of that territory again for Ukraine."[2] Trump didn't make clear what he considers to be "prime" territory, solely vaguely noting that Russia has taken "largely ocean in actual property" and that Ukraine solely maintains management over the shoreline in Odesa Oblast. Trump's references to "prime" territory are seemingly about Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts, given his discussions about territory on the ocean or a river and his point out of Odesa Oblast. Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts host an abundance of economically and strategically vital land and supply a lot broader entry to the Black Sea and the Dnipro River. Ukraine's entry to the Black Sea is crucial for Ukraine's sizeable export market, significantly of agricultural merchandise and minerals.[3] Ukraine can be wealthy in crucial uncooked supplies, and Russia's direct entry to the Black Sea might allow Russia to seize vital income streams related to Ukraine's uncooked materials export. Ukraine's entry to the Dnipro River and a buffer round that river is operationally vital as a result of the river acts as a naturally defensible barrier. Permitting Russia to keep up management over east (left) financial institution Kherson Oblast would put Russia in a way more advantageous place to conduct offensive operations in opposition to west (proper) financial institution Kherson, Mykolaiv, and Odesa oblasts, given how the present Ukrainian positions alongside the Dnipro River, if frozen, would lack the required operational depth to forestall a repeat Russian invasion. Persistent Ukrainian artillery and drone strikes are at the moment stopping Russian forces from accumulating engineering and bridging tools to cross the Dnipro River in Kherson Oblast, however a future ceasefire would forestall such strikes. Zaporizhia Oblast additionally hosts Europe's largest nuclear energy station – the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Energy Plant (ZNPP) - which provided roughly one-fifth of Ukraine's electrical energy earlier than Russia's full-scale invasion, and Russian forces have occupied the power since March 2022.[4] The Trump administration had beforehand tried to barter an settlement to safe joint Ukrainian and US management over the ZNPP, which Russia explicitly rejected in spring 2025.[5]

Trump indicated that Putin's worry of the affect of US sanctions in opposition to Russia and Russia's financial companions drove Putin to suggest a bilateral summit. Trump said that the Russian financial system is "not doing effectively proper now."[6] Trump said that his announcement imposing 50 % tariffs on India for importing Russian oil can be not serving to the Russian financial system and "was a giant blow" to nations that buy Russian oil. Trump said that he was "all set" to implement far more vital financial restrictions, however that Trump "obtained a name that [Russian officials] want to meet." Trump accurately indicated that the Russian financial system is a legal responsibility that the US, Europe, and Ukraine can leverage to degrade Russia's potential to proceed its battle in Ukraine. Putin has lengthy sustained a principle of victory that depends upon the idea that Russia can outlast Ukraine and the West, together with by counting on Russia's companions to maintain the Russian financial system and battle machine.[7] ISW continues to evaluate that robust US and different Western financial measures in opposition to Russia, in live performance with well timed and ample Western army help to Ukraine, can allow Ukraine to inflict extra extreme battlefield losses on Russia and thereby problem Putin's principle of victory.[8]

Putin's resolution to succeed in out instantly earlier than Trump imposed additional financial restrictions in opposition to Russia or its buying and selling companions undermines the Kremlin's ongoing narrative that sanctions haven't and won't have an effect on the Russian financial system . Kremlin officers have routinely claimed that Russia's financial system is robust and impervious to additional US or different Western sanctions, each with a view to painting stability to the home Russian viewers and to persuade Western states to not impose additional sanctions in opposition to Russia and its buying and selling companions.[9] Putin's resolution to succeed in out to Trump instantly earlier than the US imposed further financial restrictions demonstrates the Kremlin's recognition that this narrative is fake. The Russian financial system is weaker than Russian officers venture, and Russia has applied financial and financial insurance policies to disguise Russia's financial points, however that may seemingly exacerbate Russia's instability as an alternative.[10]

Kremlin officers proceed to emphasise that Russia is unwilling to compromise and stays dedicated to attaining its authentic battle targets in Ukraine. State Duma Committee on Worldwide Affairs First Deputy Head Alexei Chepa claimed on August 11 that the first concern of the Putin-Trump assembly can be discussions about options to the "root causes" of the battle in Ukraine (a typical Kremlin reference to Ukraine's alleged discrimination in opposition to Russian audio system and North Atlantic Treaty Group [NATO] growth) to make sure that these causes "can't be repeated."[11] Kremlin-affiliated outlet Izvestiya printed an opinion piece on August 11 by Vice-Rector of the Russian Ministry of International Affairs' (MFA) Diplomatic Academy Oleg Karpovich claiming that Russia has but to realize its goal of defending the Russian language and the Ukrainian Orthodox Church Moscow Patriarchate (UOC MP) and reiterating that Russia considers Ukrainian membership in NATO "not possible."[12] Karpovich claimed that Ukraine's "denazification" is a "matter of time." Putin and different Russian officers have continued to demand Ukraine’s demilitarization (a requirement for the discount of Ukraine's army such that Ukraine can't defend itself in opposition to future Russian aggression), denazification (a requirement for regime change in Ukraine and the set up of a Russian puppet authorities), and alliance neutrality.[13] Putin most lately reaffirmed his uncompromising calls for on August 1 when he claimed that his June 2024 calls for that Ukraine cede the entire 4 illegally annexed oblasts earlier than he would conform to a ceasefire are nonetheless in place. Putin’s latest demand is notably solely concerning the circumstances that Ukraine should meet earlier than Putin will conform to a ceasefire, not battle termination . Putin's calls for earlier than he agrees to a battle termination settlement will seemingly be much more in depth.

Putin is reportedly demoting officers inside his interior circle who've voiced disagreement with Putin's willpower to proceed the battle. The New York Instances reported on August 10 that Western and Russian sources indicated that Kremlin Deputy Chief of Employees Dmitry Kozak misplaced his affect within the Kremlin after Kozak suggested Putin up to now few months to right away cease preventing in Ukraine, begin peace negotiations, and cut back the facility of Russia's safety companies.[14] Kozak was beforehand considered one of Putin’s closest advisors and oversaw Kremlin technique in Ukraine earlier than the Kremlin shifted this accountability to Presidential Administration Deputy Head Sergei Kiriyenko.[15] Kozak’s latest opposition to Russia's battle and the following discount in his affect within the Kremlin display Putin's willpower to proceed his battle to realize his maximalist calls for.

Russian officers and media are additionally setting informational circumstances for Russia to renege on any future peace settlement to finish the battle. Russian State Duma Deputy Alexei Zhuravlev claimed on August 9 that US President Donald Trump is a "short-term particular person" because of US presidential time period limits and that US presidents typically renege on agreements that their predecessors reached.[16] Russian ultranationalist outlet Tsargrad, which frequently works to situation the Russian nationalist neighborhood to help Russia's battle effort , printed an opinion piece on August 11 claiming that any peace deal that Russia agrees to with Trump is a deal solely along with his administration, not the US or the broader West.[17] The article additional claimed that the subsequent US administration won't adhere to any settlement that Trump concludes with Putin and that peace in Ukraine is "only a truce" and the battle will resume. Russian State Duma Deputy Leonid Ivlev said on August 10 that Ukraine's Structure is meaningless and is solely a results of Ukrainian politicians and oligarchs bargaining.[18] The Kremlin has repeatedly claimed that the Ukrainian authorities is illegitimate, prone to enable Russia to renege on a peace settlement that Russia indicators with Ukraine sooner or later at a time of Russia's selecting.[19]

Putin might attempt to use the prospect of US-Russian arms management talks to achieve concessions from Trump concerning the battle in Ukraine within the August 15 assembly in Alaska. Russian Deputy International Minister Sergei Ryabkov claimed on August 10 that Russia continued analysis and improvement of shorter- and intermediate-range missiles whereas the Intermediate-Vary Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty was in impact and that Russia has a "pretty stable arsenal" of such missiles.[20] Rybakov claimed on August 11 that Russia's "dependable" sources confirmed that Russia's latest withdrawal from the INF Treaty achieved its "desired outcome" and a "sobering impact" in the US.[21] ISW beforehand assessed that the Kremlin was dangling the prospect of bilateral arms management talks to extract preemptive concessions from the US concerning the battle in Ukraine.[22] Putin might supply to barter arms management treaties with Trump in the course of the August 15 bilateral summit in Alaska. The June 2021 summit between Putin and former US President Joe Biden in Geneva in June 2021 notably targeted on arms management and largely ignored Ukraine regardless of the buildup of Russian forces on Ukraine's border on the time.[23] Russia has lengthy violated the INF Treaty and publicly flaunted its use and manufacturing of shorter- and intermediate-range missiles banned underneath the treaty, together with the Oreshnik ballistic missile and probably the Iskander missile.[24] The renewal of the INF Treaty or the institution of an analogous treaty would seemingly not end in any vital change in Russia's deployment and use of shorter- and intermediate-range missiles.

Russian sabotage and reconnaissance teams are reportedly infiltrating areas close to Dobropillya (northwest of Pokrovsk), and Russian forces seemingly lately superior southeast of the settlement. A Ukrainian supply said on August 11 that Russian sabotage and reconnaissance teams are working close to Dobropillya.[25] NASA Hearth Data for Useful resource Administration (FIRMS) reveals warmth anomalies west of Nove Shakhove and in Novyi Donbas (each east of Dobropillya), Bilytske (southeast of Dobropillya), and Rodynske (north of Pokrovsk and southeast of Dobropillya), suggesting hearth missions within the space.[26] ISW due to this fact assesses that Russian forces seemingly lately seized Razine, Sukhetske, Fedorivka, Zatyshok, Boikivka, Novotoretske, Zapovidne (all southeast of Dobropillya), Mayak, and Pankivka (each east of Dobropillya). The Russian Ministry of Protection (MoD) claimed on August 11 that Russian forces seized Fedorivka (northeast of Pokrovsk).[27] Ukrainian army observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported that ahead Russian assault models and "infiltration" teams are working close to Kucheriv Yar (northeast of Dobropillya), Nove Shakhove, and Bilytske.[28] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Dorozhnie (southeast of Dobropillya) and superior north of Zapovidne, south of Bilytske, south of Dorozhnie, west of Shakhove, southeast of Vilne (each east of Dobropillya), to Nove Shakhove, south of Kucheriv Yar, and to the outskirts of Zolotyi Kolodyaz (northeast of Dobropillya).[29] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces occupy roughly half of Volodymyrivka (south of Shakhove) and that Ukrainian forces keep positions in northern Pankivka.[30] The milblogger claimed that Russian forces have interdicted a roughly 2.5 kilometer extensive part of the T-0515 Pokrovsk-Dobropillya freeway. One other Russian milblogger claimed that Kucheriv Yar and Zolotyi Kolodyaz are contested "grey zones" and that Russian forces are seemingly conducting reconnaissance-in-force missions in these areas.[31] It's untimely to name the Russian advances within the Dobropillya space an operational-level breakthrough, although Russian forces very seemingly search to mature their tactical advances into an operational-level breakthrough within the coming days. Russian forces used an analogous tactical penetration in mid-April 2024 to facilitate the seizure of operationally vital territory northwest of Avdiivka. [32] The following a number of days within the Pokrovsk space of operations will seemingly be crucial for Ukraine’s potential to forestall accelerated Russian beneficial properties north and northwest of Pokrovsk.

Russia is probably going specializing in advances towards Dobropillya to set informational circumstances forward of the August 15 US-Russian summit. ISW continues to evaluate that Putin is making an attempt to border Russia's seizure of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts as inevitable to push Ukraine and the West to capitulate to Kremlin calls for.[33] Russia's occupation of the 4 oblasts is neither inevitable nor imminent, as Russian forces will face severe operational obstacles, significantly in seemingly multi-year endeavors in Donetsk Oblast. Putin seemingly seeks to leverage intensified tactical pushes in Avdiivka to set circumstances to hunt US concessions on Russia’s battle in Ukraine.

Russian forces have been utilizing drone strikes in opposition to Ukrainian floor traces of communication (GLOCs) within the close to rear in latest weeks to set circumstances for extra speedy advances within the Pokrovsk course. ISW lately assessed that Russian drone diversifications are seemingly attaining some results of battlefield air interdiction (BAI).[34] Russian forces have elevated their use of first-person view (FPV) drone strikes in opposition to the T-0514 Dobropillya-Lyman freeway after having considerably improved their tactical drone capabilities to threaten Ukrainian GLOCs deeper within the rear than earlier than. Russian drones have additionally been focusing on Ukrainian autos alongside the T-0515 freeway in Rodynske. Russia's persistent drone strikes at longer ranges are seemingly forcing Ukrainian forces to take various roads and additional stretch GLOCs, which is probably going impacting Ukraine's defensive operations that depend on the constant circulate of kit, provides, and manpower.

Russian forces proceed to implement and area technological drone improvements designed to strike Ukrainian forces' rear and close to rear. Russian milbloggers, together with a Kremlin-affiliated milblogger, claimed on August 11 that Russian forces have tailored their indigenous Geran drone (the Russian analogue to the Iranian Shahed-136) to hold anti-tank mines that allow operators to remotely mine Ukrainian forces' rear and close to rear.[35] Ukrainian digital and radio warfare skilled Serhiy "Flash" Beskrestnov amplified footage on August 11 from a Russian milblogger exhibiting an unspecified Russian drone remotely mining an unspecified logistics route in Ukraine and famous that Russian Shahed-type drones are actually able to carrying two mines.[36] ISW continues to evaluate that Russian forces are attaining partial results of battlefield air interdiction (BAI) and are advancing on the battlefield by leveraging technological improvements and mixed drone strike techniques.[37] Russian forces are actually fielding fiber optic managed sleeper drones to places comparable to rooftops, hilltops, and roads for as much as a number of weeks in help of missions focusing on Ukrainian positions and logistics; the drones are able to remaining electronically silent and bodily inactive.[38] Russia's battle in Ukraine continues to be outlined by its dramatically shortened innovation cycle, underscoring the crucial significance of continued Western help for Ukraine's improvement of kinetic drone countermeasures and drone interceptors which can be able to interdicting Russian Shahed-type and tactical drones.[39]

Ukraine continued its long-range drone strike marketing campaign in opposition to Russian protection industrial infrastructure in a single day on August 10 to 11. Ukrainian broadcaster Suspilne reported that sources inside Ukraine's Safety Service (SBU) said that Ukrainian forces carried out a long-range drone strike in opposition to the Arzamas Instrument-Making Plant in Arzamas, Nizhny Novgorod Oblast, which produces elements for Kh-32 and Kh-101 missiles. A geolocated {photograph} reveals harm to a constructing on the plant and photographs reveals a fireplace on the constructing.[40] Nizhny Novgorod Oblast Governor Gleb Nikitin claimed that Ukrainian drones focused unspecified enterprises in two industrial zones within the oblast on the night time of August 10 to 11 and {that a} drone strike killed one enterprise worker and injured two in Arzamassky Okrug.[41]

Ukrainian official sources confirmed that Ukrainian drone strike in opposition to Komi Republic on the night time of August 9 to 10. Suspilne reported on August 11 that sources within the Ukrainian Fundamental Intelligence Directorate (GUR) confirmed that GUR carried out a drone strike in opposition to the Lukoil Refinery in Ukhta, Komi Republic, which provided gasoline and lubricants to Russian forces.[42] The GUR sources reported that the strike broken a tank with petroleum merchandise and a gasoline and gasoline condensate processing plant. Ukhta Metropolis Civil Protection and Emergencies Division Head Andrey Dudnikov claimed on August 11 that two drones fell on the oil refinery on August 10, damaging a water tank and smokestack.[43] ISW continues to evaluate {that a} doable long-range strikes moratorium will hinder Ukraine's potential to proceed its long-range strike marketing campaign in opposition to the Russian protection industrial services and power infrastructure — a marketing campaign that's geared toward focusing on Russia's protection manufacturing and power revenues, versus the solely civilian infrastructure that the Russian marketing campaign typically strikes.[44] Any settlement lower than a full and long-term cessation in long-range strikes in opposition to civilian infrastructure will pose an excellent menace to Ukraine's civilian inhabitants and infrastructure upon the expiration of the settlement and resumption of long-range Russian strikes.

Key Takeaways:

US President Donald Trump expressed the US' willingness to facilitate substantive peace negotiations between Russia and Ukraine in an effort to realize an enduring peace in Ukraine. Trump signaled that the US would purpose to return a few of Ukraine's economically and strategically vital territories in the course of the peace negotiations course of. Trump indicated that Putin's worry of the affect of US sanctions in opposition to Russia and Russia's financial companions drove Putin to suggest a bilateral summit. Putin's resolution to succeed in out instantly earlier than Trump imposed additional financial restrictions in opposition to Russia or its buying and selling companions undermines the Kremlin's ongoing narrative that sanctions haven't and won't have an effect on the Russian financial system . Kremlin officers proceed to emphasise that Russia is unwilling to compromise and stays dedicated to attaining its authentic battle targets in Ukraine. Russian officers and media are additionally setting informational circumstances for Russia to renege on any future peace settlement to finish the battle. Putin might attempt to use the prospect of US-Russian arms management talks to achieve concessions from Trump concerning the battle in Ukraine within the August 15 assembly in Alaska. Russian sabotage and reconnaissance teams are reportedly infiltrating areas close to Dobropillya (northwest of Pokrovsk), and Russian forces seemingly lately superior southeast of the settlement. Ukraine continued its long-range drone strike marketing campaign in opposition to Russian protection industrial infrastructure in a single day on August 10 to 11. Russian forces lately superior in northern Sumy Oblast and close to Lyman, Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, and Pokrovsk.

We don't report intimately on Russian battle crimes as a result of these actions are well-covered in Western media and don't instantly have an effect on the army operations we're assessing and forecasting. We are going to proceed to judge and report on the results of those legal actions on the Ukrainian army and the Ukrainian inhabitants and particularly on fight in Ukrainian city areas. We completely condemn Russian violations of the legal guidelines of armed battle and the Geneva Conventions and crimes in opposition to humanity although we don't describe them in these stories.

Ukrainian Operations within the Russian Federation Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis Russian Fundamental Effort – Jap Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate foremost efforts) Russian Subordinate Fundamental Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces again from the worldwide border with Belgorod Oblast and strategy to inside tube artillery vary of Kharkiv Metropolis Russian Subordinate Fundamental Effort #2 – Seize the rest of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into japanese Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast Russian Subordinate Fundamental Effort #3 – Seize the whole thing of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and probably advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Marketing campaign Important Exercise in Belarus Ukrainian Operations within the Russian Federation

Preventing continued in Kursk Oblast on August 11.

Russian forces carried out offensive operations in unspecified areas of Kursk Oblast on August 10 and 11.[45] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces carried out restricted assaults close to Novyi Put (southwest of Glushkovo).[46]

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian goal: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine alongside the worldwide border and strategy to inside tube artillery vary of Sumy Metropolis)

Russian forces lately superior in northern Sumy Oblast.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage printed on August 11 signifies that Russian forces lately superior in central Oleksiivka (north of Sumy Metropolis) and southwest of Yunakivka (northeast of Sumy Metropolis).[47]

Unconfirmed claims: Ukrainian army observer Kostyantyn Mashovets said that parts of the Russian 1443rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (fashioned throughout 2022 partial reserve name up) pushed Ukrainian forces again from Novomykolaivka (north of Sumy Metropolis) however have been unable to advance between Oleksiivka and Varachyne (east of Oleksiivka).[48] Mashovets said that the Russian army command started to introduce parts of the 234th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (76th VDV Division) that had been in reserve close to Yunakivka. The Ukrainian Common Employees reported that Ukrainian forces efficiently counterattacked in an unspecified space of Sumy Oblast and superior as much as 400 meters.[49]

Russian forces attacked northwest of Sumy Metropolis close to Bezsalivka and northeast of Sumy Metropolis close to Yunakivka and Sadky on August 10 and 11.[50] Mashovets and Russian milbloggers said that Ukrainian forces counterattacked close to Yunakivka, Novokostyantynivka, and Kostyantynivka (all north of Sumy Metropolis).[51]

A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Group of Forces claimed that the Russian army command deployed parts of the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet), fortieth Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet), and 177th Naval Infantry Regiment (Caspian Flotilla) north of Andriivka (north of Sumy Metropolis) and that the models are combating communication and cohesion.[52] The milblogger claimed that the Russian command had initially deliberate to redeploy parts of the 177th Naval Infantry Regiment, a hundred and fifty fifth Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet), and fortieth Naval Infantry Brigade to unspecified areas in Donetsk Oblast, however then deployed them to assaults close to Novokostyantynivka, the place they're struggling excessive personnel and tools losses. The milblogger additional claimed that parts of the first Battalion of the 83rd VDV Separate Brigade took up new positions in Yablunivka and instantly fell underneath pleasant hearth because of communication points. The milblogger claimed that the command of the 2nd Battalion of the 1443rd Motorized Rifle Regiment appointed officers to command assault teams close to Novomykolaivka because of personnel shortages and that parts of the Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz within the space turned off communication techniques, inflicting panic.[53]

Order of Battle: Mashovets said that parts of the 104th VDV Regiment (76th VDV Division) are working in Yunakivka.[54] Drone operators of the Russian Anvar Spetsnaz Detachment (probably referring to the BARS-25 Anvar volunteer detachment) are reportedly putting Ukrainian logistics in Fotovyzh (northwest of Sumy Metropolis).[55] Drone operators of the 106th VDV Division are reportedly working in Sumy Oblast.[56]

Russian Fundamental Effort – Jap Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Fundamental Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast ( Russian goal: Push Ukrainian forces again from the worldwide border with Belgorod Oblast and strategy to inside tube artillery vary of Kharkiv Metropolis)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on August 11 however didn't advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv Metropolis close to Vovchansk and Synelnykove on August 10 and 11.[57] Ukrainian army observer Kostyantyn Mashovets said that Russian forces are attacking in small assault teams towards Tykhe and Zybyne (each east of Vovchansk).[58]

Order of Battle: Components of the pro-Russian Chechen Sheikh Mansur volunteer battalion (subordinated to the Russian Ministry of Protection [MoD]) are reportedly working within the Kharkiv course.[59] Drone operators of the Russian Anvar Spetsnaz Detachment (probably referring to the BARS-25 Anvar volunteer detachment) are reportedly putting Ukrainian positions in Starytsya (northeast of Kharkiv Metropolis).[60]

Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported floor exercise within the Velykyi Burluk course on August 11.

Russian Subordinate Fundamental Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian goal: Seize the rest of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into japanese Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Kupyansk course on August 11 however didn't advance.

Russian forces continued floor assaults north of Kupyansk close to Kindrashivka and Radkivka and towards Kolodyazne; east of Kupyansk close to Petropavlivka; and southeast of Kupyansk close to Stepova Novoselivka on August 10 and 11.[61]

Order of Battle: Ukrainian army observer Kostyantyn Mashovets said that parts of the Russian twenty seventh Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st Guards Tank Military [GTA], Moscow Army District [MMD]) are working within the Kupyansk course and that parts of the 68th Motorized Rifle Division (sixth Mixed Arms Military [CAA], Leningrad Army District [LMD]) are attacking towards Putynkove (north of Kupyansk) and Kolodyazne.[62] Components of the 352nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (eleventh Military Corps [AC], Leningrad Army District [LMD]) are reportedly preventing close to Stepova Novoselivka.[63]

Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Borova course on August 11 however didn't advance.

Russian forces carried out floor assaults northeast of Borova close to Nova Kruhlyakivka and southeast of Borova close to Hrekivka and Olhivka on August 10 and 11.[64]

Order of Battle: Mashovets said that parts of the Russian third Motorized Rifle Division (twentieth Mixed Arms Military [CAA], MMD) are working within the Druzhelyubivka course (southeast of Borova).[65]

Russian forces lately superior within the Lyman course.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage printed on August 11 signifies that Russian forces lately superior northwest and southeast of Kolodyazi (northeast of Lyman).[66]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces superior south of Torske and Dibrova (each east of Lyman) and north and southeast of Serednie (northwest of Lyman).[67] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces keep positions in Myrne (northeast of Lyman).[68]

Russian forces continued floor assaults northwest of Lyman close to Serednie, Shandryholove, and Karpivka; north of Lyman close to Ridkodub; northeast of Lyman close to Kolodyazi; east of Lyman close to Torske and Zarichne; and southeast of Lyman towards Yampil and within the Serebryanske forest space on August 10 and 11.[69] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked in Kolodyazi and close to Myrne.[70]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade working within the Lyman course reported that the majority of Russian forces working on this course solely signed contracts with the Russian Ministry of Protection (MoD) one month in the past and obtained solely two weeks of coaching.[71] The spokesperson added that the Russian forces are intensifying their assaults earlier than street circumstances worsen in the course of the autumnal muddy season. A servicemember of a Ukrainian brigade working within the Lyman course reported that Russian forces assault Ukrainian ahead positions in pairs concurrently from completely different instructions, permitting Russian forces to steadily focus whole detachments in opposition to one place.[72] The servicemember added that Russian forces are deploying drone operators close to infantry positions to hit targets as deep into the Ukrainian close to rear as doable, and that the danger the Russian army command is keen to place Russian drone operators in demonstrates the abundance of drone operators. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces usually are not conducting unguided glide bomb strikes in opposition to the dams on the Zherebets River east of Kolodyazi to keep away from destroying the dams and flooding the encompassing space.[73]

Order of Battle: Mashovets said that parts of the Russian 67th Motorized Rifle Division (twenty fifth CAA, Central Army District [CMD]) are working in Torske.[74] Components of the 164th Motorized Rifle Brigade (twenty fifth CAA, CMD) are additionally reportedly working in Torske.[75] Mashovets said that parts of the 144th Motorized Rifle Division (twentieth CAA, MMD) and 2nd Motorized Rifle Division (1st GTA, MMD) are working close to Zelena Dolyna, Lypove, Hlushchenkove (all north of Lyman), Karpivka, Ridkodub, and Shandryholove. Drone operators of the 144th Motorized Rifle Division are reportedly working within the Lyman course.[76]

Russian Subordinate Fundamental Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian goal: Seize the whole thing of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and probably advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Siversk course on August 11 however didn't advance.

Russian forces attacked close to Siversk itself, northwest of Siversk towards Dronivka, northeast of Siversk close to Hryhorivka and Serebryanka, east of Siversk close to Verkhnokamyanske, and southeast of Siversk close to Vyimka and Ivano-Darivka on August 10 and 11.[77]

Order of Battle: Components of the Russian 88th Motorized Rifle Brigade (third Mixed Arms Military [CAA], previously 2nd Luhansk Individuals's Republic Military Corps [LNR AC], Southern Army District [SMD]) are putting Ukrainian forces east of Zvanivka (south of Siversk).[78]

Russian forces lately superior within the Chasiv Yar course.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces superior inside and southwest of Chasiv Yar; northwest of Stupochky; and north, northwest, and south of Predtechyne (each south of Chasiv Yar).[79]

Russian forces attacked close to Chasiv Yar itself; north of Chasiv Yar close to Novomarkove; and south of Chasiv Yar close to Stupochky on August 10 and 11.[80]

Order of Battle: Components of the Russian 1442nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (sixth Motorized Rifle Division, third AC) are reportedly working in Predtechyne.[81] Armored parts of the Nevsky Volunteer Reconnaissance-Assault Brigade (Russian Volunteer Corps) are reportedly working close to Chasiv Yar.[82]

Russian forces lately superior within the Toretsk course.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage printed on August 10 signifies that parts of the Russian 68th Tank Regiment (one hundred and fiftieth Motorized Rifle Division, eighth CAA, SMD) lately superior in japanese Katerynivka (northwest of Toretsk).[83] Further geolocated footage printed on August 11 signifies that Russian forces lately superior west of Stepanivka (northwest of Toretsk).[84]

Unconfirmed claims: Ukrainian army observer Kostyantyn Mashovets said that small Russian assault teams infiltrated east of the T-0516 Toretsk-Kostyantynivka street, nearly to the northern outskirts of Shcherbynivka (west of Toretsk).[85] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces superior southwest and east of Katerynivka, north of Yablunivka, to the japanese outskirts of Kleban-Byk, and close to Poltavka and Rusyn Yar (all northwest of Toretsk).[86]

Russian forces attacked close to Toretsk itself; north of Toretsk close to Dyliivka and Bila Hora; west of Toretsk close to Shcherbynivka and Oleksandro-Kalynove; and northwest of Toretsk close to Katerynivka, Popiv Yar, Rusyn Yar, and Poltavka and towards Stepanivka and Pleshchiivka on August 10 and 11.[87]

A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces try to interrupt by weak factors in Ukrainian defenses, particularly in areas that rely on pure obstacles and restricted floor traces of communication (GLOCs).[88] The milblogger claimed that Russian reconnaissance and sabotage teams repeatedly enter the outskirts of Rusyn Yar and that the settlement is a contested "grey zone."

Order of Battle: Mashovets said that parts of the Russian 4th Motorized Rifle Brigade (third CAA, SMD) are attacking towards Oleksandro-Shultyne (north of Toretsk) on either side of the railway.[89] Mashovets said that parts of the twentieth Motorized Rifle Division (eighth CAA, SMD) are working close to Yablunivka. Components of the 103rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (one hundred and fiftieth Motorized Rifle Division, eighth CAA) are reportedly working close to the Kleban-Byk Reservoir (northwest of Toretsk).[90] Drone operators of the twenty seventh Artillery Regiment (sixth Motorized Rifle Division, third AC) are reportedly putting Ukrainian positions close to Ivanopillya (north of Toretsk).[91] Drone operators of the Rubikon Heart for Superior Unmanned Applied sciences are reportedly putting Ukrainian positions close to Kostyantynivka (northwest of Toretsk).[92]

Russian forces lately superior within the Pokrovsk course.

See topline textual content for stories of assessed Russian advances within the Pokrovsk course.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces superior close to Troyanda (southwest of Pokrovsk).[93]

Russian forces carried out offensive operations north of Pokrovsk close to Vilne, Sukhetske, and Rodynske; northeast of Pokrovsk close to Mayak, Dorozhnie, Shakhove, Nove Shakhove, Novoekonomichne, Volodymyrivka, Zatyshok, Zapovidne, Krasnyi Lyman, Fedorivka, and Boikivka and towards Kucheriv Yar; east of Pokrovsk close to Promin, Myrolyubivka, and Myrnohrad; southeast of Pokrovsk close to Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk close to Chunyshyne and Novoukrainka; and southwest of Pokrovsk close to Zvirove, Kotlyne, and Udachne on August 10 and 11.[94]

Ukrainian Dnipro Grouping of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Viktor Trehubov said that Russian forces within the Pokrovsk course are conducting each extremely attritional infantry assaults with poorly skilled personnel and assaults with extra fight skilled and higher skilled personnel.[95] A Russian milblogger claimed that drone operators of the Russian fifth Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, previously 1st Donetsk Individuals's Republic [DNR] AC, SMD) are utilizing first-person view (FPV) drones to drop anti-tank grenades within the Pokrovsk course.[96] A Russian supply claimed that Russian forces are citing recent reserves within the Pokrovsk course.[97] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces carried out two Geran-2 drone strikes in opposition to Zolotyi Kolodyaz (northeast of Pokrovsk).[98]

Order of Battle: Mashovets reported that parts of the Russian thirty ninth Motorized Rifle Brigade (68th AC, Jap Army District [EMD]) are working within the Dobropillya course northeast of Pokrovsk.[99] Mashovets said that parts of the first and ninth motorized rifle brigades (each 51st CAA, SMD) are attacking close to Rodynske and Krasnyi Lyman. Drone operators of the eightieth Sparta Reconnaissance Battalion (51st CAA) are reportedly working close to Myrnohrad.[100]

Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Novopavlivka course on August 11 however didn't advance.

Russian forces attacked southeast of Novopavlivka close to Horikhove and Dachne; south of Novopavlivka towards Filiya; and southwest of Novopavlivka close to Zelenyi Hai and Ivanivka on August 10 and 11.[101]

Order of Battle: Mashovets reported that parts of the Russian thirty sixth Motorized Rifle Brigade and 430th Separate Motorized Rifle Regiment (each twenty ninth CAA, EMD), with reinforcements from parts of the fortieth Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet), are working close to Zelenyi Hai.[102]

Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Velykomykhailivka course on August 11 however didn't make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Mashovets reported that parts of the Russian 336th Naval Infantry Brigade (Baltic Fleet) superior roughly one kilometer south of Maliivka (southeast of Velykomykhailivka).[103] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces superior west of Piddubne (northeast of Velykomykhailivka).[104]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Velykomykhailivka close to Myrne; east of Velykomykhailivka close to Voskresenka and Oleksandrohrad; and southeast of Velykomykhailivka close to Vilne Pole, Sichneve, Maliivka, and Shevchenko and towards Novoheorhiivka and Komyshuvakha on August 10 and 11.[105]

Order of Battle: Mashovets reported that parts of the Russian thirty sixth Motorized Rifle Brigade and 430th Separate Motorized Rifle Regiment (each twenty ninth CAA, EMD), with reinforcements from parts of the fortieth Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet), are working towards Andriivka-Klevtsove (northeast of Velykomykhailivka).[106] Mashovets reported that parts of the thirty seventh Motorized Rifle Brigade (thirty sixth CAA, EMD) are working within the Sichneve and Oleksandrohrad instructions. Drone operators of the 57th Motorized Rifle Brigade (fifth CAA, EMD) are reportedly putting Ukrainian positions east of Shevchenko.[107]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian goal: Keep frontline positions, safe rear areas in opposition to Ukrainian strikes, and advance inside tube artillery vary of Zaporizhzhia Metropolis)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in japanese Zaporizhia Oblast on August 11, however didn't make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Ukrainian army observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported that Russian forces superior south of Temyrivka (northeast of Hulyaipole) alongside the O-0510 Velyka Novosilka-Hulyaipole freeway.[108]

Russian forces attacked east of Hulyaipole close to Malynivka on August 10 and 11.[109]

Order of Battle: Components of the Russian 69th Protecting Brigade and thirty eighth Motorized Rifle Brigade (each of the thirty fifth Mixed Arms Military [CAA], Jap Army District [EMD]) are reportedly working close to Malynivka.[110] Drone operators of the 57th Motorized Rifle Brigade (fifth CAA, EMD) and 143rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division, fifth CAA) are reportedly working within the Zaporizhia course (seemingly referring to japanese Zaporizhia Oblast).[111]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on August 11 however didn't advance.

Russian forces attacked west of Orikhiv close to Plavni and Stepnohirsk; southwest of Orikhiv close to Kamyanske; south of Orikhiv in the direction of Novodanylivka; and southeast of Orikhiv in the direction of Mala Tokmachka on August 10 and 11.[112] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked close to Kamyanske and Plavni.[113]

Order of Battle: Components of the Russian seventh Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly working close to Stepnohirsk.[114]

Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Kherson course on August 10 and 11, however didn't advance.[115]

Order of Battle: Components of the Russian 61st Naval Infantry Brigade (Northern Fleet) and the 104th VDV Division are reportedly working within the Kherson course.[116]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Marketing campaign (Russian Goal: Goal Ukrainian army and civilian infrastructure within the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces carried out a collection of drone strikes in opposition to Ukraine in a single day on August 10 to 11. The Ukrainian Air Power reported that Russia launched 71 Shahed-type and decoy drones from the instructions of Kursk Metropolis; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai.[117] The Ukrainian Air Power reported that Ukrainian forces downed 59 drones, that 12 drones struck six places, and that drone particles hit one location.[118]

The Ukrainian Power Ministry reported {that a} Russian airstrike broken the Exterior Disaster Heart of the ZNPP constructing in Zaporizhzhia Metropolis on August 10.[119] The Ukrainian Power Ministry reported that the Exterior Disaster Heart screens radiation ranges on the ZNPP after the Russian occupation authorities stopped transmitting information on the nuclear and radiation standing of the plant to Ukrainian authorities. Ukrainian officers said on August 11 that Russian glide bombs additionally broken residential buildings and medical infrastructure and injured at the least 23 civilians in Zaporizhzhia Metropolis on August 10.[120]

Important exercise in Belarus (Russian efforts to extend its army presence in Belarus and additional combine Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Russia and Belarus proceed to develop governmental infrastructure to extend integration inside the Union State framework. Russian President Vladimir Putin appointed Russian Deputy International Minister Alexander Grushko to additionally function Russia’s Particular Consultant for the Settlement on Safety Ensures for the Union State.[121] Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko appointed Belarusian Deputy International Minister Igor Sekreta to behave as Belarus' particular consultant on July 15.[122]

Word: ISW doesn't obtain any labeled materials from any supply, makes use of solely publicly accessible info, and attracts extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media in addition to commercially accessible satellite tv for pc imagery and different geospatial information as the idea for these stories. References to all sources used are supplied within the endnotes of every replace.

[1] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZtVMoko3mSI ; https://www.whitehouse.gov/movies/president-trump-holds-a-press-conference-aug-11-2025/

[2] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZtVMoko3mSI ; https://www.whitehouse.gov/movies/president-trump-holds-a-press-conference-aug-11-2025/

[3] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/lands-ukraine-must-liberate

[4] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-4 ; https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/mar/04/zaporizhzhia-nuclear-power-plant-everything-you-need-to-know

[5] https://isw.pub/UkrWar032625 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar032225

[6] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sypwNUiVR1Q

[7] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-30-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/adversary-entente-task-force-update-july-30-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-26-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/adversary-entente-task-force-update-july-2-2025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar072825; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042825

[8] https://isw.pub/UkrWar071425; https://isw.pub/UkrWar061925; https://isw.pub/UkrWar060725; https://isw.pub/UkrWar051725; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-7-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-8-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-6-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-24-2025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar021825

[9] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-30-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-18-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-27-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-20-2025

[10] https://isw.pub/UkrWar071725; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-20-2025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar060625; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-6-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-25-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-30-2025;

[11] https://information dot ru/vlast/v-gd-otvetili-na-slova-ryutte-o-reshenii-territorialnogo-voprosa-ukrainy ; https://lenta dot ru/information/2025/08/08/v-rossii-vyskazalis-o-gotovnosti-k-sammitu-s-evrosoyuzom/ ; https://iz dot ru/1933926/2025-08-08/v-gosdume-vyskazalis-o-vozmozhnosti-sammita-rf-i-evrosoiuza

[12] https://iz dot ru/1934898/oleg-karpovich/sammit-vo-imia-budushchego

[13] https://isw.pub/UkrWar080825

[14] https://www.nytimes.com/2025/08/10/world/europe/putin-russia-ukraine-war-dmitri-kozak.html

[15] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russia-review-kremlins-fake-de-escalation-donbas; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-31-2023 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-4 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-12-2024 ; https://meduza dot io/en/function/2022/06/10/the-viceroy

[16] https://t.me/DeputatZhuravlev/13450

[17] https://tsargrad dot television/articles/uzhe-ne-skryt-kompromiss-s-ssha-po-ukraine-lovushka-dlja-rossii-lavrov-skazal-glavnoe_1334486

[18] https://lenta dot ru/information/2025/08/10/v-gosdume-otvetili-na-zayavlenie-zelenskogo-o-territoriyah/

[19] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-1-2025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar072325 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar062225 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar061925 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar061125 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar052125 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar051225 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar060425; https://isw.pub/UkrWar021425; https://isw.pub/UkrWar121624; https://isw.pub/UkrWar070424

[20] https://tass dot ru/armiya-i-opk/24751559

[21] https://tass dot ru/politika/24754151

[22] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-9-2025

[23] https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/biden-putin-summit-review-good-news-for-ukraine/; https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IN/PDF/IN11694/IN11694.5.pdf

[24] https://isw.pub/UkrWar080525

[25] https://t.me/Dobropillya_info/13316

[26] https://companies.modaps.eosdis.nasa.gov/map/#d:24hrs;@37.16,48.43,10.00z;

[27] https://t.me/mod_russia/55459; https://t.me/mod_russia/55460;

[28] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2915

[29] https://t.me/z_arhiv/32215; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/175534; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66605

[30] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66605

[31] https://t.me/dva_majors/77185

[32] https://isw.pub/UkrWar042824; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042524

[33] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-7-2025

[34] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-drone-innovations-are-likely-achieving-effects-battlefield-air-interdiction

[35] https://t.me/rybar/72741 ; https://t.me/milinfolive/154488 ; https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/22389; https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/22390 ; https://x.com/wartranslated/standing/1954885734982148519

[36] https://t.me/serhii_flash/6050

[37] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-drone-innovations-are-likely-achieving-effects-battlefield-air-interdiction

[38] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-drone-innovations-are-likely-achieving-effects-battlefield-air-interdiction

[39] https://isw.pub/UkrWar073125 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-19-2025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar081025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar080825

[40] https://x.com/Osinttechnical/standing/1954717862003933242; https://t.me/exilenova_plus/11401

[41] https://t.me/glebnikitin_nn/7410; https://t.me/tass_agency/330372

[42] https://suspilne dot media/1087534-droni-gur-atakuvali-rosijskij-npz-za-2000-km-vid-ukraini-dzerela/

[43] https://t.me/pgukhta11/19585

[44] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-7-2025

[45] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27704 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27668 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27665

[46] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32300

[47] https://t.me/OMBR156/867 ; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9772 ; https://x.com/blinzka/standing/1954837169010290773; https://x.com/PuenteUribarri/standing/1954797025020567627; https://t.me/black_swan_ukraine/380; https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/30189

[48] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2913

[49] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27704

[50]https://t.me/severnnyi/4788 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/28404 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/175582 ; https://t.me/rybar/72737

[51] https://t.me/severnnyi/4788 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/28404 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/175582; https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2913

[52] https://t.me/severnnyi/4793

[53] https://t.me/severnnyi/4792

[54] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2913

[55] https://t.me/bear007/73615

[56] https://t.me/mod_russia/55458

[57] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27704 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27668 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27665 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15422 ; https://t.me/rybar/72737 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/77184 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/28404 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/175582 ; https://t.me/severnnyi/4788

[58] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2913

[59] https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/5899

[60] https://t.me/bear007/73615

[61] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27704; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27668; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27665

[62] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2914

[63] https://t.me/motopatriot78/40350

[64] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27668; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27668; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15422

[65] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2914

[66] https://t.me/bbps_vidarr/241; https://x.com/richardzai38580/standing/1954871360712478947; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9777; https://t.me/bbps_vidarr/241

[67] https://t.me/motopatriot78/40448; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66586; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66587

[68] https://t.me/motopatriot78/40467; https://t.me/motopatriot78/40470

[69] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27704; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27668; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27665; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15422; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66586; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66587; https://t.me/wargonzo/28404; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/175582

[70] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66586; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66587

[71] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ch7hItGD05g ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/11/aktyvno-prymushuyut-kupuvaty-motoczykly-rosiyany-pershymy-kydayut-pomyraty-v-atakah-misyachnykiv/

[72] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vnsq2tu2Oo0; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/11/yakshho-yih-absolyutno-ne-shkoda-to-yih-duzhe-bagato-poblyzu-lymanu-generaly-rf-vidpravlyayut-dronariv-na-pihotni-pozycziyi/

[73] https://t.me/motopatriot78/40467; https://t.me/motopatriot78/40470

[74] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2914

[75] https://t.me/motopatriot78/40446

[76] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/175561

[77] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27704; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27668; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27665; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15422; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/175582;

[78] https://t.me/shock3OA/1858; https://x.com/richardzai38580/standing/1954822367223640553

[79] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32297; https://t.me/rusich_army/25154

[80] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27704; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27668; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27665

[81] https://t.me/motopatriot78/40517; https://t.me/motopatriot78/40519

[82] https://t.me/tass_agency/330431

[83] https://x.com/AudaxonX/standing/1954813872541483425 ; https://t.me/rus_alania/175

[84] https://t.me/bbc44ombr/107 ; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9775

[85] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2914

[86] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/175541 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/330302 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/175541

[87] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27704 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27668 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27665 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15422

[88] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/175600

[89] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2914

[90] https://t.me/motopatriot78/40350

[91] https://t.me/sashakots/55460

[92] https://t.me/tass_agency/330458

[93] https://t.me/wargonzo/28404

[94] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27704; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27668 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27665; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15422; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66605

[95] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vnsq2tu2Oo0 ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/11/daleko-ne-dzhony-rembo-ale-i-ne-chmoni-pokrovsk-atakuyut-rosijski-pidrozdily-zarobitchan/

[96] https://t.me/sashakots/55465

[97] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/175582

[98] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/175590

[99] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2915

[100] https://t.me/nm_dnr/14166

[101] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27704 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27668 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27665 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15422

[102] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2915

[103] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2915

[104] https://t.me/motopatriot78/40521

[105] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27704 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27668 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27665 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15422 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/28404 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66584 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/175582

[106] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2915

[107] https://t.me/voin_dv/16407; https://x.com/richardzai38580/standing/1954594349658030169

[108] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2915

[109] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27668; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27665; https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2915

[110] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2915

[111] https://t.me/voin_dv/16419; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32327; https://t.me/voin_dv/16410

[112] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27704; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27668; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27665; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/175582; https://t.me/rybar/72737; https://t.me/rybar/72738 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/77184

[113] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/175582; https://t.me/rybar/72737; https://t.me/rybar/72738 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/77184

[114] https://t.me/rybar/72738 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/77184

[115] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27704; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27668; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27665

[116] https://t.me/dva_majors/77222; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32321

[117] https://t.me/kpszsu/40202

[118] https://t.me/kpszsu/40202

[119] https://t.me/energyofukraine/4249 ; https://suspilne dot media/zaporizhzhia/1088130-vnaslidok-rosijskogo-aviaudaru-po-zaporizzu-10-serpna-poskodzeno-zovnisnij-krizovij-centr-zaes/

[120] https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/standing/1954609405863071994; https://suspilne dot media/zaporizhzhia/1087444-armia-rf-atakuvala-zaporizza-e-poraneni-8/; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/23635

[121] https://t.me/tass_agency/330428; https://t.me/belta_telegramm/328528; https://belta dot by/politics/view/putin-naznachil-spetspredstavitelja-po-dogovoru-o-garantijah-bezopasnosti-mezhdu-belarusjju-i-rf-731302-2025/

[122] https://belta dot by/president/view/lukashenko-naznachil-spetspredstavitelja-belarusi-po-realizatsii-dogovora-o-garantijah-bezopasnosti-v-726599-2025/