Russian Offensive Marketing campaign Evaluation, August 16, 2025

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Grace Mappes, Daria Novikov, Olivia Gibson, Jennie Olmsted, Anna Harvey, and Frederick W. Kagan

August 16, 2025, 9pm ET

Click on here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is up to date each day alongside the static maps current on this report.

Click on here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click on here to see ISW’s 3D management of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a pc (not a cellular machine) is strongly advisable for utilizing this data-heavy software.

Click on here to entry ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces each day by exhibiting a dynamic frontline. ISW will replace this time-lapse map archive month-to-month.

Word: The information cut-off for this product was 12pm ET on August 16. ISW will cowl subsequent studies within the August 17 Russian Offensive Marketing campaign Evaluation.

Numerous US officers indicated that Russian President Vladimir Putin could also be prepared to compromise on some battle termination calls for, however Putin's personal statements and Russian official statements contradict these claims. US President Donald Trump said on August 16 that his assembly with Putin and subsequent name with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and European and NATO leaders have been productive.[1] Trump said following that "all" decided that one of the best ways to finish Russia's battle in Ukraine is to start direct negotiations for a peace settlement, reasonably than a ceasefire settlement. Trump introduced that he'll meet with Zelensky on the White Home on August 18 and that he and Zelensky might schedule a subsequent assembly with Putin if the August 18 assembly goes properly. Trump didn't specify whether or not the following assembly with Putin will likely be bilateral or trilateral, although Trump informed Fox Information following the Alaska summit on August 15 that each Putin and Zelensky need Trump to attend a leader-level assembly.[2] Axios correspondent Barak Ravid reported on August 16, citing an unspecified supply who was on Trump's name with Zelensky and European leaders, that Trump said that Putin expressed curiosity in a complete settlement to finish the battle reasonably than a ceasefire and said that "a fast peace settlement is healthier than a ceasefire."[3] Bloomberg reported, citing sources accustomed to the matter, that Trump said on this name that Putin needs Ukraine to cede all of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts however famous that it's as much as Ukraine to resolve what to do with its territory.[4] The sources informed Bloomberg that Putin proposed to successfully freeze the entrance line in Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts. The sources reported that Trump expressed the USA' readiness to contribute to safety ensures for Ukraine as long as the ensures don't contain NATO, and that Trump steered that Putin would settle for this. Axios reported, citing a supply with direct information of Trump's cellphone name, that Trump knowledgeable Zelensky and the European leaders that Putin claimed that Russian forces have been making important battlefield progress and that Putin may seize all of Donetsk Oblast.[5] The supply informed Axios that US Particular Envoy for the Center East Steve Witkoff briefed Zelensky and NATO leaders through the name on how Putin views territorial points and what Putin is prepared to offer in return. The supply reported that Witkoff knowledgeable the leaders that Putin is prepared to finish the battle and decide to abstaining from seizing extra Ukrainian territory and to not assault Ukraine or different international locations in a brand new battle.

It's unclear what Putin provided in his assembly with Trump past reiterating his demand for Donetsk Oblast and providing a restricted ceasefire with no identified timeframe in Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts. Russian Presidential Aide Yuri Ushakov said on August 16, after the Alaska Summit, that he didn't know when Trump and Putin would meet once more and that the topic of a trilateral assembly between Putin, Trump, and Zelensky has not been mentioned.[6] Ravid reported {that a} supply briefed on Trump's talks with Putin said that Putin proposed to freeze the frontline in Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts in change for Ukraine's withdrawal from Donetsk Oblast and that the US delegation perceived that Putin is open to negotiations concerning Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts.[7] Ravid reported that Putin requested that the USA acknowledge "these 4 oblasts" (presumably Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts, though the reporting is just not clear) and occupied Crimea as Russian. The Monetary Occasions (FT) reported, citing 4 sources with direct information of the talks, that Putin demanded that Ukrainian forces withdraw from all of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts as a precondition for ending Russia’s battle in Ukraine.[8] Three of the sources informed FT that Putin provided to freeze the frontline in Kherson and Zaporizhia oblasts and to not launch new assaults to grab further territory (it's not clear if he meant in these two oblasts or elsewhere), in change for Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts. Senior Russian officers and most sources talking to Western media didn't point out that Putin talked about Sumy or Kharkiv oblasts, which is notable as a result of Russian forces are additionally conducting offensive operations in these areas. Newsmax White Home correspondent Mike Carter reported on August 15, citing unspecified sources, that Putin dropped his objections to educating the Ukrainian language in Ukraine and NATO states offering safety ensures to Ukraine that might allow NATO states to defend Ukraine if Russia violates any settlement.[9] Carter reported that the unspecified sources said that Russia and Ukraine nonetheless have to work out the definition and implementation of a ceasefire.

Putin’s demand for all of Donetsk Oblast is essentially the most clear and constant demand popping out of the Alaska Summit. Putin might have additionally provided a restricted ceasefire in southern Ukraine in change for Donetsk Oblast, however different particulars of Putin's supply to Trump stay unclear. Putin has established territorial calls for over the rest of Donetsk Oblast, that are sometimes the topic of battle termination negotiations, as preconditions for any attainable future ceasefire in Ukraine. A former senior Kremlin official steered to FT that Putin is ready to compromise on different points, together with territory, if Putin is glad that an settlement addresses the “root causes” of the battle.[10] The Kremlin has repeatedly outlined root causes as NATO's eastward enlargement and Ukraine's alleged discrimination towards Russian-speakers and has repeatedly invoked this phrase as shorthand for Ukraine's full capitulation to Russia and the resumption of Russian management over Ukraine.[11] Putin's demand that any settlement deal with these "root causes" is just not a compromise from his unique battle goals, and studies that Putin "compromised" on points corresponding to Ukraine's skill to show its personal language in its personal nation are designed to obfuscate Putin's precise unwillingness to compromise.

Ukrainian forces wouldn't be capable to conduct a protected and orderly withdrawal from unoccupied Donetsk Oblast in accordance with Putin's demand with no full ceasefire throughout all the theater, nonetheless. A Ukrainian withdrawal from the rest of Donetsk Oblast – which ISW continues to evaluate could be a significant strategic navy and political concession – with no full ceasefire that extends to long-range strikes and all frontline exercise would pose main dangers to each withdrawing Ukrainian forces and Ukrainian forces in rear areas in Kharkiv Oblast. Putin notably has not provided a ceasefire underneath which Ukrainian forces would be capable to safely withdraw throughout the Donetsk Oblast border and defend rear areas towards renewed Russian aggression on the flanks. The Donetsk Oblast administrative boundary is way from Ukraine's principal defensive position in Donetsk Oblast often known as the "fortress belt," and even when Putin carried out a ceasefire lengthy sufficient for Ukrainian forces to withdraw from Donetsk Oblast, renewed Russian floor assaults and fires each from advancing forces in Donetsk Oblast and forces on the flank in Kharkiv Oblast would threaten Ukrainian forces alongside the frontline and in rear areas.[12] A Ukrainian withdrawal would seemingly lead to massive power concentrations alongside main Ukrainian thoroughfares and defensive buildings that Russian aviation, drones, and artillery would seemingly goal upon the expiration of a ceasefire. These strikes would degrade Ukrainian forces' fight capabilities, together with Ukraine's skill to defend towards renewed Russian efforts to advance into Kharkiv Oblast from Donetsk Oblast or alongside the suitable flank in Kharkiv Oblast. Russian forces working in Donetsk Oblast would additionally seemingly pursue withdrawing Ukrainian forces alongside routes of egress, threatening to rout the withdrawing Ukrainian forces and degrade their skill to determine new defensive positions in Kharkiv Oblast. Russian forces in Donetsk Oblast would seemingly additionally obtain fireplace assist from Russian forces already working in neighboring Kharkiv Oblast, which might additional threaten the rear of the withdrawing Ukrainian forces. These Russian strikes would additionally make it untenable for Ukrainian forces to take care of their positions on the east (left) financial institution of the Oskil River and set situations for Russian forces to push additional into Kharkiv Oblast from Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts. A partial ceasefire that doesn't lengthen to Russian navy exercise in Kharkiv and Luhansk oblasts would subsequently be inadequate for assuring the protected withdrawal of Ukrainian forces from the rest of Donetsk Oblast.

ISW continues to evaluate {that a} potential Ukrainian withdrawal from Donetsk Oblast would degrade Ukraine's defensive capabilities and protection industrial base (DIB) and put tons of of hundreds extra Ukrainian civilians underneath Russian occupation. Ukraine would require sturdy worldwide safety ensures and the speedy deployment of a world peacekeeping contingent to discourage future Russian aggression. ISW continues to evaluate that surrendering presently unoccupied areas of Donetsk Oblast to Russia would place Russian forces extraordinarily properly to resume their aggression towards Ukraine on rather more favorable phrases, having prevented a protracted and bloody wrestle for this territory and given Russia the chance to construct up manpower and weapons shares.[13] ISW beforehand famous that permitting Russia to occupy the rest of Donetsk Oblast would concede Ukraine’s fortress belt to Russian forces, and this fortress belt additionally contains important DIB infrastructure. Russian forces have notably been unable to advance to or envelop the fortress belt since Fall 2022. The Russian navy command would virtually definitely work to quickly set up lasting positions all through the fortress belt and make the most of the fortress belt's DIB for navy manufacturing if Ukrainian forces withdraw from their positions in Donetsk Oblast. ISW additionally beforehand famous that the Donetsk Oblast border space is of course poorly suited to behave as a sturdy defensive position attributable to its few settlements, open fields, and pure obstacles such because the Oskil and Siverskyi Donets rivers.[14] A Ukrainian withdrawal throughout the Donetsk Oblast border would subsequently additionally require the deployment of a sturdy worldwide peacekeeping power and large-scale funding in infrastructure suitable with a large-scale, long-term ceasefire monitoring mission to stop future Russian aggression. The absence of a full ceasefire on the frontline and concerning long-range strikes would seemingly preclude the deployment of this worldwide power, nonetheless.

Seizing the rest of Donetsk Oblast would seemingly be a troublesome and years-long effort for Russian forces reasonably than a fast effort as Putin seemingly goals to painting, as Russian forces stay unable to safe operationally important advances or advance quicker than foot tempo. Putin has remained dedicated to gradual, grinding advances on the battlefield by means of attritional infantry assaults – constraining the utmost attainable charge of Russian advance to footpace.[15] Ukrainian drone strikes have considerably sophisticated the Russian navy command's skill to tactically make use of heavy gear, as Russia has not discovered learn how to adequately defend armored automobiles and tanks from Ukrainian drones.[16] Russian forces have subsequently been unable to revive mechanized maneuver to the battlefield to create and exploit breakthroughs and obtain operationally-significant advances.[17] The Russian navy command has carried out an operational sample that leverages creeping partial envelopments of frontline cities and settlements earlier than starting street-by-street frontal assaults to power Ukrainian withdrawals. Russian forces have confirmed unable to make important advances in Ukraine by conducting frontal assaults.[18] The Russian navy command has didn't operationalize its envelopment tactic towards a big Ukrainian defensive position and can seemingly be unable to leverage this tactic to grab the fortress belt cities that type the spine of the Ukrainian forces' protection quickly — such an operation three and a half years into the battle would seemingly be a multi-year effort with important Russian personnel and materials losses.[19] Russian forces have additionally lately leaned on infiltration techniques to make tactically-significant advances, however have so far struggled to take advantage of these infiltrations and consolidate positions of their paths of advance at scale.[20] Russian forces presently haven't any technique of quickly enveloping, penetrating, or in any other case seizing Ukraine’s fortress belt or the rest of unoccupied Donetsk Oblast, which Putin has demanded as a precondition for a ceasefire with no comparable Russian concessions.

Putin's reported rejection of a full ceasefire in Ukraine and the continuing Russian offensives in Kharkiv and Sumy oblasts point out that Putin intends to proceed his battle in Ukraine whereas negotiations are ongoing — a degree that Russian Safety Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev welcomed. Medvedev said on his Russian- and English-language Telegram channels on August 16 that the Trump-Putin assembly "demonstrated that negotiations are attainable with out preconditions" whereas Russia continues its battle in Ukraine.[21] The Kremlin seems to have efficiently narrowed discussions of the battle in Ukraine to the destiny of Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhia oblasts — the 4 oblasts that Russia illegally annexed in September 2022.[22] Russian forces proceed offensive efforts to advance into northern Sumy Oblast and northern and japanese Kharkiv Oblast, nonetheless. Putin's reported calls for largely don't deal with the destiny of those oblasts or the Russian navy efforts inside them. Russian forces would presumably proceed their offensive efforts in these areas whereas negotiations are ongoing. Putin is trying to obfuscate his unwillingness to decide to a complete ceasefire by repackaging certainly one of his battle goals as a prerequisite to negotiations for a everlasting peace. Putin seemingly goals to each stave off additional US sanctions that would hinder Russia's skill to finance its battle effort and to extract additional US, Ukrainian, and European concessions by means of the continuing negotiation course of.

The Kremlin reportedly instructed Russian media retailers to current the Alaska summit as a gathering between two superpowers and to organize Russian society for the potential for a protracted battle in Ukraine. Russian opposition outlet Meduza reported on August 16 that the Kremlin disseminated an instruction handbook to pro-government and state-run media retailers in Russia after the summit to report that "no deal [on Ukraine] was reached on the summit — and that no deal may have been reached."[23] Meduza reported that the Kremlin instructed media retailers to assert that Trump and Putin didn't talk about "Ukrainian and European calls for for an unconditional ceasefire," that Trump urged Zelensky to make a take care of Putin, and that Trump greeted Putin on the tarmac as a gesture of goodwill. Meduza reported that the Kremlin instructed media retailers to explain the assembly as "historic" as a result of "Putin restored Russia's standing as an amazing superpower" and to explain Trump and Putin as "equals." Meduza quoted the handbook as claiming that "the revival of Russia’s energy and authority is the results of current years," seemingly referring to Russia's aggression in Ukraine, long-term navy reorganization efforts, and strengthened ties with states together with Iran, North Korea, and the Individuals's Republic of China (PRC) since February 2022.[24] Meduza reported that the Kremlin issued a separate instruction handbook earlier than the summit stating that media retailers ought to emphasize that Putin spoke with Trump about "Kyiv's unwillingness to barter," that Russia is prepared for any state of affairs within the talks, and that it's Putin — reasonably than Trump —who units the agenda for US-Russian relations.[25] Meduza reported that the pre-summit handbook instructed reporters to emphasise that the USA and Russia have many avenues for "mutual understanding" and that bilateral cooperation wouldn't be restricted to the "Ukrainian problem." A media strategist working with the Russian Presidential Administration’s political staff informed Meduza that the Russian authorities aimed to organize the Russian public for the chance that the summit would fail to pause combating and emphasize that Putin is setting the phrases — cohering with ISW's long-held evaluation that the Kremlin is just not setting informational situations for Russians to simply accept an finish to the battle that doesn't quantity to a Russian victory on Putin's phrases.

Russian officers proceed rhetorical campaigns designed to undermine Ukraine's sovereignty and peace negotiations and to legitimize Russia's battle in Ukraine. Russian State Duma Deputy Alexei Zhuravlev claimed in an interview with Russian outlet Information dot ru on August 16 that Trump and Putin communicated as political equals and that the summit was a significant occasion in international diplomacy.[26] Zhuravlev additionally claimed that the USA understands the ”root causes” of the battle in Ukraine — a time period Russian officers use as shorthand to reiterate Putin's pre-war calls for of Ukrainian neutrality and regime change.[27] Zhuravlev claimed in one other interview to Russian outlet Gazeta dot ru that the battle in Ukraine can solely finish if the USA "affirm[s] Russia's safety ensures" and added that Ukraine and the EU shouldn't be concerned within the peace course of.[28] Russian officers have ceaselessly claimed that Ukrainian and European management are prolonging the battle in Ukraine and will not be thinking about peace negotiations in an effort to undermine Ukraine's sovereignty, deny Kyiv a task within the peace course of, and divide Ukraine from its allies.[29] Russian Federation Council Committee on Constitutional Laws and State Constructing Chairperson Andrei Klishas claimed that the assembly between Trump and Putin confirmed Russia's need for a long-term and simply peace and that Russia will obtain this objective both by means of navy or diplomatic means.[30] Klishas additionally reiterated a long-standing Russian declare that there may be no unconditional ceasefire in Ukraine.[31] This rhetoric reinforces to a home Russian viewers that it should not count on Putin to compromise on his long-held, public calls for to attain his full aims in Ukraine.

Russian International Minister Sergei Lavrov, who was a part of the Russian delegation in Alaska, arrived in Anchorage on August 15 carrying a USSR sweatshirt in a staged media stunt.[32] Lavrov seemingly sought to current Russia because the heir of the Soviet Union and concurrently equate Russia and the USA as comparable superpowers, in keeping with the reported Kremlin command to Russian media to report that Putin restored Russia to its nice energy standing, a standing that Putin and different Russian officers have lengthy complained was misplaced when the Soviet Union collapsed.[33] Russian officers have claimed that the Soviet Union by no means legally dissolved and that the Soviet Union subsequently nonetheless exists, with Russia because the authorized heir of its energy, territory, and treaties — setting informational situations to exert management over former Soviet Union states.[34] ISW continues to evaluate that Russia very seemingly maintains territorial ambitions past occupied Crimea and the opposite 4 Ukrainian oblasts it has illegally annexed.[35] Lavrov additionally seemingly sought to current the battle in Ukraine as a matter that falls inside Russia's sphere of affect wherein different states shouldn't intervene, much like Russian Presidential Advisor Anton Kobyakov's declare in Could 2025 that the Soviet Union nonetheless legally exists and that the battle in Ukraine is subsequently an "inner course of."[36] Putin additionally said through the joint press convention with Trump on August 15 that Russia and Ukraine share the "similar roots" and that Russia considers Ukraine to be a "brotherly" nation, a long-standing Kremlin narrative with roots in Putin's July 2021 essay on the "Historic Unity of Russians and Ukrainians" that additionally seeks to current the battle in Ukraine as an inner affair.[37]

Ukrainian forces seemingly cleared a number of settlements throughout the Russian penetration northeast of Dobropillya. Geolocated footage revealed on August 15 reveals Ukrainian forces clearing Russian positions and taking Russian prisoners of battle (POWs) northeast of Dobropillya inside Vesele and Hruzke (northeast of Dobropillya).[38] The Ukrainian Basic Employees confirmed the first Azov Military Corps (AC) August 15 report that Ukrainian forces cleared six settlements northeast of Dobropillya, together with Hruzke, Rubizhne, Novovodyane, Petrivka, Vesele, and Zolotyi Kolodyaz in operations from August 12 to fifteen.[39] The Ukrainian Basic Employees and 1st Azov AC said that Ukrainian forces killed 271 Russian personnel, wounded 101, and took 13 POWs, and that Ukrainian forces destroyed one Russian tank, two armored automobiles, and 37 bikes and different automobiles in these operations. Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces solely superior in unfortified areas northeast of Dobropilllya and that Russian forces are strengthening their positions within the northern part of the penetration.[40] One Russian milblogger denied Ukrainian claims that Ukrainian forces superior within the salient however conceded that Ukrainian forces entered Vesele and Zolotyi Kolodyaz.[41] The milblogger additionally claimed that Russian forces are holding their positions close to Zolotyi Kolodyaz.[42] One other Russian milblogger complained that the Russian penetration is just not sustainable as a result of it's too slender and weak to Ukrainian interdiction efforts and assaults that threaten Russian forces' skill to maintain the penetration.[43] The milblogger claimed that Russian forces are unable to chop the T-0514 Dobropillya-Kramatorsk freeway as a result of the bottom of the penetration is simply too slender for its depth, and that Russian forces have to widen the penetration’s flanks earlier than combating towards the freeway. The footage of Ukrainian forces recapturing settlements northeast of Dobropillya and the shortage of reporting suggesting that Russian forces are reinforcing and resupplying the penetration sufficient to take advantage of the penetration signifies that Ukrainian forces have seemingly retaken these settlements, as a number of Ukrainian sources have now reported.[44] This footage and these studies additionally recommend that Russian forces very seemingly don't have steady and enduring positions throughout the penetration and certain don't management the world between Russian positions east and northeast of Dobropillya and the bottom of the penetration southeast of Dobropillya.

Key Takeaways:

Numerous US officers indicated that Russian President Vladimir Putin could also be prepared to compromise on some battle termination calls for, however Putin's personal statements and Russian official statements contradict these claims. It's unclear what Putin provided in his assembly with Trump past reiterating his demand for Donetsk Oblast and providing a restricted ceasefire with no identified timeframe in Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts. Putin’s demand for all of Donetsk Oblast is essentially the most clear and constant demand popping out of the Alaska Summit. Ukrainian forces wouldn't be capable to conduct a protected and orderly withdrawal from unoccupied Donetsk Oblast in accordance with Putin's demand with no full ceasefire throughout all the theater, nonetheless ISW continues to evaluate {that a} potential Ukrainian withdrawal from Donetsk Oblast would degrade Ukraine's defensive capabilities and protection industrial base (DIB) and put tons of of hundreds extra Ukrainian civilians underneath Russian occupation. Ukraine would require sturdy worldwide safety ensures and the speedy deployment of a world peacekeeping contingent to discourage future Russian aggression. Seizing the rest of Donetsk Oblast would seemingly be a troublesome and years-long effort for Russian forces reasonably than a fast effort as Putin seemingly goals to painting, as Russian forces stay unable to safe operationally important advances or advance quicker than foot tempo. Putin's reported rejection of a full ceasefire in Ukraine and the continuing Russian offensives in Kharkiv and Sumy oblasts point out that Putin intends to proceed his battle in Ukraine whereas negotiations are ongoing — a degree that Russian Safety Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev welcomed. The Kremlin reportedly instructed Russian media retailers to current the Alaska summit as a gathering between two superpowers and to organize Russian society for the potential for a protracted battle in Ukraine. Russian officers proceed rhetorical campaigns designed to undermine Ukraine's sovereignty and peace negotiations and to legitimize Russia's battle in Ukraine. Ukrainian forces seemingly cleared a number of settlements throughout the Russian penetration northeast of Dobropillya. Ukrainian forces superior close to Pokrovsk and Velykomykhailivka. Russian forces superior close to Siversk.

We don't report intimately on Russian battle crimes as a result of these actions are well-covered in Western media and don't immediately have an effect on the navy operations we're assessing and forecasting. We are going to proceed to judge and report on the consequences of those legal actions on the Ukrainian navy and the Ukrainian inhabitants and particularly on fight in Ukrainian city areas. We totally condemn Russian violations of the legal guidelines of armed battle and the Geneva Conventions and crimes towards humanity despite the fact that we don't describe them in these studies.

Ukrainian Operations within the Russian Federation Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis Russian Most important Effort – Japanese Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate principal efforts) Russian Subordinate Most important Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces again from the worldwide border with Belgorod Oblast and strategy to inside tube artillery vary of Kharkiv Metropolis Russian Subordinate Most important Effort #2 – Seize the rest of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into japanese Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast Russian Subordinate Most important Effort #3 – Seize the whole lot of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and presumably advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Marketing campaign Vital Exercise in Belarus Ukrainian Operations within the Russian Federation

Restricted combating continued in Kursk Oblast on August 16.[45]

Russian forces continued floor assaults in unspecified areas of Kursk Oblast.[46] A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed that Ukrainian forces attacked towards Tetkino (southwest of Glushkovo) and crossed the Seim River.[47]

Ukrainian forces seemingly struck a Russian protection industrial base (DIB) enterprise in Stavropol Krai in a single day on August 15 to 16 . The Nevinnomyssk, Stavropol Krai Mayor Mikhail Minenkov claimed that Ukrainian forces performed a drone strike towards the town's industrial zone in a single day on August 15 to 16.[48] Russian opposition outlet Astra reported, citing locals, that there have been no less than 9 explosions and a hearth close to the Azot chemical plant in Nevinnomyssk.[49] Astra famous that the August 15 to 16 strike marks the third strike towards the Azot Chemical Plant so far in Summer time 2025. Astra reported that the Azot chemical plant is Russia's largest producer of nitrogen fertilizers and ammonia and is situated roughly 650 kilometers from Ukrainian-controlled territory.[50]

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian goal: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine alongside the worldwide border and strategy to inside tube artillery vary of Sumy Metropolis)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on August 16 however didn't advance.

Russian forces attacked north of Sumy Metropolis close to Novokostyantynivka and Varachnye and northeast of Sumy Metropolis close to Yunakivka on August 15 and 16.[51] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked close to Novokostyantynivka, Oleksiivka (north of Sumy Metropolis), and Sadky (northeast of Sumy Metropolis).[52]

Order of Battle: Components of the Russian 51st Airborne (VDV) Regiment (106th VDV Division) reportedly proceed to function close to Sadky.[53]

Russian Most important Effort – Japanese Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Most important Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast ( Russian goal: Push Ukrainian forces again from the worldwide border with Belgorod Oblast and strategy to inside tube artillery vary of Kharkiv Metropolis)

Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Kharkiv path on August 16 however didn't make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on August 15 that Russian forces superior to the south (left) financial institution of the Vovcha River in central Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv Metropolis).[54]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv Metropolis close to Vovchansk and Synelnykove on August 15 and 16.[55] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked on the south (left) financial institution of the Vovcha River and close to Synelnykove.[56]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade working within the Kharkiv path reported on August 16 that Russian forces are attacking blindly in small infantry teams with drones to information their routes of advance and are leveraging bikes and foliage and bikes to advance extra shortly.[57]

Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Velykyi Burluk path on August 16 however didn't advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Velykyi Burluk close to Milove and Khatnie on August 15 and 16.[58]

The Ukrainian Dnipro Grouping of Forces reported that Russian forces elevated their guided glide bomb strikes to assist assaults within the Milove and Khatnie instructions.[59] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces additionally struck Ambarne (northeast of Velykyi Burluk) with unguided glide bombs.[60]

Russian Subordinate Most important Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian goal: Seize the rest of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into japanese Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Kupyansk path on August 16 however didn't make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces superior into Petropavlivka (east of Kupyansk).[61]

Geolocated footage revealed on August 16 signifies that Russian forces lately performed a roughly platoon-sized mechanized assault southwest of Lyman Pershyi (northeast of Kupyansk).[62]

Russian forces attacked close to Kupyansk itself; northwest of Kupyansk close to Kindrashivka; north of Kupyansk close to Holubivka and Zapadne and towards Kolodyazne; northeast of Kupyansk close to Kamyanka; east of Kupyansk close to Petropavlivka; southeast of Kupyansk close to Stepova Novoselivka; and west of Kupyansk close to Solobivka on August 15 and 16.[63] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked close to Petropavlivka.[64]

The commander of a Ukrainian regiment working within the Kupyansk path reported that Russian forces are carrying civilian garments to disguise themselves as locals to infiltrate Ukrainian battle formations within the Kupyansk path.[65] Combatants dressing as civilians to assist efforts aspiring to injure, kill, or seize an adversary is classed as perfidy and is illegitimate underneath worldwide regulation.[66] The Ukrainian commander reported that Russian forces have maintained the depth of their assaults and try to interdict Ukrainian logistics within the Kupyansk path.

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 68th Motorized Rifle Division (sixth Mixed Arms Military [CAA], Leningrad Navy District [LMD]) are reportedly hanging Ukrainian positions with Groza Leska fiber-optic first-person view (FPV) drones close to Kupyansk.[67]

Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Borova close to Nova Kruhlyakivka and Zahryzove on August 15 and 16, however didn't advance.[68]

Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Lyman path on August 16 however didn't make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: The Russian Ministry of Protection (MoD) and Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Kolodyazi (northeast of Lyman).[69] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces superior in central Ridkodub (north of Lyman).[70]

Russian forces attacked northwest of Lyman close to Serednie, Shandryholove, and Karpivka; north of Lyman close to Ridkodub and Zelena Dolyna; northeast of Lyman close to Kolodyazi and Yampolivka; and southeast of Lyman towards Yampil and within the Serebryanske forest space on August 15 and 16.[71]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 144th Motorized Rifle Division (twentieth CAA, Moscow Navy District [MMD]) are reportedly working within the Lyman path.[72]

Russian Subordinate Most important Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian goal: Seize the whole lot of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and presumably advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces lately superior within the Siversk path.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage revealed on August 16 signifies that Russian forces lately seized Serebryanka (north of Siversk).[73]

Russian forces attacked towards Siversk itself, north of Siversk close to Serebryanka, northeast of Siversk close to Hryhorivka, southeast of Siversk close to Vyimka, south of Siversk close to Pereizne, and southwest of Siversk close to Fedorivka on August 15 and 16.[74]

The commander of a Ukrainian brigade working within the Siversk path said that current rainfall has sophisticated Russian forces’ makes an attempt to subject infantry combating automobiles (IFVs).[75]

Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Chasiv Yar path on August 16 however didn't advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Chasiv Yar close to Orikhovo-Vasylivka and towards Bondarne on August 15 and 16.[76]

Ukrainian Kostyantynivka Navy Administration Head Serhiy Horbunov said on August 15 that Russian forces performed two first-person view (FPV) drone strikes towards civilian infrastructure in Kostyantynivka, killing one Ukrainian civilian.[77]

Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Toretsk path however didn't advance.

Russian forces attacked close to Toretsk itself; north of Toretsk close to Dyliivka and Oleksandro-Shultyne, and northwest of Toretsk close to Pleshchiivka, Yablunivka, Kleban Byk, Rusyn Yar, Poltavka, and Katerynivka, and towards Stepanivka on August 15 and 16.[78] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked close to Shcherbynivka (west of Toretsk).[79]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the 103rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (a hundred and fiftieth Motorized Rifle Division, eighth Mixed Arms Military [CAA], Southern Navy District [SMD]) and the 439th Rocket Artillery Brigade (eighth CAA) are reportedly coordinating artillery strikes of parts of the 238th Artillery Brigade (eighth CAA) towards Ukrainian positions close to Kleban Byk.[80]

Ukrainian forces lately superior within the Pokrovsk path.

See topline textual content for studies of exercise east and northeast of Dobropillya.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces superior towards Rodynske (northeast of Pokrovsk) and are attacking on the north and northeast outskirts of the settlement.[81] One other Russian milblogger refuted claims that Russian forces are attacking in Rodynske, claiming that Russian forces maintain positions within the north and northeastern outskirts however that Ukrainian forces keep positions throughout the settlement.[82]

Russian forces attacked close to Pokrovsk itself; north of Pokrovsk close to Rodynske and Sukhetske; northeast of Pokrovsk close to Volodymyrivka, Fedorivka, Novoekonomichne, Nove Shakhove, Zapovidne, and Zatyshok; east of Pokrovsk close to Promin and Myrolyubivka; southeast of Pokrovsk close to Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk close to Chunyshyne; and southwest of Pokrovsk close to Zvirove, Troyanda, Leontovychi, Kotlyne, and Udachne on August 15 and 16.[83]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade working within the Pokrovsk path reported that Russian forces proceed to consistently assault in small infantry fireplace groups of 1 to 2 personnel and try to camouflage themselves with greenery and anti-drone thermal imaging cloaks.[84] The spokesperson added that Russian forces try to make use of bikes to bypass Ukrainian positions. The commander of a Ukrainian drone crew working within the Pokrovsk path assessed that Russian forces proceed to concern the heavy losses mandatory for an operation towards Pokrovsk itself and try to encircle Pokrovsk and Dobropillya (north of Pokrovsk) as an alternative.[85]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian AirNomads Group reportedly proceed to function within the Pokrovsk path.[86]

Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Novopavlivka path on August 16 however didn't advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Novopavlivka close to Muravka; southeast of Novopavlivka close to Dachne, Novoukrainka, and Horikhove; south of Novopavlivka towards Filiya; and southwest of Novopavlivka close to Novokhatske and Tovste on August 15 and 16.[87]

A servicemember of a Ukrainian unmanned programs battalion working within the Novopavlivka path said that Ukrainian drone strikes, mines, and anti-tank ditches are denying Russian forces the flexibility to advance nearer than 5 kilometers from the frontline on this path.[88] The servicemember said that Russian forces proceed to conduct small infantry assaults of two to 4 personnel to a number of areas to assault Ukrainian positions from a number of sides.

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 74th Motorized Rifle Brigade (forty first CAA, Central Navy District [CMD]) reportedly proceed to function within the Dnipropetrovsk Oblast (Novopavlivka) path.[89]

Ukrainian forces lately superior within the Velykomykhailivka path.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage revealed on August 16 signifies that Ukrainian forces lately recaptured Andriivka-Klevtsove (northeast of Velykomykhailivka).[90]

Russian forces attacked east of Velykomykhailivka close to Voskresenka, Oleksandrohrad, and Myrne; and southeast of Velykomykhailivka close to Vilne Pole, Vorone, and Maliivka, and towards Zaporizhske, Komyshuvakha, and Novoheorhiivka on August 15 and 16.[91]

Ukraine’s Most important Navy Intelligence Directorate (GUR) said on August 16 that the Russian navy command is sending small infantry teams of two personnel to bypass Ukrainian positions, enter a given settlement, and movie themselves elevating a Russian flag with a purpose to falsely declare seizures of settlements and create the false notion of Russian advances.[92] The GUR reported that Russian forces lately filmed themselves close to Andriivka-Klevtsove for this function, however that Ukrainian forces management the settlement.

Order of Battle: Artillery and drone parts of the Russian fifth Tank Brigade (thirty sixth CAA, Japanese Navy District [EMD]) reportedly participated within the August 15 claimed seizure of Vorone.[93] Components of the Russian thirty sixth Motorized Rifle Brigade (twenty ninth CAA, EMD) reportedly proceed to function close to Oleksandrohrad.[94] Components of the eleventh Air Power and Air Protection Military (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and EMD) reportedly proceed unguided glide bomb strikes towards Ukrainian positions in Novoselivka (east of Velykomykhailivka).[95]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian goal: Keep frontline positions, safe rear areas towards Ukrainian strikes, and advance inside tube artillery vary of Zaporizhzhia Metropolis)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in japanese Zaporizhia Oblast on August 16 however didn't advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Hulyaipole close to Zelene Pole and towards Olhivske on August 15 and 16.[96]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 69th Separate Cowl Brigade (thirty fifth Mixed Arms Military [CAA], Japanese Navy District [EMD]) are reportedly working within the Zaporizhia path.[97]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on August 16 however didn't advance.

Russian forces attacked southeast of Orikhiv close to Mala Tokmachka, south of Orikhiv close to Novodanylivka, southwest of Orikhiv close to Nesteryanka, west of Orikhiv close to Plavni and Stepnohirsk, and northwest of Orikhiv towards Prymorske on August 16.[98]

Order of Battle: Artillery parts of the Russian 4th Navy Base (58th CAA, Southern Navy District [SMD]) are reportedly hanging Ukrainian positions close to Orikhiv.[99]

Russian forces continued restricted assaults within the Kherson path on August 16 however didn't advance.

Russian forces attacked within the Kherson path, together with east of Kherson Metropolis close to the Antonivsky highway and rail bridges and southwest of Kherson Metropolis close to Bilohrudyi Island on August 15 and 16.[100]

Order of Battle: Components of the Russian 61st Naval Infantry Brigade (Northern Fleet) are reportedly working on the Dnipro River islands.[101]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Marketing campaign (Russian Goal: Goal Ukrainian navy and civilian infrastructure within the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces performed a sequence of missile and drone strikes towards Ukraine on the evening of August 15 to 16. The Ukrainian Air Power reported that Russian forces launched one Iskander-M ballistic missile and 85 Shahed and decoy drones from the instructions of Kursk and Oryol cities; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea.[102] The Ukrainian Air Power reported that Ukrainian forces downed 61 drones over northern and japanese Ukraine. The Ukrainian Air Power reported that Russian strikes primarily focused frontline areas in Sumy, Donetsk, Chernihiv, and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts. Ukrainian officers reported that Russian forces broken civilian infrastructure in Kharkiv and Sumy oblasts.[103]

The US Particular Inspector Basic Quarterly Operation Atlantic Resolve report from April 1 to June 30 indicated {that a} US Protection Intelligence Company (DIA) report confirmed that the rise in Russian use of ballistic missiles with enhanced maneuverability has undermined the effectiveness of the Patriot air protection system in Ukraine.[104] The report said that Ukraine is struggling to persistently down Russian ballistic missiles attributable to Russian tactical technological enhancements, together with enhanced steerage and maneuverability programs, that enable missiles to fly irregular flight paths and alter paths in-flight reasonably than solely flying alongside typical ballistic trajectories. Ukrainian Air Power Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat reported in late Could 2025 that Russian variations to its ballistic weapons have been complicating Ukraine's efforts to intercept these ballistic missiles[105]

Vital exercise in Belarus (Russian efforts to extend its navy presence in Belarus and additional combine Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing important to report.

Word: ISW doesn't obtain any categorised materials from any supply, makes use of solely publicly obtainable data, and attracts extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media, in addition to commercially obtainable satellite tv for pc imagery and different geospatial information as the premise for these studies. References to all sources used are offered within the endnotes of every replace.

[1] https://truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrump/posts/115037569702889410

[2] https://www.nytimes.com/2025/08/16/world/europe/trump-hannity-interview-fox-news.html ; https://www.foxnews.com/video/6376968557112

[3] https://x.com/BarakRavid/standing/1956619580744274342

[4] https://www.bloomberg.com/information/articles/2025-08-16/zelenskiy-says-he-will-meet-trump-in-washington-on-monday

[5] https://archive.ph/7th56 ; https://www.axios.com/2025/08/16/trump-zelensky-meet-white-house-putin-summit

[6] https://t.me/tass_agency/331561 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/331562

[7] https://x.com/BarakRavid/standing/1956722650123841678 ; https://x.com/BarakRavid/standing/1956724881732599961

[8] https://www.ft.com/content material/6b0b4912-9438-4de0-aebe-2a8dd804cbab

[9] https://x.com/MikeCarterTV/standing/1956506083079680103

[10] https://www.ft.com/content material/6b0b4912-9438-4de0-aebe-2a8dd804cbab

[11] https://isw.pub/UkrWar081525 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar081125 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar080825 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-14-2024 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar050825 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042825 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042425 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041925

[12] https://isw.pub/UkrWar080825

[13] https://isw.pub/UkrWar080825

[14] https://isw.pub/UkrWar080825

[15] https://isw.pub/UkrWar080525 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-1-2025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar071425 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar070125

[16] https://isw.pub/UkrWar061625

[17] https://isw.pub/UkrWar081025

[18] https://isw.pub/UkrWar120724

[19] https://isw.pub/UkrWar080825

[20] https://isw.pub/UkrWar062425 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar081425 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar081325

[21] https://t.me/tass_agency/331571 ; https://t.me/medvedev_telegram/602 ; https://t.me/medvedev_telegramE/91

[22] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-20

[23] https://meduza dot io/en/function/2025/08/16/putin-restored-russia-s-status-as-a-superpower

[24] https://isw.pub/UkrWar121624; https://isw.pub/UkrWar122623; https://isw.pub/UkrWar121923 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar121723; https://isw.pub/UkrWar121823; https://isw.pub/UkrWar120723; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-1-2025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar073025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russia-ukraine-warning-update-initial-russian-offensive-campaign-assessment

[25] https://meduza dot io/function/2025/08/15/propagandistam-rekomendovali-ne-obnadezhivat-rossiyan-pered-sammitom-putina-i-trampa-v-ankoridzhe-vot-o-chem-budut-govorit-v-gossmi

[26] https://information dot ru/vlast/v-gosdume-obyasnili-kakaya-fraza-trampa-sulit-snyatie-sankcij-s-rossii

[27] https://isw.pub/UkrWar122924; https://isw.pub/UkrWar012025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar021225; https://isw.pub/UkrWar021825; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-24-2025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar030225; https://isw.pub/UkrWar030625; https://isw.pub/UkrWar032825; https://isw.pub/UkrWar040125; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041525; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041825; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042825; https://isw.pub/UkrWar051125; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-25-2025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar070325

[28] https://www.gazeta dot ru/politics/information/2025/08/16/26508452.shtml

[29] https://isw.pub/UkrWar022725 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar022625

[30] https://t.me/tass_agency/331563

[31] https://isw.pub/UkrWar060225 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar053025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar051725 ;

[32] https://foreignpolicy.com/2025/08/15/lavrov-ussr-russia-trump-putin-ukraine-summit-alaska/

[33] https://meduza dot io/function/2025/08/16/putin-vosstanovil-otnoshenie-k-rossii-kak-k-velikoy-derzhave-trebovaniya-kieva-dazhe-ne-obsuzhdalis; https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna7632057; https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/putin-rues-soviet-collapse-demise-historical-russia-2021-12-12/ ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-6-2025

[34] https://isw.pub/UkrWar052125 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-15-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-29-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-24-2025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042425 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041525 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar021825; https://isw.pub/UkrWar030424

[35] https://isw.pub/UkrWar062325 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar062325 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042025

[36] https://t.me/agentstvonews/10328 ; https://t.me/severrealii/30495

[37] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-15-2025; http://en.kremlin dot ru/occasions/president/information/66181

[38] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/30294; https://t.me/HolodniyYar_93ombr/1439; https://x.com/moklasen/standing/1956445467296104912

[39] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/15/271-rosiyanyn-nazavzhdy-zalyshyv-pole-boyu-azov-zachystyv-6-sil-na-pokrovskomu-napryamku/; https://t.me/azov_media/7159 ; https://x.com/GirkinGirkin/standing/1956410147233771808 ; https://x.com/666_mancer/standing/1956411132001784116 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27846

[40] https://t.me/yurasumy/24354; https://t.me/wargonzo/28528

[41] https://t.me/yurasumy/24361

[42] https://t.me/yurasumy/24354

[43] https://t.me/philologist_zov/2955

[44] https://isw.pub/UkrWar081525

[45] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27869 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27849 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27847

[46] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27869 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27849 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27847

[47] https://t.me/severnnyi/4840

[48] https://militarnyi dot com/en/information/drones-attacked-azot-chemical-plant-in-stavropol-krai/ ; https://t.me/astrapress/89723

[49] https://t.me/astrapress/89723

[50] https://t.me/dva_majors/77564

[51] https://t.me/dva_majors/77564 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/28528 ; https://t.me/severnnyi/4840 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27869 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27849 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27847

[52] https://t.me/severnnyi/4840 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/77564

[53] https://t.me/severnnyi/4840

[54] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32496

[55] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27869 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27849 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27847 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15738 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32496

[56] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32496

[57] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/08/16/slipyh-shturmovykiv-vedut-pomyraty-yihni-zh-roboty-poblyzu-vovchanska-rosiyan-masovo-utylizuyut/

[58] https://t.me/wargonzo/28528 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15738

[59] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15738

[60] https://t.me/wargonzo/28528

[61] https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/13852

[62] https://x.com/moklasen/standing/1956665765538508803 ; https://t.me/skyraders/776

[63] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27869 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27849 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27847 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15738 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/28528 ; https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/13852

[64] https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/13852

[65] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/08/16/chuvaky-v-czyvilnomu-vykonuyut-speczyfichni-zavdannya-nepodalik-kupyanska-aktyvni-vorozhi-dyversanty/

[66] https://casebook.icrc.org/a_to_z/glossary/perfidy?afd_azwaf_tok=eyJraWQiOiJCMERCQzkzNTgwRTlCM0FCNzJBRUMyRDQ4RjU0MDYwRkI5Rjc2ODIzMEE5OUJDOEEyQUE0MUEwMkE0RjIzNTUzIiwiYWxnIjoiUlMyNTYifQ.eyJhdWQiOiJjYXNlYm9vay5pY3JjLm9yZyIsImV4cCI6MTc1NTM4NzY5MCwiaWF0IjoxNzU1Mzg3NjgwLCJpc3MiOiJ0aWVyMS03YzY0NDU3ZmMtYnRsNnciLCJzdWIiOiIxOTEuOTYuMTIyLjUzIiwiZGF0YSI6eyJ0eXBlIjoiaXNzdWVkIiwicmVmIjoiMjAyNTA4MTZUMjM0MTIwWi1yMTdjNjQ0NTdmY2J0bDZ3aEMxTE9ObWM1czAwMDAwMDExYTAwMDAwMDAwMG43bnAiLCJiIjoidkR2YUkzU2hQWGhlYVpUQkxQTy1qLU0xV2JDMTRxOVBrYlY0UWVJOGRWWSIsImgiOiJ6RzJjOHlianMzS0ViV1oyZmU1S1dlbG9ZQkdCRS1Yemp4b00tWTFNTk44In19.VmeeKq3sRMyLISuDjXxphUfPVbvXVJ91GQdc9HToDgJsEG6wLdpyhySnQ3brL-V_BBB8bCq7cRU8m7XyAzmm6RyRZ8sUL4Nd1GZEOrGr_fOLX-jpb-UiFTF7sxUOdhtinSA0WJhY1PcZ6OK4jxVuVNZ6Bl0YUhL6HZkXpeRBh9K1biVc9PbATtnA9ojhIf8o1jgU6tSO1m_iDELNhfRhgFFyDCmEOu-B26nq2I7wutu7uJim_3jmlcdy9QpOPffPUrqUqNqti07M2TMOmFErr7flVXpGunMI173mk7ZtNjsZ5hHd8EsdRY8Bqm--fRFiD3Gc4yjyDPLZeqaTHCA8cw.WF3obl2IDtqgvMFRqVdYkD5s

[67] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/97842

[68] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27869 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27849 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27847 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15738

[69] https://t.me/mod_russia/55613 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/55615 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32542 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32542 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/77590 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66738 ; https://t.me/sashakots/55601

[70] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32539

[71] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27869 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27849 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27847 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15738 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32539

[72] https://t.me/vysokygovorit/20539

[73] https://t.me/osintpen/1642; https://t.me/shock3OA/1933

[74] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27869; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27849; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27847; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15738; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32546

[75] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/16/vse-peretvoryuyetsya-na-take-safari-na-siverskomu-napryamku-vshhent-rozbyrayut-shturmovi-grupy-rosiyan/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vnsq2tu2Oo0

[76] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27849; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27847

[77] https://www.fb.com/sergij.gorbunov.197981/posts/pfbid0Q6rk1Y6gkXETfDDsmwx4hEMYhv6hKAuETG8ht1KiWhiovJH5VGTB21vzgoAoyY8yl

[78] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27869; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27849; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27847; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15738; https://t.me/wargonzo/28528

[79] https://t.me/wargonzo/28528

[80] https://t.me/nm_dnr/14183

[81] https://t.me/dva_majors/77564

[82] https://t.me/yurasumy/24355

[83] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27869; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27849; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27847; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15738 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32550 , https://t.me/wargonzo/28528 , https://t.me/dva_majors/77564

[84] https://www.fb.com/share/v/1HcYjRrAbE/; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/16/rezhym-nevydymky-ne-spraczyuvav-pid-pokrovskom-vorozhi-grupy-shhodnya-stayut-mishenyamy/

[85] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1092170-armia-rf-moze-zajti-v-pokrovsk-ale-boitsa-velikih-vtrat-komandir-zagonu-bpla/

[86] https://t.me/voin_dv/16490 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32548 ;

[87] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27869; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27849; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27847; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15738

[88] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/16/yakshho-zastrybuye-v-riv-to-bude-jomu-aj-yaj-yaj-na-novopavlivskomu-napryamku-rosiyan-galmuyut-fortyfikacziyi/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-O_iTjCYsKI

[89] https://t.me/dva_majors/77574 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/77601

[90] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9806; https://t.me/OVMBr_5/269; https://x.com/richardzai38580/standing/1956600815470391789

[91] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27869; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27849; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27847; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15738; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32538; https://t.me/wargonzo/28528

[92] https://t.me/DIUkraine/6668

[93] https://t.me/mod_russia/55618; *GRAPHIC* https://t.me/voin_dv/16484; https://t.me/voin_dv/16488; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/97867; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32551

[94] https://t.me/dva_majors/77564

[95] https://t.me/voin_dv/16491

[96] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27869; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27849; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27847; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15738

[97] https://t.me/voin_dv/16480

[98] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27847; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27849; https://t.me/dva_majors/77564; https://t.me/dva_majors/77564; https://t.me/wargonzo/28528

[99] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/97850

[100] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27869; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27849; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27847

[101] https://t.me/mod_russia/55621

[102] https://t.me/kpszsu/40478

[103] https://t.me/synegubov/16537 ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/08/16/vorog-obstrilyav-harkivsku-oblast-poshkodzheno-zhytlovi-budynky/; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/15/udar-po-czentru-sum-vorog-atakuvav-misto-bezpilotnykom-na-misczi-vluchannya-pozhezha/; https://t.me/sumy_mva/547

[104] https://www.twz.com/land/ukraines-patriots-now-struggling-with-enhanced-russian-ballistic-missiles ; https://www.stateoig.gov/uploads/report/report_pdf_file/oar_q3_fy25_final_508.pdf