Russian Offensive Marketing campaign Evaluation, August 29, 2025

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Jessica Sobieski, Grace Mappes, Jennie Olmsted, Justin Younger, Anna Harvey, and George Barros with Nate Trotter

August 29, 2025, 8:15pm ET

Click on here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is up to date day by day alongside the static maps current on this report.

Click on here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click on here to see ISW’s 3D management of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a pc (not a cellular gadget) is strongly advisable for utilizing this data-heavy instrument.

Click on here to entry ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces day by day by exhibiting a dynamic frontline. ISW will replace this time-lapse map archive month-to-month.

Be aware: The info cut-off for this product was 1pm ET on August 29. ISW will cowl subsequent reviews within the August 30 Russian Offensive Marketing campaign Evaluation.

Russia reportedly leveraged the August 15 Alaska Summit in an effort to stall for a deliberate Fall 2025 offensive, amongst different issues. A German supply with insider information advised Reuters that Ukrainian officers warned German officers on August 13 that Ukrainian intelligence assessed that Russian President Vladimir Putin deliberate to make use of the Alaska Summit to "play for time" forward of a possible Russian offensive in October or November 2025.[1] This report is in line with latest Ukrainian warnings of Russian efforts to organize for renewed offensives sooner or later, although it isn't but clear the place Russian forces could focus their important effort in Fall 2025. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky acknowledged on August 12 that Russia could switch 15,000 troops to the Zaporizhia route, 7,000 troops to the Pokrovsk route, and 5,000 troops to the Novopavlivka route to accentuate offensive operations in these areas within the close to future.[2] Ukrainian Fundamental Army Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Deputy Chief Main Normal Vadym Skibitskyi acknowledged in an interview printed on August 12 that Russian forces deliberate to attain all their targets close to Kupyansk, Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, and Pokrovsk — presumably seizing the whole thing of those cities — by the top of August or begin of September 2025.[3] Skibitskyi acknowledged that Russian forces postponed their preliminary plan to grab the rest of Donetsk Oblast by August 1 to December 31, 2025, and that Russian forces elevated strikes in opposition to Kherson Metropolis in accordance with plans to take action. Russian forces notably took benefit of the August 15 Alaska Summit to accentuate ongoing offensive operations in sure areas of the theater, akin to conducting an infiltration operation close to Dobropillya, and to stockpile drones and missiles that Russian forces used to strike Kyiv and inflict heavy civilian casualties in a single day on August 27 to twenty-eight.[4] Stories that Russian forces are nonetheless planning for a Fall 2025 offensive assist ISW's long-term evaluation and Russian International Minister Sergey Lavrov's latest statements that the Kremlin's warfare goals in Ukraine haven't modified.[5]

Russian Protection Minister Andrei Belousov gave a serious speech on the Russian Ministry of Protection (MoD) Collegium on August 29. Belousov gave an replace on the ten precedence instructions for the Russian MoD. Belousov additionally mentioned Russian battlefield progress in Ukraine and exaggerated Russian positive factors in latest weeks. Belousov claimed on August 29 that Russian forces seized roughly 300 to 400 sq. kilometers of Ukrainian territory per thirty days originally of 2025 however that Russian forces are presently seizing roughly 600 to 700 sq. kilometers per thirty days.[6] ISW assesses that Russian forces seized roughly 426.85 sq. kilometers of territory in January 2025, 310.67 sq. kilometers in February 2025, 193.19 sq. kilometers in March 2024, 173.79 sq. kilometers in April 2025, 499.28 kilometers in Might 2025, 465.80 sq. kilometers in June 2025, 445.88 sq. kilometers in July 2025, and about 500 sq. kilometers to this point in August 2025. Russian advances in August 2025 are far beneath Belousov’s claims. Belousov’s assertion additionally ignores that Russian forces are making these positive factors in open fields and areas with minimal fortifications, by failed infiltration operations akin to these east and northeast of Dobropillya, and at heavy personnel losses.[7] Ukrainian Normal Employees reporting about Russian personnel casualties thus signifies that Russian forces suffered a median of 938 personnel casualties per day to this point in August 2025.[8] Belousov acknowledged that 97 p.c of wounded in motion (WIA) servicemembers return to the frontlines “after being wounded,” which is in line with reviews that the Russian navy command continues to ship injured Russian personnel on attritional, infantry-led assaults.[9]

Belousov indicated that the Russian MoD has shifted its priorities to supply mild autos over heavy armored autos, reflecting Russian battlefield ways since winter 2024–2025. Belousov claimed that the Russian MoD procured and delivered 22,725 bikes, all-terrain autos (ATVs), and buggies to the frontlines and plans to ship a further 12,186 mild autos to Russian forces alongside the frontlines by the top of August 2025.[10] ISW beforehand noticed reviews from unspecified Russian navy sources that claimed that Russia bought over 40,000 Chinese language-made bikes in 2024 and intends to buy as much as 200,000 bikes and 60,000 different mild autos in 2025.[11] Russian forces are more and more fielding mild autos together with bikes, all-terrain autos (ATVs), and buggies in lieu of heavy armored autos akin to tanks as a result of their maneuverability and low cost value relative to armored autos, which Ukrainian drone operations threaten.[12] Russian forces haven't applied satisfactory safety for armored autos and tanks in opposition to Ukrainian drone strikes and Russia faces declining tank and armored car stockpiles.[13]

Belousov acknowledged that Russia continues to deal with creating its Unmanned Methods Forces and drone manufacturing capability. Belousov acknowledged that Russian forces are targeted on integrating parts of the Russian Unmanned Methods Forces models into the broader Russian forces and famous that the MoD should nonetheless increase logistics and repairs, implement sooner coaching of drone operators, and higher workers unmanned programs models.[14] The Russian MoD launched a coordinated effort in August 2024 to create a centralized separate service for unmanned programs, prone to centralize the MoD’s management over casual specialised drone detachments and unmanned programs procurement.

Belousov indicated that the Russian MoD is increasing its efforts to digitalize Russian recruitment possible as a part of wider efforts to reinforce Russia’s administrative capability to deal with conscription and mobilization processes. Belousov famous that the MoD continues implementing a myriad of digital adjustments to streamline administrative processes for Russian personnel, together with onboarding new servicemembers, receiving suggestions and appeals from Russian servicemembers, and digitizing the appliance course of and issuance of fight veteran standing.[15] Belousov highlighted that the MoD accomplished the State System of Unified Army Registration, which is a “unified digital atmosphere” for the MoD.[16] Russia has targeted on digitizing parts of the conscription and mobilization course of because the partial involuntary reserve call-up in September 2022 and has digitalized features of this course of together with issuing digital draft summons for Russian conscripts.[17] Russian State Duma Protection Committee Chairperson Andrei Kartapolov launched a invoice in late July 2025 that might facilitate Russia’s means to course of mobilized personnel all year long fairly than solely through the semi-annual reserve call-ups, permitting Russia to mitigate bureaucratic bottlenecks that complicate Russia’s means to conduct large-scale involuntary call-ups of conscripts and reservists.[18]

ISW will cowl Belousov’s speech in higher element in a forthcoming Russian Pressure Technology and Technological Variations report

Ukrainian forces proceed to strike Russian navy property and vitality infrastructure in Russia and occupied Ukraine. Ukraine's Fundamental Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on August 29 that GUR forces struck a Russian Buyan-M radar system belonging to an S-400 air protection system in an unspecified location in occupied Crimea in a single day on August 28 to 29.[19] The Ukrainian Normal Employees reported on August 29 that Ukrainian forces, together with parts of the Ukrainian Safety Service (SBU) and Particular Operations Forces (SOF), struck a Russian diesel gas pumping station close to Naytopovychi, Bryansk Oblast.[20] The Ukrainian Normal Employees reported that the station pumps diesel gas by Russia’s important oil product pipelines, together with for Russian forces, and has a pumping capability of roughly 10.5 million tons per 12 months. Ukrainian intelligence sources advised Ukrainian outlet Suspilne on August 28 that unspecified actors, implied to be pro-Ukrainian, planted and remotely detonated explosives underneath railway gas tanks on the Tver Metropolis railway station situated between Moscow and St. Petersburg and that the explosion precipitated a large hearth.[21] The sources acknowledged that the Tver railway junction is a hub that Russia makes use of to provide its military with gas and lubricants, ammunition, and personnel. Geolocated footage printed on August 28 and Russian opposition outlet Astra clarified that Ukrainian drones struck a crude distillation unit, a liquefied fuel rack, a liquified fuel pipeline, a gasoline pipeline, a diesel gas storage tank, and different gear on the Kuibyshev Oil Refinery in Samara Oblast throughout a strike on August 28.[22] Astra reported that 28 Ukrainian drones struck the Kuibyshev Oil Refinery and compelled the refinery to stop operations.

Ukraine’s ongoing strikes marketing campaign in opposition to Russian oil infrastructure continues to contribute to gasoline shortages in Russia. Sources advised Reuters on August 29 that injury from Ukrainian strikes on the Ust-Luga port in Leningrad Oblast in a single day on August 23 to 24 will drive the port’s oil export terminal to function at about half its traditional capability at round 350,000 barrels per day in September 2025.[23] Assaults in opposition to Russian rail-transported gas shipments additionally could exacerbate provide issues. Russian enterprise outlet Kommersant famous on August 21 that rail-transported gas additionally causes provide logistics issues as gas tanks can take two to a few months to achieve their vacation spot railway station after which stand idle for a number of weeks earlier than reaching their supposed oil depots.[24] Ukraine’s continued strikes are evidently having an influence on Russia’s home gasoline market, exacerbating shortages and inflicting worth spikes that can possible push over inflation upwards and create additional macroeconomic instability in Russia.[25]

US and Ukrainian representatives met in New York Metropolis on August 29 and reaffirmed Ukraine’s readiness for peace negotiations with Russia, together with on the degree of heads of state. Ukrainian Presidential Workplace Head Andriy Yermak acknowledged on August 29 that he and Ukrainian Deputy International Minister Serhiy Kyslytsia met with US Particular Envoy for the Center East Steve Witkoff and emphasised Ukraine’s readiness to finish the warfare.[26] Yermak famous that Ukraine welcomes all US-proposed peace initiatives and efforts to finish the warfare and that Ukraine is prepared for direct negotiations on the degree of heads of state.[27]

The US State Division authorised three International Army Gross sales (FMS) of aviation ammunition, Starlink providers, and Patriot air protection system assist to Ukraine. The US Protection Safety Cooperation Company (DSCA) introduced on August 28 that the US State Division authorised an FMS to Ukraine price roughly $825 million that features as much as 3,350 Prolonged Vary Assault Munition (ERAM) air-launched missiles and three,350 navigation programs outfitted with modules outfitted with anti-spoofing modules, weapons parts and spare components, assist gear, weapons software program and assist gear, technical documentation, personnel coaching and coaching gear, and logistics and transportation assist.[28] The DCSA reported that Denmark, Norway, the Netherlands, and US International Army Funding are funding this FMS to Ukraine. The DSCA announcement confirmed an August 24 report from the Wall Road Journal (WSJ) that the USA had authorised the sale of the three,350 ERAMs for Ukraine.[29] The DCSA introduced on August 29 that the US State Division authorised one other FMS to Ukraine price roughly $150 million that features an extension of Starlink terminal assist providers and a 3rd FMS to Ukraine price roughly $179 million that features Patriot air protection system spare components, upkeep, and associated gear and technical assist.[30]

Russian forces not too long ago executed seven Ukrainian prisoners of warfare (POWs) close to Myrolyubivka, Donetsk Oblast. The Ukrainian Donetsk Oblast Prosecutor’s Workplace reported on August 29 that it opened an investigation into Russian forces who brutally tortured and executed seven Ukrainian POWs in a basement close to Myrolyubivka, Donetsk Oblast in August 2025, and tried to kill an eighth Ukrainian POW who survived the execution try.[31] Ukrainian outlet Suspilne detailed how the surviving Ukrainian POW crawled to security for 5 days after the executions and famous that the POW needed to write his account of the executions by hand as a result of the harm Russian forces inflicted prevented him from verbally talking.[32] There was a pointy improve in credible reviews and photographs of Russian forces executing Ukrainian POWs all through 2024 and 2025, and ISW continues to evaluate that Russian navy commanders together with battlefield commanders are both complicit in or instantly enabling their subordinates to conduct systemic executions in direct violation of worldwide legislation.[33]

Key Takeaways:

Russia reportedly leveraged the August 15 Alaska Summit in an effort to stall for a deliberate Fall 2025 offensive, amongst different issues. Russian Protection Minister Andrei Belousov gave a serious speech on the Russian Ministry of Protection (MoD) Collegium on August 29 and gave an replace on the ten precedence instructions for the Russian MoD. Belousov additionally mentioned Russian battlefield progress in Ukraine and exaggerated Russian positive factors in latest weeks. Belousov indicated that the Russian MoD has shifted its priorities to supply mild autos over heavy armored autos, reflecting Russian battlefield ways since Winter 2024–2025. Belousov acknowledged that Russia continues to deal with creating its Unmanned Methods Forces and drone manufacturing capability. Belousov indicated that the Russian MoD is increasing its efforts to digitalize Russian recruitment, possible as a part of wider efforts to reinforce Russia’s administrative capability to deal with conscription and mobilization processes. Ukrainian forces proceed to strike Russian navy property and vitality infrastructure in Russia and occupied Ukraine. Ukraine’s ongoing strikes marketing campaign in opposition to Russian oil infrastructure continues to contribute to gasoline shortages in Russia. US and Ukrainian representatives met in New York Metropolis on August 29 and reaffirmed Ukraine’s readiness for peace negotiations with Russia, together with on the degree of heads of state. The US State Division authorised a $825 million International Army Sale (FMS) of aviation ammunition and associated gear to Ukraine. Russian forces not too long ago executed seven Ukrainian prisoners of warfare (POWs) close to Myrolyubivka, Donetsk Oblast. Ukrainian forces not too long ago superior in northern Kharkiv Oblast and Russian forces not too long ago superior close to Borova and Pokrovsk.

We don't report intimately on Russian warfare crimes as a result of these actions are well-covered in Western media and don't instantly have an effect on the navy operations we're assessing and forecasting. We are going to proceed to guage and report on the consequences of those legal actions on the Ukrainian navy and the Ukrainian inhabitants and particularly on fight in Ukrainian city areas. We totally condemn Russian violations of the legal guidelines of armed battle and the Geneva Conventions and crimes in opposition to humanity despite the fact that we don't describe them in these reviews.

Ukrainian Operations within the Russian Federation Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis Russian Fundamental Effort – Jap Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate important efforts) Russian Subordinate Fundamental Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces again from the worldwide border with Belgorod Oblast and method to inside tube artillery vary of Kharkiv Metropolis Russian Subordinate Fundamental Effort #2 – Seize the rest of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into japanese Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast Russian Subordinate Fundamental Effort #3 – Seize the whole thing of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and probably advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Marketing campaign Important Exercise in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations within the Russian Federation

See topline textual content for Ukrainian strikes in Russia and occupied Ukraine.

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian goal: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine alongside the worldwide border)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on August 29 however didn't advance.

Russian forces attacked northwest of Sumy Metropolis close to Bezsalivka; northeast of Sumy Metropolis inside Yunakivka and close to Sadky; and in unspecified areas of Sumy and Kursk oblasts on August 28 and 29.[34] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked north of Sumy Metropolis close to Oleksiivka.[35]

A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed that Russian forces have been slowed down in attritional preventing in Yunakivka for over a month, regardless of day by day Russian reviews of incremental positive factors.[36] The milblogger famous that Russian forces have repeatedly claimed the seizure of Yunakivka and that the presence of particular person Russian troopers doesn't point out that Russian forces seized the settlement.

Order of Battle: Parts of the Russian 76th and 106th airborne (VDV) divisions, eleventh and 83rd VDV brigades, and the 56th VDV Regiment (seventh VDV Division) reportedly proceed to function in Sumy Oblast.[37]

Russian Fundamental Effort – Jap Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Fundamental Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast ( Russian goal: Push Ukrainian forces again from the worldwide border with Belgorod Oblast and method to inside tube artillery vary of Kharkiv Metropolis)

Ukrainian forces not too long ago superior in northern Kharkiv Oblast.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Derhachi Metropolis Army Administration Head Vyacheslav Zadorenko acknowledged on August 29 that Ukrainian forces didn't observe any enduring Russian advances east of Kozacha Lopan (north of Kharkiv Metropolis).[38] ISW beforehand noticed geolocated footage posted on August 28 that indicated that Russian forces had superior within the space and had recoded earlier Russian advances within the space as Ukrainian-controlled territory.[39]

Russian forces attacked north of Kharkiv Metropolis close to Hlyboke and Lyptsi and northeast of Kharkiv Metropolis close to Vovchansk on August 28 and 29.[40] Kharkiv Oblast occupation governor Vitaly Ganchev claimed on August 28 that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking within the Vovchansk route.[41]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz Kanada Detachment (204th Akhmat Spetsnaz Regiment) are reportedly placing Ukrainian positions close to Kozacha Lopan.[42] Parts of the Chechen Zapad-Akhmat Battalion, the Chechen Ministry of Inner Affairs (MVD) forces, and the Russian 128th Motorized Rifle Brigade (forty fourth Military Corps [AC], Leningrad Army District [LMD]) are reportedly working within the Kharkiv route.[43] Drone operators of the forty first Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, forty fourth AC) reportedly proceed to function in Kharkiv Oblast.[44]

Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported floor exercise within the Velykyi Burluk route.

Russian Subordinate Fundamental Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian goal: Seize the rest of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into japanese Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Kupyansk route on August 29 however didn't make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian sources claimed on August 28 and 29 that Russian forces superior inside and close to Kupyansk.[45]

Russian forces attacked close to Kupyansk itself; north of Kupyansk close to Holubivka, Zapadne, and towards Kutkivka; northeast of Kupyansk close to Synkivka and Fyholivka; southeast of Kupyansk close to Stepova Novoselivka; and west of Kupyansk close to Sobolivka on August 28 and 29.[46]

The commander of a Ukrainian firm working within the Kupyansk route reported on August 29 that Russian forces are primarily attacking at night time utilizing infantry with thermal-imagery gadgets and anti-thermal cloaks to seek out gaps and penetrate deep into Ukrainian positions to direct drone strikes in opposition to Ukrainian positions and logistics.[47] The Ukrainian commander acknowledged that Russian forces are relying extra on infantry within the Kupyansk route, as Russian forces proceed to battle to move heavy gear throughout the Oskil River, and are remotely mining roads and leveraging sleeper drones. An officer of a Ukrainian brigade working within the Kupyansk route reported that Russian forces are utilizing small teams, often consisting of a single soldier, in an try to realize a foothold close to Ukrainian positions and conduct semi-sabotage operations.[48]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian sixteenth Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian Normal Employees’s Fundamental Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly placing Ukrainian positions close to Kupyansk.[49]

Russian forces not too long ago superior within the Borova route.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage printed on August 28 signifies that Russian forces not too long ago superior in southern Hrekivka (southeast of Borova).[50]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces superior close to Borivska Andriivka (northeast of Borova).[51]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova close to Zahryzove and Nova Kruhlyakivka and southeast of Borova close to Hrekivka and towards Druzhelyubivka on August 28 and 29.[52]

Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Lyman route on August 29 however didn't make confirmed advances

Unconfirmed claims: A Ukrainian supply reportedly affiliated with Ukrainian navy intelligence reported that Russian forces not too long ago superior close to Shandryholove.[53]

Russian forces attacked northwest of Lyman close to Shandryholove; north of Lyman close to Novomykhailivka, Hlushchenkove, Novyi Myr, Karpivka, Ridkodub, and Zelena Dolyna and towards Stavky; northeast of Lyman close to Kolodyazi; east of Lyman close to Torske and Zarichne; and southeast of Lyman towards Yampil and within the Serebryanske forest space on August 28 and 29.[54] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking close to Ridkodub.[55]

Geolocated footage printed on August 29 exhibits parts of the Russian 144th Motorized Rifle Division (twentieth Mixed Arms Military [CAA], Moscow Army District [MMD]) placing a company-sized Ukrainian mechanized assault together with unmanned floor autos (UGVs) close to Shandryholove.[56] Ukrainian forces first reported conducting a completely robotic operation in December 2024.[57]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Rubikon Middle for Superior Unmanned Applied sciences are reportedly placing Ukrainian positions close to Lyman and drone operators of the 752nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (third Motorized Rifle Division, twentieth CAA) are reportedly working within the Lyman route.[58]

Russian Subordinate Fundamental Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian goal: Seize the whole thing of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and probably advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Siversk route on August 29 however didn't advance.

Russian forces attacked northwest of Siversk close to Dronivka, northeast of Siversk close to Hryhorivka and Serebryanka, southeast of Siversk close to Vyimka, and south of Siversk close to Pereizne on August 28 and 29.[59] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked close to Serebryanka.[60]

The Russian Ministry of Protection (MoD) printed footage purportedly exhibiting Russian forces placing a Ukrainian crossing close to Dronivka.[61]

Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Chasiv Yar route on August 29 however didn't advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Chasiv Yar close to Vasyukivka and south of Chasiv Yar close to Stupochky on August 28 and 29.[62]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade working within the Chasiv Yar route reported that Russian forces are trying to advance by destroyed Chasiv Yar in small infantry teams that comply with completely different routes and attempt to assemble close to Ukrainian positions for assaults.[63] The spokesperson famous that it's tough for Ukrainian forces to find out the depth of Russian assaults as Russian models are higher capable of cover amongst the rubble.

Kramatorsk Metropolis Army Administration Head Oleksandr Honcharenko reported that Russian forces struck a grocery store and a publish workplace in Kramatorsk (northwest of Chasiv Yar) with a V2U autonomous drone outfitted with synthetic intelligence (AI), killing one civilian and injuring one other.[64] The Monetary Instances reported on August 28 that Russian forces are frequently conducting drone strikes in opposition to Druzhivka (instantly south of Kramatorsk).[65] ISW not too long ago noticed reviews that Russian forces carried out a large-scale glide bomb strike in opposition to Kramatorsk and that 90 p.c of the affected areas had been civilian.[66]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Sever-V Brigade (Russian Volunteer Corps) are reportedly placing Ukrainian provide strains close to Markove (northwest of Chasiv Yar).[67] Snipers of the 98th Airborne (VDV) Division reportedly proceed to function close to Chasiv Yar.[68]

Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Toretsk route on August 29 however didn't make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces superior southwest of Stepanivka (northwest of Toretsk).[69]

Russian forces attacked close to Toretsk itself; north of Toretsk close to Oleksandro-Shultyne; northwest of Toretsk close to Rusyn Yar, Kleban-Byk, Katerynivka, Pleshiivka, Nelipivka, and Poltavka; and west of Toretsk close to Shcherbynivka on August 28 and 29.[70] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked close to Kleban-Byk.[71]

A humanitarian employee in Kostyantynivka advised the Monetary Instances in an article printed on August 28 that the scenario in Kostyantynivka has change into rather more harmful in latest weeks because of the risk of Russian drone strikes.[72] A Russian milblogger claimed on August 29 that Russian forces struck a big warehouse storing humanitarian assist in Kostyantynivka.[73]

Order of Battle: Parts of the Medusa crew (a 152mm artillery gun crew) of the Russian 238th Artillery Brigade (eighth Mixed Arms Military [CAA], Southern Army District [SMD]) are reportedly working close to Kleban-Byk.[74]

Russian forces not too long ago superior within the Pokrovsk route.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage printed on August 28 exhibits two Russian troopers elevating a flag in northeastern Leontovychi, indicating that Russian forces not too long ago seized (southwest of Pokrovsk) the settlement.[75] Russian sources, together with the Russian MoD, claimed that the Russian thirtieth Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd CAA, Central Army District [CMD]) participated in seizing Leontovychi.[76] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized the settlement by assaulting Ukrainian hearth factors and strongholds in small teams underneath artillery and drone cowl.[77]

Unconfirmed claims: A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed on August 29 that Russian forces superior northwest of Lysivka (southeast of Pokrovsk).[78]

Russian forces attacked close to Pokrovsk itself; north of Pokrovsk close to Rodynske; northeast of Pokrovsk close to Volodymyrivka, Novoekonomichne, Sukhetske, Shakhove, Mayak, and Zapovidne; east of Pokrovsk close to Myrolyubivka and Promin and towards Myrnohrad; southeast of Pokrovsk close to Lysivka, Sukhyi Yar, Mykolaivka, and Dachenske and towards Novopavlivka; south of Pokrovsk close to Novoukrainka; and southwest of Pokrovsk close to Troyanda, Zvirove, Udachne, and Kotlyne on August 28 and 29.[79] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked close to Bilytske (north of Pokrovsk) and between Rubizhne and Nove Shakhoveand close to Zapovidne, Malynivka, and Myrne (all northeast of Pokrovsk).[80]

A Russian supply claimed that Russian forces interdicted the T-0514 Dobropillya-Kramatorsk freeway, which Ukraine makes use of as a floor line of communication (GLOC).[81] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces proceed to struggle within the Dobropillya salient northeast of Pokrovsk and are generally capable of advance.[82] The milblogger claimed that Russian forces gained footholds north of Zolotyi Kolodyaz and in southern Petrivka behind the T-0514 freeway (each northeast of Pokrovsk). The milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are pushing Russian forces again in Vesele, western Zolotyi Kolodyaz, and towards Kucheriv Yar (all northeast of Pokrovsk) and that Ukrainian forces are holding positions west of Vesele and Kucheriv Yar. The milblogger claimed that Russian forces are preventing in northern Volodymyrivka and making an attempt to grab Shakhove and advancing towards Sofiivka (northeast of Pokrovsk) from the east.

A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed on August 29 that Russian forces are attempting to occupy the suburbs round Pokrovsk in an effort to create strains from which they'll start an assault on town and that preventing continues on the approaches to the city.[83] The milblogger claimed that Russian reconnaissance models are working in Pokrovsk.[84]

A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces launched a collection of Shahed and mixed strikes in opposition to Ukrainian close to rear targets within the Pokrovsk route, together with in opposition to Ukrainian positions close to Dobropillya, Vesna, and Novostepanivka (all northwest of Pokrovsk), damaging vitality and industrial infrastructure and a Ukrainian command publish.[85]

Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Novopavlivka route on August 29 however didn't advance.

Russian forces attacked close to Novopavlivka itself, northeast of Novopavlivka close to Novomykolaivka, southeast of Novopavlivka close to Horikhove and Novoukrainka, south of Novopavlivka close to Filiya, and southwest of Novopavlivka close to Tovste and Zelenyi Hai on August 28 and 29.[86] Mashovets acknowledged on August 29 that Russian forces proceed to assault on either side of the Zaporizhia-Donetsk H-15 freeway, together with within the Ivanivka-Andriivka-Klevtsove space (southwest of Novopavlivka) and that Ukrainian forces not too long ago counterattacked close to Andriivka-Klevtsove-Zelenyi Hai (southwest of Novopavlivka).[87]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian Normal Employees's Fundamental Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly placing Ukrainian positions close to Ivanivka.[88]

Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Velykomykhailivka route on August 29 however didn't make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Novoselivka (east of Velykomykhailivka) and superior south of Ternove, south of Vorone, towards Komyshuvakha, close to Maliivka, and into central Khoroshe (all southeast of Velykomykhailivka).[89] Mashovets acknowledged on August 29 that parts of the Russian sixtieth Motorized Rifle Brigade (fifth CAA, Jap Army District [EMD]), 69th Separate Cowl Brigade (thirty fifth CAA, EMD), and 114th Motorized Rifle Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division, fifth CAA) superior towards Komyshuvakha from the east, south, and southeast.[90]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Velykomykhailivka close to Piddubne, Oleksandrohrad, and Andriivka-Klevtsove; east of Velykomykhailivka close to Novoselivka and Voskresenka; southeast of Velykomykhailivka close to Sichneve, Maliivka, Novoheorhiivka, and Zaporizke; and south of Velykomykhailivka close to Novomykolaivka and Berezove on August 28 and 29.[91] Mashovets reported that Ukrainian forces not too long ago counterattacked east of Velykomykhailivka close to Oleksandrohrad-Myrne and southeast of Velykomykhailivka close to Sosnivka-Vorone (southeast of Velykomykhailivka).[92]

Order of Battle: Ukrainian navy observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported that parts of the Russian thirty sixth Motorized Rifle Brigade and 430th Motorized Rifle Regiment (each of the twenty ninth CAA, EMD) and the thirty seventh Motorized Rifle Brigade, fifth Tank Brigade (each of the thirty sixth CAA, EMD), and 336th Naval Infantry Brigade (Baltic Fleet) are working within the Myrne-Oleksandrohrad, Voskresenka-Sichneve, and Voskresenka-Maliivka instructions.[93] Mashovets reported that parts of the 127th Motorized Rifle Division (fifth CAA, EMD) are working towards Novoheorhiivka.[94] Mashovets added that the Russian navy command redeployed nearly all of the thirty fifth CAA, together with the 69th Cowl Brigade, to the fifth CAA space of accountability (AOR), which extends roughly from Andriivka-Klevtsove to Mala Tokmachka (southeast of Orikhiv), to bolster the southern a part of the AOR of the Russian Jap Grouping of Forces, which possible represents a reprioritization of this space.[95]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 69th Cowl Brigade are reportedly placing Ukrainian forces close to Komyshuvakha.[96] Drone operators of the 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (GRU) and the fifth Tank Brigade are reportedly placing Ukrainian forces close to Novoselivka.[97] Parts of the eleventh Air Pressure and Air Protection Military (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and EMD) are conducting unguided glide bomb strikes in opposition to Ukrainian positions in Sosnivka.[98]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian goal: Keep frontline positions, safe rear areas in opposition to Ukrainian strikes, and advance inside tube artillery vary of Zaporizhzhia Metropolis)

Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported floor exercise in japanese Zaporizhia Oblast on August 29

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian thirty eighth Motorized Rifle Brigade (thirty fifth Mixed Arms Military [CAA], Jap Army District [EMD]) are working within the Zaporizhia route.[99] Drone operators of the of the 69th Separate Cowl Brigade (thirty fifth CAA) are reportedly placing Ukrainian positions within the Vremivka route (northeast of Hulyaipole).[100]

Russian forces continued offensive operations within the western Zaporizhia Oblast on August 29 however didn't advance.

Russian forces attacked close to Orikhiv itself; southwest of Orikhiv close to Nesteryanka and Stepove and west of Orikhiv close to Stepnohirsk and Plavni on August 28 and 29.[101] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking west of Orikhiv close to Stepnohirsk and Stepove and southwest of Orikhiv close to Mali Shcherbaky, and Shcherbaky.[102] Geolocated footage printed on August 29 exhibits Ukrainian forces repelling an a minimum of diminished company-sized Russian mechanized assault southeast of Mala Tokmachka (southeast of Orikhiv) through which Russian forces misplaced two T-72 tanks and 4 BMP-1 and BMP-3 infantry preventing autos.[103]

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces launched an unspecified massive variety of drones in opposition to occupied Zaporizhia Oblast and amplified footage purportedly exhibiting parts of the Russian BARS-Sarmat Unmanned Methods Particular Goal Middle (previously BARS-Sarmat Detachment, subordinated to Airborne [VDV] Forces) making an attempt to repel a drone strike in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast.[104]

Russian milbloggers claimed on August 29 that Russian forces launched an Iskander missile at a Ukrainian Neptune missile system close to Lyubytske (northeast of Orikhiv).[105]

Order of Battle: Ukrainian navy observer Kostyantyn Mashovets acknowledged that parts of the Russian nineteenth Motorized Rifle Division (58th Mixed Arms Military [CAA], Southern Army District [SMD]), together with its 429th Motorized Rifle Regiment, and parts of the seventh VDV Division, together with its 247th and 108th VDV regiments, are attacking towards Plavni (west of Orikhiv) and Stepnohirsk.[106] Drone operators of the Chechen Vostok-Akhmat Battalion are reportedly conducting aerial reconnaissance in northwestern Robotyne (south of Orikhiv).[107] Parts of the sixtieth Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (fifth CAA, EMD) are reportedly working close to Mala Tokmachka.[108] Drone operators of the Russian Nemets group of the 291st Motorized Rifle Regiment (forty second Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA, SMD) are reportedly working in Zaporizhia Oblast.[109]

Russian forces continued restricted assaults within the Kherson route on August 29 however didn't advance. [110]

Ukrainian navy observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on August 29 that unspecified Russian VDV and naval infantry parts and certain parts of the 18 th CAA (SMD) are frequently attacking the Dnipro River Delta and making an attempt to create a tactical bridgehead on the east (proper) financial institution of the Dnipro River.[111]

Ukrainian Navy Spokesperson Captain Third Rank Dmytro Pletenchuk reported that the Russian strike on the Ukrainian Navy reconnaissance Simferopol ship on August 28 killed two crew members.[112] That is the primary publicly documented occasion of a Russian naval sea drone placing a Ukrainian naval vessel.

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 144th Motorized Rifle Brigade (reportedly of the fortieth Military Corps [AC], 18th CAA, SMD) are reportedly placing Ukrainian positions close to Tiahynka (northeast of Kherson Metropolis) and drone operators of the 104th VDV Division are reportedly placing Ukrainian positions close to Novotiahynka and Lvove (each northeast of Kherson Metropolis).[113]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Marketing campaign (Russian Goal: Goal Ukrainian navy and civilian infrastructure within the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces carried out a collection of drone strikes in opposition to Ukraine on the night time of August 28 and 29. The Ukrainian Air Pressure reported that Russian forces launched 68 Shahed-type and decoy drones from Kursk and Bryansk cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai.[114] The Ukrainian Air Pressure reported that Ukrainian forces downed 46 drones over the north and east of Ukraine and that 22 drones struck 9 places in Donetsk and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts. Dnipropetrovsk Oblast Army Administration Head Serhiy Lysak reported on August 29 that Russian forces launched a drone strike in opposition to Dnipropetrovsk Oblast in a single day that killed two civilians and injured three others.[115]

Important exercise in Belarus (Russian efforts to extend its navy presence in Belarus and additional combine Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing important to report.

Be aware: ISW doesn't obtain any labeled materials from any supply, makes use of solely publicly accessible data, and attracts extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media in addition to commercially accessible satellite tv for pc imagery and different geospatial information as the premise for these reviews. References to all sources used are offered within the endnotes of every replace.

[1] https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/land-swap-that-wasnt-inside-trumps-frantic-dash-ukraine-peace-2025-08-28/

[2] https://suspilne dot media/sumy/1089162-zelenskij-rosia-perekidae-vijska-z-sumskogo-napramku/

[3] https://suspilne dot media/1089054-akso-putin-dast-komandu-pocnetsa-peregovornij-proces-skibickij-iz-gur-pro-plani-rosian-ta-ihnij-zapas-micnosti/

[4] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-28-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-25-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-27-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-15-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-15-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-17-2025

[5] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-24-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-22-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-19-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-23-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-21-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-20-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-26-2025

[6] https://t.me/mod_russia/56033

[7] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-27-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-26-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-25-2025

[8] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27287; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27335; https://www.fb.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid08QUZzLPnRk5oc6ZAgVAXP3v36gDfn5q4jgASZ4LrfAgDs7484s79JMoor3XNji3xl?__cft__[0]=AZX-CpX6dk2qKhQ9N2kRdqFgrN_kTEfiYEJC4R-V4WOXnnaUNsLRbM4XJT7H9u6yyspe33Cfg9gZz-8Tuwkl386vKZjmYrnKb-uFhwUXwoOnnQqcY7yfenCTKB-Eavp77ZoVvfEI1LkDgwscp4tGn7bzMltKd95MGjctpuzOjQzx6Y3LsLmvowr7yfxj0FmAvc8&__tn__=%2COpercent2CP-R; https://www.fb.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0fPCdKrw3of6da2fEhSUN1BbTSp22foVJ5GspNCKBzjLJUEWxZKAWnfMib3miPAzfl; https://www.fb.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid022dRGwoFGSRE1BcxHuA6CqRGEQhgUxUS1d3PHbcPbArX5R5guxRzWSz1wZ5RGjyPtl; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27455; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27514; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27568; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27602; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27645; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27668; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27731; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27756; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27777; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27824; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27849; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27883; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27936; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27981; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28026; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28068; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28115; https://t.me/s/GeneralStaffZSU/28115; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28189; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28233; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28260; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28309; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28349; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28380

[9] https://t.me/mod_russia/56036; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-force-generation-and-technological-adaptations-update-june-27-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-22-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-15-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-force-generation-and-technological-adaptations-update-may-7-2025

[10] https://t.me/mod_russia/56033

[11] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-1-2025

[12] https://isw.pub/UkrWar072725; https://isw.pub/UkrWar070525; https://isw.pub/UkrWar070125; https://isw.pub/UkrWar062625; https://isw.pub/UkrWar061625; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-26-2025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar052125; https://isw.pub/UkrWar062425; https://isw.pub/UkrWar051325; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042725; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042625

[13] https://isw.pub/UkrWar081625; https://isw.pub/UkrWar081025

[14] https://t.me/mod_russia/56033

[15] https://t.me/mod_russia/56038; https://t.me/mod_russia/56039; https://t.me/mod_russia/56043

[16] https://t.me/mod_russia/56043

[17] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-11-2023; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-22-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-1-2024

[18] https://isw.pub/UkrWar072425

[19] https://t.me/DIUkraine/6753 ; https://gur dot gov.ua/content material/nichnyi-hurkit-u-krymu-biitsi-hur-urazyly-rosiisku-rls-zi-skladu-s400.html

[20] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28403

[21] https://suspilne dot media/1101736-u-rosijskomu-misti-tver-zniseno-infrastrukturu-vuzlovoi-zaliznicnoi-stancii-dzerela/

[22] https://x.com/bayraktar_1love/standing/1961406201410818509; https://t.me/astrapress/90910 https://x.com/neonhandrail/standing/1961190488888975681 https://t.me/supernova_plus/43136

[23] https://www.reuters.com/enterprise/vitality/russias-ust-luga-port-operate-half-capacity-september-after-pipeline-damage-2025-08-28/

[24] https://www dot kommersant.ru/doc/7975798?tg

[25] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-28-2025 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-23-2025 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-26-2025

[26] https://t.me/ermaka2022/6871 ; https://x.com/AndriyYermak/standing/1961426832764371251

[27] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-23-2025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar082025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar081325 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar072725 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar072125 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar05022025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar051325 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar060125 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar051725 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar062625 https://isw.pub/UkrWar081525 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar081625 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar081725

[28] https://www.dsca.mil/Press-Media/Main-Arms-Gross sales/Article-Show/Article/4289280/ukraine-air-delivered-munitions

[29] https://isw.pub/UkrWar082425

[30] https://www.dsca.mil/Press-Media/Main-Arms-Gross sales/Article-Show/Article/4290506/ukraine-satellite-communications-services; https://www.dsca.mil/Press-Media/Main-Arms-Gross sales/Article-Show/Article/4290514/ukraine-patriot-air-defense-system-sustainment

[31] https://www.fb.com/don.gp.gov.ua/posts/pfbid0TimUA4aEMBJYcBdiWGvgT9gVWLyYhdmiFswyiHo1uzepc8LMq1HWewF8igU7p56Tl; https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1102238-katuvali-ukrainskih-vijskovopolonenih-na-doneccini-pravoohoronci-rozpocali-dosudove-rozsliduvanna/

[32] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1102238-katuvali-ukrainskih-vijskovopolonenih-na-doneccini-pravoohoronci-rozpocali-dosudove-rozsliduvanna/; https://suspilne dot media/dnipro/1099130-z-pererizanim-gorlom-5-dib-povz-do-ukrainskih-pozicij-na-dnipropetrovsini-likuut-vijskovogo-akij-vtik-z-polonu-rf/

[33] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-19-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-22-2025

[34] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28407; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28380; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28377; https://t.me/wargonzo/28845; https://t.me/dva_majors/78404; https://t.me/severnnyi/4969; https://t.me/severnnyi/4970

[35] https://t.me/severnnyi/4969; https://t.me/dva_majors/78404

[36] https://t.me/severnnyi/4970

[37] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/33119

[38] https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1102436-isw-kaze-so-rosiani-prosunulisa-poblizu-kozacoi-lopani-na-harkivsini-ci-tak-ce/;

[39] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-28-2025

[40] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28407; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28380; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28377; https://t.me/SJTF_Dnipro/16625; https://t.me/severnnyi/4969

[41] https://t.me/tass_agency/334139

[42] https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/5954

[43] https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/5952 ; https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/5956

[44] https://t.me/armycorp44/45

[45] https://t.me/tass_agency/334134; https://t.me/wargonzo/28845

[46] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28407; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28380; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28377; https://t.me/SJTF_Dnipro/16625; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/33128; https://t.me/wargonzo/28845

[47] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/29/litayut-po-dorozi-rozkydayut-gydotu-poblyzu-kupyanska-rosiyany-dystanczijno-minuyut-dorogy/ ; https://youtu.be/50YaHwj0Rjc

[48] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WY8sDvZdWEA ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/29/bulo-trishky-smishno-chytaty-na-kupyanshhyni-rosiyany-vzyalysya-bombarduvaty-brygadu-vygadkamy-ta-fejkamy/

[49] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/177719

[50] https://t.me/operationall_space/6070; https://x.com/richardzai38580/standing/1961126745001902461

[51] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/33128

[52] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28380; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28377; https://t.me/SJTF_Dnipro/16625; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28407; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/33128

[53] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/98687; https://deepstatemap dot dwell/en#13/49.0992738/37.7478218

[54] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28407; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28380; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28377; https://t.me/SJTF_Dnipro/16625; https://t.me/wargonzo/28845; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/33110; https://t.me/dva_majors/78404; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/177670

[55] https://t.me/motopatriot78/41567

[56] https://t.me/dva_majors/78412 ; https://t.me/zovpobedy/15800; https://t.me/milinfolive/155617; https://t.me/vysokygovorit/20687 ; https://t.me/vysokygovorit/20688; https://x.com/richardzai38580/standing/1961448880190714321

[57] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-21-2024

[58] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/177689; https://t.me/dva_majors/78401

[59] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28407 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28380 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28377 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/33141

[60] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/33141

[61] https://t.me/tass_agency/334228

[62] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28407 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28380 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28377 ; https://t.me/SJTF_Dnipro/16625

[63] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/08/29/hlopczi-dronshhyky-na-nyh-polyuyut-u-chasovomu-yaru-rosiyany-prosuvayutsya-manevruyuchy-mizh-ruyinamy/

[64] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1102350-rosijski-vijska-obstrilali-kramatorsk-29-serpna-odin-zagiblij-ta-poranena-ditina/; https://suspilne dot media/1101818-kreml-visuvae-ukraini-novi-umovi-dla-peremovin-lideriv-ermak-i-umerov-zustrinutsa-z-komandou-trampa1283-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1756472724

[65] https://archive.ph/vEo1U ; https://www.ft.com/content material/017750bb-6867-448f-a95a-ce3321704a12

[66] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-24-2025

[67] https://t.me/Sever_Z/15683 ; https://x.com/richardzai38580/standing/1961426203635847415

[68] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/33119

[69] https://t.me/rybar/73174; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/33113

[70] https://t.me/dva_majors/78404 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/41570 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/28845 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/33113

[71] https://t.me/motopatriot78/41570

[72] https://archive.ph/vEo1U ; https://www.ft.com/content material/017750bb-6867-448f-a95a-ce3321704a12

[73] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/177747

[74] https://t.me/nm_dnr/14233

[75] https://x.com/richardzai38580/standing/1961259929018535950; https://t.me/frontline_pvt/10976; https://t.me/osintpen/1701

[76] https://t.me/mod_russia/56031 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/55957; https://t.me/frontline_pvt/10976; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/98689; https://t.me/sashakots/55906

[77] https://t.me/sashakots/55906; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/98689;

[78] https://t.me/rybar/73174

[79] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28407; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28380; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28377; https://t.me/SJTF_Dnipro/16625; https://t.me/rybar/73184 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/28845 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/78404

[80] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/67076; https://t.me/rybar/73184

[81] https://t.me/tass_agency/334242

[82] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/67076

[83] https://t.me/rybar/73184; https://t.me/rybar/73174

[84] https://t.me/rybar/73184

[85] https://t.me/don_partizan/9211

[86] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28407 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28380 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28377 ; https://t.me/SJTF_Dnipro/16625 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/78404

[87] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2948

[88] https://t.me/voin_dv/16660

[89] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/98687; https://t.me/dva_majors/78404; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/33155

[90] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2948

[91] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28407; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28380; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28377; https://t.me/SJTF_Dnipro/16625; https://t.me/wargonzo/28845; https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2948

[92] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2948

[93] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2948

[94] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2948

[95] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2949

[96] https://t.me/voin_dv/16655

[97] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/177655

[98] https://t.me/voin_dv/16657; https://t.me/voin_dv/16662; https://x.com/richardzai38580/standing/1961405623901577255

[99] https://t.me/voin_dv/16658 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/16664

[100] https://t.me/voin_dv/16665

[101] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28407; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28380 ; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/12894; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28377; https://t.me/dva_majors/78451; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/33152; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/33152; https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2950

[102] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/33152; https://t.me/dva_majors/78451

[103] https://x.com/moklasen/standing/1961452084433170521; https://t.me/dumky_frontovyka/2694

[104] https://t.me/dva_majors/78411; https://t.me/rogozin_do/7517

[105] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/98696; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/177682

[106] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2950

[107] https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/5955

[108] https://t.me/dva_majors/78451

[109] https://t.me/wargonzo/28854

[110] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28407; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28380 ; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/12894; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28377

[111] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2950

[112] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lnrp2S2L6qk ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/29/urazhennya-korablya-vms-zsu-zrosla-kilkist-zagyblyh-tryvayut-poshukovo-ryatuvalni-roboty/

[113] https://t.me/osvedomitell_alex/28632; https://t.me/rusich_army/25435

[114] https://t.me/kpszsu/41227

[115] https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/23951 ; https://suspilne dot media/dnipro/1101864-vijska-rf-atakuvali-dnipro-ta-tri-rajoni-oblasti-dronami-dvoe-ludej-zaginuli-se-troe-poraneni/