Iran Replace Night Particular Report, March 10, 2026

[ad_1] The Institute for the Research of Warfare (ISW) and the Crucial Threats Undertaking (CTP) on the American Enterprise Institute are publishing two updates every day to offer evaluation on the warfare with Iran. The morning replace will focus on US and Israeli strikes on Iran and Iran and the Axis of Resistance’s response to the strikes. The night replace will likely be extra complete, protecting occasions over the previous 24-hour interval and refining objects mentioned within the morning replace.

ISW-CTP’s satellite tv for pc imagery associate has expanded its imagery restrictions to incorporate Iran and can now delay the discharge of all satellite tv for pc imagery from the area by 14 days. ISW-CTP will likely be unable to verify strikes or assess injury at websites utilizing satellite tv for pc imagery from this associate for a minimum of 14 days after a strike happens. We're exploring different choices and strategies to verify strikes and can proceed to verify strikes the place potential.

Key Takeaways

US Central Command (CENTCOM) reported on March 10 that US forces destroyed 16 Iranian minelayers close to the Strait of Hormuz. Iranian mining efforts are a part of a broader Iranian effort to disrupt maritime visitors within the Strait of Hormuz and the Persian Gulf to attempt to impose a price on the Gulf states and america. Iranian efforts to mine the Strait of Hormuz will even probably additional hinder Iran’s potential to export oil, together with shipments to China, the most important importer of Iranian oil.

The Iranian regime is increasing securitization efforts amid the continuing battle, which probably displays the regime’s paranoia about US-Israeli infiltration and alerts a shift to prioritization of counterintelligence. The regime equally prioritized regime safety following the June 2025 Iran-Israel Warfare and arrested lots of of people within the days after the battle as a part of a broader effort to strengthen inside management and broaden securitization measures.

The mixed drive focused Iranian inside safety establishments in western and northwestern Iran. Check with the graphic beneath to see key Iranian inside safety websites which were struck for the reason that begin of the warfare.

The mixed drive continues to strike Iranian-backed Iraqi militia targets in Iraq to restrict the flexibility of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias to conduct retaliatory assaults in opposition to america and Israel.

Hezbollah claimed 29 assaults focusing on IDF forces and positions in northern Israel and southern Lebanon between 3:00 PM ET on March 9 and three:00 PM ET on March 10. Hezbollah’s 29 claimed assaults are the best variety of claimed assaults in a 24-hour interval that ISW-CTP has noticed for the reason that begin of the battle.

Toplines

US Central Command (CENTCOM) reported on March 10 that US forces destroyed 16 Iranian minelayers close to the Strait of Hormuz.[1] Iranian mining efforts are a part of a broader Iranian effort to disrupt maritime visitors within the Strait of Hormuz and the Persian Gulf to attempt to impose a price on the Gulf states and america. CBS Information, citing unspecified US officers, reported on March 10 that Iran could also be getting ready to deploy naval mines within the Strait of Hormuz.[2] The officers added that Iran is utilizing small craft that may carry as much as three mines every. US President Donald Trump posted on Fact Social on March 10 that america needs any mines that Iran positioned within the Strait of Hormuz “eliminated instantly,” although he added that america has “no experiences of [Iran] doing so.”[3] Trump additionally threatened navy penalties “at a stage by no means seen earlier than” if Iran fails to take away any mines it has positioned.[4] Iran beforehand laid mines within the Strait of Hormuz and the Persian Gulf through the Iran-Iraq Warfare to disrupt worldwide transport and impose a price on Iraq and its allies.[5] The US launched an operation in April 1988 that destroyed a minimum of two Iranian oil platforms, sank a minimum of three Iranian speedboats, and severely broken or sank two Iranian frigates after an Iranian mine severely broken the USS Samuel B. Roberts within the Persian Gulf.[6]

Notably, experiences of Iran making an attempt to put mines have emerged three days after the final confirmed Iranian assaults on vessels within the Persian Gulf on March 7.[7] Iran attacked a minimum of three vessels within the Persian Gulf every day from March 1 via March 4.[8] The primary section of the US-Israeli marketing campaign and continued strikes on Iranian ballistic missile infrastructure have restricted Iran’s potential to retaliate with ballistic missiles and drones, nonetheless. US Protection Secretary Pete Hegseth acknowledged on March 5 that US strikes have made Iran’s navy “fight ineffective.”[9] Hegseth acknowledged on March 10 that Iran has fired its lowest variety of missiles for the reason that warfare started within the final 24 hours.[10]

Iranian efforts to mine the Strait of Hormuz will even probably additional hinder Iran’s potential to export oil, together with shipments to China, the most important importer of Iranian oil.[11] Mining is, subsequently, an excessive choice to which Iran has resorted and doesn't signify a fascinating possibility for the nation’s navy officers. Industrial maritime knowledge exhibits that solely three tankers listed as a part of Iran’s ghost fleet have crossed the Strait of Hormuz since March 2.[12] This marks a major decline from the 24 vessels that crossed between February 22 and March 1.[13]

The mixed drive continues to conduct airstrikes focusing on air offensive and defensive capabilities. The Israel Protection Forces (IDF) confirmed that the Israel Air Drive (IAF) fighter jets dropped greater than 170 munitions focusing on the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Drive in Tehran Metropolis, a missile manufacturing and storage website and several other air protection methods in Esfahan Metropolis, and unspecified navy infrastructure in Shiraz Metropolis on March 9.[14] The IDF additionally struck a missile launcher and Iranian navy personnel in an unspecified location in Iran on March 9.[15] Anti-regime media reported on March 10 that an airstrike focused a hidden missile launcher in Shiraz’s industrial space at an unspecified time.[16] An Israeli open-source intelligence (OSINT) analyst additionally recognized that earlier mixed drive airstrikes destroyed a number of radars and Hawk missile batteries on the Shahid Sattari Speedy Response Air Protection website in Ghani Abad, southeast of Tehran Metropolis, on commercially obtainable satellite tv for pc imagery on March 10.[17] Israeli assume tank Alma additionally recognized injury to a minimum of six assist constructions and two radar emplacements on satellite tv for pc imagery on March 7.[18] Alma reported that this air protection website covers a number of key Iranian navy websites, together with the Khojir missile manufacturing and Parchin weapons complexes in northern Tehran Metropolis – each of which mixed drive airstrikes have focused and broken since February 28.[19] Israel beforehand focused this air protection website in October 2024, when it focused Iran’s three of Iran’s S-300 air protection methods.[20]

The mixed drive continues to strike industrial websites affiliated with Iran’s missile and drone program that goal to make it tougher for Iran to reconstitute its missile and drone stockpiles. An OSINT analyst reported that mixed drive airstrikes on March 9 focused the Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group, which produces liquid-fueled ballistic missiles at a website west of Tehran Metropolis.[21] The Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group is a subsidiary firm of the Iranian Protection and Armed Forces Logistics Ministry’s Aerospace Industries Group liable for Iran’s missile and drone manufacturing program.[22] An OSINT analyst individually geolocated a goal of IAF airstrikes on March 6 to a chemical business advanced in Shokuhiyeh industrial city in Qom Province on.[23]

The mixed drive’s decapitation marketing campaign has efficiently focused key figures within the Iranian armed forces’ command and management and logistics. Anti-regime media confirmed on March 10 that earlier mixed drive airstrikes killed Armed Forces Normal Employees (AFGS) Basij chief Asadollah Badfar.[24] Iranian media has but to verify Badfar’s loss of life on the time of this writing. Iranian media on March 10 introduced the funerals of a number of senior Iranian commanders killed in mixed drive airstrikes for the reason that begin of the warfare.[25] The next listing accommodates deceased commanders that ISW-CTP has not reported beforehand:

IRGC Mohammad Rasoul Ollah Unit Commander for Larger Tehran Brigadier Normal Hassan Hassanzadeh (operates below IRGC Floor Forces Sarallah Headquarters, which enforces inside safety)[26]

AFGS Logistic head Brigadier Normal Hassan Ali Tajik[27]

AFGS Logistics and Industrial Analysis deputy Brigadier Normal Mohsen Darrebaghi[28]

AFGS Plans and Operations head Brigadier Normal Hosseini Motlagh[29]

Regulation Enforcement Command (LEC) Intelligence Group head Brigadier Normal Gholamreza Rezaian[30]

LEC Public Locations head Brigadier Normal Khalil Helali (liable for public institutions and companies inspections)[31]

Brigadier Normal Davoud Askari (unspecified place)[32]

The Iranian regime is increasing securitization efforts amid the continuing battle, which probably displays the regime’s paranoia about US-Israeli infiltration and alerts a shift to prioritization of counterintelligence. Iranian safety and intelligence providers reported a number of arrests throughout Iran on March 10, together with 30 people accused of appearing as spies or “media operatives.”[33] Iranian media claimed that intelligence authorities arrested a international nationwide in Khorasan Razavi Province, accused of spying for 2 unspecified Gulf international locations by gathering Iranian navy and safety data.[34] Iranian media additionally reported arrests tied to alleged militant and anti-regime networks alongside Iran’s southeastern and northwestern borders.[35] Safety forces individually arrested people accused of offering footage of strike websites to anti-regime media shops and speaking with the Iran Worldwide community, together with the arrest of 81 people accused of sharing data with an anti-regime outlet via social media.[36] The regime equally prioritized regime safety following the June 2025 Iran-Israel Warfare and arrested lots of of people within the days after the battle as a part of a broader effort to strengthen inside management and broaden securitization measures.[37]

The next sequence of infographics tracks US and Israeli efforts to focus on key nodes of the Iranian regime’s inside safety equipment, together with the IRGC Floor Forces, Basij, and Regulation Enforcement Command (LEC). These establishments are vital to Iran’s potential to keep up home stability and social management, significantly in periods of inside unrest. Lots of the items listed beneath participated in protest suppression through the winter 2025-2026 protest wave, for instance.

The mixed drive focused Iranian inside safety establishments in western and northwestern Iran. The IDF reported on March 10 that the mixed drive struck an LEC Particular Forces Unit, the LEC Provincial Command headquarters, a police prison investigation constructing, the Intelligence Ministry constructing, and a Basij compound in Tabriz, East Azerbaijan Province.[38] Regime-affiliated media additionally reported on March 10 that the mixed drive struck six different police buildings in East Azerbaijan.[39] The IDF acknowledged on March 10 that it struck the LEC Provincial Command headquarters, the Intelligence Ministry, a Basij compound, and an LEC Particular Forces Unit in Ilam Province.[40] The IDF mentioned that it “dismantled a lot of the central belongings” of the LEC and Basij in Ilam Province.[41] LEC Particular Forces Items are the regime’s elite anti-riot police.[42] Anti-regime media and OSINT accounts reported on March 10 that the mixed drive additionally struck a Basij unit headquarters and an IRGC drive headquarters in Kermanshah Province.[43]

Iranian Retaliation

Iran launched a minimum of seven missile barrages at Israel between 3:00 PM ET on March 9 and three:00 PM ET on March 10.[44] One Iranian ballistic missile landed in an open space of Beit Shemesh, Central Israel, on March 10 however didn't trigger casualties or injury.[45] A earlier Iranian missile strike on Beit Shemesh killed a minimum of 9 folks on March 1.[46] A separate Hezbollah rocket assault struck Beit Shemesh on February 9 however didn't trigger casualties.[47] The IDF estimates that Iran has fired roughly 300 missiles at Israel since February 28, which is about half the entire quantity Iran fired through the 12-Day Warfare.[48]

Iran continued drone and ballistic missile assaults on Gulf states on March 10. The UAE has detected fewer incoming projectiles since March 9, which means that mixed drive strikes on Iranian drone launch infrastructure have degraded Iran’s potential to maintain large-scale drone assaults. The Emirati Protection Ministry reported that Iran launched 9 ballistic missiles and 35 drones on the UAE on March 10, which is according to the considerably decrease fee the UAE reported on March 9.[49] The UAE recorded 9 drone impacts on March 10, which killed two folks.[50] The rise in drone impacts in comparison with March 9, when there was just one influence, probably displays variability in interception charges or focusing on reasonably than a restoration in Iranian launch capabilities.[51] Iranian drone launch charges focusing on the UAE have declined from roughly 100 drones per day earlier within the marketing campaign to fewer than 50 per day since March 9, probably on account of mixed drive strikes on Iranian launch websites.[52] The speed of Iranian ballistic missiles launched stays comparatively according to a median of round 13 a day since March 1, nonetheless. Iran additionally launched drones and ballistic missiles focusing on Bahrain, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait between 8:00 am ET and three:00 pm ET on March 10, however the international locations’ respective protection ministries reported that air protection methods intercepted all projectiles.[53]

Axis of Resistance Response

The mixed drive continues to strike Iranian-backed Iraqi militia targets in Iraq to restrict the flexibility of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias to conduct retaliatory assaults in opposition to america and Israel. The mixed drive reportedly performed a number of rounds of airstrikes focusing on the headquarters of the Iranian-backed In style Mobilization Forces (PMF) close to al Qaim, Anbar Province, on March 10.[54] A number of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias management brigades inside the PMF.[55] A few of the airstrikes focused the 18th PMF Brigade, which is affiliated with Saraya Talia al Khurasani, and injured 5 members of the brigade.[56] The mixed drive struck the 18th PMF Brigade headquarters in the identical space on March 9.[57] The mixed drive additionally struck a number of unidentified places on the Syria-Iraq border on March 10, in line with a safety supply in Anbar Province chatting with Iraqi media.[58] Mixed drive strikes focusing on a fortieth PMF Brigade headquarters close to Kirkuk Metropolis, Kirkuk Province, on March 10, killed a minimum of 4 Kataib al Imam Ali members.[59] Kataib al Imam Ali controls the fortieth PMF Brigade.[60]

Iranian-backed Iraqi militias proceed to conduct and declare to conduct assaults focusing on US forces and bases in Iraq and the area. US air defenses at Baghdad Worldwide Airport intercepted two drones on March 10, in line with Iraqi media.[61] Iranian-backed Iraqi militias proceed to assert that the US occupies its former Camp Victory base at Baghdad Worldwide Airport, regardless of america withdrawing from the bottom in 2011.[62] Iraqi air defenses additionally reportedly intercepted a drone close to Erbil Airport, which homes a US base.[63] The Islamic Resistance in Iraq, which is a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, claimed on March 9 that its forces performed 37 drone and missile operations focusing on US and “enemy” bases in Iraq and the area.[64] The Islamic Resistance in Iraq additionally claimed on March 10 that it intercepted a US MQ9 drone over northern Basra Province.[65] Iraqi media reported two separate cases of drone impacts in Majnoon oil discipline in northern Basra Province, however it's unclear if the Islamic Resistance of Iraq is related to those occasions.[66] Probably Iranian-backed Iraqi militia entrance teams Saraya Awliya al Dam, Kataib Sarqhat al Quds, and Rijal al Bas al Shadid proceed to assert assaults focusing on US forces and US-affiliated websites in Baghdad and Iraqi Kurdistan, in addition to US bases in different regional international locations reminiscent of Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Jordan.[67] ISW-CTP assessed on March 6 that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias could also be utilizing entrance teams in an try and keep away from US and Israeli strikes on militia positions and obfuscate culpability.[68] An OSINT account reported on March 10 that unidentified Iraqi militias performed a drone assault focusing on the UAE consulate in Erbil.[69] The Saudi International Ministry condemned the assault focusing on the Emirati consulate.[70]

A spokesperson for Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba informed Axis of Resistance-affiliated media on March 10 that the Axis of Resistance is coordinating its efforts throughout Iraq, Lebanon, and Yemen to strike US and Israeli navy bases within the area.[71] Completely different Axis of Resistance members, such because the Iranian-backed Iraqi militias and the Houthis, have beforehand coordinated assaults, together with through the October 7 Warfare.[72] ISW-CTP has noticed no indicators of coordination between Axis members or Axis members and Iran through the present battle, nonetheless. The Houthis have but to conduct any assaults and even threaten to take action in response to the mixed drive’s marketing campaign in Iran or Israeli operations in Lebanon. The IDF Spokesman Brigadier Normal Effie Defrin reported that the IDF has no intelligence indicating that an assault on unspecified websites in central Israel on March 4, with concurrent fireplace from Iran and by Hezbollah in Lebanon, was a coordinated effort.[73]

The IDF has continued to conduct airstrikes focusing on Hezbollah navy websites in Lebanon to degrade Hezbollah’s potential to conduct retaliatory assaults in opposition to Israel. The IDF has continued to strike Hezbollah rocket launch websites in Lebanon on March 9.[74] Israel additionally launched evacuation orders for 4 further cities, Yohmor, Western Beqaa District, and Arnoun, Yohmor, Zawtar El Charqiyeh, and Zawtar El Gharbiyeh – all in Nabatieh District – on March 10.[75] The IDF mentioned that any residential website utilized by Hezbollah for navy functions might be focused.[76]

Hezbollah claimed 29 assaults focusing on IDF forces and positions in northern Israel and southern Lebanon between 3:00 PM ET on March 9 and three:00 PM ET on March 10. Hezbollah’s 29 claimed assaults are the best variety of claimed assaults in a 24-hour interval that ISW-CTP has noticed for the reason that begin of the battle.[77] Israeli media reported on March 9 that Israel’s safety institution informed Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Israeli Protection Minister Israel Katz that Hezbollah will broaden its rocket assaults “within the coming days,” placing deeper inside Israeli territory at “vital amenities.”[78] Hezbollah has continued to assault IDF forces and positions in southern Lebanon, together with launching rockets focusing on Israeli forces in Tal al Hamamis, Wadi al Asafir, and Khallet al Mahafir, Marjaayoun District.[79] Hezbollah has repeatedly focused Israeli forces at these places for the reason that begin of the battle.[80] Hezbollah moreover claimed that it focused two Israeli navy positions on the Israel-Lebanon border, one Israeli navy base in northern Israel, and a protection industrial website southeast of Acre, Northern Israel.[81]

Syrian media reported that Hezbollah shelled a Syrian city on the Lebanon-Syria border on March 10.[82] The Syrian Military informed Syrian state media on March 10 that Hezbollah fighters shelled the Syrian city of Serghaya, Rif Dimashq Province, on the Lebanon-Syria border.[83] The Syrian Military reported that it has noticed Hezbollah reinforcements arriving on the Lebanon-Syria border.[84] The Syrian military mentioned that it's intently monitoring the state of affairs, assessing subsequent steps, and in touch with the LAF.[85] Lebanese President Joseph Aoun and Syrian President Ahmed al Shara had a telephone name on March 10 to debate coordination to strengthen Lebanon-Syria border management.[86] Syrian authorities have repeatedly interdicted weapons smuggling shipments in Serghaya, nearly actually sure for Hezbollah, in latest months.[87] The IDF has continued to conduct “ahead protection maneuver[s]” in southern Lebanon.[88] The IDF introduced that troopers from the seventh Armored Brigade (thirty sixth Division) performed raids inside southern Lebanon on March 9, through which they recognized and killed an unspecified variety of Hezbollah fighters who had entered a constructing close to the Israeli drive.[89] The IDF additionally mentioned that thirty sixth Division troopers raided a weapons depot and a Hezbollah Radwan Drive command submit in southern Lebanon.[90] The IDF additionally reported that 769th Regional Brigade (91st Division) troopers recognized a Hezbollah cell and directed airstrikes focusing on the people in southern Lebanon.[91] The 769th Regional Brigade (91st Division) has operated focusing on Hezbollah navy infrastructure in southern Lebanon in latest months.[92]

Unspecified Lebanese sources informed Reuters on March 10 that Hezbollah is using classes that the group discovered through the Fall 2024 Israeli marketing campaign in Lebanon.[93] The 4 Lebanese sources “accustomed to Hezbollah’s navy actions” mentioned that Hezbollah has appointed 4 deputies to every commander to make sure continued operations within the occasion of the commander’s loss of life.[94] The IDF focused quite a few brigade, firm, and platoon-level commanders in southern Lebanon through the Israeli marketing campaign in Fall 2024, which ISW-CTP assessed could have diminished the fight effectiveness of some Hezbollah items in organizing an efficient protection in opposition to Israeli advances.[95] The Lebanese sources additionally informed Reuters that Hezbollah is rationing the usage of its anti-tank guided missiles (ATGM).[96] ATGMs are the first munition that Hezbollah fighters in southern Lebanon have traditionally relied upon to defend in opposition to Israeli armor.[97] The autumn 2024 Israeli marketing campaign in Lebanon severely diminished Hezbollah’s weapons stockpiles, and the IDF seized tens of 1000's of ATGMs from Hezbollah warehouses in southern Lebanon through the marketing campaign.[98]

Axios reported on March 9 that Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) Commander Normal Rodolphe Haykal has refused to implement the Lebanese authorities’s determination to outlaw Hezbollah’s navy exercise.[99] The Lebanese Cupboard declared all Hezbollah navy and safety exercise to be unlawful on March 2 and demanded that Hezbollah hand over all of its weapons to the state.[100] Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam known as upon the LAF to take ”instant measures” to implement the federal government’s determination.[101] The LAF has been traditionally reticent to confront Hezbollah with drive. The LAF has indirectly confronted Hezbollah as a part of its latest efforts inside the previous 12 months to disarm Hezbollah, for instance, which is a major barrier to any significant disarmament of the group.[102] Haykal’s unwillingness to deploy LAF items to confront Hezbollah fighters is reportedly fueling tensions with Salam.[103]

Endnotes

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https://x.com/modgovksa/standing/2031147323028328776?s=20 ; https://x.com/modgovksa/standing/2031190688868532435?s=20 ; https://x.com/modgovksa/standing/2031258122707206169?s=20 ; https://x.com/modgovksa/standing/2031258122707206169?s=20 ; https://x.com/modgovksa/standing/2031472181201260549?s=20 ; https://x.com/KuwaitArmyGHQ/standing/2031475975276372360 ; https://x.com/MOD_Qatar/standing/2031404661614199239 ; https://x.com/BDF_Bahrain/standing/2031470084594581772 [54] https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D8percentA3percentD9percent85percentD9percent80percentD9percent86/%D9percent82percentD8percentB5percentD9percent81-%D8percentACpercentD9percent88percentD9percent8A-%D8percentACpercentD8percentAFpercentD9percent8ApercentD8percentAF-%D9percent8ApercentD8percentB3percentD8percentAApercentD9percent87percentD8percentAFpercentD9percent81-%D8percentA7percentD9percent84percentD8percentADpercentD8percentB4percentD8percentAF-%D8percentA7percentD9percent84percentD8percentB4percentD8percentB9percentD8percentA8percentD9percent8A-%D8percentBApercentD8percentB1percentD8percentA8percentD9percent8A-%D8percentA7percentD9percent84percentD8percentB9percentD8percentB1percentD8percentA7percentD9percent82 ; https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D8percentA3percentD9percent85percentD9percent80percentD9percent86/%D8percentA7percentD9percent84percentD8percentABpercentD8percentA7percentD9percent84percentD8percentAB-%D8percentAEpercentD9percent84percentD8percentA7percentD9percent84-%D8percentB3percentD8percentA7percentD8percentB9percentD8percentA7percentD8percentAA-5-%D9percent85percentD8percentB5percentD8percentA7percentD8percentA8percentD9percent8ApercentD9percent86-%D8percentA8percentD9percent82percentD8percentB5percentD9percent81-%D8percentACpercentD9percent88percentD9percent8A-%D8percentA7percentD8percentB3percentD8percentAApercentD9percent87percentD8percentAFpercentD9percent81-%D8percentA7percentD9percent84percentD8percentADpercentD8percentB4percentD8percentAF-%D8percentA7percentD9percent84percentD8percentB4percentD8percentB9percentD8percentA8percentD9percent8A-%D8percentBApercentD8percentB1percentD8percentA8percentD9percent8A-%D8percentA7percentD9percent84percentD8percentB9percentD8percentB1percentD8percentA7percentD9percent82 [55] https://understandingwar.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/The20Leadership20and20Purpose20of20IraqE28099s20Popular20Mobilization20Forces.pdf [56] https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D8percentA3percentD9percent85percentD9percent80percentD9percent86/%D9percent82percentD8percentB5percentD9percent81-%D8percentACpercentD9percent88percentD9percent8A-%D8percentACpercentD8percentAFpercentD9percent8ApercentD8percentAF-%D9percent8ApercentD8percentB3percentD8percentAApercentD9percent87percentD8percentAFpercentD9percent81-%D8percentA7percentD9percent84percentD8percentADpercentD8percentB4percentD8percentAF-%D8percentA7percentD9percent84percentD8percentB4percentD8percentB9percentD8percentA8percentD9percent8A-%D8percentBApercentD8percentB1percentD8percentA8percentD9percent8A-%D8percentA7percentD9percent84percentD8percentB9percentD8percentB1percentD8percentA7percentD9percent82 ; 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https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D8percentA3percentD9percent85percentD9percent80percentD9percent86/%D8percentB3percentD8percentAApercentD8percentA9-%D8percentB6percentD8percentADpercentD8percentA7percentD9percent8ApercentD8percentA7-%D8percentA8percentD9percent82percentD8percentB5percentD9percent81-%D8percentACpercentD9percent88percentD9percent8A-%D9percent8ApercentD8percentB3percentD8percentAApercentD9percent87percentD8percentAFpercentD9percent81-%D9percent85percentD9percent82percentD8percentB1percentD8percentA7-%D9percent84percentD9percent84percentD8percentADpercentD8percentB4percentD8percentAF-%D8percentA7percentD9percent84percentD8percentB4percentD8percentB9percentD8percentA8percentD9percent8A-%D9percent81percentD9percent8A-%D9percent83percentD8percentB1percentD9percent83percentD9percent88percentD9percent83 [60] https://understandingwar.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/Iraq20-20ISF20PMF20Orders20of20Battle_0_0.pdf pg 44 [61] https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D8percentA3percentD9percent85percentD9percent80percentD9percent86/%D8percentA8percentD8percentBApercentD8percentAFpercentD8percentA7percentD8percentAF-%D9percent82percentD8percentB5percentD9percent81-%D9percent81percentD9percent8A-%D9percent85percentD8percentADpercentD9percent8ApercentD8percentB7-%D9percent82percentD8percentA7percentD8percentB9percentD8percentAFpercentD8percentA9-%D9percent81percentD9percent83percentD8percentAApercentD9percent88percentD8percentB1percentD9percent8ApercentD8percentA7-%D9percent88percentD8percentACpercentD9percent87percentD8percentA7percentD8percentB2-%D9percent85percentD9percent83percentD8percentA7percentD9percent81percentD8percentADpercentD8percentA9-%D8percentA7percentD9percent84-%D8percentB1percentD9percent87percentD8percentA7percentD8percentA8-%D9percent88-%D9percent86percentD8percentA8percentD8percentA7-%D8percentB9percentD9percent86-%D8percentB5percentD8percentA7percentD8percentA8percentD8percentA7percentD8percentAA [62] https://t.me/Extremedistress/903 ; https://www.nbcnews.com/slideshow/information/us-troops-withdraw-from-iraq-44991270 [63] https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D8percentA3percentD9percent85percentD9percent80percentD9percent86/%D8percentA7percentD9percent84percentD8percentAFpercentD9percent81percentD8percentA7percentD8percentB9percentD8percentA7percentD8percentAA-%D8percentA7percentD9percent84percentD8percentACpercentD9percent88percentD9percent8ApercentD8percentA9-%D8percentAA-%D8percentB3percentD9percent82percentD8percentB7-%D8percentB7percentD8percentA7-%D8percentB1percentD8percentA9-%D9percent85percentD8percentB3percentD9percent8ApercentD8percentB1percentD8percentA9-%D9percent81percentD9percent8A-%D8percentB1percentD8percentA8percentD9percent8ApercentD9percent84-%D9percent88-%D8percentAEpercentD8percentB1percentD9percent89-%D8percentA8percentD8percentADpercentD9percent82percentD9percent84-%D9percent86percentD9percent81percentD8percentB7percentD9percent8A-%D8percentACpercentD9percent86percentD9percent88percentD8percentA8percentD9percent8A-%D8percentA7percentD9percent84percentD8percentB9percentD8percentB1percentD8percentA7percentD9percent82 [64] https://t.me/ElamAlmoqawama/1570 [65] https://t.me/ElamAlmoqawama/1571 [66] https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D8percentA3percentD9percent85percentD9percent80percentD9percent86/%D8percentA7percentD9percent84percentD8percentAFpercentD9percent81percentD8percentA7percentD8percentB9percentD8percentA7percentD8percentAA-%D8percentA7percentD9percent84percentD8percentACpercentD9percent88percentD9percent8ApercentD8percentA9-%D8percentAA-%D8percentB3percentD9percent82percentD8percentB7-%D8percentB7percentD8percentA7-%D8percentB1percentD8percentA9-%D9percent85percentD8percentB3percentD9percent8ApercentD8percentB1percentD8percentA9-%D9percent81percentD9percent8A-%D8percentB1percentD8percentA8percentD9percent8ApercentD9percent84-%D9percent88-%D8percentAEpercentD8percentB1percentD9percent89-%D8percentA8percentD8percentADpercentD9percent82percentD9percent84-%D9percent86percentD9percent81percentD8percentB7percentD9percent8A-%D8percentACpercentD9percent86percentD9percent88percentD8percentA8percentD9percent8A-%D8percentA7percentD9percent84percentD8percentB9percentD8percentB1percentD8percentA7percentD9percent82 [67] https://t.me/awlialdm/252 ; 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