Toplines
Russian President Vladimir Putin straight responded to complaints about Russia’s cellular web outages by justifying the outages as needed for Russian home safety and setting circumstances to arrange Russians for continued restrictions. Putin held an unrelated assembly with the Russian authorities on April 23 however started the assembly by listening to a report on present points, together with cellular web restrictions.[1] Putin famous that Russians in giant city facilities and in areas bordering Ukraine are scuffling with authorities restrictions on cellular web throughout “terrorist assaults” — the Kremlin’s shorthand for Ukraine’s long-range strike marketing campaign towards Russian navy, protection industrial, and oil infrastructure. Putin asserted that Russia should prioritize the safety of its folks, significantly civilians, as a method of justifying the outages. Putin claimed that there are safety dangers in informing Russians about outages forward of time however did name for the Russian authorities to be extra clear in regards to the objective of the outages after-the-fact. Russian authorities have lengthy been utilizing the pretext of Ukrainian drone and missile strikes towards reputable targets on Russian territory to close off cellular web service, which has impacted the on a regular basis lives of Russians by depriving them the flexibility to make the most of fundamental companies together with banking and transportation.[2] Putin did partially acquiesce on April 23 to Russians impacted by these outages, nonetheless, ordering the Russian authorities to whitelist sure companies even throughout cellular web outages and to ascertain bodily communications traces to frame areas.[3] That is the primary occasion that Putin himself has publicly acknowledged the cellular web outages; Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov was beforehand probably the most senior Russian official to acknowledge these outages in mid-March 2026.[4] Putin’s acknowledgement of the affect of those outages on the on a regular basis lives of Russians, who’re already more and more bearing the burden of Putin’s struggle in Ukraine, is probably going each a response to his dropping approval scores and a strategy to justify continued restrictions on cellular web amid the Kremlin’s broader censorship marketing campaign.[5]
The Kremlin continues to set circumstances for potential future aggression towards Baltic states. The Russian Safety Council accused Lithuanian authorities on April 23 of making a “hotbed of rigidity” close to the border with Kaliningrad Oblast and militarizing the nation underneath the guise of a “Russian risk.”[6] Russian Deputy Overseas Minister Alexander Grushko claimed to Russian state information outlet RIA Novosti on April 23 that NATO’s Joint Expeditionary Power workouts are practising eventualities for a naval blockade and the seizure of Kaliningrad Oblast and accused NATO of purposefully “intensifying confrontation” with Russia.[7] These statements are a part of the Kremlin’s ongoing cognitive warfare narrative geared toward falsely framing NATO as an aggressor in response to the Kremlin’s navy aggression in Ukraine and long-term posturing.[8] The Kremlin has been advancing a number of info operations focusing on the Baltic states with the intention to set long-term informational circumstances to justify potential future navy motion towards the Baltics.[9] The Kremlin has been utilizing its management of Kaliningrad Oblast particularly to set justifications for future Russian aggression towards the Baltic States or Poland underneath the guise of defending Kaliningrad Oblast.[10]
Russian forces struck an residence constructing in Dnipro Metropolis, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast in a single day on April 22 to 23, killing at the very least three civilians and injuring at the very least 10.[11] Ukrainian authorities reported on April 23 and geolocated footage confirms that Russian forces struck an residence constructing in Dnipro Metropolis and geolocated footage exhibits extreme injury to a excessive rise constructing in Dnipro Metropolis.[12] Russia’s long-range strike ways disproportionately have an effect on civilian areas, and ISW continues to evaluate that Russia is intentionally modifying its strike ways and automobiles to enhance this impact.[13]
The European Council (EC) adopted on April 23 the ultimate piece of laws underpinning the EU’s 90 billion euro (roughly $105 billion) interest-free mortgage to Ukraine, which the EC initially authorized in December 2025.[14] The mortgage allocates 60 billion euros (roughly $70 billion) to investing in Ukraine’s protection industrial capacities and 30 billion euros (roughly $35 billion) to macroeconomic assist for Ukraine. The mortgage is backed by the EU price range, and Ukraine solely must repay the mortgage if Russia pays Ukraine reparations for the struggle.
Key Takeaways
- Russian President Vladimir Putin straight responded to complaints about Russia’s cellular web outages by justifying the outages as needed for Russian home safety and setting circumstances to arrange Russians for continued restrictions.
- The Kremlin continues to set circumstances for potential future aggression towards Baltic states.
- Russian forces struck an residence constructing in Dnipro Metropolis, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast in a single day on April 22 to 23, killing at the very least three civilians and injuring at the very least 10.
- The European Council (EC) adopted on April 23 the ultimate piece of laws underpinning the EU’s 90 billion euro (roughly $105 billion) interest-free mortgage to Ukraine, which the EC initially authorized in December 2025.
- Russian forces superior in northern Sumy Oblast.
- Russia launched 155 drones towards Ukraine in a single day. Ukrainian forces struck Russian oil infrastructure in Nizhny Novgorod and Samara oblasts and an air protection system in Bryansk Oblast.
We don’t report intimately on Russian struggle crimes as a result of these actions are well-covered in Western media and don’t straight have an effect on the navy operations we’re assessing and forecasting. We’ll proceed to guage and report on the consequences of those prison actions on the Ukrainian navy and the Ukrainian inhabitants and particularly on fight in Ukrainian city areas. We completely condemn Russian violations of the legal guidelines of armed battle and the Geneva Conventions and crimes towards humanity despite the fact that we don’t describe them in these studies.
Observe: ISW has modified the way it studies Russian order of battle (ORBAT) particulars within the Russian Offensive Marketing campaign Evaluation on April 20, 2026. ISW beforehand printed all ORBAT info collected in a day by day 24-hour reporting interval within the day by day evaluation. Shifting ahead, ISW will solely publish ORBAT info that’s new or signifies a change in Russian items’ positions, deployments, redeployments, or command and management preparations with the intention to focus the day by day publication on inflections and new info. ISW continues amassing a considerable amount of repetitive ORBAT info and may make this unpublished knowledge accessible to chose readers upon request. Please contact [email protected] for any request for info.
Ukrainian Operations within the Russian Federation
Ukrainian forces struck Russian oil infrastructure in Nizhny Novgorod and Samara oblasts in a single day on April 22 to 23. Sources in Ukraine’s Safety Service (SBU) advised Ukrainian broadcaster Suspilne on April 23 that SBU and Ukrainian Particular Operations Forces (SSO) drones struck the Gorky oil pumping station in Neshikha, Nizhny Novgorod Oblast in a single day, damaging three oil tanks.[15] Geolocated footage printed on April 23 exhibits a big smoke plume close to the Gorky oil pumping station.[16] Nizhny Novgorod Oblast Governor Gleb Nikitin claimed on April 23 that drone particles broken an industrial facility in Kstovo Raion, Nizhny Novgorod Oblast.[17] Russian opposition outlet Astra reported on April 23 that Ukrainian forces struck the Novokuibyshevsk petrochemical plant in Samara Oblast in a single day, and Samara Oblast Governor Vyacheslav Fedorishchev acknowledged that Ukrainian strikes broken an industrial facility in Novokuibyshevsk.[18] Ukrainian forces beforehand struck the Novokuibyshevsk oil refinery in a single day on April 17 to 18.[19]
Ukrainian forces proceed to strike Russian air protection belongings in Russia. Ukrainian Unmanned Programs Forces (USF) Commander Main Robert “Magyar” Brovdi reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian Tor-M2 air protection system in Bryansk Oblast in a single day on April 22 to 23.[20] Brovdi said that Ukrainian USF drone operators have struck a complete of twenty-two Russian air protection methods in Russia and occupied Ukraine to date in April 2026.
Russian Supporting Effort: Northern Axis
Russian goal: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast alongside the worldwide border
Russian forces are prioritizing offensive operations east and southeast of Sumy Metropolis over operations north and northeast of Sumy Metropolis.[21] Ukrainian Joint Forces Job Power Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov said that Russian forces in Sumy Oblast are attacking most intensely alongside the worldwide border in southern Sumy Oblast and famous that Russian forces have seized Myropilske (east of Sumy Metropolis) and have superior two to a few kilometers deep in some areas alongside the worldwide border.[22]
Russian forces are reportedly struggling to switch Russian airborne (VDV) components working in northern Sumy Oblast. A supply reporting on the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed that components of the Russian ninth Motorized Rifle Regiment (18th Motorized Rifle Division, eleventh Military Corps [AC], Leningrad Army District [LMD]) are struggling to switch components of the 119th VDV Regiment (106th VDV Division) because the Russian navy command deliberate.[23] The supply additionally claimed that components of the 83rd Separate VDV Brigade will redeploy to the Yunakivka (north of Sumy Metropolis) space, although components of the 83rd Separate VDV Brigade have been working within the northern Sumy Oblast border space persistently for months.[24]
Russian Predominant Effort: Japanese Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Predominant Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast
Russian goal: Push Ukrainian forces again from the worldwide border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and method to inside tube artillery vary of Kharkiv Metropolis
Russian forces carried out an infiltration mission and continued offensive operations northeast of Kharkiv Metropolis on April 23 as Ukrainian forces counterattacked within the space.[25] Geolocated footage printed on April 23 exhibits Ukrainian forces hanging Russian servicemembers northwest of Bochkove (northeast of Kharkiv Metropolis) after what ISW assesses was an infiltration mission.[26]
Russian forces proceed to accentuate battlefield air interdiction (BAI) efforts alongside the worldwide border with Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts, prone to set circumstances for potential future offensive operations. Kharkiv Regional State Administration Head Oleg Synehubov reported on April 22 that Russian drones struck Bohodukhiv (northwest of Kharkiv Metropolis alongside the Merla River on the intersection of the P-46 Sumy Metropolis-Kharkiv Metropolis freeway and P-45 Kharkiv Metropolis-Okhtyrka freeway) roughly 50 instances on April 22.[27] Russian forces have been intensifying strikes on Bohodukhiv within the final week (since round April 18) probably as a part of a BAI marketing campaign, making an attempt to stress the Ukrainian rear and disrupt Ukrainian logistics between Sumy and Kharkiv cities and facilitate potential future offensive operations.[28]
Ukrainian forces continued their short-range strike marketing campaign towards Russian near-rear navy belongings in Kharkiv Oblast on the evening of April 22 to 23. The Ukrainian Basic Workers reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian drone management level close to Strilecha (north of Kharkiv Metropolis alongside the worldwide border).[29]
Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported floor exercise within the Velykyi Burluk route on April 23.
Russian Subordinate Predominant Effort #2 – Oskil River
Russian goal: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into japanese Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast
Russian forces continued floor assaults and are intensifying infiltration makes an attempt within the southern Kupyansk route.[30] Ukrainian Joint Forces Job Power Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov reported on April 23 that Russian forces have intensified infiltration missions north of Kupyansk close to Holubivka and are attempting to get rid of the Ukrainian bridgehead by intensifying assault operations on the left financial institution of the Oskil River.[31] Trehubov added that Russian forces don’t maintain any everlasting positions in Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi (north of Kupyansk) regardless of Russian Chief of the Basic Workers Military Basic Valery Gerasimov’s April 21 claims.[32]
Ukrainian officers proceed to refute Gerasimov’s aggrandized battlefield claims. The Ukrainian third Military Corps reported on April 22 that Ukrainian forces management Novoyehorivka, Nadiya, and Hrekivka (all southeast of Borova) regardless of Gerasimov’s April 21 claims that Russian forces management all of Luhansk Oblast.[33]
Russian Subordinate Predominant Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast
Russian goal: Seize the whole lot of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
Russian forces are probably concentrating tools for a mechanized assault within the Lyman route and proceed hanging Ukrainian logistics within the space. The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade working within the Lyman route reported on April 23 that Russian forces are making ready to conduct a mechanized assault and are proceed hanging Ukrainian logistics routes to complicate personnel rotations and ammunition provides.[34]
Russian forces proceed infiltration missions within the Slovyansk route. Geolocated footage printed on April 23 exhibits Ukrainian forces hanging Russian positions in japanese Rai-Oleksandrivka (southeast of Slovyansk) after what ISW assesses was an infiltration mission that didn’t happen within the final 24 hours.[35]
Geolocated footage printed on April 23 exhibits Russian forces shelling a Ukrainian place northeast of Lyman in an space the place Russian sources beforehand claimed that Russian forces maintained positions.[36]
Russian forces not too long ago continued offensive operations within the Kostyantynivka route on April 23 however didn’t make confirmed advances.[37] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces superior in southern Illinivka (south of Kostyantynivka).[38]
Geolocated footage printed on April 22 signifies that Ukrainian forces maintain positions northeast of Smelly (north of Kostyantynivka) and in southern Chasiv Yar (northeast of Kostyantynivka) in areas the place Russian sources beforehand claimed that Russian forces maintained positions.[39]
Russian forces proceed to conduct mechanized and motorized assaults within the Kostyantynivka route. Footage printed on April 22 exhibits Ukrainian forces hanging three Russian automobiles south of Predtechyne (east of Kostyantynivka) in a roughly platoon-sized motorized assault.[40] Russian forces not too long ago carried out two roughly platoon-sized mechanized assaults east of Chasiv Yar on April 18 and 19.[41]
Russian forces carried out an infiltration mission and continued offensive operations within the Dobropillya tactical space on April 23 however didn’t make confirmed advances.[42] Geolocated footage printed on April 23 exhibits Ukrainian forces hanging Russian positions south of Zapovidne (southeast of Dobropillya) after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission.[43] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces seized Novyi Donbas (east of Dobropillya) and superior west of the settlement.[44]
Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Pokrovsk route, focusing assaults northwest and north of Pokrovsk, however didn’t make confirmed advances.[45]Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces superior within the fields north and south of Hryshyne (northwest of Pokrovsk) and west of Rodynske (north of Pokrovsk).[46]
Russian forces proceed to current fabricated proof in an try to assist exaggerated battlefield claims. Russian state-run tv channel Perviy Kanal printed footage on April 21 of two Russian servicemembers, reportedly of the thirty fifth Motorized Rifle Brigade (forty first Mixed Arms Military (CAA), Central Army District [CMD), raising a flag in what the channel claimed was Hryshyne.[47] A geolocation of the footage printed on April 23 exhibits that the Russian servicemembers had been truly in Mykailivka (southeast of Pokrovsk and roughly 40 kilometers from Hryshyne) and staged the flag elevating, prone to accomplish informational results.[48]
Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Novopavlivka and Oleksandrivka instructions on April 23 however didn’t advance.[49]
Ukrainian forces continued their mid-range strike marketing campaign towards Russian navy belongings in occupied southern Ukraine on April 22 and 23. Ukrainian Unmanned Programs Forces (USF) Commander Main Robert “Magyar” Brovdi reported on April 23 that the USF struck a Russian command put up and base of the Russian Federal Safety Service’s (FSB) Cell Operations Directorate in occupied Donetsk Oblast on the morning of April 22.[50] Brovdi reported that the USF additionally destroyed two Russian Tor-M2 air protection methods and one Osa-AK air protection system in occupied Donetsk and Zaporizhia oblasts.
Russian Supporting Effort: Southern Axis
Russian goal: Keep frontline positions, safe rear areas towards Ukrainian strikes, and advance inside tube artillery vary of Zaporizhzhia Metropolis
Ukrainian forces proceed to carry positions southwest of Hulyaipole as Russian forces focus offensive operations northwest and west of Hulyaipole.[51] Geolocated footage printed on April 22 exhibits Ukrainian forces working inside Charivne in areas the place Russian sources beforehand claimed that Russian forces maintained positions.[52]
Russian forces continued restricted offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast, together with west of Orikhiv, on April 23 because the Russian navy command continues to make aggrandized claims of advance.[53] Ukrainian Southern Protection Forces Spokesperson Colonel Vladyslav Voloshyn reported on April 22 that Russian forces are nonetheless 15 kilometers from Orikhiv – refuting Russian officers’ claims that avenue combating is ongoing inside Orikhiv.[54] Voloshyn famous Russian forces would want to grab Novodanylivka (simply south of Orikhiv) earlier than starting floor assaults towards the settlement.
Russian forces continued restricted floor assaults within the Kherson route on April 23, together with towards islands within the Dnipro River Delta, however didn’t advance.[55]
Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike marketing campaign towards Russian navy belongings and oil transport infrastructure in occupied Crimea on the evening of April 22 to 23. The Ukrainian Basic Workers reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian P-18 radar system close to occupied Yevpatoria (roughly 170 kilometers from the frontline).[56] Russian opposition outlet Astra reported on April 23 that Ukrainian forces additionally struck the JSC Marine Oil Terminal in occupied Fedosia (roughly 250 kilometers from the frontline).[57] Astra famous that the terminal acts is a key transport hub for Russian oil between Russia and occupied Ukraine.
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