Why Ukraine wants Russia's terminal defeat – not simply deterrence

[ad_1] A body from a video exhibits Ukrainian servicemen firing a D-30 howitzer towards Russian positions close to Bakhmut, Donetsk Oblast, Ukraine, on March 21, 2023. (Sergey Shestak/AFP/Getty Photos)

5 years into the full-scale battle, it has turn into clear that the mannequin of strategic deterrence – the "metal porcupine" that Ursula von der Leyen usually invokes when talking about Ukraine – gives no assure of resilience and long-term peace.

The "metal porcupine" mannequin assumes that, given Russia's vital useful resource benefit, Ukraine's solely reasonable technique is to construct a protection so robust that continued aggression turns into prohibitively pricey for Russia.

Nevertheless, as of 2026, this mannequin is inadequate by itself.

It obscures the truth that Ukraine is being steadily drained of its sources whereas defending itself and Europe . In a technological struggle, even a strong protection step by step deteriorates underneath the strain of drone-powered high-precision kill-webs and fixed assaults, particularly when one has to struggle in opposition to a resource-abundant state.

<img alt="Article image" loading="lazy" width="1200" height="675" decoding="async" data-nimg="1" style="color:transparent;object-fit:cover" sizes="50vw" srcset="/_next/image?url=https%3A%2F%2Fassets.kyivindependent.com%2Fcontent%2Fimages%2F2025%2F10%2FGettyImages-2230236716.jpg&w=256&q=100 256w, /_next/image?url=https%3A%2F%2Fassets.kyivindependent.com%2Fcontent%2Fimages%2F2025%2F10%2FGettyImages-2230236716.jpg&w=360&q=100 360w, /_next/image?url=https%3A%2F%2Fassets.kyivindependent.com%2Fcontent%2Fimages%2F2025%2F10%2FGettyImages-2230236716.jpg&w=414&q=100 414w, /_next/image?url=https%3A%2F%2Fassets.kyivindependent.com%2Fcontent%2Fimages%2F2025%2F10%2FGettyImages-2230236716.jpg&w=640&q=100 640w, /_next/image?url=https%3A%2F%2Fassets.kyivindependent.com%2Fcontent%2Fimages%2F2025%2F10%2FGettyImages-2230236716.jpg&w=768&q=100 768w, /_next/image?url=https%3A%2F%2Fassets.kyivindependent.com%2Fcontent%2Fimages%2F2025%2F10%2FGettyImages-2230236716.jpg&w=1024&q=100 1024w, /_next/image?url=https%3A%2F%2Fassets.kyivindependent.com%2Fcontent%2Fimages%2F2025%2F10%2FGettyImages-2230236716.jpg&w=1280&q=100 1280w, /_next/image?url=https%3A%2F%2Fassets.kyivindependent.com%2Fcontent%2Fimages%2F2025%2F10%2FGettyImages-2230236716.jpg&w=1536&q=100 1536w" src="https://kyivindependent.com/_next/image?url=https%3A%2F%2Fassets.kyivindependent.com%2Fcontent%2Fimages%2F2025%2F10%2FGettyImages-2230236716.jpg&w=1536&q=100"/> European Fee President Ursula von der Leyen, UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer, Finnish President Alexander Stubb, President Volodymyr Zelensky, U.S. President Donald Trump, French President Emmanuel Macron, Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, and NATO Secretary Common Mark Rutte collect and speak within the Cross Corridor of the White Home in Washington, D.C., U.S. on Aug. 18, 2025. (Ukrainian Presidency / Handout / Anadolu by way of Getty Photos) The speculation of "purposeful defeat" additionally appears unlikely to supply significant outcomes by itself. This strategy goals to create situations during which an adversary, although nonetheless militarily succesful, loses the power to deploy that functionality successfully.

Ukraine demonstrated this technique within the Black Sea in 2023 and 2024, efficiently constraining Russia's freedom of maneuver with out destroying its fleet outright. But replicating this success in different domains has confirmed tough, and as of 2026, no clear path to doing so has emerged.

On the Sahaidachnyi Security Center , we imagine {that a} decisive victory means depriving Russia of the mere capacity to wage struggle. That is what we name a "terminal defeat," and right here is how it may be achieved.

This mannequin rests on two interrelated vectors.

The primary is the termination vector: figuring out and systematically exploiting crucial vulnerabilities throughout the Russian Federation to supply cascading, irreversible results on the strategic stage.

That is essentially totally different from occasional strikes on infrastructure that may later be repaired. As an alternative, it means making use of sustained strain throughout Russia's economy , expertise base, and public notion in ways in which trigger lasting, hard-to-reverse injury — step by step eroding each its capability to maintain the struggle and the broader functioning of the state.

Ukraine is already scaling up deep strikes, however extra is required. Past ongoing navy efforts, Ukraine ought to construct devoted groups to map systemic weaknesses and anticipate the downstream results, not simply the quick affect of any given motion.

It must also proceed growing next-generation deep-strike capabilities by way of autonomy and swarm applied sciences, actively supporting its burgeoning navy tech.

If the objective is the definitive elimination of the risk posed by Russia , this reshapes the logic of the second vector — deterrence and protection, too. On this mannequin, protection is not an finish in itself. Its objective is to carry the road and restrict losses whereas shopping for time for efforts that weaken Russia at a deeper stage.

This implies preserving the entrance secure and, above all, defending Ukrainian soldiers — accepting that occupied territories will be reclaimed later, as soon as Russia's war-making capability begins to interrupt down.

Quite than sustaining a fragile protection indefinitely, the precedence is holding out for an outlined interval whereas concentrating sources the place they matter most, and making certain that Russia bleeds personnel and gear quicker than it might exchange them.

Nevertheless, this strategy should account for 2 vital dangers.

Russia could shift towards distant strike techniques. They could scale back floor assaults whereas repeatedly focusing on Ukrainian forces with artillery, loitering munitions, and drones.

Alternatively, it could go for normal or renewed partial mobilization. Manpower shortages stay a bottleneck for Russia however are partly synthetic, constrained by Russia's self-imposed "particular navy operation" framework and the Kremlin's concern of social backlash.

Addressing these dangers requires two issues. First, far larger safety for troopers' lives, each on the entrance line and instantly behind it, given the intense lethality of a battlefield that's monitored by fixed surveillance and precision strikes.

Second, Ukraine should broaden its capability to strike and suppress advancing forces at a distance, in order that even a considerably bigger Russian power will be successfully contained.

This variation in technique calls for accelerated doctrinal, organizational, and personnel reforms — above all, the speedy robotization of front-line fight.

The present plan to broaden Unmanned Systems Forces to five% of whole power energy is only a ground, and if the Ukrainian command needs to attain real strategic danger management, it could require pushing that share to 10% and even 20%, with deep integration throughout all navy branches.

Mixed with engineering fortifications and a unified kill-web, this might allow the creation of an unmanned exclusion zone alongside the contact line and the Russian border.

Ukraine additionally wants a clearer strategic framework for air protection, ideally with a differentiated risk evaluation that weighs precise injury, scaling potential, and cost-effective countermeasures.

Drone lessons such because the Shahed, Geran, and Gerbera characterize probably the most acute strategic risk: they're far cheaper than missiles , already inflict severe infrastructure injury, and are steadily bettering in precision. Anti-drone air protection should subsequently be the precedence.

<img alt="Fragments of Shahed drones are found at the sites of Russian strikes in Kharkiv, Ukraine, on Sept. 19, 2025" loading="lazy" width="1200" height="675" decoding="async" data-nimg="1" style="color:transparent;object-fit:cover" sizes="50vw" srcset="/_next/image?url=https%3A%2F%2Fassets.kyivindependent.com%2Fcontent%2Fimages%2F2025%2F10%2FGettyImages-2236005016.jpg&w=256&q=100 256w, /_next/image?url=https%3A%2F%2Fassets.kyivindependent.com%2Fcontent%2Fimages%2F2025%2F10%2FGettyImages-2236005016.jpg&w=360&q=100 360w, /_next/image?url=https%3A%2F%2Fassets.kyivindependent.com%2Fcontent%2Fimages%2F2025%2F10%2FGettyImages-2236005016.jpg&w=414&q=100 414w, /_next/image?url=https%3A%2F%2Fassets.kyivindependent.com%2Fcontent%2Fimages%2F2025%2F10%2FGettyImages-2236005016.jpg&w=640&q=100 640w, /_next/image?url=https%3A%2F%2Fassets.kyivindependent.com%2Fcontent%2Fimages%2F2025%2F10%2FGettyImages-2236005016.jpg&w=768&q=100 768w, /_next/image?url=https%3A%2F%2Fassets.kyivindependent.com%2Fcontent%2Fimages%2F2025%2F10%2FGettyImages-2236005016.jpg&w=1024&q=100 1024w, /_next/image?url=https%3A%2F%2Fassets.kyivindependent.com%2Fcontent%2Fimages%2F2025%2F10%2FGettyImages-2236005016.jpg&w=1280&q=100 1280w, /_next/image?url=https%3A%2F%2Fassets.kyivindependent.com%2Fcontent%2Fimages%2F2025%2F10%2FGettyImages-2236005016.jpg&w=1536&q=100 1536w" src="https://kyivindependent.com/_next/image?url=https%3A%2F%2Fassets.kyivindependent.com%2Fcontent%2Fimages%2F2025%2F10%2FGettyImages-2236005016.jpg&w=1536&q=100"/> Fragments of Shahed drones are discovered on the websites of Russian strikes in Kharkiv, Ukraine, on Sept. 19, 2025. (Viacheslav Madiievskyi / Ukrinform / NurPhoto by way of Getty Photos) This doesn't diminish the significance of countering missile threats, notably ballistic ones, the place viable options stay scarce. PAC-3 MSE interceptors for Patriot programs are presently the one actually efficient possibility, and international provide falls properly in need of what Russia's capabilities demand.

Ukraine should subsequently function underneath situations of persistent shortage. Whereas efforts to safe extra interceptors proceed, a longer-term response ought to embody growing a home or joint European analog to the Patriot system , which is unlikely to occur within the close to future. The remaining viable possibility is a sustained program to relocate crucial infrastructure underground.

Finally, victory — if the time period is to retain any which means — requires eliminating the very supply of the risk. Strategic success, nevertheless unsure, is barely attainable by working concurrently alongside each tracks: containment and elimination. Neither can perform with out the opposite.

Editor's be aware: The opinions expressed within the op-ed part are these of the authors and don't purport to mirror the views of the Kyiv Impartial.

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