Russian Offensive Marketing campaign Evaluation, August 20, 2025

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Jennie Olmsted, Daria Novikov, Jessica Sobieski, Justin Younger, Anna Harvey, Kateryna Stepanenko, Nate Trotter, Adham Fattah, George Barros, and Frederick W. Kagan

August 20, 2025, 7pm ET

Click on here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is up to date day by day alongside the static maps current on this report.

Click on here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click on here to see ISW’s 3D management of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a pc (not a cellular machine) is strongly advisable for utilizing this data-heavy device.

Click on here to entry ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces day by day by exhibiting a dynamic frontline. ISW will replace this time-lapse map archive month-to-month.

Word: The information cut-off for this product was 1 pm ET on August 20, 2025. ISW will cowl subsequent reviews within the August 21, 2025, Russian Offensive Marketing campaign Evaluation.

The Kremlin is demanding that Russia have a veto over any Western safety ensures for Ukraine in an effort to undermine ongoing US, European, and Ukrainian efforts to ascertain circumstances for lasting peace in Ukraine. Russian International Minister Sergey Lavrov acknowledged on August 20 that any critical discussions on Western safety ensures for Ukraine with out Russian enter are a “highway to nowhere” and that Russia “can not agree” that now-proposed "collective safety points" could be resolved with out Russia, successfully demanding a Russian veto over Western safety ensures for Ukraine.[1] Lavrov additionally threatened that Russia will take “agency and harsh” motion to make sure that Russia’s “respectable pursuits” are part of any postwar safety association for Ukraine.

The Kremlin is probably going making an attempt to inject its calls for into the continued US, European, and Ukrainian joint effort to create a safety construction that may function a safeguard towards a future Russian re-invasion within the occasion of a peace settlement.[2] Granting Russia veto energy over Western safety ensures would allow the Kremlin to dictate circumstances that may weaken Ukraine’s means to withstand one other Russian invasion by stopping Ukraine from forming binding bilateral or multilateral safety agreements corresponding to at the moment are being mentioned, growing and modernizing its army, and receiving assist from Ukraine's companions. Russian International Affairs Ministry Spokesperson Maria Zakharova not too long ago mentioned that Russia couldn't tolerate the presence of troops from NATO member states in Ukraine as a part of any safety ensures.[3]

European leaders not too long ago launched a joint assertion reaffirming that no peace settlement ought to place limitations on Ukraine’s armed forces or on its cooperation with third international locations nor can Russia have veto energy over Ukraine’s pathway to becoming a member of the European Union (EU) or NATO.[4] European Fee Vice President Kaja Kallas acknowledged on August 19 that Russian President Vladimir Putin can't be trusted to honor any guarantees or commitments to completely stop army exercise towards Ukraine and that any safety ensures should be sturdy and credible to discourage the Russian army command doesn't re-group and launch a future invasion of Ukraine.

The Kremlin seems to be demanding that any safety ensures be primarily based on these proposed within the Istanbul 2022 framework, which might grant Russia and its allies the precise to veto Western army help to Ukraine and go away Ukraine helpless within the face of future Russian threats. Lavrov acknowledged on August 20 that Russia is in favor of collective safety ensures which can be “really dependable” and {that a} good instance of such ensures was evident within the 2022 Istanbul Ukraine-Russia negotiations, which might have completely prohibited Ukraine from becoming a member of NATO, imposed limitations on the Ukrainian army, and banned Ukraine from receiving Western army help with none imposing restrictions on the scale or functionality of Russian forces.[5] The safety ensures proposed within the draft 2022 Istanbul Protocol handled Russia as a impartial safety “guarantor state” of Ukraine together with the opposite everlasting members of the UN Safety Council, failing to establish Russia as a belligerent within the battle. The outlined safety ensures would give China and Russia veto energy over any motion the guarantors may soak up response to a renewed Russian assault by granting the UN Safety Council the authority to take “measures vital to revive and keep worldwide peace and safety.”[6] Such "safety ensures" would permit the Kremlin and its allies to dictate the means and instruments that Ukraine may use to defend itself towards Russia and limit the power of different guarantor states to come back to Ukraine's help.

The Kremlin is constant to point that Russian President Vladimir Putin is unwilling to have an instantaneous bilateral assembly with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky on the timeline proposed by US President Donald Trump. Lavrov acknowledged on August 20 that Putin confirmed his readiness to proceed direct negotiations with Ukraine within the Istanbul format.[7] Russian and Ukrainian delegations have engaged in three rounds of bilateral talks in Istanbul since February 2025, which have resulted in 9 prisoners of battle (POW) exchanges, however little extra.[8] Lavrov claimed that Putin would take into account elevating the extent of the delegation heads after working teams had been established however added {that a} summit between Putin and Zelensky would want thorough preparations that might take time. A number of US officers have acknowledged that Putin promised Trump that he would meet with Zelensky following the multilateral summit between the United Acknowledged, Ukraine, and European leaders on August 18.[9] Trump acknowledged on August 18 that Zelensky and Putin want to satisfy urgently and that ready too lengthy earlier than having a leader-level bilateral assembly would end in hundreds of deaths.[10] Lavrov might have tried to painting the Kremlin’s proposal of continued negotiations inside the Istanbul framework and dealing teams as fulfilling Putin's reported promise to Trump to carry a bilateral assembly with Zelensky. Continued negotiations inside the Istanbul framework are a far cry from a head of state-level bilateral assembly, nonetheless, and Lavrov's assertion is probably going a part of the Kremlin’s continued efforts to protract peace negotiations and deflect blame for delays onto Ukraine and the West.

The Russian financial system continues to face funds deficits on account of elevated protection spending and detrimental results of Western sanctions and secondary tariffs. Reuters reported on August 20 that the Russian authorities is making ready to extend taxes and scale back its spending because it makes an attempt to take care of its protection expenditure amid financial cooling.[11] Russian Finance Ministry information indicated that the Kremlin ran a funds deficit of 4.9 trillion rubles (roughly $61 billion) from January to August of 2025, exceeding the goal for the complete yr by 1 / 4.[12] Russian Federation Council Committee on Finances and Monetary Markets Chairperson Antatoly Artamonov claimed in late July 2025 that Russia wanted to “urgently begin fiscal consolidation” amidst more and more pessimistic financial indicators and a decline in oil and gasoline revenues.[13] Reuters reported that Russia spends over 17 trillion rubles (roughly $211 billion) or 41 p.c of its federal funds on its protection and nationwide safety. A Russian authorities supply acknowledged that Russia's protection spending probably constitutes greater than the acknowledged eight p.c of Russian GDP and assessed that protection spending if unlikely to lower in 2026 or in an occasion of a ceasefire.[14] Reuters reported that the Russian authorities is more and more pulling funds away from the healthcare and training sectors, and Russian officers are pushing for Russia to reallocate funds from non-defense budgetary objects to the protection sector. Reuters reported that Russia has comparatively a low debt-to-GDP ratio of round 20 p.c; nonetheless, this metric is way much less consequential as Russia is a rentier state which makes use of oil and gasoline revenues and Russia’s sovereign wealth fund to fund its battle in Ukraine. The sovereign wealth fund is a state-owned funding fund that Russia pulls cash from to keep away from incurring debt, however Putin is steadily depleting the fund’s liquid reserves to fund its battle in Ukraine.[15]

Russia is jeopardizing its financial stability and the livelihoods of Russian civilians to more and more feed its protection industrial base (DIB) and maintain the battle effort in Ukraine. Russia faces a rising checklist of prices from the battle, together with offering compensation for servicemembers and their households, increasing its DIB, and sponsoring recruitment drives for its battle in Ukraine.[16] Russian officers have repeatedly tried to persuade the Russian inhabitants that the Russian federal funds prioritizes civilian and social expenditures whereas persevering with to allocate higher sums of the funds to protection spending.[17] The Russian authorities additionally should face the long run prices of compensating veterans and their households by offering them with monetary, medical, and psychological assist from the federal government over the approaching many years.

Secondary tariffs are probably forcing Russia to promote oil beneath market worth, which might be reducing the incoming circulation of international funds into the Russian financial system and depleting Russia’s main supply of wealth. Bloomberg reported on August 20 that India’s state-owned oil refineries bought an elevated quantity of Russian oil from August 18 to 19, and Russian deputy commerce consultant in India Yevgeny Griva advised Bloomberg on August 20 that Russia expects India to proceed shopping for Russian oil due to a 5 p.c low cost.[18] Bloomberg reported that Russia deepened its low cost from one greenback in July 2025 to $2.50 a barrel to Dated Brent, prone to incentivize Indian refineries to buy Russian oil amidst secondary tariffs.[19] Bloomberg reported that Chinese language oil refiners stepped up purchases of Russian flagship oil as some Indian corporations pulled again purchases of Russian oil in August amidst US threats of tariffs.[20] Bloomberg reported that China acquired shipments of 75,000 barrels per day from the Urals, a marked improve from the year-to-date common of 40,000 barrels per day. Secondary tariffs might price Russia further international funds if Russia is unable to efficiently persuade tariffed international locations to purchase extra oil from Russia that may compensate the distinction between the low cost and market worth. ISW continues to evaluate that secondary sanctions will probably additional affect the Russian financial system by undercutting Russian oil revenues that are important for the Kremlin's financing of its battle towards Ukraine.[21]

The Kremlin is reportedly contemplating changing Russian Investigative Committee (Sledkom) Chairman Alexander Bastrykin, probably as a part of the Kremlin's efforts to type a brand new and youthful elite. Moscow-based enterprise newspaper Vedomosti reported on August 20 that the Kremlin is contemplating Bastrykin for the vacant place of Chairman of the Russian Supreme Court docket.[22] Unspecified sources near the Russian Presidential Administration, Supreme Court docket, and judicial group advised Vedomosti that Bastrykin’s alternative presents a possibility to “introduce new blood” to Sledkom, provided that Bastrykin has headed Sledkom since 2011 and is approaching the age of 72. The Kremlin allowed Bastrykin to stay in workplace previous the age of 70 in September 2024.[23] The Kremlin’s alternative of Bastrykin is in step with Putin’s latest apply of reshuffling older members of his internal circle to different roles quite than retiring or firing them, as demonstrated by the appointment of former Russian Safety Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev to supervise the Russian shipbuilding trade in Might 2025.[24] Putin has been not too long ago selling youthful officers who've vital involvement with the Russian battle effort corresponding to former Tula Oblast Governor Alexei Dyumin, who turned the youngest ever member of the Russian Safety Council in September 2024.[25] The promotion of youthful officers linked to the battle effort is per Putin’s February 2024 announcement that he's forming a brand new elite out of veterans and dedicated supporters of the battle effort.[26]

Key Takeaways:

The Kremlin is demanding that Russia have a veto over any Western safety ensures for Ukraine in an effort to undermine ongoing US, European, and Ukrainian efforts to ascertain circumstances for lasting peace in Ukraine. The Kremlin seems to be demanding that any safety ensures be primarily based on these proposed within the Istanbul 2022 framework, which might grant Russia and its allies the precise to veto Western army help to Ukraine and go away Ukraine helpless within the face of future Russian threats. The Kremlin is constant to point that Russian President Vladimir Putin is unwilling to have an instantaneous bilateral assembly with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky on the timeline proposed by US President Donald Trump. The Russian financial system continues to face funds deficits on account of elevated protection spending and detrimental results of Western sanctions and secondary tariffs. Secondary tariffs are probably forcing Russia to promote oil beneath market worth, which might be reducing the incoming circulation of international funds into the Russian financial system and depleting Russia’s main supply of wealth. The Kremlin is reportedly contemplating changing Russian Investigative Committee (Sledkom) Chairman Alexander Bastrykin, probably as a part of the Kremlin's efforts to type a brand new and youthful elite. Ukrainian forces superior close to Pokrovsk. Russian forces superior in northern Sumy Oblast and close to Lyman, Toretsk, and Velykomykhailivka.

We don't report intimately on Russian battle crimes as a result of these actions are well-covered in Western media and don't straight have an effect on the army operations we're assessing and forecasting. We'll proceed to judge and report on the consequences of those prison actions on the Ukrainian army and the Ukrainian inhabitants and particularly on fight in Ukrainian city areas. We totally condemn Russian violations of the legal guidelines of armed battle and the Geneva Conventions and crimes towards humanity despite the fact that we don't describe them in these reviews.

Ukrainian Operations within the Russian Federation Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis Russian Primary Effort – Jap Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate principal efforts) Russian Subordinate Primary Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces again from the worldwide border with Belgorod Oblast and strategy to inside tube artillery vary of Kharkiv Metropolis Russian Subordinate Primary Effort #2 – Seize the rest of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into jap Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast Russian Subordinate Primary Effort #3 – Seize the whole lot of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and presumably advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Marketing campaign Important Exercise in Belarus Ukrainian Operations within the Russian Federation

Preventing continued in unspecified areas of Kursk Oblast on August 19 and 20. [27]

A Russian milblogger claimed that preventing is ongoing within the path of Novyi Put (southwest of Glushkovo).[28]

Sources within the Ukrainian army advised The New Voice of Ukraine (NV) that Ukrainian forces struck the Russian BARS Kursk Unmanned Techniques Battalion base in Oboyansky Raion, Kursk Oblast, the place Russian forces stationed drones in a single day on August 19 to twenty.[29] Social media sources geolocated footage of the strikes on August 20.[30]

The Russian Federal Safety Service (FSB) claimed on August 20 that the FSB detained three Ukrainian servicemen conducting a sabotage and reconnaissance operation in an unspecified space of Bryansk Oblast’s worldwide border space.[31]

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian goal: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine alongside the worldwide border and strategy to inside tube artillery vary of Sumy Metropolis)

Russian forces not too long ago superior within the Sumy path.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage revealed on August 19 and 20 signifies that Russian forces superior seized Bezsalivka (northwest of Sumy Metropolis) and into central Oleksiivka (north of Sumy Metropolis).[32]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces superior southeast of Andriivka (north of Sumy Metropolis) and west of Varachyne (northeast of Sumy Metropolis).[33]

Russian forces attacked northwest of Sumy Metropolis close to Ryzhivka and Bezsalivka; north of Sumy Metropolis close to Kindrativka; and northeast of Sumy Metropolis close to Yunakivka on August 19 and 20.[34] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked close to Kindrativka and northeast of Sumy Metropolis close to Varachyne and Sadky.[35]

Ukrainian Middle for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko acknowledged on August 20 that Russian milbloggers are mentioning Sumy Oblast much less regularly as a result of Russian forces in Sumy Oblast are struggling losses and regularly retreating in a number of areas of the oblast.[36] A Ukrainian reserve officer famous that Russian President Vladimir Putin's June 2025 plan to create a buffer zone in Sumy Oblast failed since Russian forces solely keep two small pockets within the oblast.[37]

Order of Battle: Parts of the Russian fortieth Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) are reportedly working close to Kindrativka.[38] Parts of the 1434th Akhmat-Chechnya Regiment, together with an connected Storm V firm of the twenty second Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, forty fourth Military Corps [AC], Leningrad Army District [LMD]), and the 83rd Separate Airborne (VDV) Brigade are reportedly working close to Varachyne.[39]

Russian Primary Effort – Jap Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Primary Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast ( Russian goal: Push Ukrainian forces again from the worldwide border with Belgorod Oblast and strategy to inside tube artillery vary of Kharkiv Metropolis)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on August 20 however didn't make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces superior close to Tykhe (northeast of Kharkiv Metropolis).[40]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv Metropolis close to Vovchansk, Synelnykove, and on the south (left) financial institution of the Vovcha River on August 19 and 20.[41] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked close to Synelnykove.[42]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Velykyi Burluk close to Ambarne and southeast of Velykyi Burluk towards Katerynivka on August 19 and 20 however didn't advance. .[43]

Russian Subordinate Primary Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian goal: Seize the rest of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into jap Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces carried out offensive operations within the Kupyansk path on August 20 however didn't make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces superior in northeastern and northern Kupyansk.[44]

Russian forces attacked close to Kupyansk itself; west of Kupyansk close to Sobolivka; northwest of Kupyansk close to Myrove; north of Kupyansk close to Kindrashivka; northeast of Kupyansk close to Synkivka, Fyholivka, and Kamyanka; and southeast of Kupyansk close to Stepova Novoselivka on August 19 and 20.[45] Ukrainian army observer Kostyantyn Mashovets acknowledged that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking inside Kupyansk itself.[46] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking close to Synkivka and Petropavlivka (east of Kupyansk).[47]

The Kharkiv Oblast Prosecutor’s Workplace reported on August 19 {that a} Russian drone struck an ambulance in Kupyansk, in violation of worldwide legislation.[48]

Order of Battle: Mashovets acknowledged that components of the Russian 1st Guards Tank Military [GTA] (Moscow Army District [MMD]) and infantry, probably of the 68th Motorized Rifle Division (sixth Mixed Arms Military [CAA], Leningrad Army District [LMD]) are working within the Kupyansk path.[49] Parts of the 352nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (eleventh Military Corps [AC], LMD) are reportedly working close to Stepova Novosellivka.[50] Drone operators of the twenty seventh Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st GTA, MMD) and the Udaya Drone Group (reportedly of the 68th MRD) are reportedly hanging Ukrainian positions close to Kupyansk and within the Kupyansk path, respectively.[51]

Russian forces carried out offensive operations within the Borova path on August 20 however didn't advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova close to Zahryzove and southeast of Borova towards Olhivka and close to Hlushchenkove on August 19 and 20.[52]

Order of Battle: Mashovets acknowledged that components of the Russian 1st GTA (MMD) are working close to Zahryzove.[53]

Russian forces not too long ago superior within the Lyman path.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage revealed on August 20 signifies that Russian forces superior inside southern Zarichne (east of Lyman).[54]

Russian forces attacked northwest of Lyman close to Shandryholove and Serednie; north of Lyman close to Karpivka, Zelena Dolyna, and Ridkodub; northeast of Lyman close to Kolodyazi and Myrne; east of Lyman close to Torske and Zarichne; and southeast of Lyman towards Yampil and within the Serebryanske forest space on August 19 and 20.[55]

A non-commissioned officer (NCO) of a Ukrainian brigade working within the Lyman path reported that Russian forces on this path launch small infantry group assaults towards Ukrainian positions always of the day, attacking from a number of instructions concurrently and always citing reserves to delay assaults, sending as many as 10 successive small infantry teams per assault wave.[56] The NCO reported that Russian forces are supported by drone operators utilizing Mavic, Lancet, and first-person view (FPV) drones, and infrequently leverage bikes for these assaults. The NCO famous that terrain options on this path, together with the Chorny Zherebets River, forestall Russian forces from leveraging armored autos. The NCO additionally acknowledged that the Russian army command is deploying drone operators as shut as potential to the road of contact on this path to be able to strike at Ukrainian firing factors and logistical routes within the rear and that preventing is attritional in Lyman path.[57]

Order of Battle: Mashovets reported that components of the Russian 144th Motorized Rifle Division (twentieth CAA, MMD), and the first and fifteenth motorized rifle regiments (each of the 2nd Guards Motorized Rifle Division, 1st GTA, MMD) are working towards the west (proper) financial institution of the Oskil River and Drobysheve (northwest of Lyman).[58] Mashovets acknowledged that components of the 2nd Guards Motorized Rifle Division (1st GTA, MMD) are working south of Karpivka. Mashovets acknowledged that components of the 144th Motorized Rifle Division (twentieth CAA, MMD) are working close to Ridkodub and that components of the third Motorized Rifle Division (twentieth CAA, MMD) are working close to Hrekivka (north of Lyman). Drone components of the BARS-16 Kuban Detachment are reportedly hanging Ukrainian positions west of Novoselivka (northwest of Lyman).[59]

Russian Subordinate Primary Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian goal: Seize the whole lot of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and presumably advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Siversk path on August 20 however didn't make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces superior northeast of Siversk and south of Novoselivka (east of Siversk).[60]

Russian forces attacked north of Siversk close to Serebryanka and within the Kreminskyi forest space, northeast of Siversk close to Hryhorivka, east of Siversk close to Verkhnokamyanske and Novoselivka, southeast of Siversk close to Vyimka, south of Siversk close to Pereizne, and southwest of Siversk close to Fedorivka on August 19 and 20.[61] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked close to Serebryanka.[62]

Order of Battle: Parts of the Russian 123rd Motorized Rifle Brigade (third Mixed Arms Military [CAA], previously 2nd Luhansk Individuals's Republic Military Corps [LNR AC], Southern Army District [SMD]) are reportedly working close to Vyimka.[63]

Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Chasiv Yar path on August 20 however didn't make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces superior to the jap outskirts of Kostyantynivka (southwest of Chasiv Yar).[64]

Russian forces attacked south of Chasiv Yar close to Stupochky and Predtechyne and southwest of Chasiv Yar close to Kostyantynivka on August 20.[65]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 77th Motorized Rifle Regiment (reportedly of the seventh Army Base, forty ninth CAA, SMD) are reportedly hanging Ukrainian positions within the Kostyantynivka (Chasiv Yar) path.[66] Sniper components and drone operators of the 98th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly working and hanging Ukrainian positions within the Kostyantynivka path and close to Chasiv Yar, respectively.[67] Parts of the 299th VDV Regiment (98th VDV Division) are reportedly working close to Chasiv Yar.[68] Drone operators of the eighth CAA (Southern Army District [SMD]), together with its 439th Rocket Artillery Brigade and 238th Artillery Brigade, are reportedly coordinating Lancet drone strikes towards Ukrainian positions close to Kostyantynivka.[69]

Russian forces not too long ago superior within the Toretsk path.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage revealed on August 19 signifies that Russian forces not too long ago superior south of Oleksandro-Shultyne (north of Toretsk).[70]

Russian forces attacked close to Toretsk itself; north of Toretsk close to Oleksandro-Shultyne, Dyliivka, and Bila Hora; west of Torestk close to Shcherbynivka; and northwest of Toretsk close to Kleban Byk, Katerynivka, Pleshchiivka, Yablunivka, Rusyn Yar, and Poltavka and towards Stepanivka on August 19 and 20.[71] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked close to Shcherbynivka.[72]

Order of Battle: Parts of the Russian 4th Motorized Rifle Brigade (third CAA, previously 2nd LNR AC, SMD) are reportedly working close to Oleksandro-Shultyne.[73] Parts of the 103rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (a hundred and fiftieth Motorized Rifle Division, eighth CAA, SMD) are reportedly working close to Kleban Byk.[74]

Ukrainian forces not too long ago superior within the Pokrovsk path.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage revealed on August 20 signifies that Ukrainian forces retook Petrivka (north of Pokrovsk).[75] ISW didn't beforehand lengthen assessed advances or claims over Petrivka and doesn't assess that Ukrainian forces retook Petrivka within the final 24 hours, provided that Ukrainian army sources reported that Ukrainian forces retook the settlement on August 15.[76]

Unconfirmed claims: The Russian Ministry of Protection (MoD) claimed that Russian forces seized Pankivka (northeast of Pokrovsk).[77] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian compelled superior north of Poltavka and northeast of Poltavka inside Volodymyrivka, east of Shakhove, towards Sofiivka, and north of Kucheriv Yar.[78]

Russian forces attacked close to Pokrovsk itself; north of Pokrovsk close to Rodynske and Krasnyi Lyman; northeast of Pokrovsk close to Shakhove, Zapovidne, Novoekonomichne, Fedorivka, Mayak, Sofiivka, Zolotyi Kolodyaz, Vesele, Kucheriv Yar, Zatyshok, and Volodymyrivka and towards Myrnohrad; east of Pokrovsk close to Promin, Hrodivka, and Myrolyubivka; southeast of Pokrovsk close to Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk close to Novoukrainka and Chunyshyne; and southwest of Pokrovsk close to Zvirove, Kotlyne, and Udachne on August 19 and 20.[79] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked within the Russian penetration northeast of Dobropillya, together with north of Pokrovsk close to Rubizhne and northeast of Pokrovsk close to Zolotyi Kolodyaz and Zapovidne.[80]

Ukrainian army observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on August 20 that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking alongside the complete perimeter of the Dobropillya penetration.[81] Mashovets acknowledged that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking Russian positions on the base of the penetration to be able to minimize off the salient alongside the Nykanorivka-Mayak line however that Russian forces nonetheless maintain a number of positions alongside the railroad west of Sukhetske. Mashovets acknowledged that Ukrainian forces broke via to Mayak and are preventing within the settlement.

Mashovets reported that components of the Russian 51st CAA (previously 1st Donetsk Individuals's Republic [DNR] AC, SMD) are working within the Dobropillya penetration look like strengthened by as much as one and a half battalions-worth of reserve models however that command will want time to regroup manpower and materiel earlier than any models can press north of Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad.[82] Mashovets acknowledged that the Russian forty first CAA and 2nd CAA (each of the Central Army District [CMD]) are accumulating personnel and materiel close to Pokrovsk in anticipation of future makes an attempt by the 51st CAA to interrupt via towards the northern outskirts of Pokrovsk and sever the bottom strains of communication (GLOCs) to Dobropillya, although this breakthrough is delayed resulting from Ukrainian counterattacks.[83] Mashovets reported that the Russian 114th and 132nd motorized rifle brigades (each of the 51st CAA) are working northeast of Pokrovsk between Shakhove and Nove Shakhove and attacking towards Kucheriv Yar to be able to advance to the remaining Russian assault models inside the settlement however can not break via.[84] Mashovets acknowledged that the first Motorized Rifle Battalion (77th Motorized Rifle Regiment, reportedly of the seventh Army Base, forty ninth CAA, SMD) and the thirty ninth Motorized Rifle Brigade (68th AC, Jap Army District [EMD]) are attacking Ukrainian positions east of Nykanorivka and seized a windbreak north of Zatyshok (all northeast of Pokrovsk). Mashovets reported that components of the Russian 137th Motorized Rifle Brigade (forty first CAA) and the 72nd Spetsnaz Battalion (reportedly of the third AC) are attacking towards Hrodivka and Myrnohrad and superior one kilometer towards Promin (all east of Pokrovsk).[85] Mashovets acknowledged that components of the fifteenth Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd CAA, CMD) are working close to Udachne however haven't superior and that the 1437th Motorized Rifle Regiment (fashioned throughout 2022 partial reserve name up) are nonetheless working in Zvirove.

Russian milbloggers claimed on August 20 that the Dobropillya penetration stays a fluid a part of the frontline and that neither Ukrainian nor Russian forces are in a position to seize the initiative.[86] One milblogger claimed that Russian forces keep positions in Zolotyi Kolodyaz regardless of Ukrainian counterattacks and that Russian forces are consolidating positions in Rodynske.[87] One other milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces allegedly cleared Zolotyi Kolodyaz and Kucheriv Yar however didn't affirm these reviews.[88]

An intelligence officer of a Ukrainian particular forces unit working within the Pokrovsk path reported on August 20 that Russian forces are utilizing anti-drone thermal imaging cloaks and transporting digital warfare (EW) techniques to ahead infantry positions to counteract Ukrainian drone exercise.[89] The intelligence officer reported that Russian forces typically try to move EW techniques to the road of contact on bikes and scooters resulting from Ukrainian drone exercise impeding Russian forces’ entry to GLOCs.

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 56th Separate Spetsnaz Battalion (51st CAA, previously 1st DNR AC, SMD) are reportedly hanging Ukrainian positions within the Pokrovsk path.[90] Drone operators of the Rubikon Middle for Superior Unmanned Applied sciences are reportedly hanging Ukrainian positions close to Myrnohrad.[91] Digital warfare components of the twenty seventh Motorized Rifle Division (2nd CAA, CMD) are reportedly working within the Pokrovsk path.[92]

Russian forces carried out offensive operations within the Novopavlivka path on August 20 however didn't advance.

Russian forces attacked towards Novopavlivka itself; northeast of Novopavlivka close to Novomykolaivka; southeast of Novopavlivka close to Horikhove and Novoukrainka; south of Novopavlivka close to Zirka, Hrushivka, and Dachne and towards Filiya; and southwest of Novopavlivka close to Hrushivske and Tovste on August 19 and 20.[93]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian eleventh Air Power and Air Protection Military (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and EMD) are reportedly coordinating airstrikes towards Ukrainian positions close to Ivanivka (southwest of Novopavlivka).[94] Drone operators of the 656th Motorized Rifle Regiment and the 657th Anti-Tank Artillery Battalion (each of the twenty ninth CAA, EMD) are reportedly hanging Ukrainian positions close to Filya.[95] Drone operators of the Rubikon Middle for Superior Unmanned Applied sciences are reportedly hanging Ukrainian forces close to Novopavlivka.[96] Parts of the 74th Motorized Rifle Brigade (forty first CAA, CMD) are reportedly working within the Dnipropetrovsk Oblast (Novopavlivka) path.[97]

Russian forces not too long ago superior within the Velykomykhailivka path.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage revealed on August 20 reveals components of the Russian 57th Motorized Rifle Brigade (fifth CAA, EMD) elevating a flag in northern Novoheorhiivka, indicating that Russian forces not too long ago seized Novoheorhiivka (southeast of Velykomykhailivka).[98] The Russian Ministry of Protection (MoD) credited components of the Russian 57th Motorized Rifle Brigade with the seizure of Novoheorhiivka.[99] Ukrainian army observer Kostyantyn Mashovets acknowledged on August 20 that Russian forces seized Maliivka and superior east of Vorone (each southeast of Velykomykhailivka).[100]

Unconfirmed claims: Mashovets acknowledged on August 20 that components of the thirty seventh Motorized Rifle Brigade (thirty sixth CAA, EMD) and the 336th Naval Infantry Brigade (Baltic Fleet) superior towards Voskresenka (east of Velykomykhailivka) and Sichneve (southeast of Velykomykhailivka).[101] Mashovets added that components of the Russian 127th Motorized Rifle Division (fifth CAA, EMD) and 69th Separate Cowl Brigade (thirty fifth CAA) superior as much as 2 kilometers southeast of Velykomykhailivka between Zaporizke (southeast of Velykomykhailivka) and Novoserhiivka referring to Novomykolaivka or Novoheorhiivka) from the Temyrivka-Vilne Pole line. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces seized Vorone and superior towards Komyshuvakha (southeast of Velykomykhailivka).[102]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Velykomykhailivka close to Zelenyi Hai; east of Velykomykhailivka close to Voskresenka and Oleksandrohrad; and southeast of Velykomykhailivka close to Shevchenko, Zaporizke, Sichneve, and Vorone and towards Komyshuvakha.[103]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian goal: Preserve frontline positions, safe rear areas towards Ukrainian strikes, and advance inside tube artillery vary of Zaporizhzhia Metropolis)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in jap Zaporizhia Oblast on August 20 however didn't make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Ukrainian army observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on August 20 that Russian forces superior alongside either side of the O-080619 Velyka Novosilka – Hulyaipole highway and within the Novopil – Novoivanivka path (all northeast of Hulyaipole).[104] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized and superior north and south of Temyrivka and towards Novomykolaivka (each northeast of Hulyaipole).[105]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Hulyaipole close to Temyrivka, Obratne, and Zelene Pole and towards Novohryhorivka on August 19 and 20.[106]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 1198th Motorized Rifle Regiment (reportedly of the thirty fifth Mixed Arms Military [CAA], Jap Army District [EMD]) are reportedly hanging Ukrainian positions close to Hulyaipole.[107] Drone operators of the sixtieth Motorized Rifle Brigade (fifth CAA, EMD) are reportedly working in Zaporizhia Oblast and artillery components of the Russian seventh Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly working within the Zaporizhia path.[108]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on August 20 however didn't make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces superior close to Plavni (southwest of Orikhiv) and south of Stepnohirsk (west of Orikhiv).[109]

Russian forces attacked southeast of Orikhiv close to Mala Tokmachka; southwest of Orikhiv close to Nesteryanka; west of Orikhiv close to Plavni, Stepnohirsk, and Shcherbaky; and northwest of Orikhiv towards Prymorske on August 19 and 20.[110]

Geolocated footage revealed on August 20 reveals Ukrainian forces hanging a Russian command put up in Myrne (southwest of Orikhiv) and Ukrainian drones hanging a Russian S-300V air protection system north of Oleksiivka (southeast of Orikhiv).[111]

Russian forces continued restricted assaults within the Kherson path on August 20 however didn't advance. [112]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Rubikon Middle for Superior Unmanned Applied sciences and components of the Naval Detachment of the 88 th Hispaniola Volunteer Brigade (Russian Volunteer Corps) are reportedly hanging Ukrainian forces close to the coast of occupied Crimea.[113]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Marketing campaign (Russian Goal: Goal Ukrainian army and civilian infrastructure within the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces carried out a sequence of missile and drone strikes towards Ukraine on the evening of August 19 to twenty. The Ukrainian Air Power reported that Russian forces launched two Iskander-M ballistic missiles from occupied Crimea and 93 Shahed-type and decoy drones from the instructions of Bryansk and Millerovo cities; Primosko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea.[114] The Ukrainian Air Power reported that Ukrainian forces downed 62 drones and one Iskander-M ballistic missile and that one missile and 31 drones struck 20 areas in Ukraine. Ukrainian officers reported that Russian drones and missile broken civilian and vitality infrastructure in Dnipropetrovsk, Chernihiv, Kharkiv, Odesa, and Sumy oblasts.[115] Sumy Oblast Prosecutor’s Workplace reported that Russian forces struck a residential space in Okhtyrka, Sumy Oblast, injuring 18 civilians.[116] Izmail Raion Administration reported that Russian forces struck port infrastructure and triggered a fireplace at a gas and vitality infrastructure facility in Izmail, Odesa Oblast.[117]

Important exercise in Belarus (Russian efforts to extend its army presence in Belarus and additional combine Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian met with Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko in Minsk on August 20 to debate alternatives to develop bilateral relations.[118] Pezeshkian acknowledged that Iran and Belarus share frequent pursuits and that each international locations search to fight US and European efforts to ”push unilateralism” within the regional and worldwide affairs.[119] Pezeshkian emphasised that Iran and Belarus can cooperate to mitigate the consequences of worldwide sanctions.[120] Iranian and Belarusian officers signed 12 memorandums of understanding (MoU) centered on growing bilateral commerce, military-tech cooperation, and mutual funding throughout Pezeshkian’s go to.[121] Iranian Minister of International Affairs Abbas Araghchi acknowledged on August 20 that Iran plans to signal a complete strategic partnership with Belarus.[122] Iran and Belarus have elevated protection and safety cooperation in recent times.[123] Iran showcased army tools at a Belarusian army exhibit in Might 2025.[124] Iran has reportedly labored to ascertain a drone manufacturing facility in Belarus since Might 2023 to assist the Russian invasion of Ukraine.[125]

Word: ISW doesn't obtain any categorised materials from any supply, makes use of solely publicly accessible info, and attracts extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media in addition to commercially accessible satellite tv for pc imagery and different geospatial information as the premise for these reviews. References to all sources used are supplied within the endnotes of every replace.

[1] https://mid dot ru/ru/press_service/minister_speeches/2042165/

[2] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=csTu3YEniMM ; https://suspilne dot media/1094506-u-bilomu-domi-zapevnili-so-ssa-ne-vidpravlat-svoi-vijska-do-ukraini-ak-garantiu-bezpeki/ ; https://suspilne dot media/1094514-putin-poobicav-zustritis-iz-zelenskim-bilij-dim/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=csTu3YEniMM ; https://www.foxnews.com/video/6377103891112 ; https://suspilne dot media/1094558-putin-pogodivsa-na-zustric-iz-zelenskim-ssa-ne-vidpravlatimut-vijska-do-ukraini-1274-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1755677182&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps

[3] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-18-2025

[4] https://www.consilium.europa dot eu/en/press/press-releases/2025/08/16/statement-by-president-macron-prime-minister-meloni-chancellor-merz-prime-minister-starmer-president-stubb-prime-minister-tusk-president-costa-president-von-der-leyen/

[5] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/fact-sheet-istanbul-protocol-draft-document-april-15-2022

[6] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/fact-sheet-istanbul-protocol-draft-document-april-15-2022

[7] https://mid dot ru/ru/press_service/minister_speeches/2042165/

[8] https://isw.pub/UkrWar072325 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar022725

[9] https://suspilne dot media/1094514-putin-poobicav-zustritis-iz-zelenskim-bilij-dim/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=csTu3YEniMM ; https://www.foxnews.com/video/6377103891112 ; https://suspilne dot media/1094558-putin-pogodivsa-na-zustric-iz-zelenskim-ssa-ne-vidpravlatimut-vijska-do-ukraini-1274-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1755677182&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps

[10] https://www.cbsnews.com/information/trump-putin-zelenskyy-meeting-russia-ukraine/%20;%20https://open.spotify.com/episode/5fwDeXpJbiJti9Zu1LqL9t?si=775b668b22814b29

[11] https://www.reuters.com/markets/asia/russia-under-war-spending-pressure-set-more-austerity-tax-hikes-2025-08-20/

[12] https://www.reuters.com/markets/europe/russias-seven-month-budget-deficit-exceeds-annual-target-2025-08-07/

[13] https://www.reuters.com/markets/asia/russia-under-war-spending-pressure-set-more-austerity-tax-hikes-2025-08-20/

[14] https://www.reuters.com/markets/asia/russia-under-war-spending-pressure-set-more-austerity-tax-hikes-2025-08-20/

[15] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-19-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russias-weakness-offers-leverage; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-26-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-22-2025

[16] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-force-generation-and-technological-adaptations-update-august-13-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-force-generation-and-technological-adaptations-update-august-13-2025

[17] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-27-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-22-2025

[18] https://www.bloomberg.com/information/articles/2025-08-20/russia-says-it-will-keep-selling-oil-to-india-despite-us-tariffs

[19] https://www.bloomberg.com/information/articles/2025-08-20/india-s-refiners-ramp-up-russian-oil-buying-despite-us-criticism

[20] https://www.bloomberg.com/information/articles/2025-08-19/china-refiners-grab-russian-oil-as-trump-menaces-flows-to-india

[21] https://isw.pub/UkrWar071725 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-6-2025

[22] https://meduza dot io/information/2025/08/20/vedomosti-glava-sk-aleksandr-bastrykin-odin-iz-osnovnyh-kandidatov-na-post-predsedatelya-verhovnogo-suda; https://www.vedomosti dot ru/society/articles/2025/08/20/1132828-istochniki-vedomostei-bastrikin-odin-iz-kandidatov-na-dolzhnost-glavi-verhovnogo-suda

[23] https://www.themoscowtimes dot com/2024/10/24/how-russia-returned-to-gerontocracy-a86797; http://duma dot gov.ru/information/60047/

[24] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-14-2025

[25] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-30-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-14-2025

[26] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/putin-unlikely-demobilize-event-ceasefire-because-he-afraid-his-veterans; https://www.interfax dot ru/russia/948380; http://kremlin dot ru/occasions/president/information/73585

[27] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28056 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28026 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28024

[28] https://t.me/rusich_army/25298

[29] https://english.nv dot ua/nation/russian-drone-base-located-in-kursk-oblast-s-children-s-camp-hit-50538677.html

[30] https://x.com/OsintWarrior/standing/1958127667640734015

[31] https://t.me/tass_agency/332385 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/332373 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/332374 ; https://meduza dot io/information/2025/08/20/fsb-zayavila-chto-v-bryanskoy-oblasti-pri-popytke-proryva-zaderzhany-troe-ukrainskih-diversantov-esche-troe-ubity

[32] https://t.me/osintpen/1656;%20https://t.me/severnnyi/4864;%20https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9836;%20https://x.com/MikiValbuena/standing/1958148603429421121;%20https://x.com/PuenteUribarri/standing/1958138101018030405;%20https://t.me/black_swan_ukraine/391

[33] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32683

[34] https://t.me/wargonzo/28624; https://t.me/dva_majors/77861; https://t.me/severnnyi/4877; https://t.me/rusich_army/25298

[35] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32683; https://t.me/dva_majors/77861; https://t.me/severnnyi/4877

[36] https://t.me/akovalenko1989/9655

[37] https://x.com/Tatarigami_UA/standing/1957971297322807632; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-21-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-6-2025

[38] https://t.me/ButusovPlus/22252

[39] https://t.me/severnnyi/4884

[40] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32676

[41] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28056; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28026; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28024; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15984; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32676; https://t.me/wargonzo/28624; https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/13881

[42] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32676

[43] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28056

[44] https://t.me/motopatriot78/41116

[45] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28056; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28026; https://t.me/motopatriot78/41116; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28024; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15984; https://t.me/wargonzo/28624

[46] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2933

[47] https://t.me/wargonzo/28624; https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/13881

[48] https://t.me/prokuratura_kharkiv/24537; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/19/udar-po-shvydkij-u-kupyansku-rosijskyj-fpv-dron-poranyv-dvoh-medykiv/;

[49] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2933

[50] https://t.me/motopatriot78/41112

[51] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/176623; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/176647 ; https://t.me/natoptishh/4020; https://t.me/operationall_space/5832

[52] https://t.me/rybar/72945; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28056; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28026; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28024; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15984; https://t.me/tass_agency/332350 ; https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2933

[53] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2933

[54] https://x.com/GeoConfirmed/standing/1958090286728421820; https://x.com/NOELreports/standing/1958074910611243317; https://x.com/GeoRaccoon/standing/1958088200708034954; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9831

[55] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28056; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28026; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28024; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15984; https://t.me/rybar/72945; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/176580 ; https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2934

[56] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/20/ataky-u-desyatok-shturmovyh-nakativ-vijskovi-pro-vysnazhlyvu-taktyku-voroga/

[57] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/20/okupanty-pochaly-pidtyaguvaty-operatoriv-droniv-blyzhche-do-liniyi-bojovogo-zitknennya/

[58] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2934

[59] https://x.com/MikiValbuena/standing/1958136470650118565

[60] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32707

[61] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28056; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28026; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28024; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15984; https://t.me/rybar/72945; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32707; https://t.me/dva_majors/77861

[62] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32707

[63] https://t.me/rybar/72945

[64] https://t.me/motopatriot78/41114

[65] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28056; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66830; https://t.me/tass_agency/33236; https://t.me/wargonzo/28624; https://t.me/motopatriot78/41140; https://t.me/tass_agency/332361

[66] https://t.me/mod_russia/55709

[67] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32688

[68] https://t.me/mod_russia/55716

[69] https://t.me/nm_dnr/14194

[70] https://t.me/kurt_compani_group/735; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9831; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66830

[71] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28056; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28026; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28024; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15984; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66830; https://t.me/wargonzo/28624; https://t.me/motopatriot78/41140; https://t.me/dva_majors/77861; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32696; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66836

[72] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66830

[73] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32696

[74] https://t.me/motopatriot78/41112

[75] https://t.me/fakhivtsi/398; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9832

[76] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27846; https://t.me/azov_media/7159

[77] https://t.me/mod_russia/55720

[78] https://t.me/motopatriot78/41101; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66836

[79] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28056 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28026; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28024; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15984; https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2934; https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2935; https://t.me/dva_majors/77861; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/176629 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66836; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32715 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/41101 ; https://t.me/rybar/72951

[80] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66836 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/28624

[81] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2934; https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2935

[82] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2934; https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2935 ; https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2936

[83] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2936

[84] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2934; https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2935

[85] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2936

[86] https://t.me/wargonzo/28624; https://t.me/rybar/72951

[87] https://t.me/wargonzo/28624

[88] https://t.me/rybar/72951

[89] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cKS8agbS1G0; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/20/dobigaly-do-pomerlyh-i-z-nyh-lutalysya-poblyzu-pokrovska-dronari-roblyat-bolyache-vorozhij-logistyczi/

[90] https://t.me/mod_russia/55727

[91] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/176613

[92] https://t.me/sashakots/55686

[93] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28056; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28026; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28024; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15984 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66844

[94] https://t.me/voin_dv/16533

[95] https://x.com/richardzai38580/standing/1957868389910868442; https://t.me/army29th/390

[96] https://t.me/mod_russia/55727

[97] https://t.me/dva_majors/77870 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/77893

[98] https://x.com/richardzai38580/standing/1958085485160722907; https://x.com/voin_dv/standing/1958084087555752220; https://t.me/osintpen/1653; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9833

[99] https://t.me/mod_russia/55724

[100] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2936

[101] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2936

[102] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66844

[103] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28056; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28026; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28024; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15984; https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2936; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66844

[104] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2936

[105] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66844; https://t.me/motopatriot78/41115; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/176622; https://t.me/motopatriot78/41122

[106] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28056; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28026; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28024; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15984; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66844

[107] https://t.me/voin_dv/16536

[108] https://t.me/voin_dv/16535; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32688

[109] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32688; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32694

[110] https://t.me/wargonzo/28624; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28056; https://t.me/dva_majors/77861

[111] https://x.com/Osinttechnical/standing/1958047730334392331; https:// t.co/eGGrH4xy0h; https://x.com/moklasen/standing/1958140162153607480; https://x.com/bayraktar_1love/standing/1958133305267650853

[112] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28056; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28026; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/12869; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28024

[113] https://t.me/icpbtrubicon/434 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66847; https://t.me/dva_majors/77887; https://t.me/mod_russia/55732; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32714; https://t.me/dva_majors/77885

[114] https://t.me/kpszsu/40722

[115] https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/standing/1958080635240652899 ; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/1568 ; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/23703 ; https://t.me/synegubov/16650 ; https://t.me/suspilnenews/54919 ; https://t.me/dsns_telegram/48154 ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/20/ataka-dronamy-po-odeshhyni-spalahnula-masshtabna-pozhezha-na-energoobyekti/

[116] https://t.me/Sumy_news_ODA/37988

[117] https://t.me/suspilnenews/54919 ; https://t.me/dsns_telegram/48154; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/20/ataka-dronamy-po-odeshhyni-spalahnula-masshtabna-pozhezha-na-energoobyekti/

[118] https://defapress dot ir/fa/information/771585/

[119] https://defapress dot ir/fa/information/771585/

[120] https://defapress dot ir/fa/information/771585/

[121] https://belta dot by/president/view/fundament-dlja-masshtabnogo-ryvka-est-glavnoe-iz-peregovorov-lukashenko-i-pezeshkiana-v-minske-732940-2025/ ; https://www.entekhab dot ir/fa/information/880973; https://belta dot by/president/view/zdravoohranenie-selskoe-hozjajstvo-smi-belarus-i-iran-podpisali-paket-dokumentov-po-razvitiju-732917-2025/

[122] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/information/1404/05/29/3380432

[123] https://defapress dot ir/fa/information/683452 ; https://mehrnews dot com/information/207163/An-overlook-on-3-decades-of-Iran-Belarus-relations ; https://english.alarabiya dot internet/Information/world/2023/08/02/Iran-Belarus-seek-closer-military-collaboration-amid-tensions-with-West ; https://www.belarus dot by/en/authorities/occasions/foreign-observers-invited-to-csto-exercise-in-belarus_i_160617.html