Russian Offensive Marketing campaign Evaluation, August 27, 2025

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Jessica Sobieski, Justin Younger, Christina Harward, Anna Harvey, Kateryna Stepanenko, and George Barros with Nate Trotter

August 27, 2025, 6:30pm ET

Click on here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is up to date each day alongside the static maps current on this report.

Click on here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click on here to see ISW’s 3D management of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a pc (not a cellular gadget) is strongly advisable for utilizing this data-heavy device.

Click on here to entry ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces each day by displaying a dynamic frontline. ISW will replace this time-lapse map archive month-to-month.

Be aware: The information cut-off for this product was 12pm ET on August 27. ISW will cowl subsequent reviews within the August 28 Russian Offensive Marketing campaign Evaluation.

Restricted Russian tactical forces lately infiltrated Ukrainian defenses in two border settlements in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast however haven't established enduring positions within the space. The Ukrainian Common Workers and Ukrainian Dnipro Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov reported on August 27 that Ukrainian forces stopped Russian advances in Zaporizske (3.75 kilometers from the Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast administrative border) and Novoheorhiivka (730 meters from the Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast administrative border) however that Russian forces are working inside each settlements and haven't but secured positions.[1] The Ukrainian army officers reported that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking in Zaporizske and Novoheorhiivka. The Russian Ministry of Protection (MoD) claimed on August 20 and 25 that components of the Russian 57th Motorized Rifle Brigade (fifth Mixed Arms Military [CAA], Jap Army District [EMD]) seized Novoheorhiivka and Zaporizske, respectively.[2] It's untimely to characterize these reported advances as a breakthrough into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast because the exercise is at most a small-scale infiltration. It is usually inaccurate to characterize these reported advances as Russia‘s “first“ territorial positive factors in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, particularly as Russian forces entered Dnipropetrovsk Oblast lengthy earlier than the Russian MoD claimed the seizures of Zaporizske and Novoheorhiivka. ISW noticed geolocated footage in June and July 2025 that indicated that Russian forces had superior in Dachne and Maliivka (each northeast of Zaporizske and Novoheorhiivka), and geolocated footage from August 25 additional indicated that Russian forces had superior in Vorone (west of Maliivka).[3] ISW assessed in November 2024 that the Russian army command would seemingly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast as a way to interdict Ukrainian floor traces of communication (GLOCs) that help Ukrainian positions in Donetsk Oblast and try and envelop these positions.[4] Russian forces might also be attempting to advance in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast to set situations for additional operations within the area.

Russian forces are utilizing infiltration ways in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast just like these they used close to Dobropillya (northwest of Pokrovsk) in early August 2025. Trehubov reported that Russian forces are working in small teams of 5 servicemembers, who infiltrate behind Ukrainian traces, wait and accumulate, after which assault in numerous instructions concurrently.[5] Trehubov particularly famous that Russian ways in Zaporizske and Novoheorhiivka are comparable to those who Russian forces employed close to Dobropillya, and ISW has noticed reviews that Russian forces have been more and more adopting these ways all through the frontline.[6] Russian forces lately infiltrated east and northeast of Dobropillya however have been unsuccessful in establishing enduring positions and exploiting the penetration to this point.[7] Such infiltration ways additionally look like weak to well-organized Ukrainian counterattacks.[8] ISW’s Assessed Russian Advances map layer notably solely reveals the Russian Ahead Line of Personal Troops (FLOT) and doesn't differentiate between enduring Russian positions and restricted infiltration missions.[9] Russian forces are seemingly utilizing infiltration ways that don't mechanically end in enduring positions, and Russian actors usually leverage maps that try to indicate these actions to magnify the presence of significant Russian exercise on the battlefield.

The Kremlin seems to be resuming its drone and missile strike marketing campaign concentrating on Ukraine's power infrastructure forward of Winter 2025, seemingly in an effort to undermine Ukrainian will to withstand Russian aggression. The Ukrainian Air Drive reported that Russian forces launched 95 Shahed-type and decoy drones from the instructions of Kursk and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea on the evening of August 26 to 27.[10] The Ukrainian Air Drive reported that Ukrainian forces downed 74 drones over northern, southern and jap Ukraine and that 21 drones struck 9 places. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky acknowledged that Russian strikes induced energy outages in Poltava, Sumy, and Chernihiv oblasts, leaving greater than 100,000 households with out electrical energy.[11] The Ukrainian Ministry of Vitality acknowledged that Russian strikes broken a crucial electrical substation in Sumy Metropolis and fuel transportation infrastructure amenities in Poltava Oblast.[12] The Ministry of Vitality added that Ukrainian authorities take into account the strikes to be a continuation of the Russian marketing campaign to destroy Ukrainian power infrastructure on the eve of the heating season. Ukrainian officers acknowledged that Russian strikes additionally de-energized water utilities in Sumy Metropolis and broken {an electrical} substation in Novhorod-Siverskyi, Chernihiv Oblast; a college in Kharkiv Oblast, and an condo constructing in Kherson Metropolis.[13] Ukraine's largest personal power firm, DTEK, reported {that a} Russian strike on August 26 destroyed the DTEK coal enrichment plant in Donetsk Oblast, which prepares coal for heating.[14]

The Kremlin is trying to undermine US and European joint efforts to find out acceptable safety ensures for Ukraine by seemingly demanding that Russia and the US privately focus on such issues. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov acknowledged on August 27 that the Kremlin doesn't wish to publicly focus on the difficulty of Western safety ensures for Ukraine and referred to as such public discussions "unhelpful."[15] Peskov additionally acknowledged that Russia takes a "damaging view" of European proposals of safety ensures for Ukraine and that Russia will understand European pressure deployments to postwar Ukraine as an enlargement of NATO's presence.[16] Peskov's assertion was seemingly in response to the August 26 Monetary Occasions (FT) report that the US is reportedly keen to produce supporting belongings to a European-led pressure grouping as a part of postwar safety ensures for Ukraine.[17] Peskov's rejection of the Western proposals for safety ensures and his efforts to discredit public discussions of those proposals are seemingly a part of the Kremlin's efforts to demand that Russia have a veto over any Western safety ensures for Ukraine and to sideline Ukraine's European companions from offering Ukraine strong safety ensures as a part of a battle termination settlement.[18]

The Kremlin signaled that Russian President Vladimir Putin stays unwilling to fulfill with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky unconditionally. Peskov reiterated a recurrent Kremlin excuse that any Russia-Ukraine contacts at a excessive or prime degree require intensive preparations, however that the heads of the Russian and Ukrainian negotiating teams stay in touch.[19] Peskov added that Russia and Ukraine haven't scheduled the following spherical of talks between their negotiating teams. Peskov tried to shift blame onto Ukraine for the Kremlin's unwillingness to arrange a Putin-Zelensky bilateral assembly by claiming that the decision of the warfare requires "reciprocity from Kyiv."

Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev reiterated Azerbaijan's continued help for Ukraine's territorial sovereignty and condemned the Soviet Purple Military for "invading and occupying" Azerbaijan in 1920 — additional aggravating already deteriorating Russian-Azerbaijani relations. Aliyev acknowledged in an interview with Saudi Arabian state-owned outlet Al Arabiya printed on August 27 that "the Russian military invaded Azerbaijan and occupied the nation" in 1920.[20] Aliyev acknowledged that Azerbaijan had "created [its] personal state, however the Bolsheviks took it away." Aliyev additionally notably characterised Russia's warfare towards Ukraine as an "invasion" and reiterated that Azerbaijan has supported Ukraine's territorial integrity because the begin of the full-scale invasion. Aliyev recalled the "current cooling" of Russian-Azerbaijani relations, stating that Azerbaijan will "by no means tolerate" any "aggression or disrespect" towards Azerbaijan. Aliyev acknowledged that Russia's downing of the Azerbaijan Airways aircraft in December 2024 and the Kremlin's response are "inflicting nice disappointment and discontent" in Azerbaijan. Russian-Azerbaijani relations have been declining since a Russian air protection system shot down an Azerbaijan Airways flight 8243 over the Republic of Chechnya in December 2024, inflicting the aircraft to crash in Kazakhstan.[21] Aliyev publicly rejected the Kremlin's makes an attempt to cowl up Russia's position within the days following the incident.[22] Russian-Azerbaijani relations continued to say no in June and July 2025 over small-scale incidents that Aliyev seized upon to reiterate his calls for that Russia take duty for the aircraft crash.[23] Russian forces performed a Shahed drone strike towards the Ukrainian fuel compressor station in Odesa Oblast that transports Azerbaijani fuel in a single day on August 5 to six and struck the State Oil Firm of the Azerbaijani Republic (SOCAR) oil depot in Odesa Metropolis in a single day on August 7 to eight.[24]

Key Takeaways:

Restricted Russian tactical forces lately infiltrated Ukrainian defenses in two border settlements in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast however haven't established enduring positions within the space. Russian forces are utilizing infiltration ways in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast just like these they used close to Dobropillya (northwest of Pokrovsk) in early August 2025. The Kremlin seems to be resuming its drone and missile strike marketing campaign concentrating on Ukraine's power infrastructure forward of Winter 2025, seemingly in an effort to undermine Ukrainian will to withstand Russian aggression. The Kremlin is trying to undermine US and European joint efforts to find out acceptable safety ensures for Ukraine by seemingly demanding that Russia and the US privately focus on such issues. The Kremlin signaled that Russian President Vladimir Putin stays unwilling to fulfill with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky unconditionally. Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev reiterated Azerbaijan's continued help for Ukraine's territorial sovereignty and condemned the Soviet Purple Military for "invading and occupying" Azerbaijan in 1920 — additional aggravating already deteriorating Russian-Azerbaijani relations. Russian forces lately superior close to Borova, Toretsk, and Pokrovsk and in jap Zaporizhia Oblast.

We don't report intimately on Russian warfare crimes as a result of these actions are well-covered in Western media and don't straight have an effect on the army operations we're assessing and forecasting. We are going to proceed to guage and report on the results of those prison actions on the Ukrainian army and the Ukrainian inhabitants and particularly on fight in Ukrainian city areas. We completely condemn Russian violations of the legal guidelines of armed battle and the Geneva Conventions and crimes towards humanity despite the fact that we don't describe them in these reviews.

Ukrainian Operations within the Russian Federation Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis Russian Important Effort – Jap Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate essential efforts) Russian Subordinate Important Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces again from the worldwide border with Belgorod Oblast and strategy to inside tube artillery vary of Kharkiv Metropolis Russian Subordinate Important Effort #2 – Seize the rest of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into jap Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast Russian Subordinate Important Effort #3 – Seize the whole lot of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and probably advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Marketing campaign Vital Exercise in Belarus Ukrainian Operations within the Russian Federation

Unspecified actors seemingly performed an assault towards the important thing oil pipeline that provides Moscow Metropolis in Ryazan Oblast on August 26. Sources within the Ukrainian Important Army Intelligence Directorate (GUR) informed Ukrainian broadcaster Suspilne on August 27 that native Ryazan Oblast boards reported an explosion and subsequent hearth on a piece of the Ryazan-Moscow oil pipeline.[25] Suspilne reported that legislation enforcement companies and restore crews are at the moment working close to the village of Bozhatkovo, Ryazan Oblast, to answer the emergency state of affairs of the explosion and hearth. GUR sources acknowledged that Russian state-controlled petroleum firm Transneft, which provides the Russian army, repurposed the pipeline in 2018 to move car gasoline. GUR sources reported that the explosion indefinitely halted transfers of petroleum to Moscow Metropolis through the pipeline.

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian goal: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine alongside the worldwide border)

Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Sumy course on August 27 however didn't make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces seized Bezsalivka (northwest of Sumy Oblast).[26]

Russian forces attacked northwest of Sumy Metropolis close to Bezsalivka; northeast of Sumy Metropolis close to Varachyne, Oleksiiivka, and Yunakivka; and in unspecified areas of Kursk Oblast on August 26 and 27.[27] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked close to Bezsalivka; northeast of Sumy Metropolis close to Oleksiivka and Andriivka and from the Sadky course; and from the Marine course (northeast of Sumy Metropolis).[28]

A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed that components of 1st Battalion of the 237th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (76th VDV Division) are struggling to conduct rotations in Yunakivka and may solely go away the settlement through its jap outskirts by an open subject.[29] The milblogger claimed that the army command of the 1434th Akhmat-Chechnya Regiment is constant to commit the hooked up V firm (twenty second Motorized Rifle Regiment, 72nd Motorized Rifle Division, forty fourth Military Corps [AC], Leningrad Army District [LMD]), which was transferred to the regiment's command, into grinding assaults to regain misplaced positions close to Varachyne.[30] The milblogger famous that components of the 83rd Separate VDV Brigade grew to become fight ineffective after marginally advancing from the jap aspect of Varachyne and that the brigade doesn't have adequate reserves for offensive operations. The milblogger added that components of the 83rd VDV Brigade are additionally unsuccessfully attacking on the western outskirts of Yunakivka.

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 56th VDV Regiment (seventh VDV Division) are working in Sumy Oblast.[31] Components of the 51st VDV Regiment (106th VDV Division) are reportedly laying mines remotely and assuming defensive positions close to Sadky.[32]

Russian Important Effort – Jap Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Important Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast ( Russian goal: Push Ukrainian forces again from the worldwide border with Belgorod Oblast and strategy to inside tube artillery vary of Kharkiv Metropolis)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on August 27 however didn't make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces superior inside Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv Metropolis).[33]

Russian forces attacked north of Kharkiv Metropolis close to Hlyboke and northeast of Kharkiv Metropolis close to Vovchansk and Synelnykove on August 26 and 27.[34]

Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Velykyi Burluk course on August 27 however didn't make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces superior towards Khatnie (northeast of Velykyi Burluk).[35]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz Kanada Detachment (204th Akhmat Spetsnaz Regiment) and the 83rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (69th Motorized Rifle Division, sixth Mixed Arms Military [CAA], Leningrad Army District [LMD]) are reportedly placing Ukrainian forces close to Ambarne (northeast of Velykyi Burluk).[36]

Russian Subordinate Important Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian goal: Seize the rest of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into jap Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Kupyansk course on August 27 however didn't make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces superior north of Blahodativka (west of Kupyansk) and west of Stroivka (north of Kupyansk close to the worldwide border).[37]

Russian forces attacked close to Kupyansk itself; north of Kupyansk towards Kolodyazne and Doroshivka; northeast of Kupyansk close to Krasne Pershe; east of Kupyansk close to Petropavlivka; and southeast of Kupyansk close to Stepova Novoselivka on August 26 and 27.[38]

Order of Battle: Components of the Russian twenty fifth Motorized Rifle Brigade (sixth Mixed Arms Military [CAA], Leningrad Army District [LMD]) and the twenty seventh Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st Guards Tank Military [GTA], Moscow Army District [MMD]) are reportedly working close to Kindrashivka (north of Kupyansk).[39] Components of the 352nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (eleventh Military Corps [AC], LMD) are reportedly working close to Stepova Novoselivka.[40]

Russian forces lately superior within the Borova course.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage printed on August 27 signifies that Russian forces lately superior north of Borivska Andriivka (northeast of Borova).[41]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova towards Nova Kruhlyakivka and southeast of Borova towards Olhivka on August 26 and 27.[42]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Yastreb group of the Russian 252nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (third Motorized Rifle Division, twentieth CAA, MMD) are placing Ukrainian forces southwest of Novovodyane (southeast of Borova).[43]

Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Lyman course on August 27 however didn't make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces superior in western Novomykhailivka (north of Lyman) and in northern Shandryholove (northwest of Lyman).[44]

Russian forces attacked northwest of Lyman close to Shandryholove; north of Lyman close to Novomykhailivka, Karpivka, Ridkodub and Zelena Dolyna and towards Stavky and Novyi Myr; northeast of Lyman close to Kolodyazi and Myrne; east of Lyman close to Zarichne and Torske; and southeast of Lyman towards Yampil on August 26 and 27.[45] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked close to Novomykhailivka.[46]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade working within the Lyman course reported on August 27 that Russian forces lately modified ways and are actually accumulating forces to assault Ukrainian positions in small teams from a number of instructions.[47] The spokesperson acknowledged that Russian forces outnumber Ukrainian forces in some areas of the Lyman course six to 1. A non-commissioned officer (NCO) of a Ukrainian brigade working within the Lyman course reported that Russian forces within the space — as on a lot of the frontline — are trying to bypass Ukrainian ahead positions as a way to enter the Ukrainian close to rear and accumulate forces.[48] The NCO acknowledged that Russian forces are leveraging fiber-optic first-person-view (FPV) drones to attempt to interdict Ukrainian floor traces of communication (GLOCs) and Shahed drones to strike frontline cities.

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian sixteenth Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian Common Workers's Important Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly placing Ukrainian forces close to the junction of the executive boundaries of Donetsk, Luhansk, and Kharkiv oblasts (northeast of Lyman).[49]

Russian Subordinate Important Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian goal: Seize the whole lot of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and probably advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Siversk course on August 27 however didn't advance.

Russian forces attacked northwest of Siversk towards Dronivka and Zakitne; northeast of Siversk close to Hryhorivka and Serebryanka; southeast of Siversk close to Vyimka; and southwest of Siversk close to Fedorivka on August 26 and 27.[50] A Russian supply claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked close to Serebryanka.[51]

A Russian milblogger claimed on August 27 that Russian forces started assaults on Dronivka and that seizing the settlement would permit Russian forces to enter Siversk from the northern outskirts and undermine Ukrainian defenses on this space.[52] The milblogger claimed that Russian forces are conducting fixed drone strikes towards Siversk and are primarily specializing in placing high-rise buildings on the outskirts of the settlement.

Order of Battle: Components of the Russian seventh Motorized Rifle Brigade (third Mixed Arms Military [CAA], previously 2nd Luhansk Folks's Republic Military Corps [AC], Southern Army District [SMD]) are reportedly working close to Bilohorivka and Serebryanka (each northeast of Siversk).[53]

Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Chasiv Yar course on August 27 however didn't make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on August 27 that Russian forces superior southwest of Maiske (northeast of Chasiv Yar).[54]

Russian forces attacked close to Chasiv Yar itself and south of Chasiv Yar towards Stupochky on August 26 and 27.[55]

Order of Battle: Sniper teams of the Russian 98th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly working close to Chasiv Yar, and drone operators of the 98th VDV reportedly performed a fiber-optic drone strike towards a street close to Kostyantynivka (southwest of Chasiv Yar).[56]

Russian forces lately superior within the Toretsk course.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage printed on August 26 signifies that Russian forces, together with components of the Vladikavkaz Rifle Battalion and different components of the 68th Tank Regiment (a hundred and fiftieth Motorized Rifle Division, eighth CAA, SMD), seized Katerynivka (northwest of Toretsk).[57] A Russian milblogger claimed that the 68th Tank Regiment is conducting clearing operations in Katerynivka.[58] Footage geolocated on August 27 signifies that Russian forces superior alongside the Donetska railroad northeast of and in northern Shcherbynivka (west of Toretsk), in addition to southeast of Nelipivka (northwest of Toretsk).[59]

Russian forces attacked close to Toretsk itself; north of Toretsk close to Oleksandro-Shultyne; northwest of Toretsk close to Rusyn Yar, Poltavka, Katerynivka, and Oleksandro-Kalynove and towards Berestok, Pleshchiivka, and Stepanivka; and west of Toretsk close to Shcherbynivka on August 26 and 27.[60] A Russian milblogger claimed on August 27 that Ukrainian forces counterattacked close to Bila Hora (north of Toretsk), Shcherbynivka, and Katerynivka.[61]

A milblogger claimed on August 27 that Russian forces are attacking Pleshchiivka as a way to minimize off Ukrainian floor traces of communication (GLOCs) between the settlement and Kleban Byk (southwest of Pleshchiivka).[62]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Rubikon Middle for Superior Unmanned Applied sciences are reportedly placing Ukrainian positions in Oleksandro-Shultyne and Rodynske (north of Pokrovsk).[63] Components of the twentieth Guards and a hundred and fiftieth motorized rifle divisions (each of the eighth CAA) are reportedly working close to Rusyn Yar and Poltavka.[64]

Russian forces lately superior within the Pokrovsk course.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage printed on August 26 signifies that Russian forces lately superior north of Hrodivka (southeast of Pokrovsk).[65]

Unconfirmed claims: The Russian MoD claimed on August 27 that Russian forces seized Leontovychi (southwest of Pokrovsk).[66] Russian milbloggers claimed that neither Ukrainian nor Russian forces are capable of achieve a foothold in Leontovychi, nevertheless.[67] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Volodymyrivka (northeast of Pokrovsk) and Myrolyubivka (east of Pokrovsk) and superior in jap Zapovidne (northeast of Pokrovsk), northeast of Myrolyubivka, and west of Udachne (southwest of Pokrovsk).[68] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces pushed Russian forces again to south of Chunyshyne (south of Pokrovsk).[69]

Russian forces performed offensive operations close to Pokrovsk itself; north of Pokrovsk close to Rodynske, Rubizhne, and Bilytske; northeast of Pokrovsk close to Volodymyrivka, Novoekonomichne, Sukhetske, Krasnyi Lyman, and Zapovidne; east of Pokrovsk close to Myrolyubivka, Myrnohrad, and Promin and towards Balahan; southeast of Pokrovsk close to Lysivka and towards Novopavlivka; south of Pokrovsk close to Novoukrainka; and southwest of Pokrovsk close to Troyanda, Leontovychi, Udachne, and Kotlyne and towards Molodetske on August 26 and 27.[70] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked close to Leontovychi.[71]

A spokesperson of a Ukrainian corps working within the Pokrovsk course reported that Russian sabotage and reconnaissance teams have been working in Pokrovsk and in Myrnohrad (east of Pokrovsk) within the first half of August, however there are not any Russian personnel inside the cities at the moment.[72] The spokesperson acknowledged that Russian forces are once more attempting to assault the Pokrovsk agglomeration in small infantry teams consisting of 1 to 2 personnel and that Russia has amassed about 100,000 servicemen within the Pokrovsk course. The spokesperson famous that Russian forces have been unable to bolster the current penetration close to Dobropillya (northwest of Pokrovsk) with a bigger pressure grouping. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian assault, sabotage, and reconnaissance teams proceed to enter Pokrovsk.[73] Russian milbloggers characterised Udachne as a contested "grey zone," with Russian forces in Udachne’s south, and Ukrainian forces in Udachne’s north.[74]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Rubikon Middle for Superior Unmanned Applied sciences, the Atlant Battalion of the thirty fifth Motorized Rifle Brigade (forty first CAA, Central Army District [CMD]), and the 238th Artillery Brigade (eighth CAA) are reportedly placing Ukrainian forces in Rodynske.[75] Components of the one hundred and tenth Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, previously 1st Donetsk Folks's Republic Military Corps [DNR AC], SMD) are reportedly working close to Volodymyrivka, and drone operators of the fifth Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA) are reportedly working close to Novoekonomichne.[76]

Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Novopavlivka course on August 27 however didn't advance.

Russian forces performed offensive operations towards Novopavlivka itself; south of Novopavlivka close to Filiya; and southwest of Novopavlivka close to Ivanivka and Zelenyi Hai on August 26 and 27.[77] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked close to Zelenyi Hai.[78]

The commander of a Ukrainian drone battalion working within the Novopavlivka course reported that Russian forces are attacking in small infantry teams however are struggling to ascertain crossings over the Vovcha River at scale on account of Ukrainian drone operations, so Russian forces are as an alternative specializing in offensive operations additional south close to Maliivka and Komyshuvakha (southwest of Novopavlivka and southeast of Velykomykhailivka).[79]

Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Velykomykhailivka course on August 27 however didn't advance.

Russian forces performed offensive operations northeast of Velykomykhailivka close to Andriivka-Klevtsove; east of Velykomykhailivka close to Voskresenka, Sichneve, and Oleksandrohrad; and southeast of Velykomykhailivka close to Vorone, Komyshuvakha, and Novoheorhiivka on August 26 and 27.[80] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked close to Vorone.[81]

Order of Battle: Components of the Russian 74th Motorized Rifle Brigade (forty first CAA, CMD) are reportedly working within the Dnipropetrovsk (Velykomykhailivka) course. [82] Drone operators of the 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian Common Workers's Important Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly working close to Ternove (southeast of Velykomykhailivka).[83] Drone operators of the fifth Tank Brigade (thirty sixth CAA, Jap Army District [EMD]) are reportedly placing Ukrainian forces close to Sosnivka (southeast of Velykomykhailivka), and drone operators of the thirtieth Spetsnaz Firm (reportedly of the thirty sixth CAA) are reportedly placing Ukrainian forces close to Novoselivka (east of Velykomykhailivka).[84]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian goal: Preserve frontline positions, safe rear areas towards Ukrainian strikes, and advance inside tube artillery vary of Zaporizhzhia Metropolis)

Russian forces lately superior within the jap Zaporizhia course.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage printed on August 26 signifies that Russian forces lately superior in southern Temyrivka (northeast of Hulyaipole).[85]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian thirty eighth Motorized Rifle Brigade (thirty fifth Mixed Arms Military [CAA], Jap Army District [EMD]) are reportedly placing Ukrainian positions in Zaporizhia Oblast, together with northeast of Hulyaipole close to Uspenivka, Poltavka, and Olhivske and east of Hulyaipole close to Zelenyi Hai.[86]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on August 27 however didn't advance.

Russian forces attacked southeast of Orikhiv close to Mala Tokmachka, south of Orikhiv close to Novodanylivka, and west of Orikhiv close to Plavni and Stepnohirsk on August 26 and 27.[87]

Order of Battle: Components of the Russian seventh Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly working close to Stepnohirsk and Plavni; drone operators of the forty second Motorized Rifle Division and 4th Army Base (each of the 58th CAA, Southern Army District [SMD]) are reportedly placing Ukrainian positions close to Orikhiv; drone operators of the Smuglyanka Detachment are reportedly placing Ukrainian positions within the Orikhiv course; and drone operators of the Viking Drone Detachment are reportedly placing Ukrainian positions within the Zaporizhia course.[88]

Russian forces continued restricted assaults within the Kherson course on August 26 and 27, however didn't advance. [89]

Geolocated footage printed on August 26 signifies that Russian forces struck civilian infrastructure east of the M-14 Kherson Metropolis-Mykolaiv Metropolis freeway in central Kherson Metropolis.[90] Former Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada Deputy Ihor Lutsenko acknowledged that Ukrainian officers acknowledged the M-14 freeway as impassable due to Russian drone operations and that Russian forces have formally ”semi-encircled“ Kherson Metropolis with drones.[91] Russian milbloggers claimed on August 26 and 27 that any object on the M-14 freeway and all "crucial" infrastructure, together with inside residential buildings, in Kherson Metropolis is a legit goal for Russian forces.[92]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Marketing campaign (Russian Goal: Goal Ukrainian army and civilian infrastructure within the rear and on the frontline)

See topline textual content.

Vital exercise in Belarus (Russian efforts to extend its army presence in Belarus and additional combine Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

The Collective Safety Treaty Group (CSTO) contingent arrived in Belarus to take part in joint army workout routines related to the Belarusian-Russian Zapad-2025 army train. The Belarusian Ministry of Protection (MoD) reported on August 26 and 27 that Tajik, Kyrgyz, and Kazakh forces arrived in Belarus to take part within the Interplay-2025, Search-2025, and Echelon-2025 army workout routines on the Losvido and Lepelskyi coaching grounds in Vitebsk Oblast (in northern Belarus bordering Lithuania, Latvia, and Russia) from August 31 to September 6.[93]

Be aware: ISW doesn't obtain any labeled materials from any supply, makes use of solely publicly out there info, and attracts extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media in addition to commercially out there satellite tv for pc imagery and different geospatial knowledge as the premise for these reviews. References to all sources used are supplied within the endnotes of every replace.

[1] https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/news-zsu-dnipropetrovshchyna-boyi-trehubov/33514442.html; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28294 https://www.bbc.com/information/articles/c17n1p24yv9o

[2] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-20-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-25-2025; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/67015; https://t.me/rybar/73118?single

[3] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-24-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-31-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-25-2025

[4] https://isw.pub/UkrWar112424

[5] https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/news-zsu-dnipropetrovshchyna-boyi-trehubov/33514442.html;

[6] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-18-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-12-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-20-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-7-2025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar072725; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-25-2025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar072225

[7] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-25-2025 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-19-2025

[8] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-25-2025 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-19-2025

[9] https://isw.pub/UkrWar081425

[10] https://t.me/kpszsu/41079

[11] https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/standing/1960629961175294116; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/15808

[12] https://t.me/energyofukraine/4369

[13] https://t.me/vodokanalSMR/2896; https://suspilne dot media/1099996-tramp-pogroziv-rosii-ekonomicnou-vijnou-colovikam-vikom-18-22-rokiv-dozvolili-viizd-za-kordon-1281-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1756269279; https://suspilne dot media/chernihiv/1100064-poskodzeni-elektropidstancia-ta-veza-mobilnogo-zvazku-armia-rf-atakuvala-prikordonna-cernigivsini/; https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/standing/1960629961175294116; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/15808

[14] https://t.me/dtek_ua/2604

[15] https://tass dot ru/politika/24883949

[16] https://www.rbc. dot ru/rbcfreenews/68aefb8f9a79475e72e467bc

[17] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-26-2025; https://www.ft.com/content material/66ec25a0-4af8-467f-9fbe-cf42de890a7e

[18] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-20-2025; https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2025/aug/24/russia-ukraine-vance-trump

[19] https://tass dot ru/politika/24883949

[20] https://meduza dot io/information/2025/08/27/aliev-rasskazal-v-intervyu-o-vtorzhenii-rossiyskoy-armii-i-okkupatsii-azerbaydzhana-v-1920-godu; https://azertag dot az/ru/xeber/prezident_azerbaidzhana_ilham_aliev_dal_intervyu_telekanalu_al_arabiya-3715927

[21] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-26-2024

[22] https://isw.pub/UkrWar122924; https://isw.pub/UkrWar072025

[23] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-30-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-20-2025

[24] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-10-2025

[25] https://suspilne dot media/1100282-u-razanskij-oblasti-rf-vibuhnuv-truboprovid-akij-postacav-naftoprodukti-do-moskvi-dzerelo/

[26] https://t.me/rybar/73116

[27] https://www.fb.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0zP9LK53A5ZktkVNbewXtrQZfFCJ3Cj7opuonmbyzpexa5mZb3axiXz3kns9VN8X7l?__cft__percent5B0percent5D=AZVmdfNS5xZ7OdqzGAjUXhxpcCtD6Gqn8xvCBHLSBZoWg62rkIloTD0O1gtbEqW-eQWNHR8gL4CK4Vsbi0xx_ayMKlnWc5cC0yY1f2eITZURT-8optPwMx1_ZUWY2oVBIHfjfuh_l4p8fHdYv5EB1CTxeZJC31eFZaAICA8baOubwTGQWWKcUvnD0ItjF7kF-PM&__tn__=%2COpercent2CP-R; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28309; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28307 ; https://t.me/rybar/73118; https://t.me/rybar/73116 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/28799; https://t.me/severnnyi/4960

[28] https://t.me/dva_majors/78278; https://t.me/rybar/73116; https://t.me/wargonzo/28799 https://t.me/severnnyi/4956

[29] https://t.me/severnnyi/4956; https://t.me/severnnyi/4960

[30] https://t.me/severnnyi/4960; https://t.me/severnnyi/4884

[31] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/33020

[32] https://t.me/severnnyi/4956

[33] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/33011

[34] https://www.fb.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0zP9LK53A5ZktkVNbewXtrQZfFCJ3Cj7opuonmbyzpexa5mZb3axiXz3kns9VN8X7l; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28309; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28307; https://t.me/severnnyi/4956; https://t.me/dva_majors/78278; https://t.me/wargonzo/28799

[35] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/33011

[36] https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/5945

[37] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/33043

[38] https://www.fb.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0zP9LK53A5ZktkVNbewXtrQZfFCJ3Cj7opuonmbyzpexa5mZb3axiXz3kns9VN8X7l; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28309; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28307; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/33043; https://t.me/wargonzo/28799

[39] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/33043

[40] https://t.me/motopatriot78/41456; https://t.me/motopatriot78/41474; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/33043

[41] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9883; https://t.me/army_corp_10/333

[42] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28309; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28307

[43] https://x.com/ZoamSc2/standing/1960461215869907311; https://t.me/mapukrdailyupdate/2249

[44] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/33034

[45] https://www.fb.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0zP9LK53A5ZktkVNbewXtrQZfFCJ3Cj7opuonmbyzpexa5mZb3axiXz3kns9VN8X7l; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28309; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28307; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/33034; https://t.me/dva_majors/78278

[46] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/33034; https://t.me/dva_majors/78278

[47] https://suspilne dot media/1099996-tramp-pogroziv-rosii-ekonomicnou-vijnou-colovikam-vikom-18-22-rokiv-dozvolili-viizd-za-kordon-1281-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1756305250; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GuRX3eyVWyA; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/27/u-nas-odna-a-z-togo-boku-mozhe-buty-shist-poblyzu-lymanu-vorog-potrohu-modyfikuye-svoyu-taktyku/

[48] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/27/nebo-tut-nikoly-ne-buvaye-chystym-na-lymanskomu-napryamku-zasyllya-vorozhyh-droniv/

[49] https://t.me/voin_dv/16631

[50]https://www.fb.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0zP9LK53A5ZktkVNbewXtrQZfFCJ3Cj7opuonmbyzpexa5mZb3axiXz3kns9VN8X7l?__cft__percent5B0percent5D=AZVmdfNS5xZ7OdqzGAjUXhxpcCtD6Gqn8xvCBHLSBZoWg62rkIloTD0O1gtbEqW-eQWNHR8gL4CK4Vsbi0xx_ayMKlnWc5cC0yY1f2eITZURT-8optPwMx1_ZUWY2oVBIHfjfuh_l4p8fHdYv5EB1CTxeZJC31eFZaAICA8baOubwTGQWWKcUvnD0ItjF7kF-PM&__tn__=%2COpercent2CP-R; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28309 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28307 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/33037

[51] https://t.me/tass_agency/333751

[52] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/33037

[53] https://t.me/motopatriot78/41472

[54] https://t.me/z_arhiv/32266

[55] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28309; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28307; https://t.me/rybar/73123

[56] https://t.me/tass_agency/333796; https://t.me/mod_russia/55954; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/33020

[57] https://x.com/AudaxonX/standing/1960462969747218580; https://x.com/AudaxonX/standing/1960463383767236830; https://t.me/rus_alania/177 https://t.me/osintpen/1684; https://t.me/VESTIDONETSK/15118; https://x.com/AudaxonX/standing/1960461087046074584https://x.com/AudaxonX/standing/1960461087046074584

[58] https://t.me/rybar/73135

[59] https://t.me/Khyzhak_brigade/1547; https://x.com/AudaxonX/standing/1960731841863807210; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9873; https://t.me/opbr_zsu/667

[60] https://www.fb.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0zP9LK53A5ZktkVNbewXtrQZfFCJ3Cj7opuonmbyzpexa5mZb3axiXz3kns9VN8X7l ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28309 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28307; https://t.me/rybar/73123 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/41443 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/78278 ; https://t.me/rybar/73135; https://t.me/motopatriot78/41448

[61] https://t.me/rybar/73135

[62] https://t.me/wargonzo/28799

[63] https://t.me/icpbtrubicon/450; https://x.com/AudaxonX/standing/1960472033071903103

[64] https://t.me/motopatriot78/41448

[65] https://t. me/WarArchive_ua/30504; https://x.com/moklasen/standing/1960405064473841777 ; https://t. me/Borsuky_503/118

[66] https://t.me/mod_russia/55957

[67] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/33028 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/177397

[68] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/33028 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/33005 ; https://t.me/z_arhiv/32272; https://t. me/motopatriot78/41460

[69] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/177397

[70] https://www.fb.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0zP9LK53A5ZktkVNbewXtrQZfFCJ3Cj7opuonmbyzpexa5mZb3axiXz3kns9VN8X7l?__cft__percent5B0percent5D=AZVmdfNS5xZ7OdqzGAjUXhxpcCtD6Gqn8xvCBHLSBZoWg62rkIloTD0O1gtbEqW-eQWNHR8gL4CK4Vsbi0xx_ayMKlnWc5cC0yY1f2eITZURT-8optPwMx1_ZUWY2oVBIHfjfuh_l4p8fHdYv5EB1CTxeZJC31eFZaAICA8baOubwTGQWWKcUvnD0ItjF7kF-PM&__tn__=%2COpercent2CP-R ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28309 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28307 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/28799; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/177397; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/177487; https://t.me/rybar/73123

[71] https://t.me/dva_majors/78278

[72] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/27/ugrupuvannya-hotilo-zajty-shvydko-i-nahabno-pokrovsk-i-myrnograd-pochystyly-vid-vorozhyh-dyversantiv/

[73] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/177487

[74] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/33028 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/177397

[75] https://t.me/icpbtrubicon/450 ; https://x.com/AudaxonX/standing/1960472033071903103; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/177412; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/177497 ; https://t.me/Sib_army/6119

[76] https://t.me/Bratchuk_Sergey/137187 ; https://militarnyi dot com/en/information/arey-battalion-captured-invaders-near-volodymyrivka-including-residents-of-makiivka-and-mariupol/; https://t.me/nm_dnr/14218

[77] https://www.fb.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0zP9LK53A5ZktkVNbewXtrQZfFCJ3Cj7opuonmbyzpexa5mZb3axiXz3kns9VN8X7l?__cft__percent5B0percent5D=AZVmdfNS5xZ7OdqzGAjUXhxpcCtD6Gqn8xvCBHLSBZoWg62rkIloTD0O1gtbEqW-eQWNHR8gL4CK4Vsbi0xx_ayMKlnWc5cC0yY1f2eITZURT-8optPwMx1_ZUWY2oVBIHfjfuh_l4p8fHdYv5EB1CTxeZJC31eFZaAICA8baOubwTGQWWKcUvnD0ItjF7kF-PM&__tn__=%2COpercent2CP-R ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28309 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28307

[78] https://t.me/wargonzo/28799

[79] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/27/ye-czikavi-rozrobky-yaki-nepryyemno-zdyvuyut-na-novopavlivskomu-napryamku-tryvaye-dystanczijna-vijna/

[80] https://www.fb.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0zP9LK53A5ZktkVNbewXtrQZfFCJ3Cj7opuonmbyzpexa5mZb3axiXz3kns9VN8X7l?__cft__percent5B0percent5D=AZVmdfNS5xZ7OdqzGAjUXhxpcCtD6Gqn8xvCBHLSBZoWg62rkIloTD0O1gtbEqW-eQWNHR8gL4CK4Vsbi0xx_ayMKlnWc5cC0yY1f2eITZURT-8optPwMx1_ZUWY2oVBIHfjfuh_l4p8fHdYv5EB1CTxeZJC31eFZaAICA8baOubwTGQWWKcUvnD0ItjF7kF-PM&__tn__=%2COpercent2CP-R ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28309 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28307 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/28799

[81] https://t.me/rybar/73118 ; https://t.me/rybar/73123 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/67015

[82] https://t.me/dva_majors/78287

[83] https://t.me/voin_dv/16633

[84] https://t.me/voin_dv/16636 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/16640

[85] https://x.com/auditor_ya/standing/1960448837195325519; https://t.me/SkifskiGrifony/209; https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/30512

[86] https://t.me/voin_dv/16632

[87] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/33009; https://t.me/dva_majors/78278

[88] https://t.me/mod_russia/55943; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/33020; https://t.me/basurin_e/20692; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/33009; https://t.me/vrogov/21644; https://t.me/dva_majors/78308; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/177432