Russian Offensive Marketing campaign Evaluation, August 31, 2025

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Grace Mappes, Christina Harward, Jennie Olmsted, Jessica Sobieski, and Kateryna Stepanenko

August 31, 2025, 6:30pm ET

Click on here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is up to date each day alongside the static maps current on this report.

Click on here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click on here to see ISW’s 3D management of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a pc (not a cellular system) is strongly advisable for utilizing this data-heavy software.

Click on here to entry ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces each day by displaying a dynamic frontline. ISW will replace this time-lapse map archive month-to-month.

Word: The information cut-off for this product was 12:45 pm ET on August 31. ISW will cowl subsequent reviews within the September 1 Russian Offensive Marketing campaign Evaluation.

The Kremlin is pursuing a multi-pronged informational effort geared toward deterring Western help for Ukraine and undermining European participation within the peace course of. The Kremlin has just lately been intensifying three rhetorical strains geared toward influencing Western decision-making within the Kremlin's favor: accusing European states of prolonging the battle in Ukraine, levying nuclear threats towards Western states, and claiming that Russian victory in Ukraine is inevitable. Kremlin officers, most notably Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov and CEO of the Russian Direct Funding Fund (RDIF) Kirill Dmitriev, implied that European states search to delay the battle in Ukraine in an effort to reinject this long-held Russian narrative again into the Western info area to undermine US belief in European governments.[1] The Kremlin usually leverages Dmitriev to advocate for Russia's pursuits within the West, significantly involving the peace course of in Ukraine and sanctions, on English-language platforms and media shops.[2] Russian Safety Council Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev criticized French President Emmanuel Macron and German Chancellor Friedrich Merz on his English-language X (previously Twitter) account on August 31, relating to France's and Germany's involvement in US efforts to finish the battle in Ukraine.[3] Medvedev claimed that Merz and Macron have "forgotten the teachings" of the Second World Warfare and that "issues may find yourself like they did in 1945 – [Macron and Merz] too might find yourself being recognized by their tooth." Medvedev is evoking the reminiscence of US atomic bombs to threaten France and Germany for supporting Ukraine within the peace course of. Medvedev additionally claimed that Russian advances are "unhealthy information" for Macron and Merz. These numerous rhetorical strains search to bolster the Russian Ministry of Protection (MoD)'s just lately intensified effort to falsely painting Russian victory in Ukraine as inevitable.[4] The MoD tried to make use of giant quantities of qualitative knowledge to make claims about Russian advances – knowledge and claims which ISW assesses are inflated.

Russian milbloggers criticized the Russian Ministry of Protection (MoD) for exaggerating its battlefield successes. Russian milbloggers closely criticized Russian Chief of the Common Workers Military Common Valery Gerasimov's August 30 claims that Russian forces seized 3,500 sq. kilometers of territory and 149 settlements since March 2025 and rejected Gerasimov's declare that Russian forces have seized half of Kupyansk.[5] The milbloggers characterised Gerasimov's figures as a "very huge exaggeration" and requested which components of the Russian navy command construction are feeding false reviews to the Russian excessive command. ISW has noticed proof to evaluate that Russian forces had gained solely roughly 2,346 sq. kilometers of Ukrainian territory and seized 130 settlements between March 1 and August 30.[6]

The Kremlin is intensifying these info efforts as a result of its territorial beneficial properties stay disproportionately restricted and gradual relative to the excessive losses incurred. The Ukrainian Common Workers reported on August 30 that Russian forces incurred 210,000 personnel casualties in Kharkiv, Luhansk, and Donetsk oblasts from January to August 2025, a median of 26,250 casualties per thirty days.[7] The Ukrainian Common Workers reported that Russian forces suffered a complete of 290,000 personnel casualties all through the whole theater from January to August 2025, a median of 36,250 casualties per thirty days. Russian opposition shops Meduza and Mediazona reported on August 29 that knowledge from the Russian Register of Inheritance Instances (RND) means that no less than 93,000 Russian navy personnel died in 2024 — virtually twice as many as in 2023 (about 50,000), and estimated utilizing a predictive mannequin that no less than 56,000 Russian troopers have died for the reason that begin of 2025.[8] Russia's beneficial properties have been largely gradual and creeping for a lot of months, and Russia's price of advance is extremely gradual below the norms of contemporary mechanized warfare.[9] Any evaluation of Russia's battlefield efficiency and energy should look at each the tempo of advance and the ensuing losses to make these beneficial properties.

Key Takeaways:

The Kremlin is pursuing a multi-pronged informational effort geared toward deterring Western help for Ukraine and undermining European participation within the peace course of. Russian milbloggers criticized the Russian Ministry of Protection (MoD) for exaggerating its battlefield successes. The Kremlin is intensifying these info efforts as a result of its territorial beneficial properties stay disproportionately restricted and gradual relative to the excessive losses incurred. Ukrainian forces superior close to Novopavlivka. Russian forces superior close to Toretsk.

We don't report intimately on Russian battle crimes as a result of these actions are well-covered in Western media and don't instantly have an effect on the navy operations we're assessing and forecasting. We'll proceed to guage and report on the consequences of those legal actions on the Ukrainian navy and the Ukrainian inhabitants and particularly on fight in Ukrainian city areas. We totally condemn Russian violations of the legal guidelines of armed battle and the Geneva Conventions and crimes towards humanity despite the fact that we don't describe them in these reviews.

Ukrainian Operations within the Russian Federation Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis Russian Major Effort – Japanese Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate fundamental efforts) Russian Subordinate Major Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces again from the worldwide border with Belgorod Oblast and strategy to inside tube artillery vary of Kharkiv Metropolis Russian Subordinate Major Effort #2 – Seize the rest of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into jap Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast Russian Subordinate Major Effort #3 – Seize the whole lot of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and presumably advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Marketing campaign Important Exercise in Belarus Ukrainian Operations within the Russian Federation

Nothing important to report.

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian goal: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine alongside the worldwide border)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on August 31 however didn't advance.

Russian forces attacked north of Sumy Metropolis close to Kindrativka, northeast of Sumy Metropolis close to Yunakivka and Sadky, and in unspecified areas of Kursk Oblast on August 30 and 31.[10] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked close to north of Sumy Metropolis close to Andriivka and Kindrativka and northeast of Sumy Metropolis close to Yunakivka and Varachnye.[11]

A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed on August 31 that components of the Russian 186th Motorized Rifle Regiment (Japanese Navy District [EMD]) preventing close to Sadky are taking heavy losses and struggling to evacuate wounded personnel.[12] The milblogger claimed that components of the Russian 119th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (106th Airborne Division) will reinforce or exchange Russian forces preventing in Yunakivka. The Russian milblogger claimed that components of Chechen Akhmat forces just lately performed a failed assault close to Varachyne and are getting ready for a brand new assault alongside components of the twenty second Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, forty fourth Military Corps [AC], Leningrad Navy District [LMD]) and with help from the 1443rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (shaped throughout 2022 partial reserve name up).[13] The milblogger indicated that the Chechen forces seemingly hope to consolidate positions that components of the twenty second and 1443rd motorized rifle regiments goal to grab in an effort to keep away from collaborating in any important fight. The milblogger expressed shock that Chechen forces participated in an assault and reiterated longstanding claims that Chechen forces solely movie propaganda movies and don't take part in precise fight.

The Russian milblogger additionally claimed that North Korean sappers will reportedly quickly function within the Sudzha and Guyevo areas in Kursk Oblast.[14] The milblogger claimed that Russian commanders obtained an order to inform their subordinates of the North Korean deployment within the coming days to stop pleasant hearth incidents or different "misunderstandings" which will come up from the language barrier. The milblogger assessed that North Korean forces are unlikely to conduct assaults towards Ukraine and can seemingly conduct duties within the rear, together with cooks and cleaners, to unlock the Russian rear personnel for infantry assaults.

Order of Battle: Components of the 137th VDV Regiment (106th VDV Division) reportedly proceed working within the Sumy route.[15]

Russian Major Effort – Japanese Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Major Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast ( Russian goal: Push Ukrainian forces again from the worldwide border with Belgorod Oblast and strategy to inside tube artillery vary of Kharkiv Metropolis)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on August 31 however didn't make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces superior 100 meters alongside the south (left) financial institution of the Vovcha River inside Vovchansk and 500 to 600 meters within the forests west of Synelnykove (each northeast of Kharkiv Metropolis).[16]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv Metropolis close to Vovchansk and Hlyboke and towards Synelnykove on August 30 and 31.[17]

Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported floor exercise within the Velykyi Burluk route on August 31.

Russian Subordinate Major Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian goal: Seize the rest of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into jap Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Kupyansk route on August 31 however didn't advance.

Russian forces attacked towards Kupyansk itself; northeast of Kupyansk close to Kamyanka, Synkivka, and Kranse Pershe, and towards Novovasylivka; east of Kupyansk close to Petropavlivka; and west of Kupyansk towards Solobika on August 30 and 31.[18]

Order of Battle: Components of the Russian 352nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (eleventh Military Corps [AC], Leningrad Navy District [LMD]) reportedly proceed to function close to Stepova Novoselivka (southeast of Kupyansk).[19]

Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Borova route on August 31 however didn't advance.

Russian forces attacked southeast of Borova close to Druzhelyubivka and Olhivka on August 30 and 31.[20] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked towards Novomykhailivka.[21]

Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Lyman route on August 30 however didn't make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces superior east of Novoselivka (northwest of Lyman).[22]

Russian forces attacked northwest of Lyman towards Shandryholove; north of Lyman close to Novyi Myr and Karpivka; northeast of Lyman close to Kolodyazi; east of Lyman close to Torske, Zarichne, and Dibrova; and southeast of Lyman towards Yampil and within the Serebryanske forest space on August 30 and 31.[23] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked close to Shandryholove and Ridkodub (north of Lyman).[24]

Ukrainian Dnipro Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov reported that Russian forces pushed Ukrainian forces from some positions within the Serebryanske forest space.[25] An officer of a Ukrainian battalion working within the Lyman route reported that Russian forces proceed solely to area bikes and are usually not deploying armored autos.[26] The officer said that just one or two Russian bikes out of 15 bikes collaborating in an assault will break by way of, after which Russian forces will try to accumulate extra forces on the new place.

Russian Subordinate Major Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian goal: Seize the whole lot of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and presumably advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Siversk route on August 31 however didn't advance.

Russian forces attacked northwest of Siversk towards Dronivka, northeast of Siversk close to Hryhorivka and Serebryanka and southeast of Siversk close to Vyimka on August 30 and 31.[27] A Russian supply claimed that Ukrainian forces repeatedly counterattack close to Serebryanka.[28]

Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Chasiv Yar route on August 31 however didn't advance.

Russian forces attacked close to the west of Chasiv Yar towards Podilske and south of Chasiv Yar close to Stupochky on August 30 and 31.[29]

Russian milbloggers claimed that western Predtechyne (south of Chasiv Yar) is a contested "grey zone" and that Ukrainian forces usually counterattack within the settlement.[30]

Order of Battle: Artillery components of the Russian 98th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly working close to Chasiv Yar.[31]

Russian forces just lately superior within the Toretsk route.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage revealed on August 31 signifies that Russian forces just lately seized Rusyn Yar and superior southeast of Sofiivka (each northwest of Toretsk).[32]

Russian forces attacked close to Toretsk itself; northeast of Toretsk close to Oleksandro-Shulytne; north of Toretsk close to Dyliivka; northwest of Toretsk close to Kleban Byk, Poltavka, Rusyn Yar, Katerynivka, Sofiivka, and Pleshchiivka; and west of Toretsk close to Shcherbynivka on August 30 and 31.[33]

A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are conducting glide bomb strikes towards Kostyantynivka and acknowledged that Ukrainian civilians stay within the metropolis.[34]

Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Pokrovsk route on August 31 however didn't make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian supply claimed that Russian sabotage and reconnaissance teams entered Myrnohrad (east of Pokrovsk).[35] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces superior inside southern Pokrovsk and northwest of Lysivka (southeast of Pokrovsk).[36]

Russian forces attacked close to Pokrovsk itself; north of Pokrovsk close to Rodynske; northeast of Pokrovsk close to Vilne, Shakhove, Fedorivka, Mayak, Zapovidne, Nove Shakhove, Novoekonomichne, Sukhetske, Volodymyrivka, Krasnyi Lyman, and Zolotyi Kolodyaz; east of Pokrovsk close to Myrnohrad, Myrolyubivka, and Promin and towards Kozatske; southeast of Pokrovsk close to Sukhyi Yar and Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk close to Dachenske, Chunyshyne, and Novoukrainka; and southwest of Pokrovsk close to Zvirove, Kotlyne, Udachne, and Leontovychi on August 30 and 31.[37]

Ukrainian Dnipro Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov reported that Ukrainian forces are clearing the remaining Russian forces within the Russian penetration close to Dobropillya (northwest of Pokrovsk).[38] Trehubov said that Ukrainian forces have minimize off these Russian forces from the principle power grouping within the space. Trehubov said that small Russian infantry teams try to infiltrate into Pokrovsk from a number of instructions, significantly from the southwest. Trehubov said that Russian forces gathered roughly 110,000 personnel close to Pokrovsk to start with of Summer time 2025 however that this quantity has since decreased barely.[39] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are conducting glide bomb and Shahed (Geran) drone strikes towards Ukrainian ahead positions close to Shakhove and credited Russian glide bomb strikes towards Ukrainian strongholds with contributing to Russian forces' means to penetrate into the Ukrainian close to rear within the Pokrovsk route – seemingly referring to the latest penetration close to Dobropillya.[40] One other Russian milblogger claimed that Novoekonomichne is a contested "grey zone."[41]

Order of Battle: Components of the Russian 506th Motorized Rifle Regiment (twenty seventh Motorized Rifle Division, 2nd Mixed Arms Military [CAA], Central Navy District [CMD]) are reportedly working within the Pokrovsk route.[42] Drone operators of the thirty third Motorized Rifle Regiment (twentieth Motorized Rifle Division, eighth CAA, Southern Navy District [SMD]) are reportedly hanging Ukrainian forces close to Volodymyrivka and Shakhove.[43]

Ukrainian and Russian forces just lately superior within the Novopavlivka route.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage from the Ukrainian Common Workers revealed on August 31 signifies that Ukrainian forces just lately liberated Dachne (southwest of Novopavlivka).[44]

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage revealed on August 31 signifies that Russian forces just lately superior southwest of Kotlyarivka (northeast of Novopavlivka).[45]

Russian forces attacked east of Novopavlivka close to Horikhove; southeast of Novopavlivka close to Dachne; south of Novopavlivka close to Filya and Yalta; and southwest of Novopavlivka close to Tovste on August 30 and 31.[46]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian Common Workers's Major Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly hanging Ukrainian forces close to Ivanivka (southwest of Novopavlivka).[47]

Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Velykomykhailivka route on August 31 however didn't make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces superior north of Komyshuvkha (southeast of Velykomykhailivka).[48]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Velykomykhailivka close to Oleksandrohrad; east of Velykomykhailivka close to Voskresenka and Novoselivka; and southeast of Velykomykhailivka close to Vorone, Maliivka, Komyshuvkha, and Shevchenko on August 30 and 31.[49]

A Russian milblogger claimed that preventing continues for Komyshuvakha, regardless of the Russian Ministry of Protection's (MoD) declare on August 30 that Russian forces seized the settlement.[50]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 114th Motorized Rifle Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division, fifth CAA, Japanese Navy District [EMD]) are reportedly hanging Ukrainian forces close to Komyshuvakha.[51] Drone operators of the fifth Tank Brigade (thirty sixth CAA, EMD) are reportedly hanging Ukrainian forces close to Novoselivka.[52]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian goal: Keep frontline positions, safe rear areas towards Ukrainian strikes, and advance inside tube artillery vary of Zaporizhzhia Metropolis.

Russian forces attacked in jap Zaporizhia Oblast northeast of Hulyaipole close to Zelene Pole on August 30 and 31 however didn't advance. [53]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on August 31 however didn't make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces superior close to Mala Tokmachka (southeast of Orikhiv).[54]

Russian forces attacked south of Orikhiv close to Novodanylivka and southwest of Orikhiv close to Kamyanske on August 30 and 31.[55] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked close to Stepove, Mali Shcherbaky, and Shcherbaky (all southwest to west of Orikhiv).[56]

A Russian milblogger claimed that the world north of Robotyne (south of Orikhiv) is a contested "grey zone."[57] One other milblogger claimed that Russian forces within the Orikhiv route are struggling to advance within the open terrain between windbreaks.[58]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 291st Motorized Rifle Regiment (forty second Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Mixed Arms Military [CAA], Southern Navy District [SMD]) and drone and artillery components of the 4th Navy Base (58th CAA) are reportedly working within the Zaporizhia route.[59]

Russian forces continued restricted assaults within the Kherson route on August 31 however didn't advance.

Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces performed air, drone, and artillery strikes towards a railway station in Kherson Metropolis.[60] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces performed an airstrike towards Karantynnyy Island (southwest of Kherson Metropolis).[61]

Order of Battle: Components of the Russian 61st Naval Infantry Brigade (Northern Fleet) are reportedly working within the Kherson route.[62]

Ukrainian forces just lately performed drone and missile strikes towards Russian navy property in occupied Crimea. Russian opposition outlet Astra reported on August 31 that sources in occupied Crimea said that Ukrainian forces performed a drone strike towards Simferopol Worldwide Airport in occupied Aeroflotskyi, Crimea, on August 30 and that no less than two drones struck the airport.[63] Ukrainian forces reportedly destroyed a Mi-8 helicopter. Satellite tv for pc imagery collected on August 30 exhibits a fireplace within the space the place Mi-8 and Mi-24 helicopters had been positioned.[64] Geolocated footage revealed on August 30 exhibits smoke close to the Simferopol Worldwide Airport.[65]

Astra reported that Ukrainian forces additionally performed a Neptune missile strike towards a Russian border put up close to occupied Voloshyne, Crimea, on August 30.[66] Ukrainian forces reportedly struck navy barracks, broken six hovercraft, and killed a Russian servicemember. Satellite tv for pc imagery collected on August 31 exhibits injury to a constructing on the border put up and particles within the water close by.[67]

Ukraine's Major Navy Intelligence Directorate (GUR) posted footage and reported on August 31 that GUR components destroyed a Utes-T radar, a RT-70 radio telescope, a GLONASS satellite tv for pc navigation system, MP-10M1E and "Mys-M1E" coastal radar stations, and a 96L6-AP radar station from an S-400 air protection system in unspecified areas of occupied Crimea at an unspecified time.[68] Geolocations of GUR's footage point out that the GUR performed drone strikes northwest and west of occupied Yevpatoriya.[69]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Marketing campaign (Russian Goal: Goal Ukrainian navy and civilian infrastructure within the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces launched a collection of drone strikes towards Ukraine on the night time of August 30 to 31. The Ukrainian Air Drive reported that Russian forces launched 142 Shahed-type and decoy drones from the instructions of Kursk Metropolis; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea.[70] The Ukrainian Air Drive reported that Ukrainian forces downed or suppressed 126 drones over northern, southern, and jap Ukraine; that 16 drones hit 10 areas; and that particles fell on six areas. Chernihiv Oblast Navy Administration Head Vyacheslav Chaus reported that Russian strikes broken a civilian essential infrastructure facility in Nizhyn, Chernihiv Oblast and left over 30,000 households with out electrical energy.[71] Odesa Oblast Navy Administration Head Oleh Kiper reported that Russian strikes focused 4 vitality infrastructure amenities in Chornomorsk, Odesa Oblast and left over 29,000 vitality clients with out electrical energy.[72]

Important exercise in Belarus (Russian efforts to extend its navy presence in Belarus and additional combine Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

The Russian-led Collective Safety Treaty Group (CSTO) started its annual navy workout routines in Belarus on August 31. The Belarusian Ministry of Protection (MoD) introduced the beginning of the "Interplay-2025," "Search-2025," and "Echelon-2025" workout routines on the Lepelsky coaching floor in Vitebsk, Belarus.[73] Forces from Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Belarus are collaborating within the workout routines.[74] The workout routines will proceed till September 6 and reportedly embody greater than 2,000 navy personnel; 450 items of weapons and gear, together with 9 plane and helicopters; and over 70 drones.[75] Belarusian Chief of the Common Workers Main Common Pavel Muraveiko said on August 31 that the continued CSTO multilateral workout routines and the upcoming Zapad-2025 bilateral Russian-Belarusian navy workout routines will plan and apply the usage of nuclear weapons, together with tactical nuclear weapons.[76]

Word: ISW doesn't obtain any labeled materials from any supply, makes use of solely publicly obtainable info, and attracts extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media in addition to commercially obtainable satellite tv for pc imagery and different geospatial knowledge as the idea for these reviews. References to all sources used are offered within the endnotes of every replace.

[1] https://t.me/tass_agency/334489; https://t.me/kadmitriev/249; https://t.me/kadmitriev/250; https://t.me/tass_agency/334581; https://t.me/tass_agency/334582 ; https://t.me/zarubinreporter/4269; https://x.com/kadmitriev/standing/1961876053548224667

[2] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/primer-russian-cognitive-warfare

[3] https://x.com/MedvedevRussiaE/standing/1962146935562756338

[4] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-30-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-29-2025

[5] https://newsland dot com/put up/7899748-na-stol-verhovnomu-legla-sensaciya-podolyaka-ulichil-gerasimova-v-bolshom-preuvelichenii-fantazii-rozhdalis-i-podavalis-naverh; https://t.me/dva_majors/78527

[6] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-30-2025

[7] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28465 ; https://suspilne dot media/1103376-sprobi-vidati-bazane-za-dijsne-u-genstabi-zsu-prokomentuvali-pidsumki-rosijskoi-vesnano-litnoi-kampanii-v-ukraini/

[8] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-30-2025; https://meduza dot io/characteristic/2025/08/29/2000-chelovek-v-nedelyu-stolko-teryala-rossiya-na-pike-svoego-nastupleniya-v-donbasse

[9] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-30-2025

[10] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28478; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28451; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28449; https://t.me/wargonzo/28901; https://t.me/rusich_army/25476; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/33203

[11] https://t.me/wargonzo/28901; https://t.me/rusich_army/25476

[12] https://t.me/severnnyi/4981

[13] https://t.me/severnnyi/4982

[14] https://t.me/severnnyi/4983

[15] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/98794; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/33203

[16] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/33199; https://t.me/wargonzo/28901

[17] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28478; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28451; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28449; https://t.me/SJTF_Dnipro/16779; https://t.me/wargonzo/28901; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/33199

[18] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28478 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28451 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28449 ; https://t.me/SJTF_Dnipro/16779 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/28901

[19] https://t.me/motopatriot78/41642

[20] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28478 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28451 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28449 ; https://t.me/SJTF_Dnipro/16779

[21] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/33199

[22] https://t.me/motopatriot78/41625 ; https://t.me/z_arhiv/32307 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/28901

[23] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28478 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28451 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28449 ; https://t.me/SJTF_Dnipro/16779 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/28901 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/98790 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/28901

[24] https://t.me/wargonzo/28901

[25] https://youtu.be/WY8sDvZdWEA ; https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1103066-tam-castkovo-rosiani-potisnili-castkovo-nasi-vidijsli-osuv-dnipro-pro-situaciu-u-serebranskomu-lisnictvi/

[26] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/30/zatyshshya-na-lymanskomu-napryamku-okrim-motoczykliv-okupanty-atakuyut-dezinformacziyeyu/

[27] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28478; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28451 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28449; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/33199; https://t.me/SJTF_Dnipro/16779

[28] https://t.me/tass_agency/334501

[29] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28451 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28449

[30] https://t.me/motopatriot78/41627; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/33206

[31] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/33203

[32] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9906; https://t.me/nichnavarta/95

[33] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28478; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28451; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28449; https://t.me/SJTF_Dnipro/16779; https://t.me/wargonzo/28901; https://t.me/motopatriot78/41629; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/33206

[34] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/33206

[35] https://t.me/tass_agency/334575

[36] https://t.me/motopatriot78/41641; https://t.me/motopatriot78/41651

[37] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28478; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28478 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28449; https://t.me/SJTF_Dnipro/16779; https://t.me/wargonzo/28901; https://t.me/motopatriot78/41648; https://t.me/wargonzo/28901

[38] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vnsq2tu2Oo0 ; https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1103368-roboti-tam-se-e-ci-vdalos-silam-oboroni-povnistu-zacistiti-vistup-pid-dobropillam-poasnenna-vid-osuv-dnipro/

[39] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/30/okupanty-ne-mayut-suttyevyh-uspihiv-poblyzu-pokrovska-popry-110-tysyachne-ugrupovannya/

[40] https://t.me/yurasumy/24504

[41] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/33237

[42] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/98792; https://t.me/motopatriot78/41633

[43] https://t.me/nm_dnr/14238

[44] https://x.com/richardzai38580/standing/1962184396854657258; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28479

[45] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9903; https://t.me/ua_42nd_ombr/967

[46] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28478; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28451 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28449; https://t.me/SJTF_Dnipro/16779

[47] https://t.me/voin_dv/16689

[48] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/98825

[49] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28478; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28451 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28449; https://t.me/SJTF_Dnipro/16779; https://t.me/wargonzo/28901

[50] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-30-2025; https://t.me/motopatriot78/41629

[51] https://t.me/voin_dv/16686

[52] https://t.me/voin_dv/16690

[53] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28451; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28449

[54] https://t.me/wargonzo/28901

[55] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28451; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28449; https://t.me/motopatriot78/41655

[56] https://t.me/wargonzo/28901

[57] https://t.me/motopatriot78/41655

[58] https://t.me/dva_majors/78542

[59] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/98807; https://t.me/dva_majors/78542

[60] https://t.me/osvedomitell_alex/28693 ; https://t.me/bpla_roy/287 ; https://t.me/osvedomitell_alex/28689

[61] https://t.me/osvedomitell_alex/28702; https://t.me/osvedomitell_alex/28698

[62] https://t.me/dva_majors/78523

[63] https://t.me/astrapress/91099

[64] https://x.com/avivector/standing/1961921723046977605?s=46&t=V5G3pSNwULQR20yvLLN2lA

[65] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-30-2025

[66] https://t.me/astrapress/91099

[67] https://x.com/zarGEOINT/standing/1962130347098857927

[68] https://t.me/DIUkraine/6774

[69] https://x.com/Dmojavensis/standing/1962158563658531327

[70] https://t.me/kpszsu/41401

[71] https://www.fb.com/Chaus.Viacheslav/posts/pfbid0PKytNwhKynbrqo9ZDAUygmeEfA7Pr4VUDcr8vFwJPX7B2XCiSRcNLtQuBxkwgvDXl

[72] https://t.me/odeskaODA/11104 ; https://suspilne dot media/odesa/1103304-rf-atakuvala-dronami-cornomorsk-postrazdala-odna-ludina-2/ ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/31/odeskyj-rajon-zaznav-masovanoyi-ataky-udarnymy-bpla/ ;

[73] https://t.me/modmilby/49922; https://meduza dot io/information/2025/08/31/v-belarusi-startovali-ucheniya-odkb-na-nih-otrabotayut-planirovanie-primeneniya-yadernogo-oruzhiya; https://ria dot ru/20250831/ucheniya-2038639496.html

[74] https://t.me/modmilby/49932; https://meduza dot io/information/2025/08/31/v-belarusi-startovali-ucheniya-odkb-na-nih-otrabotayut-planirovanie-primeneniya-yadernogo-oruzhiya; https://ria dot ru/20250831/ucheniya-2038639496.html

[75] https://ria dot ru/20250831/ucheniya-2038639496.html

[76] https://t.me/modmilby/49935; https://meduza dot io/information/2025/08/31/v-belarusi-startovali-ucheniya-odkb-na-nih-otrabotayut-planirovanie-primeneniya-yadernogo-oruzhiya