Russian Offensive Marketing campaign Evaluation, Could 15, 2025

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Christina Harward, Nicole Wolkov, Daria Novikov, Olivia Gibson, Anna Harvey, and George Barros with Nate Trotter and William Runkel

Could 15, 2025, 6:15pm ET

Click on here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is up to date each day alongside the static maps current on this report.

Click on here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click on here to see ISW’s 3D management of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a pc (not a cell machine) is strongly advisable for utilizing this data-heavy device.

Click on here to entry ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces each day by displaying a dynamic frontline. ISW will replace this time-lapse map archive month-to-month.

Be aware: The information cut-off for this product was 12 pm ET on Could 15. ISW will cowl subsequent reviews within the Could 16 Russian Offensive Marketing campaign Evaluation.

Russian President Vladimir Putin rejected Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky's invitation to interact in bilateral negotiations in Istanbul and continues refusing to supply concessions to finish the warfare in Ukraine. Putin spoke to media organizations on the night time of Could 10 to 11, following the Could 10 joint US-Ukrainian-European proposal for a common ceasefire for a minimum of 30 days starting on Could 12.[1] Putin didn't conform to the joint US-Ukrainian-European proposal and as an alternative proposed that Russia and Ukraine "resume" on Could 15 the direct negotiations that he claimed Ukraine "interrupted" in 2022 in Istanbul. Zelensky and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan accepted Putin's proposal to carry bilateral negotiations in Turkey on Could 15.[2] Zelensky said that he would personally await Putin in Turkey and arrived in Turkey on Could 15.[3] Putin assigned a number of Russian officers, who're notably not in Putin's innermost circle, to attend the talks in Istanbul, and Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov confirmed on Could 15 that Putin is not going to journey to Istanbul.[4] Putin's rejection of Zelensky's invitation demonstrates Putin's continued resistance to creating any concessions and fascinating in professional, good-faith negotiations on the highest stage.

The Russian delegation in Istanbul doesn't embody officers in Putin's innermost circle and is basically the identical delegation that Russia despatched to the Russian-Ukrainian negotiations in 2022 in Istanbul. Putin introduced on the night time of Could 14 that Presidential Aide Vladimir Medinsky is main the Russian delegation in Istanbul.[5] The delegation additionally contains Deputy Overseas Minister Mikhail Galuzin, Chief of the Russian Normal Workers's Important Directorate (GRU) Igor Kostykov, and Deputy Protection Minister Alexander Fomin. Medinsky equally headed the delegation in 2022, and Fomin and Galuzin's predecessor participated within the 2022 talks.[6] Kostyukov is the one 2025 participant who didn't attend the 2022 talks.

The 2025 Russian delegation additionally contains 4 consultants from the Presidential Administration, GRU, Russian Ministry of Overseas Affairs (MFA), and Russian Ministry of Protection (MoD) that correspond with the 4 main delegation members: Deputy Head of the Presidential Administration for State Coverage within the Humanitarian Sphere Elena Podobreevskaya, Director of the Second Division of the Commonwealth of Impartial States (CIS) of the Russian Ministry of Overseas Affairs Alexei Polishchuk, First Deputy Chief of Info of the GRU Alexander Zorin, and the Deputy Head of the Important Directorate of Worldwide Navy Cooperation within the Russian MoD Viktor Shevtsov.[7]

Medinsky explicitly described the Could 2025 Russian-Ukrainian negotiations in Istanbul as a continuation of the early 2022 Istanbul negotiations throughout which Russia issued calls for that had been tantamount to Ukraine's full capitulation. Medinsky advised journalists on Could 15 in Istanbul that Russia considers the Could 2025 negotiations a "continuation" of earlier negotiations in Istanbul in April 2022, which he claimed Ukraine interrupted.[8] Medinsky is reiterating Putin's Could 11 framing that the brand new bilateral negotiations in Istanbul could be based mostly on the April 2022 Istanbul protocols draft settlement, which included phrases that may have amounted to Ukraine's give up and left Ukraine helpless to defend towards potential future Russian aggression.[9] The Wall Avenue Journal (WSJ) and the New York Occasions (NYT) reported in March and June 2024 that they each obtained a number of variations of the Istanbul protocols draft settlement.[10] The draft protocols demanded that Ukraine forego its NATO membership aspirations and amend its structure so as to add a neutrality provision that may ban Ukraine from becoming a member of any navy alliances. The draft protocols additionally would have banned Ukraine from internet hosting international navy personnel, trainers, or weapon techniques in Ukraine. Russia demanded that it, the USA, the UK (UK), the Individuals's Republic of China (PRC), France, and Belarus function safety guarantors of the settlement. Russia demanded that the guarantor states “terminate worldwide treaties and agreements incompatible with the everlasting neutrality [of Ukraine]," together with navy support agreements. Russia demanded that Ukraine restrict its navy to 85,000 troopers, 342 tanks, and 519 artillery techniques as a part of the Istanbul protocols. Russia moreover demanded that Ukrainian missiles be restricted to a spread of 40 kilometers (25 miles), a spread that may enable Russian forces to deploy important techniques and materiel near Ukraine with out worry of strikes.

Russia demanded these phrases within the first and second months of its full-scale invasion when Russian troops had been advancing on Kyiv Metropolis and making vital positive aspects all through northeastern, jap, and southern Ukraine. Russia is now trying to reiterate these identical calls for after three years of warfare, although Ukrainian forces have since efficiently compelled Russia to withdraw from northern Ukraine, liberated vital swaths of territory in Kharkiv and Kherson oblasts, and blunted the Russian fee of advance throughout the theater. Medinsky is purposefully trying to border the Could 2025 talks as a continuation of the April 2022 Istanbul negotiations to painting Russia's calls for for Ukraine's give up as professional, although Ukraine is now in a a lot stronger battlefield place on the battlefield than in April 2022 and the Russian navy is way weaker than within the early months of the full-scale invasion.

Medinsky additionally reiterated Putin's longstanding calls for that any decision to the warfare should end in regime change in Ukraine and restrictions on NATO. Medinsky claimed that Russia's aim for the Could 2025 Istanbul negotiations is to "set up long-term peace by eliminating the foundation causes" of the warfare.[11] Russian officers routinely demand that any peace settlement handle the warfare's "root causes," which Russian officers outline as NATO's alleged violation of commitments to not broaden into jap Europe and alongside Russia's borders within the Nineties, 2000s, and 2010s, and the Ukrainian authorities's alleged discrimination towards Russians and Russian language, media, and tradition in Ukraine.[12] Russian officers have leveraged claims that Ukraine has mistreated Russian audio system in Ukraine to justify the Kremlin's calls for for regime change in Ukraine, the institution of a pro-Russian proxy authorities in Kyiv, and Russia's occupation and unlawful annexation of Ukrainian territory. Medinsky's try to border Could 2025 Istanbul negotiations as peace talks contradicts said Ukrainian, US, and European efforts to first set up a longer-term ceasefire in Ukraine that may precede peace negotiations.[13] Medinsky's framing echoes constant Russian rejections of this sequence of occasions, which Ukraine and the USA have constantly supported.[14]

Reported Kremlin directions to Russian media explaining methods to cowl the Istanbul negotiations point out that the Kremlin is making ready the Russian inhabitants for an extended warfare in Ukraine and isn't eager about partaking in good-faith negotiations that require compromises from either side. Russian opposition outlet Meduza reported on Could 15 that it acquired a guide that Russian media acquired from the Presidential Administration's political bloc with directions about methods to cowl the negotiations in Istanbul.[15] The guide reportedly instructed Russian media to elucidate Medinsky's participation within the Russian delegation as "logical" since he led the Russian delegation in Istanbul in 2022 and is constant this work. A political strategist who works with the Kremlin advised Meduza that Russian officers overseeing home coverage assess that the Istanbul talks will finish in "impasse" and that the Kremlin assesses that the West will probably impose new sanctions in response to such "impasse." The guide reportedly advises Russian media to preemptively speak about a "new bundle of sanctions" whereas claiming that new sanctions is not going to hurt Russia's improvement as Russia "efficiently copes with the challenges of any sanctions." Russian media ought to reportedly vaguely say that "negotiations are happening on worse phrases for Ukraine" than three years in the past, however the guide doesn't clarify how present battlefield realities the place Russia controls a lot much less of Ukraine are "worse phrases." The Presidential Administration's declare that the Could 2025 negotiations are happening on "worse phrases" for Ukraine in comparison with 2022 is an try to posture Russian navy power and battlefield successes whereas ignoring Ukraine's vital battlefield successes and talent to sluggish Russian advances within the final three years of the warfare. This declare additionally ignores vital Russian losses amongst elite forces and growing reliance on poorly skilled recruits. The Presidential Administration's reported framing of the negotiations demonstrates that Russia expects Ukraine to refuse the phrases the Russian delegation will current in Istanbul as Ukraine wouldn't settle for phrases tantamount to its give up. Russia equally issued ultimatums to Ukraine, the West, and NATO in 2021 earlier than it launched its full-scale invasion in 2022 definitely understanding that NATO and Ukraine wouldn't bear the transformations to their core charters, constitutions, and ideas required to satisfy the Russian calls for.[16] The West rejected Russia's pre-war ultimatums, permitting Russia to ascertain superficial justifications for its subsequent full-scale invasion. Russia's continued insistence on its 2022 Istanbul calls for in Could 2025 demonstrates that Russia continues to solely be eager about a full Ukrainian give up, is unwilling to supply compromises in any good-faith negotiations, and is ready to proceed the warfare to attain its aim of Ukrainian give up.

Key Takeaways:

Russian President Vladimir Putin rejected Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky's invitation to interact in bilateral negotiations in Istanbul and continues refusing to supply concessions to finish the warfare in Ukraine. The Russian delegation in Istanbul doesn't embody officers in Putin's innermost circle and is basically the identical delegation that Russia despatched to the Russian-Ukrainian negotiations in 2022 in Istanbul. Medinsky explicitly described the Could 2025 Russian-Ukrainian negotiations in Istanbul as a continuation of the early 2022 Istanbul negotiations throughout which Russia issued calls for that had been tantamount to Ukraine's full capitulation. Medinsky additionally reiterated Putin's longstanding calls for that any decision to the warfare should end in regime change in Ukraine and restrictions on NATO. Reported Kremlin directions to Russian media explaining methods to cowl the Istanbul negotiations point out that the Kremlin is making ready the Russian inhabitants for an extended warfare in Ukraine and isn't eager about partaking in good-faith negotiations that require compromises from either side. Ukrainian forces not too long ago superior close to Toretsk, and Russian forces not too long ago superior close to Lyman, Novopavlivka, and Velyka Novosilka.

We don't report intimately on Russian warfare crimes as a result of these actions are well-covered in Western media and don't immediately have an effect on the navy operations we're assessing and forecasting. We'll proceed to judge and report on the consequences of those felony actions on the Ukrainian navy and the Ukrainian inhabitants and particularly on fight in Ukrainian city areas. We completely condemn Russian violations of the legal guidelines of armed battle and the Geneva Conventions and crimes towards humanity though we don't describe them in these reviews.

Alleged Ceasefire Violation Ukrainian Operations within the Russian Federation Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis Russian Important Effort – Japanese Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate important efforts) Russian Subordinate Important Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces again from the worldwide border with Belgorod Oblast and method to inside tube artillery vary of Kharkiv Metropolis Russian Subordinate Important Effort #2 – Seize the rest of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into jap Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast Russian Subordinate Important Effort #3 – Seize the whole lot of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and probably advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Marketing campaign Important Exercise in Belarus Alleged Ceasefire Violations

There aren't any lively ceasefires in Ukraine.

Ukrainian Operations within the Russian Federation

Preventing continued in Kursk Oblast on Could 14 and 15.[17]

Russian milbloggers claimed that combating continues in Tetkino and close to Novyi Put (each southwest of Glushkovo).[18]

Order of Battle: Parts of the Chechen 204th “Akhmat” Spetsnaz Regiment’s “Aida” Group reportedly proceed working close to Tetkino.[19]

Russian forces continued restricted assaults in northwestern Belgorod Oblast however didn't make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed on Could 14 and 15 that Russian forces superior close to Popovka and Grafovka (each northwest of Belgorod Metropolis).[20]

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian goal: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine alongside the worldwide border and method to inside tube artillery vary of Sumy Metropolis)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on Could 15 however didn't make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces superior close to Veselivka (north of Sumy Metropolis).[21]

A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces proceed to assault close to Bilovody and Vodolahy (each northeast of Sumy Metropolis).[22] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked close to Bilovody.[23]

Order of Battle: Parts of the Russian 1427th Motorized Rifle Regiment (fashioned throughout 2022 partial reserve name up) are reportedly working close to Veselivka, and parts of the Russian 83rd Airborne (VDV) Brigade are reportedly working close to Bilovody.[24]

Russian Important Effort – Japanese Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Important Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast ( Russian goal: Push Ukrainian forces again from the worldwide border with Belgorod Oblast and method to inside tube artillery vary of Kharkiv Metropolis)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on Could 15 however didn't advance.

Russian forces attacked north of Kharkiv Metropolis close to Kudiivka, Hlyboke, and in direction of Vysoka Yaruha and northeast of Kharkiv Metropolis close to Vovchansk, Tykhe, and Vovchanski Khutory on Could 14 and 15.[25]

Ukrainian Kharkiv Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Pavlo Shamshyn reported on Could 15 that Russian forces are accumulating forces within the Kharkiv path and already began summer time offensive operations within the space.[26] The spokesperson for a Ukrainian unit working within the Kharkiv path reported on Could 15 that the Russian forces are conducting assaults close to Vovchanski Khutory and Tykhe (each northeast of Kharkiv Metropolis) daily however not too long ago ceased makes an attempt to cross the Vovcha River.[27]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Chechen 204th “Akhmat” Spetsnaz Regiment’s “Bati” Detachment are reportedly putting Ukrainian positions within the Kharkiv path.[28]

Russian Subordinate Important Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian goal: Seize the rest of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into jap Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Kupyansk path on Could 15 however didn't advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kupyansk close to Kamyanka and southeast of Kupyansk close to Hlushkivka and towards Pishchane on Could 14 and 15.[29]

Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Borova path on Could 15 however didn't advance.

Russian forces attacked north of Borova close to Bohuslavka and Zahryzove and towards Novoplatonivka; northeast of Borova close to Kruhlyakivka and Nova Kruhlyakivka; and southeast of Borova close to Novoyehorivka, Hrekivka, Olhivka, and Novyi Myr on Could 14 and 15.[30]

Russian forces not too long ago superior within the Lyman path.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage revealed on Could 15 signifies that Russian forces not too long ago superior in central Torske (east of Lyman).[31]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian Ministry of Protection (MoD) and different Russian sources claimed on Could 15 that parts of the Russian nineteenth Tank Regiment and thirty first, thirty sixth, and thirty seventh motorized rifle regiments (the entire 67th Motorized Rifle Division, twenty fifth Mixed Arms Military [CAA], Central Navy District [CMD]) seized Torske and are conducting clearing operations within the settlement.[32]

Russian forces attacked north of Lyman close to Ridkodub, Lypove, and Zelena Dolyna; northeast of Lyman close to Kolodyazi, Lozova, and Yampolivka; and southeast of Lyman within the Serebryanske forest space on Could 14 and 15.[33]

Russian Subordinate Important Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian goal: Seize the whole lot of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and probably advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Siversk path on Could 15 however didn't advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Siversk close to Bilohorivka and Hyrhorivka and east of Siversk close to Verkhnokamyanske on Could 14 and 15.[34]

Order of Battle: Parts of the Russian seventh Motorized Rifle Brigade (third Mixed Arms Military [CAA], previously 2nd Luhansk Individuals's Republic Military Corps [LNR AC], Southern Navy District [SMD]) are reportedly working close to Bilohorivka.[35]

Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Chasiv Yar path on Could 15 however didn't make any confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces superior in Chasiv Yar.[36] One other Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces superior southwest of Hryhorivka (north of Chasiv Yar).[37]

Russian forces attacked close to Chasiv Yar itself; north of Chasiv Yar close to Hryhorivka and towards Markove; south of Chasiv Yar close to Stupochky; and southeast of Chasiv Yar close to Bila Hora and Kurdyumivka on Could 14 and 15.[38] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked in Chasiv Yar.[39]

Ukrainian forces not too long ago superior close to Toretsk.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage revealed on Could 15 signifies that Ukrainian forces not too long ago superior north of Toretsk.[40]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian sources claimed that Russian forces not too long ago superior north and northwest of Druzhba (east of Toretsk), southwest of Zorya, east of Oleksandropil, inside southern Nova Poltavka, to the western outskirts of Yablunivka, north and northwest of Novoolenivka alongside the T-05-04 Pokrovsk-Kostyantynivka freeway (all southwest of Toretsk), and towards Rusyn Yar (northwest of Toretsk).[41] Russian milbloggers claimed that parts of the Russian twentieth Motorized Rifle Division (eighth CAA, SMD), not too long ago superior towards Rusyn Yar, to the southern outskirts of Yablunivka, and to Zorya and Hnativka (southwest of Toretsk).[42]

Russian forces attacked close to Toretsk itself; north of Toretsk close to Krymske and Dyliivka; east of Toretsk close to Druzhba; southwest of Toretsk close to Stara Mykolaivka, Nova Poltavka, Novoolenivka, Romanivka, Yelyzavetivka, Kalynove, Yablunivka, Hnativka, and Zorya; and west of Toretsk close to Shcherbynivka and Petrivka and towards Popiv Yar on Could 14 and 15.[43] Official Ukrainian sources reported on Could 14 and 15 that Ukrainian forces working in Toretsk repelled a number of Russian motorized assaults utilizing an unspecified variety of bikes close to Zorya and Dyliivka and in Toretsk itself.[44] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked in Toretsk.[45]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade working within the Toretsk path said on Could 15 that Russian forces have suffered 70,000 casualties since July 2024 within the Toretsk path.[46]

Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Pokrovsk path on Could 15 however didn't make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed on Could 14 that Russian forces superior northeast of Myrne; northeast, northwest, and southwest of Malynivka (each east of Pokrovsk); and north of Hrodivka (southeast of Pokrovsk).[47]

Russian forces attacked east of Pokrovsk close to Malynivka, Myrolyubivka, Myrne, and Promin and towards Mykolaivka and Novoekonomichne; southwest of Pokrovsk close to Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk close to Shevchenko; and southwest of Pokrovsk close to Zvirove, Kotlyne, and Udachne on Could 14 and 15.[48]

The commander of a Ukrainian artillery reconnaissance battalion working within the Pokrovsk path reported on Could 15 that Russian forces are utilizing massive numbers of first-person view (FPV) drones with fiber-optic cables within the space with the intention to interdict Ukrainian floor traces of communication (GLOCs) to Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad.[49] The commander said that Russian forces are utilizing not too long ago recruited and poorly-trained personnel in assaults.

Order of Battle: Parts of the Russian 74th Motorized Rifle Brigade (forty first CAA, Central Navy District [CMD]) are reportedly working within the Pokrovsk path.[50] Parts of the thirty ninth Motorized Rifle Brigade (68th AC, Japanese Navy District [EMD]) and artillery parts of the a hundred and tenth Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, previously the first Donetsk Individuals’s Republic Military Corps [DNR], SMD) are reportedly working in Malynivka.[51] Parts of the fifth Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA) are reportedly working in Myrolyubivka.[52]

Russian forces not too long ago superior within the Novopavlivka path.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage revealed on Could 15 exhibits that Russian forces carried out a roughly platoon-sized mechanized assault, indicating that Russian forces not too long ago superior south of Novoserhiivka (northeast of Novopavlivka).[53]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian sources claimed on Could 15 that Russian forces seized Novooleksandrivka (northeast of Novopavlivka).[54] A Russian milblogger claimed on Could 14 that Russian forces superior northeast of Novoserhiivka (northeast of Novopavlivka) and in Troitske and Horikove (each east of Novopavlivka).[55]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Novopavlivka close to Novomykolaivka, Novoserhiivka, Novooleksandrivka, and Muravka; east of Novopavlivka close to Kotlyarivka; southeast of Novopavlivka close to Troitske; and west of Novopavlivka close to Novoolenivka on Could 14 and 15.[56] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked close to Troitske and Horikhove.[57]

Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Kurakhove path on Could 15 however didn't make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed on Could 14 that Russian forces superior in central Bahatyr (west of Kurakhove) and south of Odradne (southwest of Kurakhove).[58]

Russian forces attacked west of Kurakhove close to Kostyantynopil, Andriivka, Oleksiivka, and Bahatyr on Could 14 and 15.[59] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked close to Bahatyr.[60]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian Normal Workers's Important Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly putting Ukrainian positions close to Odradne.[61]

Russian forces not too long ago superior within the Velyka Novosilka path.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage revealed on Could 15 signifies that Russian forces not too long ago seized Vilne Pole (west of Velyka Novosilka).[62]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces superior northeast of Shevchenko (west of Velyka Novosilka).[63] One other Russian milblogger claimed on Could 14 that Russian forces superior in an space as much as three kilometers broad and one kilometer deep from Zelene Pole to Novopil (west to southwest of Velyka Novosilka).[64]

Russian forces attacked northwest of Velyka Novosilka close to Komar, Vesele, and Burlatske; west of Velyka Novosilka close to Vilne Pole; and southwest of Velyka Novosilka close to Novopil on Could 14 and 15.[65] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked close to Vesele and Vilne Pole.[66]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian goal: Keep frontline positions, safe rear areas towards Ukrainian strikes, and advance inside tube artillery vary of Zaporizhzhia Metropolis)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on Could 15 however didn't advance. Russian forces attacked southwest of Orikhiv close to Stepove and Mali Shcherbaky on Could 14 and 15.[67]

Order of Battle: Parts of the Russian 291st Motorized Rifle Regiment (forty second Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Mixed Arms Military [CAA], Southern Navy District [SMD]) and artillery parts of the seventh Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly working within the Zaporizhia path.[68]

Russian forces continued assaults within the Kherson path on Could 15 however didn't make confirmed advances. Unconfirmed claims: Kherson Oblast occupation head Vladimir Saldo claimed on Could 15 that Russian forces not too long ago seized islands within the Dnipro River Delta northeast of Kherson Metropolis close to Nova Kakhovka, Dnipryany, and Korsunka.[69]

Russian forces attacked in unspecified areas within the Kherson path on Could 14 and 15.[70] Saldo claimed that Russian forces carried out raids on the west (proper) financial institution of the Dnipro River close to Burhunka, Mykolaivka (each northeast of Kherson Metropolis), and Kizomys (southwest of Kherson Metropolis) at an unspecified time.[71]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Marketing campaign (Russian Goal: Goal Ukrainian navy and civilian infrastructure within the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces carried out a sequence of drone strikes towards Ukraine on the night time of Could 14 to fifteen. The Ukrainian Air Drive reported that Russian forces launched 110 Shahed and decoy drones from the instructions of Bryansk, Kursk, and Oryol cities; and Millerovo, Rostov Oblast.[72] The Ukrainian Air Drive reported that Ukrainian forces downed 62 drones over northern, jap, western, and central Ukraine and that Ukrainian forces overpassed 29 decoy drones. Official Ukrainian sources reported that Russian drones struck Sumy, Dnipropetrovsk, Poltava, Kyiv, and Ivano-Frankivsk oblasts.[73]

Important exercise in Belarus (Russian efforts to extend its navy presence in Belarus and additional combine Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

The Belarusian Ministry of Protection (MoD) reported on Could 14 that Belarusian instructors-in-training from unspecified Belarusian models participated in fireplace, tactical, medical, and different coaching on the Russian 333rd Fight Coaching Middle in Mulino, Nizhny Novgorod Oblast.[74] The Belarusian MoD readout specifies that the coaching program takes under consideration ”expertise of contemporary armed conflicts” - probably referring to Russian fight operations in Ukraine.

Be aware: ISW doesn't obtain any labeled materials from any supply, makes use of solely publicly out there data, and attracts extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media in addition to commercially out there satellite tv for pc imagery and different geospatial information as the idea for these reviews. References to all sources used are offered within the endnotes of every replace.

[1] http://kremlin dot ru/occasions/president/information/76899 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar051125 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar051025

[2] https://isw.pub/UkrWar051125

[3] https://isw.pub/UkrWar051125 ; https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/standing/1923036639846101117

[4] https://tass dot ru/politika/23944355 ; http://kremlin dot ru/occasions/president/information/76923 ; https://www.cnn.com/world/live-news/ukraine-russia-talks-istanbul-turkey-intl#cmap5pxmy001q3b6m3zyl9s83 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/315148

[5] http://kremlin dot ru/occasions/president/information/76923

[6] https://meduza dot io/characteristic/2025/05/15/putin-otpravil-v-stambul-delegatsiyu-vo-glave-s-medinskim-i-s-uchastiem-nachalnika-gru

[7] http://kremlin dot ru/occasions/president/information/76923

[8] https://www.rbc dot ru/politics/15/05/2025/682606949a7947eff70c5af6

[9] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-11-2025

[10] https://www.wsj.com/world/russia-ukraine-peace-deal-2022-document-6e12e093 ; https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2024/06/15/world/europe/ukraine-russia-ceasefire-deal.html ; https://static01.nyt.com/newsgraphics/documenttools/a456d6dd8e27e830/e279a252-full.pdf

[11] https://www.rbc dot ru/politics/15/05/2025/682606949a7947eff70c5af6

[12] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-15-2025 ; https://mid dot ru/ru/foreign_policy/information/1989213/

[13] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-8-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-9-2025

[14] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-9-2025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar050825 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar043025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar031325

[15] https://meduza dot io/characteristic/2025/05/15/traditsionnyy-zhanr-metodichka-kremlya-na-etot-raz-o-tom-kak-pravilno- pisat-o-peregovorah-v-stambule

[16] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/weakness-lethal-why-putin-invaded-ukraine-and-how-war-must-end

[17] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24252; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24255; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24283; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/14211

[18] https://t.me/wargonzo/26542; https://t.me/dva_majors/71208; https://t.me/rusich_army/23472

[19] https://t.me/dva_majors/71208; https://t.me/dva_majors/71239

[20] https://t.me/z_arhiv/31554 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/164809

[21] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/164782

[22] https://t.me/dva_majors/71208

[23] https://t.me/rusich_army/23472

[24] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/164782

[25] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24283; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24255; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24252; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/10028 ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/05/15/misto-prypynylo-svoye-isnuvannya-v-rajoni-vovchanska-tryvayut-shhodenni-shturmovi-diyi/

[26] https://www.rbc dot ua/rus/information/rosiya-vzhe-pochala-litniy-nastup-otu-harkiv-1747299469.html

[27] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=F5gz4PNADr0; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/05/15/misto-prypynylo-svoye-isnuvannya-v-rajoni-vovchanska-tryvayut-shhodenni-shturmovi-diyi/

[28] https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/5729

[29] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24283; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24255; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24252

[30] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24283; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24255; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24252; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/10028

[31] https://x.com/UAControlMap/standing/1922964021264654692; https://t.me/The_Wrong_Side/23660; https://x.com/Map_Hargoo/standing/1922959923660423369; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9149; https://t.me/rian_ru/294037

[32] https://t.me/mod_russia/52686; https://t.me/mod_russia/52690; https://t.me/mod_russia/52693; https://t.me/vrogov/20315; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/91726; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/91722; https://t.me/z_arhiv/31566 ; https://t.me/notes_veterans/23375 ; https://t.me/epoddubny/23426 ; https://t.me/vysokygovorit/19665; https://t.me/sashakots/53685

[33] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24283; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24255; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24255; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/10028; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/28646

[34] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24283 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24255 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24252 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/10028

[35] https://t.me/motopatriot78/35822

[36] https://t.me/wargonzo/26542

[37] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/28658

[38] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/28658 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/164738 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24283 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24255 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24252 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/10028

[39] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/164738

[40] https://x.com/AudaxonX/standing/1922981347720642965; https://t.me/ZParaBellumMD/18908

[41] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/28608; https://t.me/z_arhiv/31557; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64262; https://t.me/motopatriot78/35809; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64272; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64258; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64261; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/164809; https://t.me/yurasumy/22967

[42] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64258; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64272

[43] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24283; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24255; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24252; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/10028; https://t.me/motopatriot78/35809; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64262; https://t.me/yurasumy/22967

[44] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/10028; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o4XONrDJWsc; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/05/14/minus-160-rosiyan-v-den-45-vidsotkiv-vid-cziyeyi-kilkosti-vtrachayut-na-toreczkomu-napryamku/

[45] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64261

[46] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/05/15/katastrofa-z-poglyadu-voyennogo-mystecztva-cze-pro-vtraty-rf-pid-toreczkom-70-000-za-10-misyacziv/; https://hromadske dot radio/information/2025/05/15/vtraty-rosiian-u-toretsku-za-ostanni-10-misiatsiv-20-tysiach-zahyblymy-50-tysiach-poranenymy-presofitser-100-ombr

[47] https://t.me/motopatriot78/35809 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/28604

[48] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24283 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24255 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24252 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/10028 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/71208

[49] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o4XONrDJWsc; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/05/15/propaganda-praczyuye-poky-ne-prybuvayut-na-front-na-pokrovskomu-napryamku-shhodnya-znyshhuyut-300-400-okupantiv/

[50] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/164718

[51] https://t.me/nm_dnr/13815; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/28604

[52] https://t.me/sashakots/53678

[53] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9153; https://t.me/blak93/8406

[54] https://t.me/mod_russia/52687 ; https://t.me/sashakots/53685

[55] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/28604

[56] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24283; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24255; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24252; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/10028; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/28604; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64266

[57] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64266

[58] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/28616 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64269

[59] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24283 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24255 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24252 ; https://www.fb.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid02Zmdnw9zZMAAMU7MMqV3J5cFf2CzkVWuFT9ZPRZg9b95MkiZBRi2ZrsVEuyYhwJfl ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/10028 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/71208 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/26542 ; https://t.me/notes_veterans/23375 ; https://t.me/epoddubny/23425 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/28616

[60] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64269 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/14954

[61] https://t.me/voin_dv/14940

[62] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9154 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/14955

[63] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/91742 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64269 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/28616

[64] https://t.me/voin_dv/14930 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/14954

[65] https://t.me/voin_dv/14954 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64269 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/14930

[66] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64269 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/14954

[67]https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24283 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24255 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24252 ; https://www.fb.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid02Zmdnw9zZMAAMU7MMqV3J5cFf2CzkVWuFT9ZPRZg9b95MkiZBRi2ZrsVEuyYhwJfl

[68] https://t.me/wargonzo/26537 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/28625

[69] https://t.me/SALDO_VGA/7375

[70] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24255 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24252

[71] https://t.me/SALDO_VGA/7375

[72] https://t.me/kpszsu/34378

[73] https://t.me/kpszsu/34378; https://t.me/onyshchuksvitlana/21924; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/05/15/vijska-rf-obstrilyaly-ivano-frankivsku-oblast-vynykla-pozhezha/; https://t.me/poltavskaOVA/23037; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/05/15/vorog-vdaryv-po-zhytlovomu-budynku-na-poltavshhyni/