Russian Offensive Marketing campaign Evaluation, February 5, 2026

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US, Ukrainian, and Russian delegations continued trilateral talks in Abu Dhabi on February 5. Ukrainian Protection Council Secretary Rustem Umerov famous that US, Ukrainian, and Russian delegations met in trilateral consultations and dealing teams — the identical format because the February 4 talks.[1] Ukrainian Presidential Workplace Head Kyrylo Budanov acknowledged that the talks have been “constructive.”[2] ISW will proceed to watch reviews of the outcomes of the February 4-5 negotiations in Abu Dhabi.

The Kremlin is searching for new narratives to attempt to persuade the US and Europe to not conform to safety ensures for Ukraine. Russian Overseas Minister Sergei Lavrov used a February 4 interview with Russian state media outlet Russia Right this moment (RT) to as soon as once more reject Western safety ensures for Ukraine.[3] Lavrov referenced a latest report from the Monetary Occasions (FT) outlining the reported multi-layered safety ensures settlement that the US, Europe, and Ukraine have been discussing to reply to a doable Russian invasion of post-war Ukraine.[4] Lavrov claimed that the reported safety ensures doc is “virtually an ultimatum” to Russia and that Ukraine would stage a false flag assault and blame Russia as a way to obtain a “carte blanche” from the West to resume preventing. Lavrov rejected a ceasefire that precedes a last peace decision, claiming that the West will use such a ceasefire to provide Ukraine with weapons. Kremlin officers have repeated the identical rhetoric about Western safety ensures in latest months, constantly calling such ensures “unacceptable” for Russia and labelling international troop deployments to Ukraine as “professional” Russian targets.[5] The Kremlin, nevertheless, seems to now be looking for new narratives to reject Western safety ensures and to persuade the US and Europe to not conform to them, possible as the US, Ukraine, and Europe transfer nearer to finalizing the settlement. Kremlin officers began to make use of new narratives on February 2 and three, claiming that the presence of international troops in Ukraine might result in a 3rd world battle and direct army battle between nuclear powers.[6] Lavrov’s February 4 declare about an alleged Ukrainian false flag assault is probably going one more try to seek out new methods to persuade the US and Europe to not present safety ensures to Ukraine. RT is a Russian state media outlet with an in depth world attain in varied languages, and the Kremlin is probably going utilizing Lavrov’s interview to disseminate these narratives to worldwide audiences, together with these in the US.

Lavrov implied that Russia’s demand for Ukrainian “neutrality” goals to show Ukraine right into a pro-Russian proxy state. Lavrov claimed to RT that the one type of Ukraine that Russia is “ready to see as a long-term, everlasting neighbor” is a “pleasant” Ukraine that's “not essentially an ally” however is “impartial” and “benevolent.”[7] Lavrov’s assertion gives perception into the extra calls for embedded in Russia’s unique battle demand for Ukrainian “neutrality” and signifies that Russia seeks to show Ukraine right into a proxy state even when Russia doesn't bodily management all of Ukraine’s territory. Lavrov’s insistence that post-war Ukraine be “pleasant” and “benevolent” implies that Russia will solely be happy with a Ukraine led by a pro-Russian authorities that makes pro-Russian insurance policies. Russia possible goals to show Ukraine into one other Belarus, which ISW assesses Russia has de facto annexed, at the same time as Belarus maintains its borders and authorities.[8]

The Kremlin continues to reject the elements of the preliminary US-proposed 28-point peace plan in addition to the newest US-Ukrainian-European 20-point peace plan as inadequate to handle Russia’s calls for about minority rights in Ukraine. Lavrov claimed that Russia obtained a peace plan proposal from the US earlier than the August 2025 US-Russian Alaska Summit that allegedly included provisions about rights for nationwide minorities and non secular freedoms in post-war Ukraine that addressed Russia’s issues.[9] Lavrov claimed, nevertheless, that the “newest model” of the 20-point peace plan seems to not embrace this provision. The draft of the 20-point plan that Ukraine launched in December 2025 known as for Ukraine to abide by EU rules on non secular and linguistic minorities, nevertheless.[10] Lavrov beforehand successfully rejected the November 2025 28-point peace plan that known as for Ukraine to just accept EU rules defending non secular and linguistic minorities, claiming that the provisions have been inadequate for Russia.[11] The Kremlin has been exploiting the shortage of publicly out there paperwork from the Alaska Summit to say that Russia and the US got here to an understanding to finish the battle in the course of the assembly.[12] Kremlin claims that the Alaska Summit supplied the one passable decision to the minorities situation possible purpose to create justifications for Russia to reject the newest 20-point peace plan, in addition to any subsequent peace plans that don't fulfill Russia’s calls for. ISW continues to evaluate that longstanding Russian claims that the Ukrainian authorities is discriminating towards ethnic Russians, Russian-speakers, and Russian Orthodoxy purpose to justify the Kremlin’s unique battle demand for the elimination of the present authorities for a pro-Russian puppet authorities and destruction of Ukraine’s sovereignty.[13] Lavrov’s feedback to RT about Ukrainian neutrality and minority rights additional spotlight how Russia is unwilling to compromise and is demanding that any future peace settlement give in to Russia’s unique battle calls for from 2022.

Lavrov tried to painting Russia’s adherence to the short-term vitality strike ceasefire as an indicator of Russia’s curiosity in good-faith negotiations, even because the Kremlin has routinely used such ceasefires to stockpile weapons for subsequent large-scale strikes. Lavrov responded within the RT interview to a query about harm to Ukraine’s vitality grid, claiming that “everybody forgets” earlier examples of Russia’s alleged “goodwill.”[14] Lavrov claimed that one instance of this goodwill was Russian President Vladimir Putin’s assist for and Russia’s claimed subsequent adherence to the US- and Ukrainian-proposed longer-term vitality strikes ceasefire in March and April 2025. Ukraine and the US proposed the moratorium in late March 2025, however the precise parameters of the ceasefire, together with agreements on the record of objects coated or the varieties of strikes prohibited, have been by no means publicly clear or finalized.[15] Russian forces exploited the shortage of readability to proceed to strike Ukrainian vitality infrastructure in the course of the ceasefire.[16]

The Kremlin has used its assist for short-term ceasefires to attempt to painting Russia as performing in good religion whereas constantly rejecting US and Ukrainian requires an extended or everlasting moratorium on long-range strikes towards civilian infrastructure.[17] ISW continues to evaluate that these shorter-term ceasefires, such because the latest vitality strikes ceasefire in late January and early February, don't symbolize a big Kremlin concession, as Russian forces have usually used these ceasefires to stockpile missiles to maximise harm in subsequent strike packages shortly after the ceasefire’s expiration.[18] The March-April 2025 momentary ceasefire ended on April 18, 2025, and Russian forces launched a strike bundle containing 70 missiles on the evening of April 23 to 24, 2025 — the best variety of missiles in a single strike bundle in all of 2025.[19] Russian forces equally carried out a strike with 71 missiles on the evening of February 2-3 after the newest momentary ceasefire ended.[20] ISW continues to evaluate that the Kremlin is attempting to painting its adherence to the latest short-term vitality strikes moratorium as a big concession to achieve leverage within the peace talks in Abu Dhabi.[21]

US and Russian officers on the sidelines of the Abu Dhabi peace talks have reportedly mentioned bilateral army relations, together with measures to informally prolong the New Strategic Arms Discount Treaty (New START) that expired on February 5. US European Command (EUCOM) reported that the US and Russia agreed on February 5 to reestablish high-level military-to-military dialogue following conferences in Abu Dhabi between EUCOM Commander Common Alexus Grynkewich and senior Russian and Ukrainian army officers.[22] Russia has notably used backchannels prior to now to unfold its info operations and affect Western leaders.[23] Three sources instructed Axios on February 5 that the American and Russian delegations in Abu Dhabi have been discussing a deal to proceed New START after its expiration however that the deal nonetheless wants presidential approval on each side.[24] A US official reported that the US and Russia can not legally formalize an extension to the treaty however that each events would proceed to function ”in good religion.“ A supply reported that the US and Russia are discussing plans to look at the phrases of the treaty for an additional six months, throughout which Russia and the US would negotiate a brand new deal. A White Home official instructed Bloomberg that US President Donald Trump will resolve the US path ahead and can announce this path on his personal timeline.[25]

The Russian Ministry of Overseas Affairs (MFA) and Russian officers are utilizing threats of escalation prone to push the US to resume New START on phrases that profit not solely Russia but in addition the Folks’s Republic of China (PRC). The Russian MFA claimed on February 4 that the US “intentionally ignored” Russia’s earlier proposal to increase New START for one yr upon its expiration and that the US strategy is “misguided and regrettable.”[26] The Russian MFA claimed that Russia assumes that the events are not sure by any obligations or declarations inside the context of the treaty and are “free to decide on their subsequent steps.” The Russian MFA claimed that Russia intends to behave responsibly however stays ready to take “decisive” countermeasures towards further threats to Russia’s nationwide safety. Russian Safety Council Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev responded to the treaty’s expiration, stating that “winter is coming” — issuing an implicit menace in reference to a “nuclear winter” after large-scale nuclear battle.[27] Russian State Duma Protection Committee Member Andrei Kolesnik additionally issued threats, claiming that Russia has all of the retaliatory weapons it wants and that the state of affairs will escalate the longer the US and Russia don't signal a brand new treaty.[28] Russian State Duma Worldwide Affairs Committee Chairperson Leonid Slutsky urged the US to increase the treaty, claiming that “the ball is within the [United States’] court docket.”[29]

Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov acknowledged on February 5 that Russian President Vladimir Putin and PRC President Xi Jinping mentioned the “detrimental penalties” of the top of New START throughout their February 4 video name.[30] Peskov acknowledged that Russia ”respects” the PRC’s place that Chinese language nuclear potential is incomparable to that of the US and Russia such that the PRC doesn't wish to take part in strategic arms management talks.[31] The Kremlin is backing the PRC’s rejection to enter strategic arms talks with the US, probably in trade for the PRC’s ongoing assist for Russia’s battle effort in Ukraine.[32] Russia is probably going making an attempt to make use of New START’s February 5 expiration to divert US consideration away from ongoing negotiations about Ukraine. The Kremlin has additionally been utilizing New START’s expiration to push the US to offer in to Russia’s calls for on Ukraine in trade for renewed strategic arms talks.[33]

Ukrainian forces lately carried out FP-5 Flamingo cruise missile strikes towards the Kapustin Yar launch web site in Astrakhan Oblast. The Ukrainian Common Employees reported on February 5 that Ukrainian forces carried out a collection of strikes towards the Kapustin Yar web site (roughly 430 kilometers from the Ukrainian-Russian worldwide border) with Ukrainian-produced long-range weapons, together with Flamingo missiles, in January 2026.[34] The Ukrainian Common Employees reported that Ukrainian forces struck hangar-type buildings, the place Russian forces put together intercontinental and medium-range ballistic missile launches. The Ukrainian Common Employees reported that the strike induced varied levels of injury to some buildings on the web site however considerably broken one hangar. Denys Shtilierman, the co-owner and chief designer of Ukraine’s Hearth Level protection industrial firm that produces the Flamingo missiles, posted footage on February 5 reportedly exhibiting latest Flamingo missile launches, together with towards Kapustin Yar.[35] Russian forces launched their November 2024 and January 2026 Oreshnik intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) strikes towards Ukraine from Kapustin Yar.[36]

Ukraine’s efforts to register Starlink terminals will possible influence Russian battlefield air interdiction (BAI) efforts. Ukrainian Protection Minister Mykhailo Fedorov reported on February 5 that the primary group of formally licensed Starlink terminals are operational inside the Ukrainian army and that Russian Starlinks can not function inside Ukraine.[37] Fedorov famous the method to confirm Ukrainian Starlinks is ongoing. A number of Russian milbloggers complained that Russian forces not might use terminals and voiced issues concerning the results that the lack of Starlink capabilities might have on the battlefield.[38] The commander of a Ukrainian unmanned techniques brigade reported on February 5 that Russian forces had accrued a big variety of Starlinks lately and that the terminals supplied Russian forces with steady interunit communications.[39] The commander acknowledged that Russian forces started integrating Starlinks to manage drones however that efforts to dam Russian Starlinks will deny Russian forces the flexibility to conduct reconnaissance and strike missions and communication between teams and complicate Russian offensive operations. The commander famous that the latest blocks on Russian terminals haven't “introduced down” Russian forces however have induced Russian forces important losses.

Russian forces could not be capable of conduct their BAI marketing campaign on the identical tempo and depth as in latest weeks with out Starlink terminals. Russian forces have lately used Starlink-enabled drones to conduct actual time concentrating on and prolong the ranges on drones for strikes towards transferring targets like trains and towards Ukrainian automobiles alongside the E-50 Pokrovsk-Pavlohrad freeway in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.[40] Russian forces will possible battle to take care of this BAI marketing campaign on the identical depth ranges within the near-term except Russian forces are capable of finding workarounds to the blocks or adapt new technological options to exchange Starlink.

Russia and Ukraine carried out a civilian prisoner and prisoner of battle (POW) trade on February 5 following trilateral US-Ukrainian-Russian negotiations in Abu Dhabi. US Particular Envoy to the Center East Steve Witkoff introduced on February 5 that the Russian and Ukrainian delegations in Abu Dhabi agreed to trade a complete of 314 personnel.[41] The Russian Ministry of Protection (MoD) acknowledged that Ukraine returned 157 Russian POWs and three civilians from Kursk Oblast, and Ukrainian officers reported that Russia returned 157 Ukrainian POWs and civilians.[42] America and United Arab Emirates (UAE) mediated the trade.

Russian President Vladimir Putin is utilizing the 2026 12 months of the Unity of the Peoples of Russia to border Russia as a multiethnic and multireligious state united across the ongoing battle effort. Putin attended a ceremony on February 5 formally opening 2026 because the 12 months of the Unity of the Peoples of Russia and acknowledged that you will need to keep in mind how Russian ethnic teams emerged.[43] Putin particularly highlighted the emergence of ethnic Russians as a “nation” and a “folks” and the historic unification of “varied Slavic teams.” Putin famous, nevertheless, {that a} multinational Russia steadily took form with totally different cultures however united by “widespread values.” Putin claimed that Russians are united of their dedication to preserving their land, households, tradition, and traditions and claimed that Russian forces preventing in Ukraine are additionally united regardless of their variations. Putin’s particular emphasis on the centrality of ethnic Russians in Russia’s historical past however overarching message about Russia’s acceptance of different teams demonstrates how Putin has to steadiness the multiethnic and multireligious nature of the Russian Federation whereas placating the pro-war ultranationalist and xenophobic group.[44] ISW continues to evaluate that Putin is leaning into an idea of civic nationalism extra per the Soviet ultimate than the Christian nationalism of Russian ultranationalists.[45]

Ukrainian Protection Minister Mykhailo Fedorov appointed Taras Chmut to symbolize the Ukrainian Ministry of Protection (MoD) on the supervisory board of the Ukrainian Protection Procurement Company (DPA). [46] Fedorov reported on February 5 that he met with Chmut, who heads the Come Again Alive basis that gives assist to Ukrainian servicemembers, to debate the MoD’s plans to assist the DPA, determine the wants of the frontline, and guarantee most transparency. Fedorov highlighted the necessity to guarantee high quality management and well timed deliveries of provides, to create a procurement system that may shortly reply to modifications within the innovation cycle and cut back corruption.

Key Takeaways

US, Ukrainian, and Russian delegations continued trilateral talks in Abu Dhabi on February 5.

The Kremlin is searching for new narratives to attempt to persuade the US and Europe to not conform to safety ensures for Ukraine.

Lavrov implied that Russia’s demand for Ukrainian “neutrality” goals to show Ukraine right into a pro-Russian proxy state.

The Kremlin continues to reject the elements of the preliminary US-proposed 28-point peace plan in addition to the newest US-Ukrainian-European 20-point peace plan as inadequate to handle Russia’s calls for about minority rights in Ukraine.

Lavrov tried to painting Russia’s adherence to the short-term vitality strike ceasefire as an indicator of Russia’s curiosity in good-faith negotiations, even because the Kremlin has routinely used such ceasefires to stockpile weapons for subsequent large-scale strikes.

US and Russian officers on the sidelines of the Abu Dhabi peace talks have reportedly mentioned bilateral army relations, together with measures to informally prolong the New Strategic Arms Discount Treaty (New START) that expired on February 5.

The Russian Ministry of Overseas Affairs (MFA) and Russian officers are utilizing threats of escalation prone to push the US to resume New START on phrases that profit not solely Russia but in addition the Folks’s Republic of China (PRC).

Ukrainian forces lately carried out FP-5 Flamingo cruise missile strikes towards the Kapustin Yar launch web site in Astrakhan Oblast.

Ukraine’s efforts to register Starlink terminals will possible influence Russian battlefield air interdiction (BAI) efforts.

Russia and Ukraine carried out a civilian prisoner and prisoner of battle (POW) trade on February 5 following trilateral US-Ukrainian-Russian negotiations in Abu Dhabi.

Russian President Vladimir Putin is utilizing the 2026 12 months of the Unity of the Peoples of Russia to border Russia as a multiethnic and multireligious state united across the ongoing battle effort.

Ukrainian Protection Minister Mykhailo Fedorov appointed Taras Chmut to symbolize the Ukrainian Ministry of Protection (MoD) on the supervisory board of the Ukrainian Protection Procurement Company (DPA).

Ukrainian forces lately superior within the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical space. Russian forces lately superior within the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical space.

We don't report intimately on Russian battle crimes as a result of these actions are well-covered in Western media and don't immediately have an effect on the army operations we're assessing and forecasting. We are going to proceed to guage and report on the consequences of those legal actions on the Ukrainian army and the Ukrainian inhabitants and particularly on fight in Ukrainian city areas. We completely condemn Russian violations of the legal guidelines of armed battle and the Geneva Conventions and crimes towards humanity although we don't describe them in these reviews.

Ukrainian Operations within the Russian Federation

Ukrainian forces continued their frontline strike marketing campaign towards army property in Russia on February 4. The Ukrainian Common Employees reported on February 5 that Ukrainian forces struck a drone management level of an unspecified Russian Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz Regiment (possible the 204th Akhmat Spetsnaz Regiment) close to Kucherov, Kursk Oblast (simply throughout the worldwide border northeast of Sumy Metropolis), an digital warfare (EW) station close to Kistyor, Bryansk Oblast (roughly three kilometers from the worldwide border northwest of Sumy Metropolis), and an S-400 anti-aircraft missile system radar station close to Krasnoye, Belgorod Oblast (roughly 25 kilometers from the worldwide border close to Belgorod Metropolis).[47]

Russian Supporting Effort: Northern Axis

Russian goal: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast alongside the worldwide border

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on February 5 however didn't advance.

Russian forces attacked in Kursk and Sumy oblasts, together with north of Sumy Metropolis close to Kostyantynivka and Kindrativka and northeast of Sumy Metropolis close to Yunakivka, on February 5.[48]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade working in northern Sumy Oblast reported on February 5 that Russian servicemembers proceed to make use of anti-thermal imaging and camouflage cloaks whereas making an attempt to advance.[49]

A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces reported on February 5 that Russian army police components are conducting raids close to Tetkino (southwest of Glushkovo, Kursk Oblast) to seek for deserters from the Russian twenty second Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, forty fourth Military Corps [AC], Leningrad Navy District [LMD]), the 1427th Motorized Rifle Regiment (eleventh AC, LMD), and an unspecified Spetsnaz (Russian Common Employees’s Essential Directorate [GRU]) unit.[50] The milblogger claimed that the servicemembers in query refused to take part in assaults towards Ryzhivka (simply south of Tetkino on the worldwide border and northwest of Sumy Metropolis).

Order of Battle: Artillery components of the Russian 106th Airborne (VDV) Division reportedly proceed to function in Sumy Oblast.[51]

Russian Essential Effort: Jap Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Essential Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast

Russian goal: Push Ukrainian forces again from the worldwide border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and strategy to inside tube artillery vary of Kharkiv Metropolis

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on February 5 however didn't advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv Metropolis close to Hrafske, Prylipka, Vovchansk, Starytsya, and Vovchanski Khutory and towards Symynivka on February 4 and 5.[52]

Ukrainian Joint Forces Process Drive Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov reported on February 5 that ice has enabled Russian forces to extra simply cross water obstacles in Kharkiv Oblast however freezing temperatures make it troublesome for Russian forces to advance multiple or two kilometers. [53] Trehubov famous that subzero temperatures impede drone operations by inflicting drone blades and fiber-optic cables to freeze.

The Ukrainian Common Employees reported on February 5 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian Twister-S A number of Launch Rocket System (MLRS) in an unspecified location within the Kharkiv course on February 4.[54]

Order of Battle: Artillery components of the Russian 288th Artillery Brigade (1st Guards Tank Military [GTA], Moscow Navy District [MMD]) and first-person view (FPV) drone operators of the forty first Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, forty fourth Military Corps [AC], Leningrad Navy District [LMD]) are reportedly working within the Kharkiv course.[55]

A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Velykyi Burluk close to Khatnie on February 4, however ISW doesn't assess that Russian forces made any advances. [56]

Russian Subordinate Essential Effort #2 – Oskil River

Russian goal: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into jap Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast

Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Kupyansk course on February 4 and 5 however didn't make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces superior into jap Kurylivka, northwest of Pishchane, and east of Novoosynove (all southeast of Kupyansk).[57]

Russian forces attacked close to Kupyansk itself; north of Kupyansk towards Kindrashivka; east of Kupyansk towards Petropavlivka and Podoly; and southeast of Kupyansk close to Pishchane and towards Novoosynove on February 4 and 5.[58]

Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Borova course on February 5 however didn't advance.

Russian forces attacked south of Borova close to Oleksandrivka on February 5.[59]

A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed on February 4 that Russian forces think about the Borova course a secondary precedence in comparison with the neighboring Lyman and Kupyansk instructions.[60] The milblogger claimed that Russian media protection of the Borova course stays restricted and elevated solely after the fallout from false reporting about developments within the Kupyansk course. The milblogger criticized the Russian army command for publishing deceptive footage to say the seizure of Novoplatonivka (north of Borova) and prioritizing producing informational results as a substitute of specializing in correcting tactical errors that exaggerated reviews trigger.

Order of Battle: Parts of the Russian 1st Guards Tank Military (GTA, Moscow Navy District [MMD]) are shelling Ukrainian positions in Zahryzove (northeast of Borova).[61]

Russian Subordinate Essential Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast

Russian goal: Seize the whole lot of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast

Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Slovyansk course on February 5 however didn't make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces superior south of Zakitne (northeast of Lyman).[62]

Russian forces attacked close to Lyman itself; northwest of Lyman close to Novoselivka; north of Lyman close to Stavky and Drobysheve; east of Lyman close to Zarichne, Zakitne, and Dronivka; northeast of Slovyansk close to Zakitne, Dronivka, and Platonivka; and east of Slovyansktoward Riznykivka, Kryva Luka, and Mykolaivka; and southeast of Slovyansk close to Nykyforivka and Fedorivka Druha and towards Dibrova, Vasyukivka, and Rai-Oleksandrivka on February 4 and 5.[63] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking close to Riznykivka.[64]

The Ukrainian Unmanned Methods Forces (USF) reported that Russian forces are struggling heavy losses whereas making an attempt to infiltrate in small teams within the Lyman course.[65] A Ukrainian brigade working within the Slovyansk course reported on February 5 that Russian forces are working at evening and profiting from chilly climate to advance throughout the frozen Siverskyi Donets river.[66]

Order of Battle: Parts of the Russian seventh Motorized Rifle Brigade (third Mixed Arms Military [CAA], previously 2nd Luhansk Folks’s Republic Military Corps [LNR AC], Southern Navy District [SMD]) reportedly proceed to function close to Siversk (east of Slovyansk) and Zakitne.[67] Drone operators of the Sever-V Brigade (Russian Volunteer Corps) are reportedly working within the Slovyansk-Kramatorsk course.[68]

Each Ukrainian and Russian forces lately superior within the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical space.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage printed on February 3 signifies that Ukrainian forces lately superior in central Ivanopillya (southeast of Kostyantynivka).[69]

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage printed on February 5 signifies that Russian forces lately superior in jap Ivanopillya.[70]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces superior west of Illinivka (southwest of Kostyantynivka).[71]

Russian forces attacked close to and inside Kostyantynivka itself; northeast of Kostyantynivka close to Pryvillya and Minkivka; southeast of Kostyantynivka close to Pleshchiivka and Ivanopillya; south of Kostyantynivka close to Kleban-Byk; southwest of Kostyantynivka close to Illinivka and Yablunivka and towards Stepanivka; south of Druzhkivka close to Rusyn Yar; and southwest of Druzhkivka close to Sofiivka and Novopavlivka and towards Pavlivka on February 4 and 5.[72]

The commander of a Ukrainian unmanned techniques battalion working within the Kostyantynivka course reported on February 5 that Russian forces try to interdict Ukrainian floor strains of communication (GLOCs) with drones and profiting from poor climate to try infiltrations behind Ukrainian strains.[73] The commander reported that Ukrainian forces are figuring out and attacking infiltrating Russian servicemembers and keep management over Kostyantynivka. The commander famous that Russian forces are primarily infiltrating from Oleksandro-Shultyne (east of Kostyantynivka).

Order of Battle: First-person view (FPV) drone operators of the Russian 1st Motorized Rifle Battalion of the Baltic Fleet (consolidated motorized rifle regiment of the Navy, below operational management of the Central Grouping of Forces) are putting Ukrainian positions north of Yablunivka.[74] Drone operators of the 68th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion and the 242nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (each of the twentieth Motorized Rifle Division, eighth CAA, SMD) are reportedly putting Ukrainian gear close to Raiske and Torske (each southwest of Druzhkivka).[75] Drone operators of the Grachi Detachment of the 346th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian Common Employees’s Essential Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly working within the Kostyantynivka course.[76]

Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Dobropillya tactical space on February 5 however didn't advance.

Russian forces attacked east of Dobropillya close to Novyi Donbas, Vilne, and Toretske on February 4 and 5.[77]

Order of Battle: FPV drone operators, artillery, and different components of the Russian fifty fifth Motorized Rifle Brigade (forty first CAA, Central Navy District [CMD]) and of the one hundred and fiftieth Motorized Rifle Division (eighth CAA, Southern Navy District [SMD]) are reportedly working within the Dobropillya course.[78]

Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Pokrovsk course on February 5 however didn't advance.

Russian forces attacked close to Pokrovsk itself; northwest of Pokrovsk close to Hryshyne; north of Pokrovsk close to Rodynske; east of Pokrovsk close to Myrnohrad; southwest of Pokrovsk close to Kotlyne, Molodetske, Udachne, and Novopidhorodne; and west of Pokrovsk close to Serhiivka on February 4 and 5.[79]

The chief of workers of a Ukrainian battalion working within the Pokrovsk course reported on February 5 that Russian infiltrators are carrying two radios in an try and counter Ukrainian indicators intelligence.[80] The Ukrainian seventh Fast Response Corps of the Air Assault Forces reported on February 5 that Russian forces intensified airstrikes within the Pokrovsk course throughout January 2026, dropping 1,034 aerial bombs – a 65 p.c improve from December 2025.[81]

Order of Battle: A number of launch rocket system (MLRS) artillery, drone operator, and armored components of the Russian fifty fifth Naval Infantry Division (Pacific Fleet) (newly fashioned from the one hundred and fifty fifth Naval Infantry Brigade), the thirty fifth Motorized Rifle Brigade (forty first CAA), and the ninth Motorized Rifle Brigade Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, previously 1st Donetsk Folks’s Republic [DNR] AC, SMD) are reportedly working within the Pokrovsk course.[82]

Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Novopavlivka course on February 5 however didn't advance.

Russian forces attacked close to Novopavlivka itself and south of Novopavlivka close to Filiya on February 4 and 5.[83]

A spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade working within the Novopavlivka course reported on February 5 that Russian forces are using tanks with anti-drone cages, infantry preventing automobiles (IFVs), unarmored civilian automobiles, and all-terrain automobiles (ATVs) to conduct mechanized and motorized assaults nearly weekly within the Novopavlivka course.[84] The spokesperson acknowledged that Ukrainian forces repelled 4 Russian mechanized and motorized assaults within the space in the course of the earlier month (presumably since January 5) and eradicated practically all concerned Russian servicemembers. The spokesperson added that Russian forces proceed to conduct small group infiltration makes an attempt close to Novopavlivka.

Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Oleksandrivka course on February 5 however didn't advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Oleksandrivka close to Zelenyi Hai; east of Oleksandrivka close to Oleksandrohrad; and southeast of Oleksandrivka close to Sosnivka on February 4 and 5.[85]

Order of Battle: Bombers of the Russian eleventh Air Drive and Air Protection Military (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and Jap Navy District [EMD]) are reportedly putting Ukrainian forces close to Pokrovske (north of Oleksandrivka).[86]

Ukrainian forces continued their mid-range strike marketing campaign towards Russian army property in occupied Donetsk Oblast on the evening of February 4 to five. The Ukrainian Common Employees reported on February 5 that Ukrainian forces struck a logistics hub in occupied Makiivka, Donetsk Oblast (roughly 60 kilometers from the frontline).[87]

Russian Supporting Effort: Southern Axis

Russian goal: Preserve frontline positions, safe rear areas towards Ukrainian strikes, and advance inside tube artillery vary of Zaporizhzhia Metropolis

Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Hulyaipole course on February 5 however didn't advance.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces superior south of Staroukrainka (west of Hulyaipole).[88]

Russian forces attacked close to Hulyaipole itself; northwest of Hulyaipole close to Pryluky; north of Hulyaipole close to Dobropillya and Nove Zaporizhzhia; northeast of Hulyaipole close to Zlahoda and Solodke; southwest of Hulyaipole close to Myrne; and west of Hulyaipole close to Zaliznychne on February 4 and 5.[89]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian Common Employees’s Essential Directorate [GRU]) are putting Ukrainian positions in Vozdvyzhivka (northwest of Hulyaipole).[90] Anti-aircraft components of the 218th Tank Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division, fifth CAA, Jap Navy District [EMD]) are intercepting Ukrainian drones south of Dobropillya.[91] Bombers of the eleventh Air Drive and Air Protection Military (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and EMD) are reportedly putting Ukrainian forces close to Verhknya Tersa (northwest of Hulyaipole).[92] Drone operators of the 57th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (fifth CAA) are reportedly putting Ukrainian forces in Zaporizhia Oblast.[93]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on February 5 however didn't advance.

Russian forces attacked west of Orikhiv close to Stepnohirsk and Prymorske and northwest of Orikhiv towards Richne and Mahdalynivka on February 4 and 5.[94]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 4th Navy Base (58th CAA, Southern Navy District [SMD]) anorth of Kamyanske (west of Orikhiv).[95] Drone operators of the Russian 1455th Motorized Rifle Regiment (operationally subordinated to the forty second Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA, SMD) are putting Ukrainian positions in Mahdalynivka.[96] Drone operators of the 1429th Motorized Rifle Regiment (operationally subordinated to the forty second Motorized Rifle Division) are putting Ukrainian positions east of Nesteryanka (southwest of Orikhiv).[97] Parts of the seventh Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly working within the Zaporizhia course. Assault teams of the 291st Motorized Rifle Regiment (forty second Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Mixed Arms Military [CAA], Southern Navy District [SMD]) are reportedly working in Zaporizhia Oblast.[98]

Ukrainian forces proceed their medium-range strike marketing campaign towards Russian army property in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast. The Ukrainian Common Employees reported on February 5 that Ukrainian forces struck the Russian Prymorskyi Posad coaching floor close to occupied Prymorskyi Posad (roughly 117 kilometers from the frontline in Zaporizhia Oblast).[99]

Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Kherson course on February 5 however didn't advance.

Russian forces attacked within the Kherson course on February 4 and 5.[100]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 331st VDV Regiment (98th VDV Division) are reportedly putting Ukrainian gear in Kherson Oblast.[101]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Marketing campaign

Russian Goal: Goal Ukrainian army and civilian infrastructure within the rear and on the entrance line

Russian forces carried out a collection of drone and missile strikes towards Ukraine in a single day on February 4 to February 5. The Ukrainian Air Drive reported that Russian forces launched two Iskander-M ballistic missiles from occupied Crimea and 183 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, and different drones — of which about 110 have been Shaheds — from the instructions of Oryol, Kursk, and Bryansk cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Donetsk Metropolis.[102] The Ukrainian Air Drive reported that Ukrainian forces downed 156 strike drones and that one ballistic missile and 22 drones struck 16 areas, and that drone particles fell at seven areas as of 0800 native time. Ukrainian officers reported that Russian forces struck residential and civilian infrastructure in Kharkiv and Mykolaiv oblasts and in Kyiv Metropolis.[103]

Important Exercise in Belarus

Russian efforts to extend its army presence in Belarus and additional combine Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks

Belarusian producers proceed to assist the Kremlin’s battle efforts by evading sanctions and procuring elements from the Folks’s Republic of China (PRC) and North Korea for the Belarusian and Russian protection industrial bases (DIBs). A Ukrainian open-source intelligence (OSINT) supply reported on February 5 that MAZ, a Belarusian state-owned maker of industrial quality vans and army automobiles, developed industrial ties with a North Korean firm to help main Russian producers such because the Ural Automotive Plant (UralAZ) in sanctions evasion and to assist the Kremlin’s battle effort.[104] The supply acknowledged that MAZ ordered massive batches of North Korean and Chinese language parts, together with drive shafts, steering techniques, and digital management modules by way of a Chinese language middleman firm. The supply acknowledged that UralAZ’s manufacturing capability stays critically depending on foreign-sourced parts, significantly from Chinese language suppliers.

Notice: ISW doesn't obtain any labeled materials from any supply, makes use of solely publicly out there info, and attracts extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media in addition to commercially out there satellite tv for pc imagery and different geospatial knowledge as the idea for these reviews. References to all sources used are supplied within the endnotes of every replace.

Endnotes

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