Russian Offensive Marketing campaign Evaluation, July 2, 2025

[ad_1]

Christina Harward, Grace Mappes, Olivia Gibson, Jennie Olmsted, Daria Novikov, Jessica Sobieski, and George Barros

July 2, 2025, 8:45pm ET

Click on here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is up to date every day alongside the static maps current on this report.

Click on here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click on here to see ISW’s 3D management of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a pc (not a cell gadget) is strongly really useful for utilizing this data-heavy instrument.

Click on here to entry ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces every day by displaying a dynamic frontline. ISW will replace this time-lapse map archive month-to-month.

Be aware: The information cut-off for this product was 12 pm ET on July 2. ISW will cowl subsequent studies within the July 3 Russian Offensive Marketing campaign Evaluation.

America paused weapons provides to Ukraine, together with vital air protection interceptors, artillery shells, missiles, and rockets. Western media shops reported that sources acknowledged on July 2 that the US pause on weapons provides to Ukraine will have an effect on dozens of PAC-3 interceptors for Patriot air protection techniques, dozens of Stinger man-portable air protection techniques, hundreds of 155mm excessive explosive howitzer munitions, over 100 Hellfire air-to-ground missiles, over 250 Guided A number of Launch Rocket System (GMLRS) rockets, dozens of grenade launchers, and dozens of AIM air-to-air missiles. [1] Acquainted sources advised Politico on July 1 that the USA determined in early June 2025 to withhold a number of the help that the USA promised Ukraine beneath the Biden administration however that the choice is simply now taking impact. [2] Politico reported that the halted weapons come from two totally different streams of Biden administration-era help — weapons from drawdowns of present US stockpiles that the US Division of Protection (DoD) acquired cash to replenish, and the Ukraine Safety Help Initiative, by which the USA funds the acquisition of weapons for Ukraine from US protection corporations. White Home Deputy Press Secretary Anna Kelly acknowledged on July 1 that US authorities made the choice following a DoD evaluation of US navy help to states all over the world. [3] Six protection officers, congressional officers, and different sources advised NBC that the Pentagon ordered the pause after a evaluation of US munitions stockpiles. [4] NBC's protection and congressional sources acknowledged that the USA may maintain up the weapons circulation to Ukraine till the evaluation of US stockpiles is full however that the USA may prolong the pause of navy help to Ukraine even longer if the weapons are briefly provide or if the USA wants to provide them to different components of the world.

The Ukrainian Ministry of International Affairs (MFA) acknowledged on July 2 that continued deliveries of beforehand allotted US protection packages are critically essential, notably with the intention to strengthen Ukraine's air protection. [5] The Ukrainian MFA emphasised that any delay in supporting Ukraine's protection capabilities will encourage Russia to proceed its warfare — and never search peace. The Ukrainian MFA acknowledged that US-Ukrainian consultations about protection provides are ongoing in any respect ranges and that Ukraine will communicate with the USA about discovering mutually helpful options to strengthen Ukraine's protection capabilities.

The choice to droop navy help to Ukraine will doubtless power Ukrainian forces to proceed to husband materiel, though the precise timing of the deliberate deliveries that the USA paused stays unclear right now. The Ukrainian Ministry of Protection (MoD) acknowledged that Ukraine had not acquired any official notifications about any suspension or revision to the supply schedules of the agreed US navy help previous to the US announcement. [6] The New York Instances (NYT) reported that US officers acknowledged that the USA had not scheduled to ship the affected munitions to Ukraine for a number of months, however the Wall Road Journal (WSJ) reported that US weapons shipments already in Poland have been halted as of July 1. [7] A Trump administration official advised Politico that the administration had not requested any additional help however that there's sufficient help left over from the Biden administration to final Ukraine "a number of extra months." [8] The deputy commander of a Ukrainian battalion advised the Washington Put up in an article revealed on July 2, nevertheless, that Ukrainian forces have already got to focus on holding positions and conserving assets reasonably than advancing. [9] Ukrainian forces have needed to husband vital materiel, together with air protection interceptors, GMLRS rockets, and artillery shells, throughout earlier suspensions of US help. Ukraine's European companions are growing their efforts to supply Ukraine with navy help and the Ukrainian protection industrial base (DIB) continues its efforts to develop into self-sufficient, however solely the USA can present sure weapons techniques at scale and rapidly. [10] Ukrainian forces very doubtless should preserve materiel once more ought to the USA proceed to droop weapons deliveries.

The suspension of US help to Ukraine will doubtless speed up Russian positive aspects on the battlefield, as earlier US help suspensions have previously. Delays in US navy help in Fall 2023 and Winter-Spring 2024 set circumstances for Russian forces to make extra accelerated battlefield positive aspects than Russian forces had beforehand been capable of make. [11] Russian forces considerably intensified offensive operations close to Avdiivka, Donetsk Oblast in mid-January 2024 and concentrated vital manpower and materiel to their effort to grab the settlement in mid-February 2024 amid the protracted debate within the US (from October 2023 till April 2024) about passing supplemental help for Ukraine. Ukrainian forces additionally confronted vital artillery constraints throughout the Russian offensive in opposition to Avdiivka, permitting Russian forces to assault beneath much less stress from Ukrainian counterbattery fireplace. Russian forces sustained a excessive tempo of offensive operations after seizing Avdiivka with the intention to push as far west as doable, and Russian forces subsequently launched offensive operations in Spring 2024 meant to grab Pokrovsk when the suspension of US help was nonetheless significantly constraining Ukrainian materiel provides. [12] ISW assesses that Russian forces superior roughly three kilometers per day between the suspension of US help to Ukraine on December 6, 2023 and the resumption of help on April 24, 2024, a lot of which was in Donetsk Oblast — as in comparison with the six months previous to the December 2023 help suspension when Russian forces truly misplaced a complete of roughly 203 sq. kilometers at a charge of 1.1 sq. kilometers misplaced per day (as a result of Ukraine’s positive aspects throughout the 2023 counteroffensive, which was enabled by the US and different allies surging navy help to Ukraine).

Russian forces additionally notably intensified offensive operations in Kursk Oblast following the suspension of US intelligence sharing in early March 2025. [13] Russian forces, augmented by North Korean forces, had been making an attempt to push Ukrainian forces from Kursk Oblast via sluggish, grinding advances for the reason that begin of Ukraine's incursion in August 2024. The Trump administration suspended US intelligence sharing with Ukraine on March 5, and Russian forces intensified offensive operations to expel Ukrainian forces from Kursk Oblast on March 6 and seven. [14] Ukrainian sources reportedly acknowledged on the time that Russian forces began making extra speedy advances in Kursk Oblast on March 5 and that the suspension of US intelligence sharing impacted Ukrainian operations in Kursk Oblast essentially the most. Kremlin officers on the time introduced their intention to reap the benefits of the suspension of US navy help and intelligence sharing to "inflict most injury" to Ukrainian forces "on the bottom." [15] Russian forces very doubtless exploited the US suspension of help and intelligence sharing in March 2025 to speed up Russia’s ongoing counteroffensive operation in Kursk Oblast. ISW assesses that Russian forces superior at a charge of about 31 sq. kilometers per day in Ukraine and Kursk Oblast between the suspension of US intelligence sharing with Ukraine on March 3, 2025 and the resumption of intelligence sharing on March 11, 2025 — versus a charge of advance of about 19 sq. kilometers per day within the six months previous to the intelligence sharing suspension.

The suspension of US help to Ukraine will reinforce Russian President Vladimir Putin's concept of victory that posits that Russia can win the warfare of attrition by making sluggish, creeping advances and outlasting Western help for Ukraine. Putin articulated a concept of victory in June 2024 — and has emphasised this identical concept of victory since — that assumes that Russian forces will be capable to proceed gradual, creeping advances indefinitely and win a warfare of attrition in opposition to Ukrainian forces. [16] Putin's concept assumes that Russia will be capable to outlast pledged Western safety help and that Ukraine won't purchase and maintain the manpower and materiel wanted to stop these gradual Russian positive aspects or to contest the initiative and conduct counteroffensive operations to liberate Ukrainian territory. The most recent US suspension of help will strengthen Putin's perception that point is on Russia's facet and his dedication to delaying negotiations towards a peace settlement and protracting the warfare.

Russia stays unlikely to make operational-level breakthroughs within the close to future. Future Russian positive aspects — even comparatively accelerated advances following the suspension of US help — will doubtless stay gradual and creeping and end in disproportionally excessive losses as Russian forces nonetheless haven't restored operational maneuver to the more and more clear battlefield. ISW has noticed geolocated proof to evaluate that Russian forces gained roughly 498 sq. kilometers in Could 2025 and roughly 466 sq. kilometers in June 2025, and Russian positive aspects in January to April 2025 ranged from roughly 175 to 590 sq. kilometers monthly. These Russian positive aspects are remarkably smaller than the 1,265 sq. kilometers per day that ISW assesses Russian forces have been gaining in the beginning of Russia's full-scale invasion in March 2022.

Russia seems, nevertheless, to be making ready to undertake doubtless months- and years-long offensive campaigns — demonstrating the Russian navy command's acceptance of continued sluggish, gradual advances and Putin's perception in his concept of victory. The Russian navy command has just lately prioritized efforts to assault Ukraine's fortress belt in Donetsk Oblast, a marketing campaign that's more likely to take Russia years to attain at Russian forces’ present tempo. [17] Russian forces might not be capable to obtain these targets by themselves. CNN reported on July 2 {that a} Ukrainian intelligence evaluation acknowledged that North Korea will doubtless ship a further 25,000 to 30,000 troopers to Russia within the coming months and that there's a "nice chance" that the North Korean forces will increase Russian forces in Ukraine, together with "throughout large-scale offensive operations." [18]

Kremlin officers are responding to the US navy help suspension by publicly flouting Putin's concept of navy victory as profitable — in direct opposition to US President Donald Trump's acknowledged purpose of bringing Russia to the negotiating desk and reaching an enduring and simply peace. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov acknowledged on July 2 in response to the suspension of US navy help that the "fewer weapons which are provided to Ukraine, the nearer the top of the [Russian invasion of Ukraine] is." [19] Russian Direct Funding Fund (RDIF) CEO Kirill Dmitriev, who has been closely concerned in diplomatic and rhetorical efforts vis-à-vis Ukraine and the USA, acknowledged that the suspension "raises questions concerning the West's capability to proceed supporting Ukraine." [20] Russian State Duma Protection Committee Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Zhuravlev steered that the US navy help suspension will degrade Ukraine's capability to "maintain out" in opposition to Russian offensive operations and claimed that the USA won't be able to "disguise" any future arms deliveries to Ukraine from Russia. [21] These Russian statements underscore how the Kremlin perceives Putin's concept of victory because it pertains to Western — notably American — navy help to Ukraine and flout the Kremlin's purpose of coercing the USA and different Western states into ceasing navy help to Ukraine. [22] The Kremlin is capitalizing on the US help suspension to accentuate its messaging that Europe must also stop weapons provides to Ukraine. Putin had a cellphone name with French President Emmanuel Macron on July 2, the primary Putin-Macron name in almost three years, and used the decision to reiterate boilerplate Kremlin narratives aimed toward discouraging additional Western navy help to Ukraine. [23] Russian Ministry of International Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova additionally criticized continued European navy help to Ukraine. [24] The Kremlin's messaging concerning the suspension of US navy help to Ukraine is one more indicator that Russia stays dedicated to reaching its warfare targets by power and is tired of significant peace negotiations to finish the warfare. [25] These senior Russian officers’ statements point out that suspending US navy help to Ukraine very doubtless won't compel Russia to conduct significant negotiations with Ukraine as President Trump wishes, however reasonably embolden Moscow to proceed protracting Russia’s warfare.

The Kremlin can also be utilizing the US help suspension as a foundation to proceed rhetorical assaults in opposition to European defensive efforts which are consistent with Trump's initiative for Europe to shoulder extra of the burden for collective protection. Russian Deputy International Minister Alexander Grushko claimed on July 2 that the European Union's (EU) elevated protection spending and improvement of its DIB present that the EU is turning into an “aggressive navy bloc” that Russia should defend itself in opposition to. [26] Grushko claimed that the EU carries out NATO's duties and that the 2 organizations are deeply linked. Zakharova additionally claimed that the EU is popping right into a navy bloc and is "pumping" Ukraine with weapons. [27] Russian Ambassador to Norway Nikolay Korchunov advised the Russian state information company RIA Novosti in an interview revealed on June 30 that Norway is making an attempt to learn from the "militarization" of Europe and is "pumping up" the Ukrainian navy. [28] Korchunov claimed that Norway is intensifying NATO navy workouts on Norwegian territory close to the Russian border and that Norway's militarization will enhance pressure and escalation dangers within the Arctic and destabilize European safety. Russian officers proceed to mischaracterize elevated NATO protection spending that's aimed toward deterring warfare in Europe by constructing protection capabilities in response to Russia’s ongoing efforts to restructure and develop Russia’s navy capabilities. [29] The Kremlin's efforts to discourage Western navy help to Ukraine and European rearmament efforts are a part of its wider cognitive warfare efforts that intention to form Western decision-making and erode the West's will to behave in opposition to Russian pursuits and resist Russia. [30]

The US choice to droop navy help to Ukraine will notably degrade Ukraine's capability to defend in opposition to Russia's enhanced long-range missile and drone strike capabilities which have inflicted vital civilian casualties — in sharp distinction to President Trump's acknowledged goal of stopping civilian casualties in Ukraine. US provisions of Patriot air protection techniques and interceptors have been vital for Ukraine's capability to defend in opposition to Russia's missile strikes, notably these with ballistic missiles. [31] Russia's long-range strikes have more and more focused densely populated cities removed from the frontline. [32] Russia has just lately prioritized increasing its long-range drone and missile manufacturing and stockpiling its ballistic missiles, enabling Russia to conduct bigger, more practical mixed missile and drone strike collection in opposition to Ukraine. [33] Russia has notably performed 5 of its largest mixed strikes in opposition to Ukraine all through the full-scale invasion between March and June 2025 and is launching an more and more excessive variety of Shahed and decoy drones that overwhelm Ukrainian air defenses, permitting extra Russian missiles to hit their targets. [34] Russia has additionally just lately tailored its strike techniques to inflict most injury to civilians, together with by deploying cluster munitions with delayed detonations, and Shahed drones outfitted with capsules of chemical weapons and conducting "double faucet" strikes that maximize casualties of civilian first responders. [35] Russia will very doubtless proceed to extend the dimensions of its mixed strikes in opposition to Ukraine as Russia stays dedicated to accelerating its missile and drone manufacturing. The US suspension of vital Patriot interceptor provides to Ukraine will doubtless impression Ukraine's capability to guard its vital, industrial, and civilian infrastructure. Russian forces exploited pauses in US navy help to Ukraine in late 2023 and early 2024 to conduct large-scale mixed strikes designed to exhaust Ukraine's degraded air protection umbrella that was affected by the dearth of Western help. [36] A dwindling provide of Patriot interceptors will power Ukraine to proceed to make troublesome protection prioritization selections.

Key Takeaways:

America paused weapons provides to Ukraine, together with vital air protection interceptors, artillery shells, missiles, and rockets. The choice to droop navy help to Ukraine will doubtless power Ukrainian forces to proceed to husband materiel, though the precise timing of the deliberate deliveries that the USA paused stays unclear right now. The suspension of US help to Ukraine will doubtless speed up Russian positive aspects on the battlefield, as earlier US help suspensions have previously. The suspension of US help to Ukraine will reinforce Russian President Vladimir Putin's concept of victory that posits that Russia can win the warfare of attrition by making sluggish, creeping advances and outlasting Western help for Ukraine. Kremlin officers are responding to the US navy help suspension by publicly flouting Putin's concept of navy victory as profitable — in direct opposition to US President Donald Trump's acknowledged purpose of bringing Russia to the negotiating desk and reaching an enduring and simply peace. The Kremlin can also be utilizing the US help suspension as a foundation to proceed rhetorical assaults in opposition to European defensive efforts which are consistent with Trump's initiative for Europe to shoulder extra of the burden for collective protection. The US choice to droop navy help to Ukraine will notably degrade Ukraine's capability to defend in opposition to Russia's enhanced long-range missile and drone strike capabilities which have inflicted vital civilian casualties — in sharp distinction to President Trump's acknowledged goal of stopping civilian casualties in Ukraine. Ukrainian forces superior in northern Sumy Oblast. Russian forces superior in northern Kharkiv Oblast and close to Toretsk and Novopavlivka. We don't report intimately on Russian warfare crimes as a result of these actions are well-covered in Western media and don't straight have an effect on the navy operations we're assessing and forecasting. We'll proceed to guage and report on the consequences of those felony actions on the Ukrainian navy and the Ukrainian inhabitants and particularly on fight in Ukrainian city areas. We totally condemn Russian violations of the legal guidelines of armed battle and the Geneva Conventions and crimes in opposition to humanity though we don't describe them in these studies.

Ukrainian Operations within the Russian Federation Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis Russian Important Effort – Jap Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate major efforts) Russian Subordinate Important Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces again from the worldwide border with Belgorod Oblast and method to inside tube artillery vary of Kharkiv Metropolis Russian Subordinate Important Effort #2 – Seize the rest of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into japanese Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast Russian Subordinate Important Effort #3 – Seize the whole lot of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and probably advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Marketing campaign Important Exercise in Belarus Ukrainian Operations within the Russian Federation

Preventing continued in Kursk Oblast on July 2.

Russian forces continued assaults in unspecified areas of Kursk Oblast on July 1 and a pair of. [37] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces attacked close to Glushkovo, Tetkino (southwest of Glushkovo), and Gornal (southeast of Tetkino). [38]

Order of Battle: Components of the Russian 91st Sapper-Engineer Regiment (reportedly beneath the operational command of the Northern Grouping of Forces) reportedly proceed working in Kursk Oblast. [39] Components of the Russian 106th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly working close to Darino (east of Tetkino). [40]

The Ukrainian Common Employees reported on July 1 that Ukrainian forces struck the Saratovorgsintez oil refinery in Saratov Oblast, inflicting a hearth on the refinery and damaging a technological set up. [41] The Ukrainian Common Employees reported that the plant produces gasoline and lubricants for the Russian navy.

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian goal: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine alongside the worldwide border and method to inside tube artillery vary of Sumy Metropolis)

Ukrainian forces just lately superior in northern Sumy Oblast.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage revealed on June 29 signifies that Ukrainian forces just lately superior west of Andriivka (north of Sumy Metropolis). [42]

Russian forces attacked within the Sumy Oblast border space on July 1 and a pair of. [43] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked close to north of Sumy Metropolis close to Andriivka and Novomykolaivka and northeast of Sumy Metropolis close to Sadky and Yunakivka. [44]

Order of Battle: Components of the Russian 76th Airborne (VDV) Division, together with its 237th VDV Regiment, are reportedly working between Loknya and Yunakivka (each northeast of Sumy Metropolis). [45] Drone operators of the Russian 83rd Separate VDV Brigade are reportedly conducting reconnaissance missions close to the Sumy-Kursk Oblast worldwide border space, and different components of the 83rd Separate VDV Brigade are reportedly combating close to Yunakivka. [46] Components of the Russian eleventh Separate VDV Brigade are reportedly working alongside the H-07 Yunakivka-Sumy Metropolis freeway close to Yunakivka. [47] Fiber-optic drone operators of the Russian thirtieth Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, forty fourth Military Corps [AC], Leningrad Navy District [LMD]) and artillery components of the Russian 106th VDV Division are reportedly hanging Ukrainian forces in northern Sumy Oblast. [48]

Russian Important Effort – Jap Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Important Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast ( Russian goal: Push Ukrainian forces again from the worldwide border with Belgorod Oblast and method to inside tube artillery vary of Kharkiv Metropolis)

Russian forces just lately superior in northern Kharkiv Oblast.

Assessed Russian advances: Footage revealed on June 25 signifies that Russian forces superior in western Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv Metropolis). [49]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces superior in central Vovchansk. [50]

Russian forces performed floor operations north of Kharkiv Metropolis close to Hlyboke and Zelene and northeast of Kharkiv Metropolis close to Vovchansk and Vovchanski Khutory on July 1 and a pair of. [51]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade working in northern Kharkiv Oblast reported on July 2 that Russian forces have just lately modified techniques in northern Kharkiv Oblast and at the moment are conducting infantry assaults in teams of as much as 25 servicemen and are not attacking in small, two-to-three personnel fireplace groups. [52] The spokesperson reported Russian forces are utilizing underground pipelines together with sewage pipes to build up personnel for assaults in addition to ammunition and provides. [53] A spokesperson for one more Ukrainian brigade working in northern Kharkiv Oblast reported on July 2 that Russian forces considerably intensified offensive operations within the space to reap the benefits of climate circumstances and are growing using fiber optic drones in an try and take ahead positions. [54]

Order of Battle: Components of the Russian 72nd Motorized Rifle Division (forty fourth Military Corps [AC], Leningrad Navy District [LMD]) are reportedly hanging Ukrainian forces in unspecified areas of Kharkiv Oblast. [55]

Russian Subordinate Important Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian goal: Seize the rest of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into japanese Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued floor assaults within the Kupyansk route on July 2 however didn't make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian supply claimed that Russian forces superior close to Kindrashivka (north of Kupyansk) and Petropavlivka (east of Kupyansk). [56]

Russian forces attacked north of Kupyansk close to Holubivka and Radivka, and close to the worldwide border towards Milove, Mytrofanivka and Ambarne; northeast of Kupyansk close to Kamyanka and Synkivka; east of Kupyansk close to Petropavlivka; and southeast of Kupyansk close to Stepova Novoselivka and towards Novoosynove on July 1 and a pair of. [57]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian twenty seventh Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st Guards Tank Military [GTA], Moscow Navy District [MMD]) are reportedly working within the Kupyansk route. [58]

Russian forces continued floor assaults within the Borova route on July 2 however didn't make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed Russian forces superior close to Hrekivka (southeast of Borova) and west of Stepy (previously Pershotravneve, east of Borova). [59]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova close to Zahryzove and Kolisnykivka, east of Borova close to Zelenyi Hai and Kopanky, and southeast of Borova close to Hrekivka, Cherneschyna, and Novovodyane on July 1 and a pair of. [60] A Russian supply claimed Ukrainian forces counterattacked close to Nadiya (east of Borova). [61]

Russian forces continued floor assaults within the Lyman route on July 2 however didn't make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces superior to southern Karpivka, close to Ridkodub, and west and east of Lypove. [62]

Russian forces attacked north of Lyman close to Ridkodub, Serednye and Zelena Dolyna; northeast of Lyman close to Novyi Myr, Myrne, and Kolodyazi; and east of Lyman close to Torske on July 1 and a pair of. [63]

Russian Subordinate Important Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian goal: Seize the whole lot of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and probably advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Siversk route on July 2 however didn't advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Siversk close to Bilohorivka, Hryhorivka, and Serebryanka; southeast of Siversk towards Vyimka; and southwest of Siversk close to Fedorivka and towards Bondrane on July 1 and a pair of. [64]

Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Chasiv Yar route on July 2 however didn't make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Mykolaivka (west of Chasiv Yar) and superior to Chervone (southwest of Mykolaivka) and close to Kurdyumivka (southeast of Chasiv Yar) and Stupochky (south of Chasiv Yar). [65]

Russian forces attacked close to Chasiv Yar itself north of Chasiv Yar towards Markove, and south of Chasiv Yar close to Stupochky on July 1 and a pair of. [66]

The commander of a Ukrainian brigade working within the Chasiv Yar route reported that Russian first-person view (FPV) drones pose the most important problem for Ukrainian forces within the space. [67] The commander acknowledged that Ukrainian forces use FPV drones to repel rare Russian mechanized assaults and that Russian forces are leveraging small groups of about two to a few personnel on bikes.

A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces occupy the dominant heights alongside the Toretsk-Kurdyumivka-Chasiv Yar line, complicating the Ukrainian protection of Kostyantynivka, which is situated in lowlands. [68]

Order of Battle: Components of the Russian 98th Airborne (VDV) Division and sixth Motorized Rifle Division (third Military Corps [AC]) are reportedly working within the Chasiv Yar route. [69]

Russian forces just lately superior within the Toretsk route.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage revealed on July 2 signifies that Russian forces just lately marginally superior north of Toretsk. [70]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces superior close to Dyliivka (north of Toretsk). [71]

Russian forces attacked close to Toretsk itself; north of Toretsk close to Dyliivka; northwest of Toretsk close to Yablunivka, Popiv Yar, Poltavka, and Oleksandro-Kalynove and towards Rusyn Yar and Pleshchiivka; west of Toretsk close to Shcherbynivka and Novospaske; and southwest of Toretsk close to Leonidivka on July 1 and a pair of. [72] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked close to Stepanivka (northwest of Toretsk). [73]

The Russian Ministry of Protection (MoD) claimed on July 2 that Russian forces performed a Geran-2 drone strike (the Russian-made analogue of the Iranian-made Shahed-136 drone) in opposition to Ukrainian positions close to Yablunivka. [74]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 68th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion (twentieth Motorized Rifle Division, eighth Mixed Arms Military [CAA], Southern Navy District [SMD]) are reportedly hanging Ukrainian positions close to Rusyn Yar and Yablunivka. [75] Drone operators of the Russian "Storm" Detachment of the 506th Motorized Rifle Regiment (twenty seventh Motorized Rifle Division, 2nd CAA, Central Navy District [CMD]), the "Rubikon" Middle for Superior Unmanned Applied sciences, and the thirty third Motorized Rifle Regiment (twentieth Motorized Rifle Division) are reportedly hanging Ukrainian forces close to Stepanivka. [76]

Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Pokrovsk route on July 2 however didn't make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces superior west of Koptieve; northwest, west, and south of Myrne; north of Novoekonomichne; south and southeast of Razine; west and southwest of Malynivka; in western Mykolaivka; and to central Novotoretske (all northeast of Pokrovsk). [77]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Pokrovsk close to Myrne and Malynivka and towards Novoekonomichne, Mykolaivka, Novotoretske, Razine, and Koptieve; east of Pokrovsk close to Promin and Myrolubivka; southeast of Pokrovsk close to Lysivka; and southwest of Pokrovsk close to Udachne and towards Molodetske on July 1 and a pair of. [78] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked close to Novoekonomichne. [79]

The commander of a Ukrainian drone battalion working within the Pokrovsk route reported that Russian forces are leveraging summer time foliage as concealment. [80] The commander acknowledged that Russian forces briefly decreased the tempo of their assaults earlier than Could 9, 2025, however that Russian forces are once more making an attempt to succeed in the Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast border on this route. The commander of a Ukrainian brigade working within the Pokrovsk route reported that Russian forces are not utilizing heavy armored autos because of the terrain and that Russian forces are as a substitute deploying fireplace groups of 1 to 2 personnel, generally on bikes, scooters, and bicycles. [81]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 68th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion (twentieth Motorized Rifle Division, eighth CAA) are reportedly hanging Ukrainian positions close to Bilytske, Novyi Donbas (each north of Pokrovsk), Koptieve, and Dobropillya (northeast of Pokrovsk). [82]

Russian forces just lately superior within the Novopavlivka route.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage revealed on July 1 signifies that Russian forces just lately superior east of Piddubne (south of Novopavlivka). [83]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed on July 1 and a pair of that Russian forces superior to Voskresenka and Piddubne and southwest of Zirka, northwest of Yalta, and southwest of Fedorivka (all south of Novopavlivka). [84]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Novopavlivka close to Novoserhiivka and Muravka; southeast of Novopavlivka close to Horikhove, Oleksiivka, and Dachne; and south of Novopavlivka close to Piddubne, Myrne, Zaporizhzhia, Perebudova, Voskresenka, and Vesele on July 1 and a pair of. [85] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are growing counterattacks close to Zirka. [86]

Ukrainian navy officers reported on July 2 that Russian forces haven't consolidated in Dachne (south of Novopavlivka) and that combating continues within the Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast administrative border. [87] The deputy commander of a Ukrainian brigade working within the Novopavlivka route reported that Russian forces are attacking on the flanks of Novopavlivka within the north and south alongside the Solona River because of the lack of canopy in the principle Novopavlivka route. [88]

Order of Battle: Components of the Russian thirty sixth Motorized Rifle Regiment (67th Motorized Rifle Division, twenty fifth CAA, CMD) are reportedly working close to Zirka. [89] Components of the 114th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA previously 1st DNR AC, SMD) are reportedly working alongside the T-0428 Dachne-Novopavlivka freeway. [90] Drone operators of the fifth Tank Brigade (thirty sixth CAA, Jap Navy District [EMD]) are reportedly remotely mining roads close to Voskresenka. [91]

Russian power continued offensive operations within the Velyka Novosilka route on July 2 however didn't make any confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on July 1 that Russian forces superior to Maliivka (northwest of Velyka Novosilka). [92]

Russian forces attacked northwest of Velyka Novosilka towards Maliivka and Voskresenka and close to Shevchenko and southwest of Velyka Novosilka close to Novopil on July 1 and a pair of. [93] A Russian milblogger claimed on July 1 that Ukrainian forces counterattacked close to Shevchenko and southwest of Velyka Novosilka close to Zelene Pole, Novodarivka, and Levadne. [94]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian goal: Preserve frontline positions, safe rear areas in opposition to Ukrainian strikes, and advance inside tube artillery vary of Zaporizhzhia Metropolis)

Russian forces continued floor assaults within the Hulyaipole route on July 2 however didn't make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Malynivka (east of Hulyaipole) and superior north of Stepanivka (southeast of Hulyaipole). [95]

A Russian milblogger claimed on July 2 that Russian forces attacked northeast of Hulyaipole towards Olhivske. [96]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian thirty eighth Motorized Rifle Brigade (thirty fifth Mixed Arms Military (CAA), Jap Navy District [EMD]) are reportedly hanging Ukrainian forces close to Chervone (east of Hulyaipole). [97]

Russian forces continued floor assaults in western Zaporizhia Oblast on July 2 however didn't advance.

Russian forces attacked southwest of Orikhiv close to Kamyanske on July 1 and a pair of. [98]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 291st Motorized Rifle Regiment (forty second Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA, Southern Navy District [SMD]) and nineteenth Motorized Rifle Division (58th CAA) are reportedly working within the Zaporizhia route. [99]

Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported floor exercise within the Kherson route on July 2.

Order of Battle: Artillery components of the Russian eightieth Arctic Motorized Rifle Brigade (14th Military Corps [AC], Leningrad Navy District [LMD]) are reportedly hanging Ukrainian forces in Kherson Oblast. [100]

Ukrainian navy intelligence reportedly assassinated the primary deputy commander of the Russian Black Sea Fleet (BSF). Ukrainian media sources amplified a declare from a non-public Russian Telegram account on July 2 that Ukraine's Important Navy Intelligence Directorate (GUR) assassinated BSF Chief of Employees — First Deputy Commander Vice Admiral Ildar Akhmerov in occupied Crimea. [101] ISW has not noticed affirmation of this declare. Neither Russian nor Ukrainian officers have commented on Akhmerov's unconfirmed assassination.

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Marketing campaign (Russian Goal: Goal Ukrainian navy and civilian infrastructure within the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces performed a collection of missile and drone strikes in opposition to Ukraine on the night time of July 1 to 2. The Ukrainian Air Pressure reported that Russian forces launched 4 S-300 air protection missiles from Kursk Oblast and 114 Shahed and decoy drones from the instructions of Bryansk and Kursk cities; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai. [102] The Ukrainian Air Pressure reported that Ukrainian forces shot down 40 drones and that 39 drones have been ”misplaced” or suppressed by Ukrainian digital warfare (EW) techniques. Ukrainian officers reported that Russian drones and missiles struck civilian and residential infrastructure amenities in Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Kharkiv, and Odesa oblasts. [103]

Ukrainian Important Navy Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Head Lieutenant Common Kyrylo Budanov reported that Russian forces tried to strike, Yuzhe, Odesa Oblast with unmanned naval drones in early June 2025 however that Ukrainian forces repelled the drones. [104] Budanov reported that Russia is making an attempt to domestically produce naval drones however has not but been profitable.

Important exercise in Belarus (Russian efforts to extend its navy presence in Belarus and additional combine Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko acknowledged on July 1 that Belarus will scale back the variety of navy personnel set to take part within the September 2025 Zapad-2025 joint Russian-Belarusian navy train by almost half and reposition the principle maneuver away from Belarus' western borders. [105] It's unclear whether or not Lukashenko meant that the entire variety of Zapad members is to be lowered in half, or whether or not the Belarusian contingent within the joint train is to be lowered by half.

Russia continues efforts to formalize Russian-Belarusian governmental integration. Russian state media outlet Parlamentskaya Gazeta reported on July 1 that Russian President Vladimir Putin submitted a invoice to the Russian State Duma to ratify a protocol that will permit Belarusian residents completely residing in Russia to vote and run in native Russian elections. [106] Putin and Lukashenko signed the protocol on March 13, 2025, amending the 1998 Russian-Belarusian treaty on Equal Rights of Residents. Lukashenko signed an identical protocol in January 2025. [107]

Be aware: ISW doesn't obtain any categorised materials from any supply, makes use of solely publicly out there info, and attracts extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media in addition to commercially out there satellite tv for pc imagery and different geospatial knowledge as the premise for these studies. References to all sources used are supplied within the endnotes of every replace.

[1] https://www.ft.com/content material/b69e327d-95a3-487d-a9b6-6a72ef48ba61; https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/national-security/pentagon-halts-weapons-shipment-ukraine-concerns-us-stockpile-rcna216358

[2] https://www.politico.com/information/2025/07/01/pentagon-munitions-ukraine-halt-00436048?s=09

[3] https://www.politico.com/information/2025/07/01/pentagon-munitions-ukraine-halt-00436048?s=09; https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/national-security/pentagon-halts-weapons-shipment-ukraine-concerns-us-stockpile-rcna216358

[4] https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/national-security/pentagon-halts-weapons-shipment-ukraine-concerns-us-stockpile-rcna216358

[5] https://mfa.gov dot ua/information/mzs-zaprosilo-timchasovogo-povirenogo-u-spravah-ssha-dlya-obgovorennya-pidtrimki-ukrayini-v-protidiyi-rosijskij-agresiyi

[6] https://t.me/ministry_of_defense_ua/13066 ;

[7]

https://www.nytimes.com/2025/07/01/us/politics/trump-ukraine-weapons.html ; https://www.wsj.com/politics/national-security/u-s-halts-key-weapons-for-ukraine-in-new-sign-of-weakening-support-for-kyiv-35d78cfc?gaa_at=eafs&gaa_n=ASWzDAgroeMA-XpoBkhywqAKIXyx10RmZXqsPeBWDKi-dnsMJFWvvKT-qx2a&gaa_ts=686575bf&gaa_sig=bb_7hoXRbQWpv0liIWv-c4kfg-BQAEfLDtEIrJ5HMFrlJy0zECN8-4uKj0FLJnFxGT8xVx7TbhfhTxh5iCcykwpercent3Dpercent3D

[8] https://www.politico.com/information/2025/07/01/pentagon-munitions-ukraine-halt-00436048?s=09

[9] https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2025/07/02/russia-ukraine-war-offensives-ceasefire/2b29644c-570c-11f0-b45b-dc9aeb848c03_story.html

[10] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukrainepercentE2percent80percent99s-long-term-path-success-jumpstarting-self-sufficient-defense-industrial-base ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar062325 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar052725; https://isw.pub/UkrWar040725 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-25-2025 ;

[11] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/how-delays-western-aid-gave-russia-initiative-ukrainian-counteroffensive-kharkiv

[12] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukrainian-defense-pokrovsk-has-compelled-russia-change-its-approach-eastern-ukraine

[13] https://isw.pub/UkrWar030725 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar030825 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar030925

[14] https://isw.pub/UkrWar030925

[15] https://isw.pub/UkrWar030925

[16] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-7-2024 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar061925

[17] https://isw.pub/UkrWar021625

[18] https://www.cnn.com/2025/07/02/europe/north-korea-troops-russia-ukraine-intl-cmd

[19] https://www.interfax-russia dot ru/rossiya-i-mir/peskov-chem-menshe-oruzhiya-postavlyaetsya-ukraine-tem-blizhe-okonchanie-svo

[20] https://t.me/kadmitriev/149

[21] https://lenta dot ru/information/2025/07/02/v-gosdume-nazvali-sroki-protivostoyaniya-vsu-bez-postavok-zapadnogo-oruzhiya/

[22] https://isw.pub/UkrWar061925 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar062025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar051725 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar050825 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar043025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042425

[23] https://www.elysee dot fr/emmanuel-macron/2025/07/01/entretien-telephonique-avec-le-president-de-la-federation-de-russie-vladimir-poutine-1; http://kremlin dot ru/occasions/president/information/77337; https://t.me/tass_agency/323383

[24] https://t.me/tass_agency/323436 ; https://tass dot ru/politika/24407615; https://t.me/tass_agency/323446

[25] https://isw.pub/UkrWar040325 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar040825 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-26-2025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar060325 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar061325 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar060525

[26] https://tass dot ru/politika/24408985

[27] https://tass dot ru/politika/24412709

[28] https://ria dot ru/20250630/korchunov-2025829378.html ; https://norway dot mid.ru/ru/embassy/press-centre/information/intervyu_posla_rossii_v_norvegii_n_v_korchunova_agentstvu_ria_novosti_30_iyunya_2025_g_/ ; https://t.me/MID_Russia/62072

[29] https://isw.pub/UkrWar062325

[30] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/primer-russian-cognitive-warfare

[31] https://isw.pub/UkrWar062925 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar030425 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar021925; https://isw.pub/UkrWar062625 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar062325 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar061725 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar061525 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar061225 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar060925 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar060625 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar060125 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar052525 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar052425 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar051025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042425 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041825 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041325 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041225 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar040825 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar040425 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar033025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar032725

[32] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-29-2025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar062425 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-24-2025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar062325; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-17-2025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar061725 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-18-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-13-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-17-2025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041225; https://isw.pub/UkrWar040625; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-17-2025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041325

[33] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-26-2025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar052525 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar062825 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar040425

[34] https://isw.pub/UkrWar030725 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar052525 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-26-2025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar060925 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar062925

[35] https://isw.pub/UkrWar062925 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar04172025

[36] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/how-delays-western-aid-gave-russia-initiative-ukrainian-counteroffensive-kharkiv

[37] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26180 ; https://www.fb.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0hEY3Ujh5T4c8q9FJTegBFWiUyBr2MDcsGW47QiMJd6TqoPRQcr3ZSp4qKvf85AnAl?__cft__[0]=AZWrKiNB8Vzer-mB-dZhqhOOjuM8uSFnMHxsO004PtDNanCXsm4xFvbC8jiX_hy3s1kWPNOlzGsRcx1QhLAEExKDug3_y8dVRzpDQzZbPPnIpZKAZQn_C9BBYT72Yp_l25KCpssCXBov0iQ75cSLdiahgM7T_Cy_-4QvBJNTRkTpQg&__tn__=%2COpercent2CP-R; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26144

[38] https://t.me/dva_majors/74509 ; https://t.me/warriorofnorth/9783; https://t.me/sashakots/54668; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/171053; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30702

[39] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/171030

[40] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30682 ; https://t.me/basurin_e/19655

[41] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26143

[42] https://x.com/UAControlMap/standing/1940092514884554825 ; https://x.com/moklasen/standing/1939760514717855923 ; https://t.me/ua_regteam/340

[43] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26180 ; https://www.fb.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0hEY3Ujh5T4c8q9FJTegBFWiUyBr2MDcsGW47QiMJd6TqoPRQcr3ZSp4qKvf85AnAl?__cft__[0]=AZWrKiNB8Vzer-mB-dZhqhOOjuM8uSFnMHxsO004PtDNanCXsm4xFvbC8jiX_hy3s1kWPNOlzGsRcx1QhLAEExKDug3_y8dVRzpDQzZbPPnIpZKAZQn_C9BBYT72Yp_l25KCpssCXBov0iQ75cSLdiahgM7T_Cy_-4QvBJNTRkTpQg&__tn__=%2COpercent2CP-R ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26144

[44] https://t.me/dva_majors/74509

[45] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30682;

[46] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30682; https://t.me/epoddubny/23976; https://t.me/motopatriot78/38123

[47] https://t.me/rusich_army/24462

[48] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/171007; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/171015

[49] https://t.me/osirskiy/1195; https://x.com/LloydUkrYT/standing/1940332907526283322 ;

[50] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30708

[51] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26180 ; https://www.fb.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0hEY3Ujh5T4c8q9FJTegBFWiUyBr2MDcsGW47QiMJd6TqoPRQcr3ZSp4qKvf85AnAl ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26144; https://t.me/otukharkiv/6830

[52] https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1056619-do-25-vijskovosluzbovciv-u-grupi-prikordonna-brigada-gart-pro-zbilsenna-rosijskih-sturmiv-na-harkivsini/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZVMUSS0B0yo ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/02/cze-vzhe-ne-mali-shturmovi-grupy-poblyzu-vovchanska-rosiyany-vtrachayut-do-100-lyudej-shhodnya/

[53] https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1056657-u-vovcansku-vijskovi-rf-perehovuutsa-u-kanalizacii-ta-pidzemnih-komunikaciah-prikordonna-brigada-gart/

[54] https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1056783-na-pivdenno-slobozanskomu-napramku-rosiani-namagautsa-zajnati-vigidni-pozicii-hartia/

[55] https://t.me/bella_Ciao44/9149 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/27643

[56] https://t.me/tass_agency/323427

[57] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26180 ; https://www.fb.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0hEY3Ujh5T4c8q9FJTegBFWiUyBr2MDcsGW47QiMJd6TqoPRQcr3ZSp4qKvf85AnAl ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26144 ; https://t.me/otukharkiv/6830

[58] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/171033

[59] https://t.me/yurasumy/23860 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/38130

[60] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26180 ; https://www.fb.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0hEY3Ujh5T4c8q9FJTegBFWiUyBr2MDcsGW47QiMJd6TqoPRQcr3ZSp4qKvf85AnAl ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26144

[61] https://t.me/tass_agency/323435

[62] https://t.me/motopatriot78/38114 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/38105 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/23860

[63] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26180 ; https://www.fb.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0hEY3Ujh5T4c8q9FJTegBFWiUyBr2MDcsGW47QiMJd6TqoPRQcr3ZSp4qKvf85AnAl ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26144 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/23859

[64] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26180 ; https://www.fb.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0hEY3Ujh5T4c8q9FJTegBFWiUyBr2MDcsGW47QiMJd6TqoPRQcr3ZSp4qKvf85AnAl ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26144

[65] https://t.me/rybar/71839; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/170962 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/38131 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/23858

[66] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26180; https://www.fb.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0hEY3Ujh5T4c8q9FJTegBFWiUyBr2MDcsGW47QiMJd6TqoPRQcr3ZSp4qKvf85AnAl; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26144 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/27645 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/170962

[67] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aEBreSv3UuQ ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/02/zbyvayemo-starym-didivskym-metodom-u-sylah-oborony-nazvaly-najbilshu-problemu-na-kramatorskomu-napryamku/

[68] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/170962

[69] https://t.me/motopatriot78/38131 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30682 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/54304

[70] https://x.com/AudaxonX/standing/1940327598296633671; https://t.me/Khyzhak_brigade/1261

[71] https://t.me/dva_majors/74509

[72] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26180; https://www.fb.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0hEY3Ujh5T4c8q9FJTegBFWiUyBr2MDcsGW47QiMJd6TqoPRQcr3ZSp4qKvf85AnAl; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26144 ; https://t.me/rybar/71839 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/170962 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/23857 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65578

[73] https://t.me/dva_majors/74541

[74] https://t.me/mod_russia/54317

[75] https://t.me/nm_dnr/13979

[76] https://t.me/dva_majors/74541

[77] https://t.me/motopatriot78/38113 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65578 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30673; https://t.me/motopatriot78/38131

[78] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26180; https://www.fb.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0hEY3Ujh5T4c8q9FJTegBFWiUyBr2MDcsGW47QiMJd6TqoPRQcr3ZSp4qKvf85AnAl; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26144 ; https://t.me/rybar/71839 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/23856 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65578 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30706

[79] https://t.me/rybar/71839

[80] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/02/prykydayutsya-derevom-i-mriyut-pro-dnipropetrovshhynu-typova-povedinka-rosiyan-bilya-pokrovska/

[81] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lnrp2S2L6qk ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/02/vorog-hoche-vyjty-na-nash-riven-za-den-pozycziyi-pid-pokrovskomu-atakuye-50-60-shturmovykiv/

[82] https://t.me/nm_dnr/13979

[83] https://www.fb.com/37obrmp/movies/1680665412635223/; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9498

[84] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30673 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/23852 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/94907 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/15774

[85] https://t.me/yurasumy/23852 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/23854 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/170988 ; https://t.me/rybar/71815 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26180 ; https://www.fb.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0hEY3Ujh5T4c8q9FJTegBFWiUyBr2MDcsGW47QiMJd6TqoPRQcr3ZSp4qKvf85AnAl ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26144

[86] https://t.me/wargonzo/27645

[87] https://suspilne dot media/dnipro/1056721-vijsk-rf-u-dacnomu-na-dnipropetrovsini-nemae-osuv-hortica/ ; https://t.me/akovalenko1989/9477 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26178

[88] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1057059-e-kadri-de-vze-peretnuli-adminkordon-ale-ih-pidkiduvali-aka-situacia-na-novopavlivskomu-napramku/

[89] https://t.me/voin_dv/15774

[90] https://t.me/yurasumy/23854

[91] https://t.me/voin_dv/15787

[92] https://t.me/voin_dv/15774

[93] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26180 ; https://www.fb.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0hEY3Ujh5T4c8q9FJTegBFWiUyBr2MDcsGW47QiMJd6TqoPRQcr3ZSp4qKvf85AnAl ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26144

[94] https://t.me/voin_dv/15774

[95] https://t.me/yurasumy/23851 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65582

[96] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65582

[97] https://t.me/voin_dv/15773

[98] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26180 ; https://www.fb.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0hEY3Ujh5T4c8q9FJTegBFWiUyBr2MDcsGW47QiMJd6TqoPRQcr3ZSp4qKvf85AnAl ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26144

[99] https://t.me/wargonzo/27657 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/54304 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/74503; https://t.me/dva_majors/74518

[100] https://t.me/tass_agency/323430

[101] https://focus dot ua/voennye-novosti/712692-ildar-ahmerov-pogib-v-krymu-vse-podrobnosti; https://t.me/c/2059151819/1045; https://warfare.obozrevatel dot com/v-okkupirovannom-kryimu-likvidirovali-komanduyuschego-chernomorskim-flotom-rf-pervyie-podrobnosti.htm

[102] https://t.me/kpszsu/37488

[103] https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/22585 ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/02/raketni-udary-ta-ataky-droniv-po-dnipropetrovshhyni-v-ova-pokazaly-naslidky-seriyi-obstriliv/ ; https://suspilne dot media/dnipro/1055689-vijska-rf-vdarili-raketou-po-kamanskomu-rajonu-stalasa-pozeza/; https://www.fb.com/permalink.phpstory_fbid=pfbid02s9XT3KqE3ZsNkcs3QbVVqxiuaT3HpQ7v7a3hzCFiCRMSpsz5RSehhbMK2azuhjw5l&id=61558717479769 ;https://t.me/OP_UA/16107 ; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/22569; https://suspilne dot media/1056303-na-vijni-zaginuv-komandir-110-i-ombr-sergij-zaharevic/; https://www.president dot gov.ua/information/u-nas-ye-chitka-informaciya-i-partneri-ce-pidtverdzhuyut-sho-98781 ; https://t.me/kramatorsk_rada/23128 ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/02/vorog-vdaryv-po-kramatorsku-geranyamy-ye-rujnuvannya-infrastruktury/ ; https://t.me/synegubov/15397 ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/02/vorog-atakuvav-harkiv-dronamy-ta-aviabombamy-ye-postrazhdali/ ; https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1056495-po-odnopoverhovomu-budinku-v-novobavarskomu-rajoni-harkova-vdariv-sahed-foto-naslidkiv/; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/2749 ; https://t.me/synegubov/15393 ; https://t.me/synegubov/15394 ; https://t.me/synegubov/15395 ; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/2747 ; https://t.me/synegubov/15396 ; https://suspilne dot media/1056451-makron-pogovoriv-z-putinim-unaslidok-rosijskogo-udaru-zaginuv-komandir-110-brigadi-zaharevic-1225-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1751409233&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps; https://t.me/IzmailRDA/36256

[104] https://suspilne dot media/1056451-makron-pogovoriv-z-putinim-unaslidok-rosijskogo-udaru-zaginuv-komandir-110-brigadi-zaharevic-1225-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1751461721&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps

[105] https://t.me/belta_telegramm/321007 ; http://belta dot by/president/view/lukashenko-raskryl-prichiny-izmenenija-parametrov-uchenij-zapad-2025-724155-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-28-2025