Russian Offensive Marketing campaign Evaluation, June 27, 2025

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Daria Novikov, Olivia Gibson, Anna Harvey, Angelica Evans, Jennie Olmsted, Jessica Sobieski, and Frederick W. Kagan

June 27, 2025, 7:20 pm ET

Click on here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is up to date every day alongside the static maps current on this report.

Click on here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click on here to see ISW’s 3D management of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a pc (not a cellular gadget) is strongly really useful for utilizing this data-heavy instrument.

Click on here to entry ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces every day by displaying a dynamic frontline. ISW will replace this time-lapse map archive month-to-month.

Notice: The information cut-off for this product was 12:15 pm ET on June 27. ISW will cowl subsequent stories within the June 28 Russian Offensive Marketing campaign Evaluation.

The Kremlin continues to downplay the social and financial prices of Russia's struggle in Ukraine and inflated navy spending. Russian President Vladimir Putin informed journalists on June 27, following the Eurasian Financial Union (EAEU) summit in Minsk, that sanctions can't harm Russia’s financial system and that Russia's financial indicators are “passable.”[1] Putin acknowledged that Russia’s financial system continues to be contending with excessive inflation and that Russia’s financial development in 2025 will probably be “rather more modest to fight inflation.” Putin additionally claimed that Russia’s navy price range is at the moment 6.3 % of its GDP, or 13.5 trillion rubles (roughly $172 billion), and that Russia plans to steadily lower protection spending starting in 2026. Russia notably elevated its protection price range by 25 % between the 2024 and 2025 federal budgets and has been rising its investments in Russia's protection business all through 2025.[2]

Putin’s statements seemingly search to painting the Russian authorities as dedicated to social and civilian expenditures and to downplay current indicators of the societal and financial toll of Russia’s struggle in opposition to Ukraine and corresponding prioritization of military-industrial sector funding. Russian officers beforehand claimed that the 2025-2027 federal budgets would prioritize civilian and social sector investments, regardless of the September 2024 draft budgets indicating Russia will spend roughly 41 % of its annual expenditures in 2025 on nationwide safety and protection.[3] The Russian Finance Ministry greater than tripled its price range deficit goal for 2025 in Might – from 0.5 % of Gross Home Product (GDP) to 1.7 % of GDP – after a number of months of staggeringly low oil and gasoline earnings.[4] Russian Central Financial institution Chairperson Elvira Nabiullina notably said on the St. Petersburg Worldwide Financial Discussion board (SPIEF) on June 19 that Russia has exhausted a lot of its “free assets“ because the begin of Russia‘s full-scale struggle in opposition to Ukraine, together with Russia’s workforce, manufacturing and import substitution capacities, and reserves of the Nationwide Welfare Fund and Russia’s banking sector.[5] Russia’s navy drive era technique at the moment hinges on giant recruitment and pension payouts, and it stays unclear how the Kremlin intends to fund these funds within the medium- to long-term, as Russia reportedly depleted all the 2025 federal recruitment price range fund between January and March 2025.[6] Russia can be making important monetary investments in its home drone manufacturing capability and dedicated 243 billion rubles (about $3 billion) to Russian drone corporations between 2023 and 2024.[7] Any sharp lower in Russia's protection spending will seemingly depress the Russian financial system within the medium time period, as Russia’s protection industrial base now accounts for a good portion of general Russian home manufacturing.

Putin additionally reiterated Kremlin narratives aimed toward discrediting Ukraine and blaming the West and NATO for his resolution to invade Ukraine . Putin claimed that Russia has agreed to conduct a 3rd spherical of negotiations, is able to meet with Ukraine in Istanbul, and has demonstrated its willingness to barter via prisoner of struggle (POW) and killed-in-action (KIA) exchanges.[8] Putin claimed that Ukraine is refusing to just accept the our bodies of some deceased servicemembers, an unsubstantiated declare that's a part of an ongoing Russian data marketing campaign depicting Ukraine as spoiling POW exchanges and KIA repatriations so as to provoke discontent and demoralize Ukrainian society and to discredit the Ukrainian authorities.[9] Putin reiterated Russia's long-term declare that NATO promised Russia it could by no means broaden east and claimed that Russia was "crudely deceived."[10] Putin claimed that Western nations in opposition to Russia will "quickly die" themselves. Putin additionally reiterated that Russia will solely conclude its struggle in opposition to Ukraine on Russia’s phrases and claimed that Russian protection spending is designed to attain this objective. ISW has beforehand famous that Russia’s phrases – the "denazification" and "demilitarization" of Ukraine, which Russia has demanded because the begin of the full-scale invasion in February 2022 – quantity to calls for for regime change, the set up of a pro-Russian proxy authorities in Ukraine, and important limitations on Ukraine's means to defend itself in opposition to future Russian aggression.[11]

Open-source information means that Russia is more and more investing in its protection business and increasing its drone, infantry combating autos (IFVs), and plane manufacturing and shipbuilding capabilities – a number of of the important thing platforms that Russia would seemingly depend on in a future struggle with NATO. Knowledge from the Russian Ministry of Protection (MoD)-affiliated Heart of Macroeconomic Evaluation and Quick-Time period Forecasting revealed on June 26 signifies that Russia elevated its industrial manufacturing by 2.6 % between April and Might 2025 and that almost all of this enhance is because of a "sharp" enhance in Russia's protection industrial output.[12] The heart reported that Russia's month-to-month plane manufacturing charge elevated by 16.9 % in Might 2025 in comparison with April 2025 and is 1.6 instances better than Russia's 2024 month-to-month manufacturing charges. The middle reported that Russia elevated its naval and plane manufacturing capability by 16 % between February and Might 2025. The middle's information means that Russia is making an attempt to broaden its shipbuilding and plane manufacturing capability, that are medium- to long-term efforts and sure a part of Russia's ongoing drive restructuring and regeneration efforts in preparation for a longer-term battle with NATO.

Satellite tv for pc imagery of choose armored automobile restore crops in Russia supplies additional proof that Russia is rising its means to supply IFVs. A social media supply monitoring tools at Russian navy depots and restore amenities through satellite tv for pc imagery reported on June 26 that Russia is now capable of refurbish and produce extra BMPs than earlier than an unspecified time and that Russia's decreased use of armored autos and tanks since Winter 2024-2025 is permitting Russia to stockpile IFVs.[13] The supply famous that the Kurganmashzavod stays the only real publicly recognized Russian facility able to producing Soviet-era BMP-3 IFVs. The supply said that satellite tv for pc imagery signifies that some Russian armor restore crops seem to have used most of their Soviet IFV shares, though a minimum of one manufacturing plant in Rubtsovsk, Altai Krai, seems to have dramatically improved its modernization capabilities. It stays unclear whether or not Russia is aiming to stockpile materiel in preparation for a bigger offensive operation in opposition to Ukraine within the close to to medium time period or to reconstitute the Russian navy in preparation for broader future battle with NATO. Further open-source intelligence signifies that Russia is efficiently rising its T-90M tank manufacturing capabilities, additional underscoring Russia's ongoing funding in long-term tank and armored automobile manufacturing capability.[14]

Russia's ongoing efforts to broaden drone manufacturing are having a extra rapid affect on the frontline in Ukraine, though Russia will proceed to learn from enhanced drone manufacturing capabilities throughout any future battle. Russian First Deputy Prime Minister Denis Manturov visited varied Russian navy industrial amenities in Novgorod Oblast on June 27, together with a fiber-optic drone manufacturing website that produced Russia's first mannequin of fiber-optic "Prince Vandal Novgorodsky" drones[15] The Russian authorities's press launch of the go to reported that Russia is now able to domestically producing lots of of hundreds of fiber-optic drones monthly and totally satisfying the wants of the Russian Armed Forces. Manturov additionally visited a collection of different protection corporations in Novgorod Oblast, together with corporations specializing in digital parts, and inspected the Clever Electronics-Valdai Progressive Scientific and Technological Heart's new semiconductor supplies science laboratory.[16] Manturov instructed the Ministry of Trade and Commerce to look at the potential for recapitalizing Novgorod Oblast's industrial growth fund to help the manufacturing of high-tech merchandise. ISW beforehand famous that Russian fiber optic manufacturing has allowed Russian forces to impose new battlefield dilemmas on Ukrainian forces beginning in mid-2024 as a result of these drones had been immune to digital warfare (EW) interference, allow precision strikes on armored tools, and are scalable on account of their simplicity.[17]

Russian forces proceed to implement tactical improvements that correspond with technological weapons system developments. A Russian milblogger claimed on June 27 that Russian forces are more and more using Geran 2 and three drones – Russian analogues of the Iranian origin Shahed-136 – over guided glide bombs for short- to mid-range frontline strikes.[18] The milblogger famous that Russian forces started reprioritizing using Geran drones final winter when Russia started mass producing modernized Geran 2 drones with improved pace, vary, and carrying capacities, and claimed that Russian forces are utilizing these drones to focus on Ukrainian storage areas, command posts, and strongholds on the frontline and within the close to rear. The milblogger famous that parts of the Russian 51st Mixed Arms Military [CAA] (previously 1st Donetsk Folks's Republic Military Corps [DNR AC], Southern Army District [SMD]) have pioneered mass frontline use of Geran drones and that Russia's Central Grouping of Forces, working largely within the Pokrovsk and Novopavlivka instructions, will reportedly quickly undertake using Geran 2 drones as soon as Russian producers additional enhance manufacturing charges. The milblogger assessed that Russian forces might be able to exchange 500- and 1000-kilogram KAB glide bombs with Geran 3 drones if Russian builders are prepared to compromise on the drone's vary to account for an elevated payload. The Russian milblogger’s evaluation largely coheres with ISW's observations that Russian forces are more and more utilizing Shahed-like drones to strike Ukrainian targets alongside the frontline.[19] Russia's protection industrial base has so far efficiently elevated Geran drone manufacturing charges and improved the Geran drone's precision and operability, which have enabled Russian forces to extra readily deploy such drones alongside the frontline.[20]

Russia continues to make use of chemical weapons in opposition to Ukrainian forces and civilians in direct violation of the Chemical Weapons Conference (CWC), of which Russia is a signatory. The Ukrainian Heart for Strategic Communications and Info Safety reported on June 27 that Ukrainian forces recorded 888 circumstances of Russian forces utilizing chemical weapons in Might 2025, together with in grenades.[21] The Group for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) revealed a report on June 26 confirming that environmental pattern testing signifies that Russian forces used a first-person view (FPV) drone outfitted with grenades containing chlorobenzalmalonodinitrile (CS) gasoline, a riot management agent (RCA) banned in fashionable warfare underneath the CWC, in opposition to Ukrainian forces close to the Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast administrative boundary in June 2025.[22]

Key Takeaways:

The Kremlin continues to downplay the social and financial prices of Russia's struggle in Ukraine and inflated navy spending. Putin’s statements seemingly search to painting the Russian authorities as dedicated to social and civilian expenditures and to downplay current indicators of the societal and financial toll of Russia’s struggle in opposition to Ukraine and corresponding prioritization of military-industrial sector funding. Putin additionally reiterated Kremlin narratives aimed toward discrediting Ukraine and blaming the West and NATO for his resolution to invade Ukraine . Open-source information means that Russia is more and more investing in its protection business and increasing its drone, infantry combating autos (IFVs), and plane manufacturing and shipbuilding capabilities – a number of of the important thing platforms that Russia would seemingly depend on in a future struggle with NATO. Russia's ongoing efforts to broaden drone manufacturing are having a extra rapid affect on the frontline in Ukraine, though Russia will proceed to learn from enhanced drone manufacturing capabilities throughout any future battle. Russian forces proceed to implement tactical improvements that correspond with technological weapons system developments. Russia continues to make use of chemical weapons in opposition to Ukrainian forces and civilians in direct violation of the Chemical Weapons Conference (CWC), of which Russia is a signatory. Ukrainian forces superior close to Lyman. Russian forces superior in western Zaporizhia Oblast and close to Kupyansk, Toretsk, and Pokrovsk.

We don't report intimately on Russian struggle crimes as a result of these actions are well-covered in Western media and don't instantly have an effect on the navy operations we're assessing and forecasting. We are going to proceed to guage and report on the consequences of those legal actions on the Ukrainian navy and the Ukrainian inhabitants and particularly on fight in Ukrainian city areas. We completely condemn Russian violations of the legal guidelines of armed battle and the Geneva Conventions and crimes in opposition to humanity despite the fact that we don't describe them in these stories.

Ukrainian Operations within the Russian Federation Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis Russian Predominant Effort – Japanese Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate important efforts) Russian Subordinate Predominant Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces again from the worldwide border with Belgorod Oblast and method to inside tube artillery vary of Kharkiv Metropolis Russian Subordinate Predominant Effort #2 – Seize the rest of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into japanese Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast Russian Subordinate Predominant Effort #3 – Seize the whole thing of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and presumably advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Marketing campaign Vital Exercise in Belarus Ukrainian Operations within the Russian Federation

Combating continued in Kursk Oblast on June 27.

Russian forces attacked in unspecified areas of Kursk Oblast on June 26 and 27.[23] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces attacked towards Glushkovo, Tetkino (southwest of Glushkovo), and Novyi Put (east of Tetkino).[24]

Order of Battle: Parts of the Russian 91st Sapper-Engineer Regiment (reportedly underneath the operational command of the Northern Grouping of Forces) are reportedly working in Kursk Oblast.[25]

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian goal: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine alongside the worldwide border and method to inside tube artillery vary of Sumy Metropolis)

Russian forces continued assaults in northern Sumy Oblast on June 27 however didn't make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on June 26 that Russian forces superior in Yunakivka (northeast of Sumy Metropolis).[26]

Russian forces continued assaults within the Sumy Oblast border space, together with north of Sumy Metropolis close to Kindrativka on June 26 and 27.[27] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked north of Sumy Metropolis close to Oleksiivka and towards Andriivka and northeast of Sumy Metropolis close to Yablunivka, Novomykolaivka, Yunakivka, and Sadky.[28]

Ukraine's Border Service Spokesperson Andriy Demchenko reported on June 27 that Russian sabotage and reconnaissance teams are conducting fewer assaults within the Sumy Oblast worldwide border space.[29] Demchenko assessed that Russian forces could also be regrouping within the space. The deputy commander of a Ukrainian regiment working in northern Sumy Oblast reported on June 27 that Russian forces proceed to probe for weak spots in Ukrainian defenses within the space.[30] The deputy commander reported that neither Ukrainian nor Russian drone operators at the moment have drone superiority within the space.

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian "Smuglyanka" Detachment are reportedly hanging Ukrainian forces close to Andriivka.[31] Drone operators of the "Tiger" drone detachment of the 83rd Separate Airborne (VDV) Brigade are reportedly hanging Ukrainian forces in northern Sumy Oblast.[32] Parts of the 810th Separate Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet) and the one hundred and fifty fifth Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) reportedly proceed working in northern Sumy Oblast.[33]

Russian Predominant Effort – Japanese Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Predominant Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast ( Russian goal: Push Ukrainian forces again from the worldwide border with Belgorod Oblast and method to inside tube artillery vary of Kharkiv Metropolis)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on June 27 however didn't make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces crossed the Vovcha River and superior in western Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv Metropolis) on the southern financial institution of the river.[34]

Russian forces carried out floor assaults north of Kharkiv Metropolis close to Hlyboke and Lyptsi and northeast of Kharkiv Metropolis close to Vovchansk on June 26 and 27.[35]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade working within the Kharkiv course mentioned that Russian forces are consistently attacking in small fireteams of two to a few troopers and are utilizing bikes and all-terrain autos (ATVs) when the climate situations are good, however leverage armored autos throughout wet climate.[36] Ukrainian Kharkiv Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Pavlo Shamshyn reported on June 27 that Russian forces are consistently attacking close to Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv Metropolis).[37]

Russian Subordinate Predominant Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian goal: Seize the rest of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into japanese Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces just lately superior within the Kupyansk course.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage revealed on June 27 indicated that Russian forces just lately superior in southern Hlushkivka (southeast of Kupyansk).[38]

Russian forces attacked north of Kupyansk close to Holubivka and Kindrashivka; northeast of Kupyansk close to Kamyanka and Krasne Pershe; east of Kupyansk in the direction of Petropavlivka; and southeast of Kupyansk close to Stepova Novoselivka on June 26 and 27.[39]

Ukrainian Kharkiv Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Pavlo Shamshyn reported on June 27 that Russian forces are consistently attacking alongside the Oskil River close to Kupyansk and are attempting to encompass Kupyansk.[40] Shamshyn reported that Russian forces are attempting to ascertain a river crossing over the Oskil River so as to switch armored autos throughout the river, however are at the moment shifting all-terrain autos (ATVs) and bikes to the proper (west) financial institution of the Oskil River on boats and rafts. A Ukrainian servicemember working within the Kharkiv course reported that Russian forces are making the most of the great climate to optimize logistics and intensify assaults north and east of Kupyansk.[41] An officer in one other Ukrainian brigade working within the Kupyansk course reported that Russian forces are utilizing artillery extra conservatively and are more and more counting on air strikes and glide bombs within the space.[42]

Order of Battle: Parts of the Russian 121st Motorized Rifle Regiment (reportedly of the 68th Motorized Rifle Division, sixth Mixed Arms Military [CAA], Leningrad Army District [LMD]) are reportedly working within the Kupyansk course.[43]

Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Borova course on June 27 however didn't make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: The Russian Ministry of Protection (MoD) and different Russian sources claimed that Russian forces seized Nova Kruhlyakivka (northeast of Borova), however one milblogger claimed that the settlement stays a contested "grey zone."[44]

Russian forces continued floor assaults north of Borova close to Novoplatonivka; northeast of Borova towards Nova Kruhlyakivka; east of Borova close to Zelenyi Hai; and southeast of Borova close to Hrekivka and towards Olhivka on June 26 and 27.[45]

Order of Battle: Parts of the Russian twenty seventh Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st Guards Tank Military [GTA], Moscow Army District [MMD]) are reportedly working close to Lozova (northeast of Borova).[46]

Ukrainian forces seemingly just lately superior within the Lyman course.

Assessed Ukrainian Advances: Russian milbloggers claimed on June 26 and 27 that Ukrainian forces carried out profitable counterattacks and regained positions in northwestern Ridkodub (north of Lyman).[47] ISW is subsequently increasing Ukrainian advances into Ridkodub.

Russian forces continued floor assaults north of Lyman close to Ridkodub, Zelenya Dolnya, and Shandryholove and towards Novyi Myr and Serednie; northeast of Lyman towards Kolodyazi; and east of Lyman close to Torske on June 26 and 27.[48]

A Ukrainian division commander working within the Lyman course reported that Russian forces are fighting low-quality Russian- and North Korean-produced ammunition.[49]

Russian Subordinate Predominant Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian goal: Seize the whole thing of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and presumably advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Siversk course on June 27 however didn't advance.

Russian forces carried out floor assaults northeast of Siversk close to Hryhorivka, southeast of Siversk close to Vyimka, and southwest of Siversk close to Fedorivka on June 26 and 27.[50]

Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Chasiv Yar course on June 27 however didn't make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces superior west of Chasiv Yar and inside central and southern Chasiv Yar, together with in Shevchenko Microrain (southwestern Chasiv Yar).[51] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces superior towards Bila Hora and the northern outskirts of Stupochky (each south of Chasiv Yar).[52]

Russian forces continued floor assaults in Chasiv Yar itself; northeast of Chasiv Yar close to Bondarne; north of Chasiv Yar close to Markove and Novomarkove; and south of Chasiv Yar close to Predtechyne, Stupochky, and towards Bila Hora on June 26 and 27.[53]

A non-commissioned officer (NCO) of a Ukrainian battalion working within the Kramatorsk (Chasiv Yar) course reported that Russian forces are sending reinforcements to the Kramatorsk course and that the Russian servicemen usually would not have any prior data about the place they're being despatched.[54] The NCO reported that Russian forces are leveraging windy and wet climate situations to build up forces and conduct assaults on foot whereas the climate constrains Ukrainian drone operations. A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian drones have low-altitude air superiority and are stopping Russian forces from fully seizing Chasiv Yar.[55]

Order of Battle: Parts of the Russian 98th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly working within the Kostyantynivka (Chasiv Yar) course.[56] Drone operators of the "Burevestnik" volunteer detachment (Russian Volunteer Corps) are reportedly working close to Chasiv Yar.[57] Parts of the “Nevsky” Volunteer Reconnaissance-Assault Brigade (Russian Volunteer Corps) are reportedly working within the Soledar-Bakhmut (Chasiv Yar) course.[58]

Russian forces just lately superior within the Toretsk course.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage revealed on June 26 signifies that Russian forces superior in northwestern Dyliivka (north of Toretsk) and sure seized the settlement.[59]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces superior west of Oleksandro-Kalynove and Yablunivka (each northwest of Toretsk).[60]

Russian forces attacked close to Toretsk itself; north of Toretsk close to Dyliivka; northeast of Toretsk close to Dachne; west of Toretsk close to Shcherbynivka; northwest of Toretsk close to Yablunivka and Oleksandro-Kalynove and towards Poltavka, Pleshchiivka, Stepanivka, Rusyn Yar, and Katerynivka; and southwest of Toretsk close to Romanivka on June 26 and 27.[61]

Order of Battle: Parts of the Russian twentieth Motorized Rifle Division (eighth Mixed Arms Military [CAA}, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly working close to Yablunivka.[62] Parts of the 102nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (a hundred and fiftieth Motorized Rifle Division, eighth CAA) are reportedly working within the Toretsk course.[63] Parts of the thirty third Motorized Rifle Regiment (twentieth Motorized Rifle Division) are reportedly working within the Toretsk course.[64]

Russian forces just lately superior within the Pokrovsk course.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage revealed on June 26 signifies that Russian forces just lately superior alongside the T-0515 Pokrovsk-Andriivka freeway northeast of Shevchenko (south of Pokrovsk).[65]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces have superior to inside one kilometer of Molodetske (southwest of Pokrovsk) and try to bypass Udachne (east of Molodetske).[66]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Pokrovsk close to Malynivka, Myrne, and Shevchenko Pershe and towards Volodymyrivka; east of Pokrovsk close to Myrolyubivka, Promin, and Myrnohrad; southeast of Pokrovsk close to Lysivka and Sukyi Yar; south of Pokrovsk close to Dachenske; and southwest of Pokrovsk close to Udachne and Kotlyne and towards Novopidhorodne on June 26 and 27.[67]

Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief Basic Oleksandr Syrskyi reported on June 27 that Russia has concentrated roughly 111,000 personnel within the Pokrovsk course.[68] A communications officer in a Ukrainian brigade working within the Pokrovsk course said that Russian forces are concentrating assaults south of Pokrovsk and are attacking with bikes from Selydove (southeast of Pokrovsk) towards Shevchenko.[69] The Russian Ministry of Protection (MoD) claimed that Russian forces struck a Ukrainian place close to Shakhove (northeast of Pokrovsk) with a Geran-2 (Russian-produced Shahed variant) drone.[70]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian "Rubikon" Heart for Superior Unmanned Applied sciences are reportedly working close to Pokrovsk.[71]

Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Novopavlivka course however didn't make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces superior northwest and east of Yalta (south of Novopavlivka) and north of Komar (south of Novopavlivka).[72]

Russian forces continued floor assaults towards Novopavlivka itself; northeast of Novopavlivka close to Novoserhiivka, Novomykolaivka, and Muravka; east of Novopavlivka close to Kotlyarivka and Troitske; southeast of Novopavlivka close to Oleksiivka, Novoukrainka, Bahatyr, Odradne, and Zeleny Kut; and south of Novopavlivka close to Zirka, Zaporizhzhia, Fedorivka, Myrne, and Komar and towards Yalta on June 26 and 27.[73]

Ukrainian sources reported that Ukrainian drone operators struck a North Korean-made artillery system within the Novopavlivka course.[74]

Order of Battle: Parts of the Russian thirty sixth Motorized Rifle Brigade (twenty ninth CAA, Japanese Army District [EMD]) reportedly participated within the seizure of Yalta.[75]

Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Velyka Novosilka course on June 27 however didn't make any confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces superior north of Shevchenko, west of Vilne Pole (each northwest of Velyka Novosilka), and south of Novopil (southwest of Velyka Novosilka).[76]

Russian forces continued floor assaults northwest of Velyka Novosilka close to Shevchenko and towards Voskresenka and southwest of Velyka Novosilka close to Zelene Pole on June 26 and 27.[77]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian goal: Keep frontline positions, safe rear areas in opposition to Ukrainian strikes, and advance inside tube artillery vary of Zaporizhzhia Metropolis)

Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Hulyaipole course on June 27 however didn't make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian sources claimed that Russian forces superior inside southern and central Malynivka (east of Hulyaipole).[78]

Russian forces attacked east of Hulyaipole close to Malynivka on June 27.[79] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked close to Malynivka.[80]

Order of Battle: Parts of the Russian eleventh Air Pressure and Air Protection Military (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and Japanese Army District [EMD]) are reportedly hanging Ukrainian positions close to Hulyaipole.[81]

Russian forces just lately superior in western Zaporizhia Oblast.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage revealed on June 27 signifies that Russian forces just lately superior alongside the E-105 Vasylivka-Kamyanske freeway into central Kamyanske (southwest of Orikhiv).[82] Further geolocated footage revealed on June 26 signifies that Russian forces just lately superior into southeastern Mala Tokmachka (southeast of Orikhiv).[83]

Russian forces attacked southeast of Orikhiv close to Mala Tokmachka and southwest of Orikhiv close to Kamyanske on June 26 and 27.[84] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked southwest of Orikhiv close to Robotyne.[85]

Order of Battle: Parts of the forty second Motorized Rifle Division (58th Mixed Arms Military [CAA], Southern Army District [SMD]), together with its seventieth Motorized Rifle Regiment, are reportedly working close to Tokmachka and inside Mala Tokmachka, respectively.[86] Parts of the seventh Airborne (VDV) Division, together with its 108th VDV Regiment, are reportedly working within the Zaporizhia course.[87]

Russian forces carried out restricted floor assaults within the Kherson course on June 27 however didn't advance.[88]

Ukraine's Predominant Army Intelligence Directorate (GUR) posted footage on June 26 and reported that GUR drone operators struck a Russian S-400 air protection system in an unspecified a part of occupied Crimea, damaging the system’s missile launcher, two multi-functional 92N2E management radars, and two 91N6E detection radars.[89]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Marketing campaign (Russian Goal: Goal Ukrainian navy and civilian infrastructure within the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces carried out a collection of drone and missile strikes in opposition to Ukraine on the evening of June 26 to 27. The Ukrainian Air Pressure reported that Russian forces launched two Kh47M2 Kinzhal air-launched ballistic missiles from airspace over Ryazan Oblast, six Kalibr cruise missiles from the Caspian Sea, and 363 Shahed and decoy drones from the instructions of Bryansk, Oryol, and Kursk cities; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast, and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai.[90] The Ukrainian Air Forces reported that Ukrainian forces downed six Kalibr cruise missiles and 211 drones and that 148 drones had been ”misplaced” or suppressed by Ukrainian digital warfare (EW) methods. The Ukrainian Air Pressure reported that Russian strikes primarily focused Starokostyantyniv, Khmelnytskyi Oblast. Ukrainian officers reported that the Russian strikes focused Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Khmelnytskyi, Kyiv, and Kherson oblasts and broken civilian and vitality infrastructure in Kherson, Kyiv, and Kharkiv oblasts.[91]

Vital exercise in Belarus (Russian efforts to extend its navy presence in Belarus and additional combine Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Russia and Belarus are leveraging the Union State framework to additional militarize their societies and indoctrinate youth into an anti-Western ideology, seemingly in preparation for a future battle with NATO. Russian President Vladimir Putin addressed the plenary session of the twelfth annual Russian and Belarusian areas discussion board on June 27 and highlighted the significance of youth "military-patriotic" packages.[92] Putin said that Russia and Belarus devoted the twelfth discussion board to insurance policies aimed toward encouraging youth to take part in "religious, ethical... and conventional" values, patriotism, and navy service. Putin said that the Union State is implementing a specialised "street map" for youth coverage via 2027 and is growing a medium-term technique for the event of youth coverage. A number of organizations at the moment oversee Russia's varied youth military-patriotic packages, and the Russian federal authorities is making an attempt to centralize management over these efforts.[93]

Notice: ISW doesn't obtain any categorised materials from any supply, makes use of solely publicly obtainable data, and attracts extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media in addition to commercially obtainable satellite tv for pc imagery and different geospatial information as the premise for these stories. References to all sources used are offered within the endnotes of every replace.

[1] http://kremlin dot ru/occasions/president/information/77316; https://eec.eaeunion dot org/en/comission/division/dep_razv_integr/strategicheskie-napravleniya-razvitiya.php

[2] https://meduza dot io/en/function/2024/10/03/russia-s-2025-federal-budget-outlines-record-military-and-top-secret-spending-and-tax-hikes-for-ordinary-citizens; https://isw.pub/RussianForceGen050725; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-force-generation-and-technological-adaptations-update-may-14-2025; https://isw.pub/ForceGen061125; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-force-generation-and-technological-adaptations-update-may-30-2025

[3] https://isw.pub/UkrWar102824

[4] https://isw.pub/UkrWar062225

[5] https://isw.pub/UkrWar062025

[6] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-force-generation-and-technological-adaptations-update-june-18-2025

[7] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-force-generation-and-technological-adaptations-update-may-21-2025

[8] http://kremlin dot ru/occasions/president/information/77316

[9] https://isw.pub/UkrWar061625; https://szru.gov dot ua/news-media/information/szru-poperedzhaie-rosiya-planuie-na-nastupnomu-tyzhni-kulminatsiyu-kampanii-z-dyskredytatsii-ukrainy-u-konteksti-obminiv-shcho-tryvayut; https://suspilne dot media/1043951-rf-prodovzit-namaganna-diskredituvati-ukrainu-sodo-obminiv-a-kulminacia-provokacij-zaplanovana-na-20-cervna-szr/

[10] http://kremlin dot ru/occasions/president/information/77316

[11] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukraine-conflict-updates

[12] https://www.bloomberg.com/information/articles/2025-06-27/russia-sharply-boosted-drone-output-in-may-think-tank-reports ; http://www.forecast dot ru/_ARCHIVE/Analitics/PROM/2025/PR-OTR_2025-06-26.pdf

[13] https://x.com/Jonpy99/standing/1938330257863455203

[14] https://isw.pub/UkrWar062025

[15] http://authorities dot ru/information/55471/

[16] http://en.kremlin dot ru/occasions/president/information/72316

[17] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/battlefield-ai-revolution-not-here-yet-status-current-russian-and-ukrainian-ai-drone

[18] https://t.me/yurasumy/23742

[19] https://isw.pub/UkrWar062125 ; https://isw.pub/ForceGen052125 ;

[20] https://isw.pub/ForceGen061125 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar062125 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar060125

[21] https://suspilne dot media/1053313-armia-rf-u-travni-majze-900-raziv-vikoristovuvala-himicnu-zbrou-na-vijni-proti-ukraini/ ; https://www.fb.com/StratcomCentreUA/posts/pfbid021GSNZ3Jya2H6dL5QGGt3J3H5oUDPTMGXW8EHLaNMM2zqHA8tWs6ZVQ5UupH5TUUxl

[22] https://www.opcw.org/media-centre/information/2025/06/opcw-issues-report-third-technical-assistance-visit-ukraine-following; https://t.me/spravdi/47601

[23] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25968; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25932; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25928;

[24] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30489; https://t.me/dva_majors/74241

[25] https://t.me/mod_russia/54204

[26] https://t.me/rybar/71701

[27] https://t.me/rybar/71701;

[28] https://t.me/dva_majors/74241

[29] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/06/27/ne-taki-i-myasni-vzhe-na-sumshhyni-suttyevo-vpala-aktyvnist-vorozhyh-dyversijnyh-grup/

[30] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/06/27/zmina-taktyky-ukrayinczi-gotuyut-fpv-drony-dlya-znyshhennya-shahediv/

[31] https://t.me/dva_majors/74229

[32] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30494

[33] https://militarnyi dot com/en/information/ukrainian-armed-forces-take-15-russian-invaders-prisoner-in-the-sumy-region/; https://t.me/ua_dshv/6167; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/06/27/chornyj-den-dlya-morpihiv-rf-na-sumshhyni-rozgromyly-elitnyj-pidrozdil-shho-zahoplyuvav-krym/; https://youtu.be/Yun3_2xTdRc

[34] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65457

[35] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25968 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25932 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/12872 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25928

[36] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CSjUUAfd7Lo; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/06/27/buly-obbyti-zdorovymy-sarayamy-na-kupyanskomu-napryamku-vorog-namagavsya-atakuvaty-vazhkoyu-tehnikoyu/

[37] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/06/27/pereprav-nemaye-ale-plany-nikudy-ne-dilysya-okupanty-ne-zalyshayut-sprob-otochyty-kupyansk/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j5TqaWCCdUg

[38] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9476; https://t.me/feniksdpsu/910

[39] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25932 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25928 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/12872

[40] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/06/27/pereprav-nemaye-ale-plany-nikudy-ne-dilysya-okupanty-ne-zalyshayut-sprob-otochyty-kupyansk/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j5TqaWCCdUg

[41] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ScdUZNkwcYc; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/06/27/epoha-koly-fpv-panuyut-u-povitri-vorog-prodovzhuye-bezperervno-atakuvaty-syly-oborony-na-richczi-oskil/

[42] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/06/27/vorog-uzhe-ne-syple-snaryadamy-yak-ranishe-zmina-taktyky-na-kupyanskomu-napryamku/

[43] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/94566

[44] https://t.me/tass_agency/322753; https://t.me/dva_majors/74259 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/54200 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/54201 ; https://t.me/notes_veterans/24058 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/94603 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/37814

[45] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25968 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25932 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/12872 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25928

[46] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/94603

[47] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30489 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/37794

[48] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25968 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25932 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/12872 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25928

[49] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/06/27/bilshe-na-zaboronu-praczyuyut-na-lymanskomu-napryamku-tryvayut-artylerijski-poyedynky/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CSjUUAfd7Lo

[50] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25932 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/12872 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25928 ; https://t.me/rybar/71701

[51] https://t.me/rybar/71696 ; https://t.me/rusich_army/24379 ; https://t.me/rybar/71706

[52] https://t.me/wargonzo/27529

[53] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25932 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/12872 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25928 ; https://t.me/rusich_army/24379 ; https://t.me/rybar/71706 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/27529

[54] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-mwW_smfVas; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/06/27/chasto-ne-rozumiyut-kudy-jdut-na-kramatorskyj-napryamok-vorog-zavozyt-pihotu-zvidusil/

[55] https://t.me/rusich_army/24379

[56] https://t.me/russian_airborne/10607; https://t.me/motopatriot78/37809

[57] https://t.me/rybar/71706

[58] https://t.me/BTGR_NEVSKIY/2935 ; https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/46354

[59] https://x.com/AudaxonX/standing/1938351857476186231; https://x.com/AudaxonX/standing/1938349962892288190; https://t.me/kurt_compani_group/688; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9472

[60] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/170424; https://t.me/motopatriot78/37793

[61] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25968; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25932; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/12872; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25928

[62] https://t.me/motopatriot78/37793

[63] https://t.me/vanek_nikolaev/33987

[64] https://t.me/dva_majors/74231

[65] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9474; https://t.me/ombr_155/422;

[66] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65458

[67] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25968; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25932; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25928; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/12872 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30489 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65458

[68] https://t.me/osirskiy/1198 ; https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1053063-blizko-111-tisac-vijskovih-rf-vouut-na-pokrovskomu-napramku-sirskij-pro-situaciu-na-fronti/

[69] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/06/27/sytuacziya-dosyt-pekelna-poblyzu-pokrovska-rosiyany-prosuvayutsya-na-mototehniczi-za-pidtrymky-artyleriyi/ ; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CSjUUAfd7Lo

[70] https://t.me/mod_russia/54194 ; https://t.me/sashakots/54557

[71] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/170416

[72] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/170419 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/37782

[73] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25968; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25932; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25928; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/12872 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/94571 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/27529

[74] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/06/27/podarunok-vid-kim-chen-yna-ne-doyihav-ukrayinskyj-dron-spopelyv-ridkisnu-pivnichnokorejsku-rszv/ ; https://www.fb.com/61563854736481/movies/697619009809671/ ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/12877

[75] https://t.me/voin_dv/15696

[76] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30495; https://t.me/motopatriot78/37801 ; https://t.me/rybar/71696

[77] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25968; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25932; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25928; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/12872

[78] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30502; https://t.me/vrogov/20875

[79] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30502

[80] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30502

[81] https://t.me/voin_dv/15703

[82] https://x.com/TuiteroMartin/standing/1938559793943171316; https://t.me/proofs_dnepr/54965; https://x.com/UkraineDailyUpd/standing/1938444339799031917

[83] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9470; https://t.me/Polk70/31562

[84] https://t.me/motopatriot78/37788; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/94583; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/94578

[85] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30502

[86] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/94583; https://t.me/ZS42MSD/3589

[87] https://t.me/rogozin_do/7257

[88] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25968; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25932; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25928; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/12637

[89] https://t.me/DIUkraine/6290 ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/06/26/ochi-rosijskoyi-ppo-v-krymu-osliply-gur-zavdalo-udaru-po-kompleksah-s-400/

[90] https://t.me/kpszsu/37115

[91] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/06/27/raketnyj-udar-po-dnipropetrovshhyni-ye-zhertvy/; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/06/27/rosijska-raketna-ataka-na-samar-5-zagyblyh-ponad-dva-desyatky-poranenyh/ ; https://meduza dot io/information/2025/06/27/rossiyskie-voyska-nanesli-raketnyy-udar-po-gorodu-samar-v-dnepropetrovskoy-oblasti-est-pogibshie-i-ranenye ; https://t.me/istories_media/9864 ; https://t.me/bbcrussian/82298; https://t.me/bbcrussian/82296; https://t.me/bbcrussian/82295; https://t.me/synegubov/15306; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/2727; https://t.me/synegubov/15322; https://suspilne dot media/1052639-gur-atakuvalo-skladi-raketnogo-paliva-u-bransku-es-ne-zmig-uhvaliti-spilnu-zaavu-z-pidtrimki-ukraini-1220-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1751007074&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps ; https://t.me/Mykola_Kalashnyk/6007; https://suspilne dot media/1052639-gur-atakuvalo-skladi-raketnogo-paliva-u-bransku-es-ne-zmig-uhvaliti-spilnu-zaavu-z-pidtrimki-ukraini-1220-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1751023120&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps ; https://www.fb.com/alexandr.prokudin.7/posts/10021585731286434?ref=embed_post ; https://t.me/khersonskaODA/38252 ; https://t.me/olexandrprokudin/9118

[92] http://kremlin dot ru/occasions/president/information/77312

[93] https://www.minobrnauki.gov dot ru/add/2024/10/%D0percent94percentD0percentBEpercentD0percentBApercentD0percentBBpercentD0percentB0percentD0percentB4_percentD0percent9FpercentD0percent9C2023_percentD0percentADpercentD0percentA6percentD0percent9F_percentD0percent9FpercentD0percentB5percentD1percent82percentD1percent80percentD0percentBEpercentD0percentB2percentD0percentB01.10.24.pdf ; https://ngkub dot ru/obshchestvo/shkolnikov-obuchat-upravleniyu-dronami-i-taktike-strelkovogo-boya ; www.dosaaf dot ru/upbringing/metodiceskie-rokomensacii-i-opit-peredovoj-raboti.php